



UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION II
101 MARIETTA STREET, N.W.
ATLANTA, GEORGIA 30323

Report No.: 50-302/88-16

Licensee: Florida Power Corporation
3201 34th Street, South
St. Petersburg, FL 33733

Docket No.: 50-302

License No.: DPR-72

Facility Name: Crystal River 3

Inspection Conducted: May 12 - June 8, 1988

Inspectors:	<u>M. Lewis for</u>	<u>7/7/88</u>
	T. Stetka, Senior Resident Inspector	Date Signed
	<u>M. Lewis for</u>	<u>7/7/88</u>
	J. Tedrow, Resident Inspector	Date Signed
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	R. Crljenjak, Section Chief	Date Signed
	Division of Reactor Safety	

SUMMARY

Scope: This routine inspection was conducted by two resident inspectors in the areas of plant operations, radiological controls, security, Licensee Event Reports and Nonconforming Operations Reports, facility modifications, TMI Task Action Plan Review, Offsite Review Committee Activities, and licensee action on previous inspection items. Numerous facility tours were conducted and facility operations observed. Some of these tours and observations were conducted on backshifts.

NRC Region II personnel met with the licensee on May 25, 1988, to discuss the licensee's efforts in improving the surveillance program (paragraph 2.b.(8)(e)).

Results: Three violations were identified: Failure to perform a channel calibration of the containment hydrogen analyzers, paragraph 2.b.(8)(a); Failure to adhere to the requirements of procedure CH-101, paragraph 2.b.(8)(b); Failure to provide adequate corrective action to prevent exceeding the maximum release rate for a liquid release, paragraph 3.b.(1).

Management attention to surveillance was evident.

REPORT DETAILS

1. Persons Contacted

Licensee Employees

- *W. Bandhauer, Assistant Nuclear Plant Operations Manager
- *G. Becker, Manager, Site Nuclear Engineering Services
- *J. Brandely, Manager, Nuclear Integrated Planning
- *P. Breedlove, Nuclear Records Management Supervisor
- *J. Colby, Manager, Nuclear Mechanical/Structural Engineering Services
- *M. Collins, Nuclear Safety and Reliability Superintendent
- E. Ford, Nuclear Operations Technical Advisor
- J. Gibson, Nuclear Technical Specification Coordinator
- *D. Green, Nuclear Licensing Specialist
- F. Gross, Engineering Aide
- *B. Hickie, Manager, Nuclear Plant Operations
- J. Holton, Senior Nuclear Results Engineer
- *G. Longhouser, Nuclear Security Superintendent
- *W. Marshall, Nuclear Operations Superintendent
- *P. McKee, Director, Nuclear Plant Operations
- *S. Robinson, Nuclear Chemistry and Radiation Protection Superintendent
- S. Roe, Nuclear Project Engineer
- *V. Roppel, Manager, Nuclear Operations Maintenance and Outages
- *W. Rossfeld, Manager, Nuclear Compliance
- L. Sexton, Senior Nuclear Mechanical Engineer
- *E. Welch, Manager, Nuclear Electrical/Instrumentation and Control Engineering Services
- *R. Widell, Director, Nuclear Operations Site Support
- *M. Williams, Nuclear Regulatory Specialist

Other licensee employees contacted included office, operations, engineering, maintenance, chemistry/radiation and corporate personnel.

*Attended exit interview

Acronyms and initialisms used throughout this report are listed in the last paragraph.

2. Review of Plant Operations (71707)

The plant continued in power operations (Mode 1) for the duration of this inspection.

a. Shift Logs and Facility Records (71707)

The inspector reviewed records and discussed various entries with operations personnel to verify compliance with the Technical Specifications (TS) and the licensee's administrative procedures.

The following records were reviewed:

Shift Supervisor's Log; Reactor Operator's Log; Equipment Out-Of-Service Log; Shift Relief Checklist; Auxiliary Building Operator's Log; Active Clearance Log; Daily Operating Surveillance Log; Work Request Log; Short Term Instructions (STI); and Selected Chemistry/Radiation Protection Logs.

