U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION APPROVED OMB NO 3150-5114 LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) EXPIRES 8/31 88 DOCKET NUMBER (2) FACILITY NAME (1) OF 013 0 | 5 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 4 | 5 | 8 1 RIVER BEND STATION Division | Diesel Generator Output Breaker Failure OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED (8) REPORT DATE (7) LER NUMBER (6) EVENT DATE (5) FACILITY NAMES DOCKET NUMBERIS SEQUENTIAL DAY YEAR YEAR MONTH 0 15 10 10 10 1 0 15 10 10 10 1 0 d 4 4 THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR & (Check one or more of the following) (11) MODE (8) 73.71(b) 20.405(c) 50 73(a)(2)(iv) 50 73(a)(2)(v) 50.38(e)(1) 20.406(2)(1)(i) POWER OTHER (Specify in Abstract below and in Text, NRC Form (1664) 50.73(a)(2)(vii) 50.38(c)(2) 20.405(a)(1)(u) 11010 50 73(a)(2)(voil(A) 20.406(4)(1)(6)) 50.73(+)(2)(1) 50 73(a)(2)(viii)(8) 50 73(+)(2)(0) 20.406(+)(1)(iv) 50.73(a)(2)(x) 50.73(a)(2)(iii) 20 406(a)(1)(v) LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12) TELEPHONE NUMBER NAME AREA CODE 5 10 14 3 8 11 1- 14 11 14 5 L.A. England - Director-Nuclear Licensing COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (13) REPORTABLE TO NPRDS MANUFAC MANUFAC CAUSE SYSTEM COMPONENT COMPONENT CAUSE SYSTEM G1 1 18 A E B 5/2

At 1735 on 02/06/87, with the unit at 100 percent power, the Division I Diesel Generator (DG) output breaker failed to close during the performance of a weekly surveillance test. An immediate inspection of the output circuit breaker revealed that a mounting bolt had fallen out of the closing spring charging motor rendering the motor inoperable.

X

SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (14)

Through an investigation it was concluded that Technical Specification 3.8.1.1 had been violated as a result of the DG output breaker automatic closure function being inoperable during the period of 01/29/87 to 02/07/87.

Modification Request 87-0141 was implemented during the refueling outage which provided for the application of a thread adhesive and specified the torquing requirements for the charging motor mounting bolts. This modification will ensure that a similar condition will not develop in the future.

During the 8 days that the Division I DG should have been declared inoperable there were no demands for its initiation. If a loss of offsite power had been experienced, the Division II DG and High Pressure Core Spray DG were operable to provide independent A.C. electrical power sources. Additionally, the output circuit breaker could have been manually closed. Therefore, there was no impact on the safe operation of the plant or to the health and safety of the public.

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YES III ves complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE!

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YEAR

DAY

MONTH

EXPECTED

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LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION

US NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

APPROV	ED 0	мв	NO.	3150	0104
EXPIRES	8:31	88			

FACILITY NAME (1)	DOCKET NUMBER (2)		LER NUMBER (6)				PAGE (3)		
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RIVER BEND STATION	0 5 0 0 0 4 5	8	817	_	0004	- 01	0/2	OF 0 13	

If more space is required, the additional NAC Form 306A's) (17)
Reported Condition

At 1735 on 02/06/87, with the unit at 100 percent power, the Division I Diesel Generator *DG* (DG) output circuit breaker *52* failed to close during the performance of a weekly surveillance test. An immediate inspection of the output circuit breaker revealed that a mounting bolt had fallen out of the closing spring charging motor *MO*, rendering the | motor inoperable. Through an investigation it was concluded that Technical Specification 3.8.1.1 had been violated as a result of the DG output breaker's automatic closure function being inoperable during the period of 01/29/87 to 02/07/87.

