

1 The Investigative Interview of MR.  
 2 GLENN L. KOESTER, taken on behalf of the Nuclear  
 3 Regulatory Commission on May 13, 1987, beginning  
 4 at 2:53 o'clock p.m.

5 Present at the interview were Mr.  
 6 Brooks Griffin and Mr. Jay E. Silberg.

7  
 8 MR. GRIFFIN: For the record, this  
 9 is an interview of Glenn Koester, K-O-E-S-T-E-R,  
 10 who is employed by.

11 THE WITNESS: Kansas Gas and  
 12 Electric Company. And there is an initial L.  
 13 Between the Glenn and the Koester, and there's two  
 14 N's in the Glenn.

15 MR. GRIFFIN: The location of this  
 16 interview is the law library at the KG&E offices  
 17 in Wichita, Kansas. The date is May the 13th,  
 18 1987 and the time is 2:53 p.m. Present at this  
 19 interview are Glenn Koester and his  
 20 representative, Jay Silberg, S-I-L-B-E-R-G, and  
 21 myself on behalf of the NRC, Brooks Griffin.

22 Mr. Koester, I need you to stand, raise  
 23 your right hand and swear to the contents of your  
 24 testimony.

25 Information in this record was sworn that the information you  
 in accordance with the Freedom of Information

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1 are about to give is the truth the whole truth and  
2 nothing but the truth, so help you God?

3 THE WITNESS: I do.

4 QUESTIONS BY MR. GRIFFIN:

5 Q. What is your current title?

6 A. Vice-president of nuclear.

7 Q. How long have you held that position?

8 A. Since August, 1980.

9 Q. And what position were you in with the  
10 company before that?

11 A. Vice-president of operations.

12 Q. What were your duties as vice-president  
13 nuclear?

14 A. My only responsibility was to be in  
15 charge of the design, construction, start-up and  
16 operation of Wolf Creek Generator Station.

17 Q. In what capacity do you serve now in  
18 relation to the nuclear station?

19 A. I'm still vice-president of nuclear for  
20 Kansas Gas and Electric Company. I no longer have  
21 the day-to-day responsibilities of Wolf Creek  
22 generating station since it has become a separate  
23 operating corporation. I'm in charge of the very  
24 small nuclear overview group that interphases with  
25 the Wolf Creek generating station, watching over

1 the Kansas Gas and Electric Company's interests in  
2 the station.

3 MR. SILBERG: You're also --

4 A. I'm also the chairman of the board of  
5 the corporation. We have a 13 member board and  
6 that's a rotating chairmanship and I'm chairman of  
7 the board until December of 1987.

8 MR. SILBERG: The corporation  
9 being the Wolf Creek?

10 A. Wolf Creek Corporation. I'm also a  
11 member of the Kansas Gas and Electric board of  
12 directors. That's a recent appointment.

13 Q. During the construction phase at Wolf  
14 Creek, you were the senior man in charge on site,  
15 is that correct, for the utility?

16 A. I was the senior officer in charge of  
17 the Wolf Creek facility. That doesn't mean I was  
18 on site every day. I was on site a lot but not  
19 every day.

20 Q. Then what did you have to do with the  
21 creation or the initiation of the Q1 program at  
22 Wolf Creek?

23 A. The initiation or creation? I didn't  
24 create the program. I didn't even initiate the  
25 program. Some of my folks that work for me

1 initiated the program, presented it to me and to  
2 other management personnel and it sounded like a  
3 very fine program to allow people to express  
4 concerns to us on site while they were there or  
5 before they left, was leaving the job site because  
6 at the time we initiated Q1, we were starting to  
7 ROF a lot of people off the site rather than  
8 having people leave the site, finding another  
9 organization, expressing those concerns to and  
10 then that organization bringing them back in a  
11 different manner, and we found out later even in a  
12 different manner than they were expressed to those  
13 outside organizations. We just made another  
14 vehicle for people to leave concerns at the site  
15 and made it mandatory that they go through Quality  
16 First. Didn't mean they had to tell us whether  
17 they had any concerns or not but it made it  
18 mandatory to go to Quality First before they got  
19 their final paycheck. They could go to NRC if  
20 they wanted to. We didn't care. But we did give  
21 them this vehicle to express concerns to us.