In addition to these record reviews, the inspector independently verified clearance order tagouts.

No violations or deviations were identified.

b. Facility Tours and Observations (71707)

Throughout the inspection period, facility tours were conducted to observe operations and maintenance activities in progress. Some operations and maintenance activity observations were conducted during backshifts. Also, during this inspection period, licensee meetings were attended by the inspector to observe planning and management activities.

The facility tours and observations encompassed the following areas: security perimeter fence; control room; emergency diesel generator room; auxiliary building; intermediate building; battery rooms; and electrical switchgear rooms.

During these tours, the following observations were made:

- (1) Monitoring Instrumentation - The following instrumentation and/or indications were observed to verify that indicated parameters were in accordance with the TS for the current operational mode:

Equipment operating status; area atmospheric and liquid radiation monitors; electrical system lineup; reactor operating parameters; and auxiliary equipment operating parameters.

No violations or deviations were identified.

- (2) Safety Systems Walkdown (71710) - The inspector conducted a walkdown of the emergency feedwater system (EF) to verify that the lineup was in accordance with license requirements for system operability and that the system drawing and procedure correctly reflected "as-built" plant conditions.

No violations or deviations were identified.

- (3) Shift Staffing (71707) - The inspector verified that operating shift staffing was in accordance with TS requirements and that control room operations were being conducted in an orderly and professional manner. In addition, the inspector observed shift turnovers on various occasions to verify the continuity of plant status, operational problems, and other pertinent plant information during these turnovers.

No violations or deviations were identified.

- (4) Plant Housekeeping Conditions (71707) - Storage of material and components and cleanliness conditions of various areas throughout the facility were observed to determine whether safety and/or fire hazards existed.

No violations or deviations were identified.

- (5) Radiological Protection Program (71709) - Radiation protection control activities were observed to verify that these activities were in conformance with the facility policies and procedures, and in compliance with regulatory requirements. These observations included:

- Selected licensee conducted surveys;
- Entry to and exit from contaminated areas including step-off pad conditions and disposal of contaminated clothing;
- Area postings and controls;
- Work activity within radiation, high radiation, and contaminated areas;
- Radiation Control Area (RCA) exiting practices; and
- Proper wearing of personnel monitoring equipment, protective clothing, and respiratory equipment.

Area postings were independently verified for accuracy by the inspector. The inspector also reviewed selected Radiation Work Permits (RWPs) to verify that the RWP was current and that the controls were adequate.

The implementation of the licensee's As Low As Reasonably Achievable (ALARA) program was reviewed to determine personnel involvement in the objectives and goals of the program.

No violations or deviations were identified.

- (6) Security Control (71881) - In the course of the monthly activities, the inspector included a review of the licensee's physical security program. The composition of the security organization was checked to insure that the minimum number of guards were available and that security activities were

conducted with proper supervision. The performance of various shifts of the security force was observed in the conduct of daily activities to include: protected and vital area access controls; searching of personnel, packages, and vehicles; badge issuance and retrieval; escorting of visitors; patrols; and compensatory posts. In addition, the inspector observed the operational status of Closed Circuit Television (CCTV) monitors, the Intrusion Detection system in the central and secondary alarm stations, protected area lighting, protected and vital area barrier integrity, and the security organization interface with operations and maintenance.

No violations or deviations were identified.

- (7) Fire Protection (71707) - Fire protection activities, staffing, and equipment were observed to verify that fire brigade staffing was appropriate and that fire alarms, extinguishing equipment, actuating controls, fire fighting equipment, emergency equipment, and fire barriers were operable.

No violations or deviations were identified.

- (8) Surveillance (61726) - Surveillance tests were observed to verify that approved procedures were being used; qualified personnel were conducting the tests; tests were adequate to verify equipment operability; calibrated equipment was utilized; and TS requirements were followed.