Investigation

A review of electrical maintenance activities associated with the output breaker, LCO sheets, DG trending and failure reports and discussions with Operations personnel determined the last successful operation on the breaker, prior to discovery of its failure on 02/06/87, was the previous performance of the weekly surveillance test on 01/29/87. Through investigation, it has been concluded that the closing springs failed to recharge following the operation of the breaker on 01/29/87 and the output breaker automatic closure function remained inoperable until being detected on 02/06/87. The inoperable charging motor was replaced with a like for like motor and the DG output circuit breaker was returned to service at 0100 on 02/07/87.

To determine if the bolting failure was indicative of a generic problem, other breaker charging motor mounting bolts were inspected for tightness. The inspection included 15 additional safety related breakers *52* of the same type as the 4.16 KV DG output breaker (Gould-Brown Boveri, Type 5HK250, Power Circuit Breaker). Loose mounting bolts were found at 14 of the breakers inspected. In addition to finding loose bolts, two motors were discovered to have missing mounting bolts (1 each). The balance (4) of the safety related 4.16 KV circuit breakers could not be released for work during plant operation and were not inspected. To verify the automatic closing capability of these breakers, the Operations Department issued a Standing Order to include a daily visual inspection of the closing spring mechanical charge indicators *XI* on all 20 safety related 4.16 KV circuit breakers.

In an attempt to determine the root cause of the failure, previously performed corrective maintenance and preventive maintenance work documents associated with the subject breakers were reviewed to determine if loose charging motor mounting bolts had been identified earlier. The documents reviewed revealed no previous similar occurrences and no corrective maintenance activities associated with the breaker charging motor.

NRC Form 366A

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION

U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSI

APPROVED OMB NO 3150-0104 EXPIRES 8/31 88

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The circuit breaker preventative maintenance program was compared to the vendor's maintenance recommendations specified in the breaker instruction manual. The circuit breaker preventive maintenance activities and frequencies were found to be in accordance with the vendor's recommendations.

Based upon no evidence of corrective maintenance previously being performed on the circuit breaker charging motors and the circuit breaker preventive maintenance program being in accordance with the vendor's recommendations, the root cause of the failure was determined to be insufficient torquing of the charging motor mounting bolts by the manufacturer.

Corrective Action

The loose and missing charging motor mounting bolts identified during the inspection of the fifteen (15) additional circuit breakers have been tightened and/or replaced.

Modification Request (MR) 87-0141 was implemented during the refueling outage which provided for the application of a thread adhesive and specified the torquing requirements for the charging motor mounting bolts. This modification will ensure that a similar condition will not develop in the future.

To verify the operability of the charging motors until MR 87-0141 could be implemented, the Operations Department issued a Standing Order to include a visual inspection of the closing spring mechanical charge indicators on all 20 safety related 4.16 KV circuit breakers. MR 87-0141 has been implemented and Operations will no longer conduct daily visual inspections of the closing spring mechanical charging indicators. Therefore, the Standing Order will no longer be active.

Safety Assessment

The inoperability of the Division I DG resulted from the output breaker's inability to close automatically on demand. However, the breaker was capable of being manually closed during this time.

During the 8 days that the Division I Diesel Generator should have been declared inoperable there were no demands for its initiation. If a loss of offsite power had been experienced, the Division II DG *EB* and HPCS DG *EB* were operable to provide independent A.C. electrical power sources. Therefore, there was no impact on the safe operation of the plant or to the health and safety of the public.

NOTE: Energy Industry Identification System codes are identified in the text as *XX*.

GULF STATES UTILITIES COMPA

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Apr/1 11. 1988 RBC-27670 File Nos, G9.3, G9.25.1.3

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Document Control Desk Washington, D.C. 20555

Gentlemen:

River Bend Station - Unit 1 Docket No. 50-458

Please find enclosed Licensee Event Report No. 87-004 Revision 1 for River Bend Station - Unit 1. This revision is Soing submitted pursuant to 10CFR50.73 to provide an undate on corrective actions taken.

Simperaly,

J. E. Burky J. E. Booker

Munager-River Band Oversight River Bend Nuclear Group

JEB/TIP/PDG/DAS/ch

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