22 Q. When Q1 was originally set up it was  
23 under the QA program, is that right?

24 A. No, it was not under the QA program.  
25 It reported to the Quality Assurance manager. It



1 was not a part of the Quality Assurance program.  
2 Two separate programs. They had -- if you see the  
3 organization chart it was very clear that you had  
4 your QA program and over here you had your Quality  
5 First program.

6 Q. The deficiency reports that the Quality  
7 First program used initially were quality QPV and  
8 QBV. Those are separate documents from Quality  
9 Assurance documents?

10 A. Probably started out the same documents  
11 but they were used by different people. We  
12 started this program. We were learning, too.  
13 There was some other programs in the United  
14 States, Palo Verde had one, Toledo Edison or  
15 somebody had one. We took parts of those and made  
16 ours. It was a lot more extensive than any  
17 utility sponsored program to my knowledge at that  
18 time in the United States. We grew with the  
19 program and it probably at first used a lot of the  
20 vehicles that were available and since we started  
21 this thing, most of the people involved were  
22 Quality Assurance people whereas when we went on  
23 into the program, we didn't necessarily use  
24 Quality Assurance type individuals. We used  
25 engineers and people that had different

1 backgrounds.

2 Q. Which of your subordinates set up the  
3 Q1 program?

4 A. Bill Rudolph was probably the prime  
5 instigator along with a couple of contract  
6 employees. Owen Thero was one. I believe Rick  
7 Young assisted but as far as I'm concerned Bill  
8 Rudolph was the daddy of our original program.  
9 There's been changes made to it since Bill  
10 instigated it.

11 Q. The Q1 program also had procedures that  
12 were written to show how it was to be conducted,  
13 is that right?

14 A. Yes, sir.

15 Q. Were they QA procedures?

16 A. They were separate procedures.

17 Q. Okay. Did you endorse or accept the  
18 procedures that were written for the creation of  
19 the program?

20 A. Yes. There was certain one's that  
21 probably had my signature on it that I had a final  
22 approval. That was again the way our procedures  
23 were set up for the whole project. It was certain  
24 procedures that had to have my final approval on.

25 Q. \*Q1's mission besides taking the

1 allegations from exiting employees, hotline calls  
2 and walk-ins was also to investigate and see if  
3 there was any validity to the concerns, is that  
4 correct?

5 A. Yes, that was one of the things they  
6 did.

7 Q. Were they also responsible initially  
8 for recommending corrective action for those  
9 allegations that they thought had validity?

10 A. Quality First, they didn't go out and  
11 correct anything. Quality First received the  
12 allegations, went out and investigated -- well,  
13 number one they looked at it even internally to  
14 see if there was any -- if it was a true  
15 allegation, could it be a 50-55E because if you  
16 knew about 50-55E only had so many hours to report  
17 it in and this is one of the things they did up  
18 front. They investigated the allegation to find  
19 out was it substantiated. If it was substantiated  
20 then they wrote an action to someone to get the  
21 thing fixed. The Quality First people themselves  
22 didn't go tell my construction manager how to fix  
23 something.

24 Q. They didn't recommend corrective action  
25 based on your knowledge of the program?

1           A.     Based on my knowledge of the program,  
2 they did not recommend corrective action.

3           Q.     Did they verify the corrective action  
4 of the affected organization?

5           A.     Yes, sir.

6           Q.     When Q1 was originally created, was it  
7 intended by you or the people that set the program  
8 up that drug allegations would be taken by Q1 from  
9 the exiting employees or from the hotline or  
10 walk-ins?

11          A.     No, sir. When we first set up the  
12 Quality First program that was the last thing we  
13 ever thought of. We did not set it up for that  
14 purpose. That was not the reason we set it up.

15          Q.     I know but was that aspect to be  
16 included in the program?

17          A.     It was never written into the program  
18 early on that we would take -- the Q1 would take  
19 those kind of allegations and do anything with  
20 them. When we got an allegation like that it was  
21 turned to someone else. Quality First would do a  
22 cursory review to see could that drug allegation  
23 or could that harassment, intimidation affect the  
24 safety or a safety component in the plant and if  
25 it didn't then they shipped it out. If you had

1 some guy that was pouring concrete out in the  
2 driveway that got harassed, Q1 certainly didn't  
3 look at that two minutes.

4 Q. They would take the allegation?

5 A. They would take the allegation.

6 MR. SILBERG: Is the question  
7 whether there was anything specific in the program  
8 that mentioned drug allegations at all?

9 Q. Well, what I was trying to find out was  
10 initially was it intended by you that Q1  
11 investigate drug allegations?