The following tests were observed and/or data reviewed:

- SP-160B, Functional and Operability Check of the Containment Hydrogen Monitoring WS-10-CE;
- SP-317, RC System Water Inventory Balance;
- SP-375A, Chilled Water Pump (1A) Quarterly Operability Demonstration;
- SP-430, Containment Air Locks Seal Leakage Test;
- SP-711, Core Flood Tank "B" Monthly Surveillance Program; and
- PT-319, Discharge Valve Positioning Verification.

- (a) Procedure SP-160B was reviewed to determine the licensee's compliance with the TS. This procedure was written to implement TS 4.6.4.1, which requires the licensee to perform a channel calibration on the containment hydrogen analyzers at least once every 92 days. The inspector noticed that this procedure did not include a check of the analyzers' local alarms or the alarm annunciated on the main control board in the control room. The TS definition of a channel calibration encompasses the entire channel including alarm functions. From a review of maintenance

history for this instrumentation, the inspector determined that a check of these alarms had not been performed since the analyzers were installed in August 1983.

Through discussions with licensee engineering and operating personnel, and a review of the licensee's emergency procedures, the inspector determined that the containment hydrogen indication would be monitored following an accident and that the loss of alarm function for this monitor would not prevent the safety function of the system. However, failure to include a check of the alarm functions during the required channel calibration is contrary to the requirements of TS 4.6.4.1 and is considered to be a violation.

Violation (302/88-16-01): Failure to perform a channel calibration on the containment hydrogen analyzers.

- (b) Procedure SP-711 was written by the licensee to implement the requirements of TS 4.5.1.b to verify the boron concentration in the core flood tanks. This procedure specifies that the boron analysis be performed in accordance with chemistry procedure CH-101, Determination of Boron, Mannitol Complex Titration Method. During the performance of this analysis on June 1, 1988, the inspector noticed that the chemistry technician deviated from the instructions provided in procedure CH-101. The technician analyzed a sample volume of 10 milliliters (ml) while procedure step 9.2.1 and Table 1 required a sample volume of 25 ml. When questioned about this apparent nonconformance, the technician stated that he had received verbal instructions from his supervisor to perform the analysis using 10 ml of sample and using a different titration apparatus than specified by procedure CH-101. The inspector met with the chemistry supervisor, who confirmed the verbal instructions provided to the technician.

Although the sampling method used by the technician did not appear to adversely affect the sample results, the use of verbal instructions vice written procedures to implement the requirements of TS 4.5.1.b is contrary to the requirements of Regulatory Guide (RG) 1.33, November 1972, Section J, and is considered to be a violation of TS 6.8.1.a.

Violation (302/88-16-02): Failure to adhere to the requirements of procedure CH-101.

- (c) During the performance of procedure SP-375A, the inspector was informed by the technician performing the procedure that the point "C" identified by the machine sketch provided in the procedure did not indicate a pump bearing, but rather the location of a packing gland. The licensee was utilizing this location for measuring the pump bearing vibration and temperature specified by the ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, Section XI.

This information was discussed with licensee engineering personnel who provided the inspector with the pump's technical manual. This type of pump does not contain a pump bearing, but utilizes two bearings on the pump's driver (motor) for support. Although, this procedure is performed by the licensee for information purposes only, in accordance with NRC relief request V-370 to the licensee's proposed inservice testing program, the inspector considered it prudent to record the vibration and temperature measurements on the motor bearing closest to the pump as required by ASME Section XI, Article IWP-1200. Licensee representatives agreed with the inspector's comments and stated that they would make appropriate changes to procedure SP-375A and the redundant B train SP-375B test procedure.

IFI (302/88-16-03): Review the revision to SP-375A/B to take bearing vibration and temperature measurements on the motor bearing closest to the pump.

