

ENCLOSURE 1

NOTICE OF VIOLATION

Georgia Power Company  
Hatch, Units 1 and 2

Docket Nos. 50-321, 50-366  
License Nos. DPR-57, NPF-5

During the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) inspection conducted on February 20 - March 25, 1988, violations of NRC requirements were identified. In accordance with the "General Statement of Policy and Procedure for NRC Enforcement Actions," 10 CFR Part 2, Appendix C (1987), the violations are listed below:

- A. Table 4.1-1 of the Unit 1 Technical Specifications and Table 4.3.1-1 of the Unit 2 Technical Specifications require weekly functional testing of the Average Power Range Monitor (APRM) flow referenced thermal power and APRM downscale trips.

Contrary to the above, prior to February 15, 1988, the APRM flow referenced thermal power and APRM downscale trips were not functionally tested weekly in either Unit 1 or Unit 2.

This is a Severity Level IV violation (Supplement I).

- B. Technical Specification 6.8.1.c requires that written procedures be established, implemented, and maintained for surveillance and test activities of safety related equipment.

Procedure 57SV-SUV-007-2S, "Analog Transmitter Trip System (ATTS) Panel 2H11-P921 Channel Functional Test and Calibration," requires that the trip unit and isolation logic be reset after injection of a simulated high pressure test signal and verification of proper relay operation but prior to closing the links.

Procedure 57SV-D11-016-1S, "GE NUMAC Main Steam Line Logarithmic Radiation Monitor Functional Test," requires the opening of links DD-23 and DD-24 in panel 1H11P611.

Contrary to the above, plant personnel failed to follow written surveillance procedures as noted below:

- (1) On February 27, 1988, personnel performing Unit 2 Procedure 57SV-SUV-007-2S failed to reset isolation logic for valve 2E11-F009 during functional testing of trip unit 2B31-N679A. This failure to follow the procedure resulted in an inadvertent isolation of shutdown cooling. At the time of this event, Unit 2 was in the REFUEL mode and core reload was in progress.
- (2) On March 7, 1988, personnel performing Unit 1 Procedure 57SV-D11-016-1S, opened links in panel 1H11P609 instead of in panel 1H11P611. This failure to follow the procedure resulted in a power interruption

to ATTS panel 1H11P921 which, in turn, resulted in a half-scam and isolation of the Reactor Water Cleanup system. At the time of this event, Unit 1 was operating in the RUN mode at approximately 100 percent of rated power.

This is a Severity Level IV violation (Supplement I).

- C. Technical Specification 6.8.1.c requires that written procedures be established, implemented, and maintained for surveillance and test activities of safety related equipment.

Contrary to the above, Unit 2 procedure 34SV-C71-005-2S, Revision 1, "Turbine Control Valve Fast Closure Instrument Functional Test", was inadequate in that it did not require the turbine to be reset prior to removing the "less than 30 percent reactor power" scram bypass feature of the logic system. As a result, on March 18, 1988, with the main turbine in the tripped mode and the turbine control valve fast closure pressure switches in the open position, a full reactor scram of Unit 2 occurred when the scram bypass feature was removed as specified in the procedure. At the time of this event, Unit 2 was operating in the STARTUP mode at approximately 5 percent of rated power.

This is a Severity Level IV violation (Supplement I).

Pursuant to the provisions of 10 CFR 2.201, Georgia Power Company is hereby required to submit a written statement or explanation to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN: Document Control Desk, Washington, D.C. 20555, with a copy to the Regional Administrator, Region II, and a copy to the NRC Resident Inspector, Hatch Nuclear Plant, within 30 days of the date of the letter transmitting this Notice. This reply should be clearly marked as a "Reply to a Notice of Violation" and should include for each violation: (1) admission or denial of the violation, (2) the reasons for the violation if admitted, (3) the corrective steps which have been taken and the results achieved, (4) corrective steps which will be taken to avoid further violations, and (5) the date when full compliance will be achieved. Where good cause is shown, consideration will be given to extending the response time. If an adequate reply is not received within the time specified in this Notice, an order may be issued to show cause why the license should not be modified, suspended, or revoked or why such other action as may be proper should not be taken.

FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

ORIGINAL SIGNED BY  
VIRGIL L. BROWNLEE

Virgil L. Brownlee, Chief  
Reactor Projects Branch 3  
Division of Reactor Projects

Dated at Atlanta, Georgia  
this 12<sup>th</sup> day of April 1988