12 A. No, sir. I don't even think that even  
13 entered our minds because the purpose of the  
14 program was to see if people had any safety  
15 allegations from out in the plant because what we  
16 were trying to do, we wanted to fix all of those  
17 before we went for a license rather than fixing  
18 them after we got a license and got to running  
19 because we wanted to get on and run and run good  
20 which we did. So we think the program worked  
21 well. Because I've seen other plants that gets  
22 their license, they get started and they don't run  
23 very damn well because they keep finding things.  
24 We wanted to find all of those ahead of time and  
25 we was looking at that. I don't know, maybe some

1 of the other guys working on the program thought  
2 of drugs, harassment and those types of things. I  
3 did not. I did not think that that's what we were  
4 trying to do at all. And I still don't think  
5 today Quality First ought to be doing that.

6 Q. Doing what is generally termed  
7 wrongdoing?

8 A. Yes, sir. That takes a special type  
9 individual.

10 MR. SILBERG: When you say not  
11 doing, do you mean --

12 Q Investigating?

13 A. Sure, take the concerns. We would take  
14 any concerns.

15 Q. What was done with the wrongdoing  
16 allegations received by Q1?

17 A. They were sent to the responsible  
18 individual where they came in, maybe the  
19 construction manager of KG&E who in turn passed  
20 them on down through whoever he was responsible  
21 for. Maybe it was in the Daniel Organization.  
22 Maybe if it was in the Bechtel.

23 Q. So you relied on KG&E construction  
24 managers or Daniel construction managers to  
25 resolve harassment, intimidation, falsification,

1 drug use?

2 A. Absolutely because our program didn't  
3 have anything in it to do that.

4 Q. I'll tell you, Mr. Koester, in my  
5 interviews with the former Q1 investigators and  
6 with Q1 management, the existing management, they  
7 have claimed credit for investigations in these  
8 areas, although my review of their files I would  
9 tend to believe your testimony is maybe more  
10 accurate.

11 A. Let me tell you something. I've never  
12 looked in a Quality First file. I believe in  
13 confidentiality to strict to the law. I read the  
14 very cursory reports that came out of Quality  
15 First, never went to a file. I do not know one  
16 single individual that's went through Quality  
17 First, what his name was, don't have the slightest  
18 idea.

19 Q. Okay.

20 A. So you've had an advantage over me.

21 Q. But based on what I've seen, Quality  
22 First has done a very good job in preserving  
23 confidentiality?

24 A. That was one of the things we said  
25 early on we were definitely going to do.



1 MR. SILBERG: Glenn, when you said  
2 that Q1 wouldn't be investigating wrongdoing, do  
3 you consider Mr. [REDACTED] as being part of Q1?

4 A. He was part of Q1 to a certain extent.  
5 He would investigate a wrongdoing item if it had  
6 to do with the safety related item in the plant.  
7 If it did not have anything to do with making that  
8 plant run, it should not have been investigated.  
9 If it did, he should have been doing it for the  
10 legal department.

11 MR. SILBERG: So the extent he was  
12 doing those kinds of wrongdoing investigations,  
13 those would have been for Quality First?

14 A. He was the only individual I had that I  
15 felt that had that kind of capabilities. I  
16 certainly don't believe any of the rest of them  
17 did. They may have thought they did.

18 Q. Glenn, could you tell me about the  
19 management change from Thero to Snyder and what  
20 the basis for that change was?

21 A. Yes. When we first started the  
22 program, we looked at our people, who could be in  
23 charge of Quality First. Bill Rudolph recommended  
24 Owen Thero. He worked for Bill in Quality  
25 organization, seemed to have the ability to do

1 that and we put Owen in charge of it. As we went  
2 on, we wanted to -- we, KG&E, made a determination  
3 we were going to have a Quality First program  
4 forever and it certainly wasn't going to have  
5 contract employees running it forever. If I could  
6 have built Wolf Creek without one contract  
7 employee I would have but I can't do that and  
8 nobody could do that.

9 Q. Do I glean from this that the reason  
10 Mr. Snyder replaced Mr. Thero, you wanted to put a  
11 KG&E employee to head that?