- (d) During the performance of procedure PT-319, the inspector noticed wide variations in the flow rate for the temporary flow monitoring instrument on the nuclear services seawater (RW) system. Also, the indicated flow appeared to be much lower (approximately 1000 gpm) than measured flows during previous tests. Troubleshooting of this indication by the licensee revealed that the flow element had been damaged during insertion into the system and silt had accumulated in the element.

Further inspection by the licensee revealed that the RW system piping was also slightly damaged during the process of inserting the flow element. The inspector observed licensee personnel perform an ultrasonic test of this piping to determine the extent of damage. Although the results of this test showed no significant deformation of the piping, the protective lining used on this piping to prevent corrosion could have been damaged. The licensee plans to perform periodic ultrasonic testing of the piping to determine if corrosion is occurring more rapidly than expected. The licensee also plans to develop a procedure

to address the installation and precautions necessary for use of this type of flow element.

IFI (302/88-16-04): Review the licensee's activities to develop a procedure for use of flow measuring devices in the RW system and periodic ultrasonic testing of RW system piping.

- (e) NRC Region II personnel met with the FPC staff to discuss the status of surveillance program improvements in light of the previous SALP 3 rating. The licensee described its overall surveillance improvement program, which included:
- instituting a new computerized Surveillance Tracking System to address deficiencies in the area of surveillance scheduling,
 - adopting a "system engineer" concept which identifies a single point of contact for each system in an effort to develop expertise in engineers who write procedures, and
 - rewriting surveillance procedures, as necessary, and implementing a verification and validation program to confirm the adequacy of surveillance procedures.

From discussions with the licensee, management attention to surveillance was evident.

- (9) Maintenance Activities (62703) - The inspector observed maintenance activities to verify that correct equipment clearances were in effect; work requests and fire prevention work permits, as required, were issued and being followed; quality control personnel were available for inspection activities as required; and TS requirements were being followed.

Maintenance was observed and work packages were reviewed for the following maintenance activities:

- Replacement of the power supply for the "D" channel of the reactor protection system in accordance with procedures MP-531, Troubleshooting Plant Equipment, SP-110, Reactor Protective System Functional Testing, SP-312, Heat Balance Calculations, and SP-113, Power Range Nuclear Instrumentation Calibration;
- Calibration of the waste gas release flow transmitter (WD-19-FT) in accordance with procedure SP-168, Radiation Monitoring Flow Rate Instrumentation Calibration;
- Ultrasonic testing for nuclear services and decay heat seawater piping degradation; and

- Troubleshooting of containment hydrogen analyzer (WS-10-CE) "Standby" indication in accordance with procedure MP-531.

No violations or deviations were identified.

- (10) Radioactive Waste Controls (71707) - Selected liquid and gaseous releases were observed to verify that approved procedures were utilized, that appropriate release approvals were obtained, and that required surveys were taken.

No violations or deviations were identified.

- (11) Pipe Hangers and Seismic Restraints (71707) - Several pipe hangers and seismic restraints (snubbers) on safety-related systems were observed to insure that fluid levels were adequate and no leakage was evident, that restraint settings were appropriate, and that anchoring points were not binding.

No violations or deviations were identified.

3. Review of Licensee Event Reports (92700) and Nonconforming Operations Reports (71707)

- a. Licensee Event Reports (LERs) were reviewed for potential generic impact, to detect trends, and to determine whether corrective actions appeared appropriate. Events which were reported immediately were reviewed as they occurred to determine if the TS were satisfied. LERs 87-22, 87-28, 88-03, 88-04, 88-11, and 88-12 were reviewed in accordance with the current NRC Enforcement policy. LERs 87-22, 87-28, 88-03 and 88-04 are closed.

