


TEXAS UTILITIES GENERATING COMPANY
SKYWAY TOWER · 400 NORTH OLIVE STREET, L.B. 81 · DALLAS, TEXAS 75201

Log # TXX-4656
File # 10110

WILLIAM G. COUNSIL
EXECUTIVE VICE PRESIDENT

December 20, 1985



Mr. Eric H. Johnson, Acting Director
Division of Reactor Safety and Projects
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
611 Ryan Plaza Drive, Suite 1000
Arlington, TX 76012

SUBJECT: COMANCHE PEAK STEAM ELECTRIC STATION
DOCKET NOS. 50-445 AND 50-446
MAIN STEAM LINE FLUID TRANSIENT
SDAR: CP-85-49

Dear Mr. Johnson:

In accordance with 10CFR50.55(e), we are submitting the enclosed written report of actions taken to correct a deficiency regarding the Auxiliary Feedwater (AFW) turbine steam supply line. On December 6, 1985 we verbally notified your Mr. S. Phillips of this potentially reportable issue. Evaluation of this issue has identified a reportable condition under the provisions of 10CFR50.55(e) involving the piping and support systems for the main steam supply line to the AFW turbine.

Very truly yours,

A handwritten signature in cursive script that reads "W. G. Council".

W. G. Council

JCH/grr
Attachment

c - NRC Region IV (0 + 1 copy)

Director, Inspection & Enforcement (15 copies)
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Washington, D.C. 20555

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ATTACHMENT

MAIN STEAM LINE FLUID TRANSIENT

DESCRIPTION

In the process of evaluating a problem report issued by operations engineering regarding damaged snubbers, a design concern was observed in two (2) main steam piping systems. As a result of steam condensation and inadequate provisions for draining, moisture accumulation creates an unevaluated fluid transient (or waterhammer).

The specific lines are installed in parallel originating at the steam generator (numbers 1 and 4) main steam headers upstream of the main steam isolation valves. The piping terminates at the auxiliary feedwater pump turbine. Thermal movement resulting from the fluid transient could exceed design stresses considered in the piping and support design, and result in damage to attached components.

The concern is applicable to Units 1 and 2.

SUMMARY OF EVENTS

Date Discovered: May 16, 1985 by Problem Report 85-297

Date Identified as Potentially Reportable: November 6, 1985

Date NRC Notified as Potentially Reportable: December 6, 1985

Date Determined Reportable: December 18, 1985

SAFETY IMPLICATION

In the event the condition had remained undetected, the capability of the piping and associated support system to perform the intended safety functions could not be assured.

CORRECTIVE ACTION

In order to implement measures to remove moisture accumulation, the piping systems will be redesigned to include sloping and additional drain pots. Reanalysis of the piping and support scheme will be performed in conjunction with the issue of system rework documents.

The Unit 1 and 2 engineering efforts are scheduled for completion in May and July of 1986 respectively. Construction activities will follow immediately in Unit 1 and as determined in the construction schedule for Unit 2.