12 A. I wanted to put a full-time KG&E  
13 employee that I could feel confident would stay  
14 with KG&E and a person that I felt had the  
15 background to do that work. Mr. Snyder had been  
16 at INPO on loan by KG&E. He would have been in  
17 their construction evaluation programs. I had  
18 excellent reports back from INPO on Mr. Snyder's  
19 work with INPO on these programs and I felt he met  
20 the qualifications that I felt we needed in  
21 Quality First and that's why I did that. On top  
22 of that, Chuck had made application to me several  
23 months before for a full-time job and I did not  
24 have anything for him. I kept telling him I'll  
25 keep looking. This came up, and he seemed to fit

1 the bill and I made him a job offer and he  
2 accepted. I brought him home from INPO two or  
3 three months early, as I remember, from his  
4 original loan time.

5 Q. As I pursued this investigation, one of  
6 the primary vehicles I've used is to interview  
7 former Q1 investigators. Many of the former  
8 investigators that I've interviewed believed that  
9 the reason that you decided to change the people  
10 that were supervising Q1 was more that Mr. Thero  
11 was not getting cases closed in a sufficiently  
12 quick manner and that Mr. Snyder was brought in to  
13 speed up the process so it wouldn't impede fuel.

14 A. No, that was not the case at all. I  
15 was never pressured to speed up anything. The way  
16 I looked at Mr. Thero, Mr. Thero had formed  
17 another company while he was working with me,  
18 quality Technologies, Inc., or Technology  
19 Company. He had already had another contract at  
20 another power plant, had people working there. I  
21 think it was Waterford. And it appeared to me  
22 that Owen Thero was going to go down the road very  
23 soon and I knew his contract was up in that year  
24 in about October. He had made no inquiries to me  
25 whether he was going to -- whether I was going to

1 extend his contract or to me, that he was wanting  
2 to extend his contract. On top of that, I was  
3 still looking for what I considered a person  
4 better qualified for that job than Owen Thero.  
5 Owen Thero, as far as I was concerned, was a good  
6 QA man. I did not think Quality First needed a QA  
7 man has its manager and I still don't today.

8 Q. Did you have any complaints or find any  
9 shortcomings in Mr. Thero as management of Q1?

10 A. Couple of things, yes, sir.

11 Q. Could you tell me what they are?

12 A. One of them was using tape recorders in  
13 interviewing people without their knowledge.

14 Q. Could you expand on that without their  
15 knowledge part?

16 A. I have no idea. What do you mean  
17 without their knowledge part? I was told by  
18 people in Quality First they used tape recorders  
19 in interviews and the people being interviewed  
20 didn't know they were being recorded.

21 Q. I hadn't heard that one before.

22 A. That's the reason I went to my legal  
23 counsel. He suggested I get rid of the tape  
24 recorders and that's what I did in a meeting in  
25 Dick Grant's office sometime after I hired Chuck

1 Snyder.

2 Q. So the exiting employees were being  
3 taped and they didn't know it?

4 A. I can't say which ones were or which  
5 ones weren't.

6 Q. You believe at least one instance where  
7 somebody was taped?

8 A. I was told it was done on a regular  
9 basis and I can't remember who told me that. I do  
10 know that there was taping done where people did  
11 know they were being taped. I knew that, too.

12 Q. There's been the removal of the tapes  
13 has been mentioned by a number of the people that  
14 I've interviewed and some other reasons have been  
15 offered for the removal of the tapes. One was the  
16 specificity of language and the detailed acts and  
17 the sex discrimination case [REDACTED]  
18 [REDACTED] as being a motivating force for  
19 removal of the tapes.

20 A. Not at all. I know the exact ones you  
21 are talking about.

22 Q. The other most often mentioned reason  
23 for removal of the tapes by the people in the Q1  
24 program was that there was a great deal of time  
25 and effort went into the preparation of the

1 transcripts from the tapes and this was cumbersome  
2 to the system.

3 A. I don't know how cumbersome that was to  
4 the system. I never did go and check on that. I  
5 myself feel and if my legal counsel would say no,  
6 tapes are fine, I probably would have continued to  
7 allow them to use tapes, maybe with some different  
8 instructions but I don't really believe in a tape  
9 being used in any type of a meeting. I even don't  
10 like it being used in this meeting right now. I  
11 despise people using tapes in any kind of a  
12 meeting.

13 Q. The reason that I use a tape and the  
14 NRC does frequently is because it allows me to  
15 move along much more quickly. If we had to sit  
16 here and talk about this and you had to wait  
17 patiently while I wrote up the results of this  
18 interview it would be not productive.