- (1) (Closed) LER 87-22: This LER reported an Engineered Safeguards (ES) actuation that occurred while electricians were installing an electrical jumper across a pressure switch. The licensee has revised procedure SP-178, Containment Leakage Test - Type "A", Including Liner Plate, (revision 13 dated May 3, 1988) to require the use of jumper leads with insulated connections.
- (2) (Closed) LER 87-28: This LER reported an ES system actuation which occurred during the operation of a vital bus transfer switch and inverter manual bypass switch. The licensee has completed the operator training on proper switch operation, and has provided a schematic diagram of the vital bus power supplies in the inverter rooms.
- (3) (Closed) LER 88-03: This LER reported that a surveillance procedure was not adequate to implement the 31 day containment integrity verification required by TS 4.6.1.1. The licensee has implemented enhancements to their TS amendment review process which will include a list of other technical specifications requirements most likely affected by the amended specification.

- (4) (Closed) LER 88-04: This LER reported that the weekly channel check of the incore detector system was not completed within the required frequency and that the initial data collected was not evaluated to determine system operability. The licensee has removed the applicable channel check instructions from procedure SP-433, Incore Backup Recorder Calibration, and has incorporated these instructions in procedure SP-438, Incore Neutron Detectors Channel Check. This new procedure has been assigned to reactor engineering for accomplishment.

LERs 88-11 and 88-12 will remain open for the following reasons:

- (5) (Open) LER 88-11: This LER reported that the inservice testing program valve stroke test was not performed during the first three months of 1988 as required by TS 4.0.5. The licensee identified this matter during a routine review of surveillance procedures. To prevent recurrence of this event, the licensee will revise procedure SP-443, Master Surveillance Plan, to specify surveillance tests subject to the ASME Section XI test frequencies. The licensee plans to implement this procedure change by July 15, 1988. This matter is considered to be a licensee identified violation in which appropriate corrective action was taken to prevent recurrence.
- (6) (Open) LER 88-12: This LER reported the inadequate electrical isolation between reactor coolant system hot leg temperature instruments in the control room and remote shutdown panel. The licensee identified this matter during an engineering design review. Upon discovering this situation, the licensee verified that a previously established roving fire watch was in effect and continued this compensatory measure until electrical separation could be provided for this instrumentation. The licensee installed modifications MAR 82-05-03-06, FCN-23, and MAR 82-05-03-01, FCN-36A, to provide the required electrical isolation. This matter is considered to be a licensee identified violation in which appropriate corrective action was taken to prevent recurrence.

The licensee's corrective action associated with this event will include a detailed review of other modifications that interface with the remote shutdown panel to determine if similar problems exist. This review will be completed by June 10, 1988. This LER will remain open pending completion of this corrective action.

- b. The inspector reviewed Nonconforming Operations Reports (NCORs) to verify the following: TS are complied with, corrective actions as identified in the reports or during subsequent reviews have been accomplished or are being pursued for completion, generic items are identified and reported as required by 10 CFR Part 21, and items are reported as required by TS.

All NCORs were reviewed in accordance with the current NRC Enforcement Policy.

- (1) NCOR 88-69 reported that on May 14, 1988, the maximum permissible liquid release rate specified by liquid radwaste release permit number L 88-160 was exceeded. This release was being performed in accordance with procedure OP-407H, Operation of the Laundry and Shower Monitoring Tanks, which requires in step 3.2.8.5 that the release rate specified on the release permit not be exceeded. The actual release rate of 36 gpm exceeded the maximum release rate permitted of 34 gpm. Further review of the post-release records, however, indicated that no radiological limits were exceeded by this event.

The licensee attributed the cause for this event to be the use of chart paper on the release recorder that indicated only half of the actual flow. This event is similar to an event which occurred in September 1987 and was the subject of a NRC violation (Violation 302/87-30-02). The licensee's corrective action for this violation was documented in a response letter to the NRC dated November 18, 1987, and included, in part, ordering new chart paper for the flow rate recorder to indicate the correct release flow rate.

This corrective action was insufficient to prevent recurrence of this event. Failure to provide adequate corrective actions is contrary to the requirements of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI and is considered to be a violation.

