

DUKE POWER COMPANY

P.O. BOX 33189
CHARLOTTE, N.C. 28242

HAL B. TUCKER
VICE PRESIDENT
NUCLEAR PRODUCTION

TELEPHONE
(704) 373-4531

April 12, 1988


U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Attention: Document Control Desk
Washington, D. C. 20555

Subject: RII/PKV/MSL
Catawba Nuclear Station
Docket Nos. 50-413 and 50-414
IE Report 50-413,-414/88-06

Dear Sir:

Please find attached a reply to the Notice of Violation for Violation 413,414/88-06-01, which was transmitted by Dr. J. Nelson Grace's letter of March 14, 1988.

Very truly yours,



Hal B. Tucker

LTB/6021/sbn

Attachments

xc: Dr. J. Nelson Grace, Regional Administrator
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Region II
101 Marietta Street, NW, Suite 2900
Atlanta, Georgia 30323

Mr. P. K. Van Doorn
NRC Resident Inspector
Catawba Nuclear Station

8804200524 880412
PDR ADOCK 05000413
Q DCD

IE01
||

Duke Power Company
Reply to a Notice of Violation
414/88-06-01

Technical Specification 3.7.4 requires at least two independent nuclear service water loops be operable in Modes 1, 2, 3 and 4. With only one nuclear service water loop operable, restore at least two loops to operable status within 72 hours or be in at least hot standby within the next six hours in cold shutdown within the following 30 hours.

Contrary to above, on August 30, 1986, at 8:30 p.m. with Unit 1 shutdown for refueling and Unit 2 in Mode 1, Power Operation, Nuclear Service Water Train A was made inoperable with respect to Unit 2. On September 8, 1986 at 4:40 a.m., Unit 2 entered Mode 5, thus exceeding by approximately 92 hours the time required to shutdown to Mode 5.

Response:

(1) Admission or Denial of Violation

Duke Power Company admits the violation.

(2) Reasons for Violation

This violation occurred as a result of an error in an evaluation of an operating procedure. In evaluating the procedure to be followed in the event that an emergency diesel were removed from service for an extended period of time, it was recognized that the redundant essential headers must be isolated to assure continued operability. The isolation valve which would normally receive electrical power from the affected diesel generator in the event of a loss of offsite power was selected as the appropriate valve to be placed in the closed (safe) position. However, it was not recognized at the time that, under certain postulated conditions, additional operator actions may have been required to assure that the Nuclear Service Water System would perform its design safety functions. The procedures to perform these actions were in place at the time.

(3) Corrective Actions Taken and Results Achieved

The affected procedures have been corrected and the system design has been reviewed in detail to assure that no similar conditions exist. This event has heightened the awareness of all involved to insure that all postulated accident scenarios are reviewed during safety evaluations.

The potential reportability of significant safety issues which are under review will be closely evaluated to determine if a preliminary courtesy report is in order. This report would present the stated problem, the potential safety significance, any interim corrective or compensatory actions, and the current state of the evaluation process. The courtesy report will be made under the LER format of 10 CFR 50.73 with an additional 10 CFR 50.72 notification, if considered appropriate. Duke Power Company will also continue to keep both Region II and NRR fully informed of emerging problems and issues using the information communications paths already established.

(4) Corrective Actions to be Taken to Avoid Further Violations

The corrective actions taken in Section 3 above should insure avoidance of further violations.

(5) Date of Full Compliance

Duke Power Company is now in full compliance.