19 A. I understand where you are coming  
20 from. We all have our opinions, though.

21 Q. I want you to understand.

22 A. I had one yesterday, too.

23 Q. Another aspect of the use that people  
24 believed that the tapes were removed was to limit  
25 the specificity of the allegations thereby making

1 it easier to close the investigations.

2 A. Had nothing to do with it. That was  
3 the least thing -- I can't even imagine him ever  
4 thinking of that. I do actually believe and I  
5 truly believe this, if some employee comes down  
6 and sits across the table from me and him and I  
7 will talk, he will talk to me more freely and  
8 openly when he knows he's not being taped,  
9 particularly when I have told him how he's going  
10 to be treated, this whole thing is going to be  
11 confidential. It can't be very damn confidential  
12 if I have a tape in my hip pocket of mine and his  
13 conversations.

14 Q. Let me make an observation.

15 A. If I take something, put it on paper  
16 and show it to him, and say is this what you said,  
17 he can either sign it or not sign it.

18 Q. Let me make an observation about what  
19 you just said. I didn't find any instances in the  
20 file reviews there were any statements written for  
21 anybody. The testimony after the taping ended was  
22 usually one or two sentence summations of the  
23 person's testimony. I don't know whether the  
24 interviews lasted for two minutes or two hours.  
25 But there is no comprehensive or I'll say none,



1 there were instances but most cases did not  
2 contain any kind of comprehensive summary of  
3 whatever the person's testimony was. It was  
4 distilled down to one or two sentences and that's  
5 all is left after that employee's gone or after  
6 that investigator's gone unless you draw on  
7 institutional memory to recover that information.  
8 So the reason I mentioned this is because some of  
9 the former Q1 investigators thought that the  
10 results of not necessarily removing the tapes but  
11 this direction of taping the Q1 program had caused  
12 the interviews to be less thoroughly detailed for  
13 the case file and they thought that was a  
14 liability to the program. But that was not your  
15 intent in removing the tapes?

16 A. Not my intent. It would have been the  
17 last thing I ever wanted it to do. I was trying  
18 to find out from these people what concerns they  
19 had out at the plant. I never did even interview  
20 anybody. I've had people come to me and tell me  
21 things and they were pretty short. I could have  
22 written them down in the palm of my hand. Most of  
23 those craftsmen don't come in, when they are  
24 getting laid off, are not going to be sitting  
25 there talking to you very damn long. Excuse

1 the -- they are wanting to get on to the next  
2 job. If they have any concerns they are going to  
3 be very blunt about what they have. We maybe ask  
4 what floor it's on or something like that, I  
5 imagine, but I don't think that's where our  
6 Quality First people were probably using most of  
7 the unknown tapes. I think they were using  
8 unknown tapes when they were around people that  
9 probably didn't even know they were being  
10 interviewed. That's what came to me and I didn't  
11 know what to do with it so I went to my legal  
12 counsel?

13 A. I did not make that decision on my own.

14 Q. At one point during the Q1 program, the  
15 supervision of Mr. Rudolph over the program was  
16 changed to Mr. Grant, is that right?

17 A. Yes, sir.

18 Q. It's been alleged to the NRC that Mr.  
19 Rudolph's directions to search an exiting  
20 employee's truck and the subsequent legal  
21 investigation and fear of litigation may have had  
22 something to do with this management change for  
23 the Q1 program. Does that have any basis in fact?

24 A. It has absolutely none. Most  
25 ridiculous thing I ever heard of. The reason I

1 changed the reporting relationship of Quality  
2 First from Bill Rudolph to Dick Grant was the  
3 insistence of Region Four and.

4 Q. For independence?

5 A. For more independence. Mr. Rudolph had  
6 nothing to do with the search of a truck. Mr.  
7 Rudolph told no one to search a truck. I want  
8 that made very plain.

9 Q. I requested a copy of the legal file  
10 and was denied the NRC for privileged purposes so  
11 you are the only one, I guess, that has access to  
12 that.

13 MR. SILBERG: You could have asked  
14 Johnson.

15 MR. GRIFFIN: I asked Frank.

16 A. Don Johnson.

17 MR. SILBERG: The story about the  
18 break in, he could have given you a very  
19 thorough --

20 MR. GRIFFIN: It was not my  
21 attempt to reproduce the investigation. I was --

22 A. It's my intent to say though that Bill  
23 Rudolph did not tell somebody to go break into his  
24 truck.

25 Q. That was?

1           A.     Why I changed Bill Rudolph, Bill  
2 Rudolph did a very good job of running Quality  
3 First as far as I was concerned. The region kept  
4 after me telling me that there could be a little  
5 conflict of interest with him running the Quality  
6 Assurance organization and the Quality First  
7 organization. That's the reason I changed it to  
8 Dick Grant.