Violation (302/88-16-05): Failure to provide adequate corrective actions to prevent exceeding the maximum release rate for a liquid radwaste release.

- (2) NCOR 88-77 reported that a fire service valve (FSV-14) was found in the closed position vice the open position required by plant procedures. The licensee discovered this situation during the removal of an equipment clearance (CL-88-05-106) and discovered that this valve was inadvertently closed during the implementation of the clearance which specified that a nearby valve (FSV-13) be closed. The improper implementation of the clearance rendered two of three fire service pumps out of service for approximately one day. The TS allows up to 7 days of operation with only one fire service pump.

As part of their corrective actions associated with this event, the licensee is reviewing procedures to determine if the requirement for independently verifying the implementation of equipment clearances needs clarification. This matter is considered to be a licensee identified violation in which

appropriate corrective action will be taken to prevent recurrence.

IFI (302/88-16-06): Review the licensee's activities to clarify the requirements to provide independent verification of equipment clearances.

4. Design, Design Changes and Modifications (37700)

Installation of new or modified systems were reviewed to verify that the changes were reviewed and approved in accordance with 10 CFR 50.59, that the changes were performed in accordance with technically adequate and approved procedures, that subsequent testing and test results met acceptance criteria or deviations were resolved in an acceptable manner, and that appropriate drawings and facility procedures were revised as necessary. This review included selected observations of modifications and/or testing in progress.

The following modification approval records (MARs) were reviewed and/or associated testing observed:

- Separation of hot leg temperature instrumentation between the remote shutdown panel and the control room in accordance with modifications MAR 82-05-03-06, FCN-23, and MAR 82-05-03-01, FCN-36A and functional test in accordance with procedure TP#11A, RC-004A-TE1 and RC-004B-TE4 Isolation Module; and
- Installation and test of the containment high range radiation monitor recorder in accordance with MAR 84-08-10-07, FCN-29A and functional test in accordance with procedure TP#4B, MAR Functional Test for RNR Recorders and Indicator Verification/Calibration.

5. NUREG 0737 - TMI Task Action Plan Item Review (92701)

The licensee's activities associated with the TMI Task Action Plan Item II.E.1.1.2, Auxiliary Feedwater System Evaluation, were reviewed. The licensee has completed construction of the emergency feedwater tank and has submitted the Probability Risk Analysis (PRA) for the emergency feedwater system in a letter to the NRC dated December 2, 1986. The inspector performed a walkdown of the completed tank and verified that the licensee's system drawings and procedures reflect the "as built" plant configuration. The licensee's action on this item is complete and this item is considered closed.

6. Review of Offsite Review Committee Activities (40701)

The inspector attended a meeting and reviewed the activities of the licensee's offsite review committee, the Nuclear General Review Committee (NGRC). This review included a determination that TS requirements were being met with regard to the following:

- Committee quorum;
- Committee composition with respect to disciplines and expertise;
- Qualification of committee members; and
- Review activities of the committee.

No violations or deviations were identified.

7. Licensee Action on Previously Identified Inspection Findings (92702 & 92701)

- a. (Closed) Violation 302/87-40-01, Failure to Perform Certifications on Active Clearances as Required by Procedure CP-115

The licensee has revised the distribution list for notification of open clearances, issued a memorandum dated December 9, 1987, emphasizing clearance holder responsibilities, and reviewed this event with operators.

- b. (Closed) Deviation 302/87-19-01, Failure to Meet a Commitment as Stated in the Response Letter to Violation 302/86-31-01 Dated January 22, 1987

The licensee has combined its two separate tracking systems to avoid similar incidents from occurring. In addition, the FSAR was revised on February 1, 1988, revision 9, to include descriptions for the normal operation of cooling water systems that supply cooling water for the makeup pumps.

