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NRC:RI
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4-5-88
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U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION I

Report No. 50-293/87-30

Docket No. 50-293

License No. DPR-35

Licensee: Boston Edison Company
25 Braintree Hill Office Park
Braintree, Massachusetts 02184

Facility Name: Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station

Meeting At: NRC Region I, King of Prussia, Pennsylvania

Meeting Date: September 9, 1987

Prepared by:

W. K. Lancaster Sm
Inspector, Physical Security

3-30-88
date

G. C. Smith
Safeguards Specialist

3/30/88
date

Approved by:

R. R. Keimig
R. R. Keimig, Chief, Safeguards Section,
DRSS

3-30-88
date

Meeting Summary: An Enforcement Conference was held at NRC Region I, King of Prussia, Pennsylvania, on September 9, 1987, to discuss the findings of a Special Inspection, No. 87-30. The special inspection concerned the status of the security program, allegations relative to deficiencies in the security program, and the circumstances that resulted in the degradation of a vital area barrier. The loss of Protected Area (PA) and Vital Area (VA) keys, guard force response to PA and VA alarms, repetitive security concerns and security organization supervisory training were also discussed.

The meeting was attended by NRC and licensee management and lasted approximately three hours.

Details

1. Participants

A. Boston Edison Company

R. Bird, Senior Vice President, Nuclear
R. Ledgett, Executive Assistant to the Vice President, Nuclear
K. Roberts, Nuclear Operations Manager
R. Grazio, Field Engineering Section Manager
C. Higgins, Security Section Manager
G. Edgar, Licensing Counsel

B. Nuclear Regulatory Commission

J. Allan, Deputy Regional Administrator
L. Bettenhausen, Chief, Reactor Projects Branch 1
J. Wiggins, Chief, Projects Section 1B
T. Martin, Director, Division of Radiation Safety and Safeguards
J. Joyner, Chief, Nuclear Materials Safety and Safeguards Branch
O. Gromley, Project Engineer
D. Holody, Enforcement Specialist
J. Gutierrez, Regional Counsel
J. Lyash, Resident Inspector
W. Kushner, Safeguards Scientist
G. Smith, Safeguards Specialist
W. Lancaster, Physical Security Inspector

2. Security Concerns

At the start of the conference, Mr. Martin summarized Region I's understanding of the circumstances relative to the licensee's identification of a degraded vital area barrier, which led to NRC Special Inspection No. 50-293/87-30 on July 13-17, 1987. The inspection was conducted to review the licensee's actions after finding an opening in the VA barrier and to determine the validity of allegations made to the NRC concerning the licensee's security program. The results of that Special Inspection were as follows: the licensee's program to upgrade the security program is on schedule; two instances of failure to maintain the integrity of a VA barrier were identified; one of the allegations reviewed resulted in identification of one of the two VA barrier failures; and, the other allegations were not substantiated. Mr. Martin expressed concern about the recurrence of VA barrier violations, the quality of work being performed on VA barriers, the licensee's understanding of the purpose of the security program, and the response to PA and VA alarms by the security force.

The licensee stated that the 22" pipe penetration point going from the PA into the VA had been created when contractor personnel removed a blank flange without the licensee's authorization. The licensee further stated that the consequences of this event to the health and safety of the public were minimal because the plant was not operating at the time of the event and there was no vital equipment inside the area. As a result of this incident, BECO management has taken the following actions to prevent a reoccurrence: retraining of supervision that reemphasizes the importance of VA barriers; procedural changes concerning work controls; and counseling of the supervisors involved in the incident.

The licensee stated that on July 8, 1987, a VA door deficiency had been discovered that would have permitted unauthorized access into a VA. The licensee further stated that the unit was defueled at the time of discovery, therefore, the consequences of this event to the health and safety of the public was minimal. The licensee noted that a contributing cause to this violation was insufficient follow-up on suggestions given to a 1985 contractor review of Heating Ventilation and Air Conditioning (HVAC) security issues. As a result of the incident, the licensee stated that a VA door survey would be conducted and would address the adequacy of all VA doors. The results of this study will be provided to the NRC upon completion.

The licensee stated that on August 3, 1987, a contract security officer had misplaced a set of PA and VA keys. The security officer, his supervisor and the licensee's shift supervisor failed to implement security contingency procedures immediately upon notification of the event. Compensatory security measures were implemented and the missing keys were found on August 4, 1987. The licensee stated that when BECO management discovered the loss of the keys, searches were conducted of both PA and VA areas and the computerized alarm histories for these areas were analyzed to ensure that no unauthorized access had been made. The licensee stated that there was minimal impact on the health and safety of the public because no penetrations to the PA and VA's had occurred. The licensee stated that they have retrained all security personnel to ensure that the correct actions are taken when either PA or VA keys are lost.

The licensee also stated that the three above mentioned events (VA pipe penetration, VA door deficiency, loss of keys) were isolated cases of security events and were not indicative of a programmatic breakdown. The licensee feels that its security program is effective.

The licensee also provided a handout (see Attachment 1) detailing each event, the cause of the event, the consequences of the event, and the corrective actions taken to prevent reoccurrence.

ATTACHMENT 1

ATTACHMENT 1 TO THIS REPORT CONTAINS SAFEGUARDS
INFORMATION AND IS BEING WITHHELD FROM PUBLIC
DISCLOSURE