



**LOUISIANA**  
POWER & LIGHT / WATERFORD 3 SES • P.O. BOX 8 • KILLONA, LA 70066-0751

July 15, 1988

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A4.05  
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U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
ATTENTION: Document Control Desk  
Washington, D.C. 20555

SUBJECT: Waterford 3 SES  
Docket No. 50-382  
License No. NPF-38  
Reporting of Special Report

Attached is Special Report Number SR-88-006-00 for Waterford Steam Electric Station Unit 3. This Special Report is submitted per 10CFR50.36(c)(2) and Technical Specifications 4.8.1.1.3 and 6.9.2.

Very truly yours,

N.S. Carns  
Plant Manager - Nuclear

NSC/WMC:rk

Attachment

cc: R.D. Martin, NRC Resident Inspectors Office, INPO Records Center  
(J.T. Wheelock), E.L. Blake, W.M. Stevenson, D.L. Wigginton

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SPECIAL REPORT

SR-88-006-00

Emergency Diesel Generator Invalid Failure  
Due to Personnel Error.

INTRODUCTION

At 0942 hours on June 16, 1988, during the performance of the Diesel Operability Surveillance, Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG) B tripped due to actuation of the reverse power relay. Troubleshooting did not discover any equipment problems and it was concluded the operator trainee who manually started the EDG did not load it quickly enough to prevent a reverse power trip. Since this is an invalid failure there is no effect on the reliability of EDG B and the testing frequency remains once per 31 days.

NARRATIVE

At 0942 hours on June 16, 1988, Waterford Steam Electric Station Unit 3 was operating at 90% power when Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG) B tripped due to personnel error. During the performance of Surveillance Procedure OP-903-068, "Emergency Diesel Generator Operability Verification", EDG B output breaker opened shortly after closing the breaker. A generator fault was indicated due to a Reverse Power Relay (RPR) trip. The RPR is designed to provide anti-motoring protection of the generator. When an EDG is connected to the grid, it must be loaded to 100 KW within 5 seconds or the RPR will trip the EDG. EDG B was declared inoperable and the action statement of Technical Specification 3.8.1.1 was entered.

Condition Identification #256717 was issued to investigate the EDG and its associated circuitry. No equipment problems were discovered and it was concluded that the only credible cause of the trip was due to failure to raise load within 5 seconds. The individual performing the manual EDG start is enrolled in a license training program and was performing under the supervision of a licensed operator as authorized by 10CFR55.13. After troubleshooting, Surveillance Procedure OP-903-068 was successfully performed and EDG B was declared operable at 1700 hours. Although the EDG was out of service for approximately 7 hours it could have been quickly restored to service if a loss of offsite power had occurred. Operating Procedure OP-9-002, "Emergency Diesel Generator" has been reviewed and is considered to adequately address this aspect of EDG operation.

The unsuccessful loading attempt due to operator action has been classified as an invalid failure in accordance with Regulatory Guide 1.108, Revision 1, Section C.2.e.(2). There has never been a valid failure of EDG B since the operating license was issued. The surveillance test interval required by Technical Specification Table 4.8-1 has always been "at least once per 31 days" since issuance of the operating license. The testing interval is not affected by this event. Since this was an invalid failure due to operator error, there is no effect on the reliability of EDG B.

PLANT CONTACT

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