- c. (Closed) FI 302/86-38-13, Review Completion of Licensee's Long-term Protective Measures for Sulfur Dioxide Tanks

Corrective actions were verified as complete, as stated in NRC Inspection Report 50-302/87-28, with the following exceptions:

- installation of improved door and damper seals to reduce inleakage into the control room; and
- installation of control logic to reposition the control complex HVAC system dampers to the recirculation mode in the event toxic gas is detected at the storage tanks' local monitors.

The licensee completed these modifications in accordance with MAR 85-03-10-01. The inspector reviewed the completed modification package, including work requests and test procedures, and where possible, conducted visual observations to verify the modification. The inspector considers action on this item complete.

- d. (Closed) IFI 302/88-11-05, Follow the Licensee's Troubleshooting Activities Associated with Reactor Protection System (RPS) Channel "D"

The licensee has identified the most probable cause for the spurious trips to be due to a faulty power supply. The power supply has subsequently been replaced.

- e. (Closed) IFI 302/88-01-04, Review the Licensee's Flow Measurement Test to Verify Discharge Valve Throttling Method and Pump Performance.

The inspector observed the performance of the flow measurement test conducted in accordance with procedure PT-319, Discharge Valve Positioning Verification. This test verified that the discharge valve throttling method used provided consistent results and that pump performance did not significantly vary with tide level.

- f. (Closed) IFI 302/86-38-07, Review the Licensee's Progress in Developing Maintenance Procedures to Cover Certain Electrical Equipment.

The licensee has implemented procedures PM-130, Static Inverters, and MP-152, Performance Checks of Power Supplies, to direct maintenance activities on the vital inverters. The licensee has decided not to develop an electrical maintenance procedure for the Emergency Diesel Generators (EDG) since no significant maintenance has been performed on these electrical generators in the past. Instead, the licensee has implemented a preventive maintenance procedure for this equipment, PM-123, Periodic Electrical Checks of Emergency Diesel Generators, to direct the periodic maintenance performed on the EDG's.

- g. (Closed) Deviation 302/87-40-03, Failure to Install a Recording Display as Committed to Meet Regulatory Guide 1.97.

The inspector reviewed and verified the implementation of the corrective actions stated in FPC's letter of March 16, 1988. The inspector reviewed modification MAR 84-08-10-07, FCN-29A and functional test procedure TP#4B which installed and tested the containment high range radiation monitor recorder.

7. Exit Interview (30703)

The inspector met with licensee representatives (denoted in paragraph 1) at the conclusion of the inspection on June 8, 1988. During this meeting, the inspector summarized the scope and findings of the inspection as they are detailed in this report with particular emphasis on the violations and IFI's.

The licensee representatives acknowledged the inspector's comments and did not identify as proprietary any of the materials provided to or reviewed by the inspectors during this inspection.

During the exit meeting, licensee representatives stated that they may take exception to the violation described in paragraph 2.b.(8)(b) of this report regarding the applicability of RG 1.33 to certain chemistry procedures.

8. Acronyms and Abbreviations

ALARA	-	As Low As Reasonably Achievable
ASME	-	American Society of Mechanical Engineers
CCTV	-	Closed Circuit Television
EDG	-	Emergency Diesel Generators
EF	-	Emergency Feedwater
ES	-	Engineered Safeguards
FPC	-	Florida Power Corporation
FSAR	-	Final Safety Analysis Report
IFI	-	Inspector Followup Item
LER	-	Licensee Event Report
MAR	-	Modification Approval Record
ml	-	Milliliters
NCOR	-	Nonconforming Operations Report
NGRC	-	Nuclear General Review Committee
NRC	-	Nuclear Regulatory Commission
PRA	-	Probability Risk Analysis
RCA	-	Radiation Control Area
RG	-	Regulatory Guide
RPS	-	Reactor Protection System
RWP	-	Radiation Work Permit
SALP	-	Systematic Assessment of Licensee Performance
STI	-	Short Term Instruction
TMI	-	Three Mile Island
TS	-	Technical Specification