NRC Form 366
(9-83)

U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
APPROVED OMB NO. 3150-0104
EXPIRES: 8/31/88

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

FACILITY NAME (1)	DOCKET NUMBER (2)	PAGE (3)
Fort Calhoun Station, Unit No. 1	0 5 0 0 0 2 8 5	1 OF 0 2

TITLE (4)
Inadvertent Start of Stand-By Component Cooling Water Pump During Breaker Testing

EVENT DATE (5)			LER NUMBER (6)			REPORT DATE (7)			OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED (8)	
MONTH	DAY	YEAR	YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	FACILITY NAMES	DOCKET NUMBER(S)
									N	0 5 0 0 0
0 6	2 1	8 8	8 8	— 0 1 5	— 0 0	0 7	2 1	8 8		0 5 0 0 0

OPERATING MODE (9)	1	THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR §: (Check one or more of the following) (11)			
POWER LEVEL (10)	0 9 5	20.402(b)	20.405(c)	XX 50.73(a)(2)(iv)	73.71(b)
		20.405(a)(1)(i)	50.36(c)(1)	50.73(a)(2)(v)	73.71(c)
		20.405(a)(1)(ii)	50.36(c)(2)	50.73(a)(2)(vii)	OTHER (Specify in Abstract below and in Text, NRC Form 366A)
		20.405(a)(1)(iii)	50.73(a)(2)(i)	50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A)	
		20.405(a)(1)(iv)	50.73(a)(2)(ii)	50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B)	
		20.405(a)(1)(v)	50.73(a)(2)(iii)	50.73(a)(2)(x)	

LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12)

NAME	TELEPHONE NUMBER
Bruce W Shubert, Shift Technical Advisor	AREA CODE 4 1 0 1 2 4 2 1 6 - 1 4 1 0 1 1 1

COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (13)

CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NPRDS		CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NPRDS	

SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (14)		EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE (15)	MONTH	DAY	YEAR
YES (If yes, complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE)	XX NO				

ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e., approximately fifteen single-space typewritten lines) (16)

At 1347 on June 21, 1988, the non-running redundant component cooling water pump AC-3A was inadvertently started. Procedure CP-AC-3B BKR, which tests the capability of the component cooling water pump AC-3B breaker, was being performed at that time. Pump AC-3A was immediately shutdown and the control switch was placed in the pull-to-lock position to prevent restarting of the pu The system was reset and returned to normal upon completion of the cal on procedure. The NRC was notified at 1440 on June 21, 1988 pursuant to 10 .R 50.72(b)(2)(ii).c

To preclude events of this type from recurring, the procedures CP-AC-3A BKR, CP-AC-3B BKR, and CP-AC-3C BKR, have been modified to add a step requiring the operations department to signoff the action placing the non-running redundant component cooling water pump not being tested in the pull-to-lock position. Additionally, to ensure that the pump is returned to standby service following the testing a operations department signoff, signifying that the pump has been returned to service, has also been added.

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FACILITY NAME (1)	DOCKET NUMBER (2)	LER NUMBER (6)			PAGE (3)
		YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER	
Fort Calhoun Station, Unit No. 1	0 5 0 0 0 2 8 5	8 8	— 0 1 5	— 0 0	0 2 OF 0 2

TEXT (If more space is required, use additional NRC Form 366A's) (17)

At 1347 on June 21, 1988, the non-running redundant component cooling water pump AC-3A was inadvertently started. Procedure CP-AC-3B BKR, which tests the cabability of the component cooling water pump AC-3B breaker, was being performed at that time. Sequence of events were as follows:

At 1347 the Turbine Building Operator notified the control room that the breaker for component cooling water pump AC-3B was placed in the test position and that the local 69-permissive switch was in the pull-to-lock position. The Control Room Operator was asked to take the control switch for AC-3B to the "red flag" position, which would give the pump a start permissive in the testing mode. Upon completing this action, a breaker mismatch occurred on the AC-3B breaker, as expected by the test, which resulted in the auto-start of the non-running redundant component cooling water pump AC-3A. The component cooling pumps are designed such that if a running pump trips, the redundant non-running component cooling water pumps will auto-start. The Control Room Operator, noticing that AC-3A had started, immediately stopped the pump and took the control switch for AC-3A to the pull-to-lock position to prevent the pump from attempting to restart following completion of the calibration procedure. The system was reset and realigned for normal standby operation. The event had no effect on the running component cooling water pump. The NRC was notified at 1440 on June 21, 1988, pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(ii).

Post-event investigation revealed that the procedure, CP-AC-3B BKR, had a note preceeding the step instructing the Control Room Operator to take the control switch to the red flag position for the pump being tested. The note instructed the operators to take the control switch for the non-running redundant pump (not being tested) to the pull-to-lock position to prevent it from auto-starting. The procedure is conducted jointly between the Electrical Maintenance Department and the Operations Departments. However, the procedure physically remained in the control of the electricians. It was determined that the cause of the auto-start of the non-running redundant component cooling water pump was human error. The human error was partially attributed to a faulty procedure. The electrician in charge of the procedure failed to acknowledge the note requiring him to notify the control room to place the pump in the pull-to-lock position.

To preclude events of this type from recurring, the procedures CP-AC-3A BKR, CP-AC-3B BKR, and CP-AC-3C BKR, have been modified to add a step requiring the operations department to signoff the action placing the non-running redundant component cooling water pump not being tested in the pull-to-lock position. Additionally, to ensure that the pump is returned to standby service following the testing, an operations department signoff, signifying that the pump has been returned to service, has been added.

Omaha Public Power District
1623 Harney Omaha, Nebraska 68102-2247
402/536-4000

July 21, 1988
LIC-88-555

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Attn: Document Control Desk
Mail Station P1-137
Washington, DC 20555

Reference: Docket No. 50-285

Gentlemen:

SUBJECT: Licensee Event Report for the Fort Calhoun Station

Please find attached Licensee Event Report 88-015 dated July 21, 1988. This report is being submitted per requirements of 10 CFR 50.73.

Sincerely,

K. J. Morris
Division Manager
Nuclear Operations

KJM/me

c: R. D. Martin, NRC Regional Administrator
P. D. Milano, NRC Project Manager
P. H. Harrell, NRC Senior Resident Inspector
INPO Records Center
American Nuclear Insurers

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