

March 18, 1988

PRELIMINARY NOTIFICATION OF EVENT OR UNUSUAL OCCURRENCE PNO-II-88-18A

This preliminary notification constitutes EARLY notice of events of POSSIBLE safety or public interest significance. The information is as initially received without verification or evaluation, and is basically all that is known by the Region II staff on this date.

FACILITY: Duke Power Company  
Catawba Units 1 and 2  
Docket No. 50-413 and 50-414  
Rock Hill, South Carolina

Licensee Emergency Classification:  
 Notification of Unusual Event  
 Alert  
 Site Area Emergency  
 General Emergency  
 Not Applicable

SUBJECT: AUGMENTED INSPECTION TEAM COMPLETES WORK AT CATAWBA

This PN supplements PNO-II-88-18, issued March 9, 1988.

The Augmented Inspection Team (AIT) dispatched by the NRC to Duke Power Company's Catawba nuclear power plant on March 9 has completed the onsite segment of its mission.

The AIT was dispatched to the site to review events associated with inadvertent introduction of raw service water into two of Unit 2's four steam generators and clogging of two of the auxiliary feedwater flow control valves with asiatic clams.

The licensee declared an Unusual Event and shut down Unit 1 on March 10 after declaring both trains of auxiliary feedwater inoperable because of the events identified earlier in Unit 2. The licensee confirmed the Unit's operability and was given NRC concurrence for restart on March 11.

After a review of the test results by the AIT, Region II and NRR, the licensee was given NRC concurrence to restart Unit 2 at 9:00 a.m. (EST) today.

The licensee has performed extensive corrective action, including flushing out all stagnant service water lines, radiography of low points in the service water system to check for asiatic clams, and extensive testing of the auxiliary feedwater system.

The licensee determined that a low level in the upper surge tank on Unit 2, coupled with isolation of the condensate storage tank and auto start configuration, caused low suction pressure, resulting in a swapover of suction to the service water system. It has also been determined that differences in sensor taps and time delays caused only one train (Train A) to swap to service water.

Normally, auxiliary feedwater is supplied to the steam generators from an upper surge tank, the condensate storage tank and the condenser hotwell. When the unanticipated switchover occurred, water from the lake was inadvertently introduced, clogging two flow control valves with clams.

The AIT is preparing a report on its findings. The licensee will be meeting with Region II and NRR management to discuss long term corrective actions and potential enforcement issues.

Local media interest has occurred. Both the licensee and the NRC have responded to media inquiries.

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The States of North and South Carolina have been informed.

This information is current as of 10:00 a.m. (EST) on March 18.

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