9           Q.     I've also heard that was the factor,  
10 the independence part was the factor. Early on in  
11 the Q1 program, one of the Q1 investigators was  
12 removed from the program and placed back in his  
13 audit function, a guy by the name of [REDACTED]  
14 [REDACTED] Did you ever know him?

15          A.     I don't know [REDACTED] but I don't remember  
16 the incident.

17          Q.     What has been alleged to the NRC is  
18 that Mr. [REDACTED] by luck of the draw or whatever,  
19 got involved in one of the early significant  
20 issues developed or identified by the Q1 program,  
21 had to do with the missing structural steel well  
22 carts and testimony I've taken indicates that Mr.  
23 Grant was responsible for removing Mr. [REDACTED]  
24 from the Q1 program and many of the Q1  
25 investigators that I've interviewed believed this

1 was retaliation for having very aggressively  
2 pursued this, particularly in meetings where  
3 resolution of this very difficult issue laid in  
4 the program which could have caused problems, that  
5 Mr. Grant became highly critical of Mr. [REDACTED]  
6 approach to this. Did you ever hear or get  
7 involved in any decision making as to the removal  
8 of [REDACTED] from the program?

9 A. No, sir, I did not get down into that  
10 level of who they put where and why. I signed all  
11 the payrolls and they went back and forth.

12 Q. I noticed in some of the testimony I've  
13 taken, certain meetings at certain levels you got  
14 involved. Like I saw your name crop up in some of  
15 the calibration problem issues, apparently  
16 meetings that were going on, so I didn't know.

17 A. You would have to be more specific  
18 there. If I was on site I may go to any damn  
19 meeting. That was my purpose.

20 MR. SILBERG: You were certainly  
21 involved in the MSSW problem.

22 A. Very definitely.

23 MR. SILBERG: But not  
24 necessarily --

25 Q. When the problem was first identified

1 apparently there was a series of meetings and  
2 there were a battalion of people trying to get  
3 resolution to this and Mr. [REDACTED] was, you might  
4 say, point man for Q1 and had become a primary  
5 advocate for the hundred percent documentation  
6 that he thought was committed to in the PSAR and  
7 once he was removed, and statements were made by  
8 Mr. Grant to people in Q1, this was the reason for  
9 his removal. It was perceived to be retaliatory  
10 and had a chilling effect at least on some of the  
11 people, so they say. But you weren't involved in  
12 that decision?

13 A. Not that I recall. Mr. Grant might be  
14 able to answer that.

15 MR. SILBERG: You say statements  
16 were made by Grant to Q1 people that he was  
17 removed.

18 Q. For that reason.

19 A. I do not recall that.

20 Q. Let me go back and revisit the tape  
21 issue for a minute. When the tapes were picked  
22 up, you ordered that the tapes were to be  
23 removed. Do you know what happened to the tapes  
24 themselves?

25 A. No, sir, I do not. I've even asked

1 what happened to the tape recorders. I do know  
2 they all ended up in Mr. Grant's office and I just  
3 found out yesterday that Mark Vining has one of  
4 them.

5 Q. One of the recorders?

6 A. One of the recorders. I do not know  
7 what happened to the tapes.

8 MR. SILBERG: My understanding on  
9 the tapes, having looked in some of the files,  
10 I've seen the tapes in the files.

11 A. I do not know what happened to the  
12 tapes. In fact, I've never seen a Quality First  
13 tape. I've seen the product of a Quality First  
14 tape but I've never seen a Quality First tape. I  
15 have no idea. I'm sure they did not turn the  
16 tapes in to Mr. Grant unless they were new tapes.

17 Q. Mr. Silberg points out that some of the  
18 files contain tapes still but I've received  
19 sufficient testimony from the former investigators  
20 who were working with files that had tapes, that  
21 had the tapes removed, to believe that not only  
22 were recorders removed but in some instances the  
23 tapes were removed, too. I was hoping to find out  
24 before I ended my investigation where these tapes  
25 may have ended up.



1           A.       I was led to believe that the tapes  
2 were never put in the files. They were only used  
3 for what you said just a minute ago, to speed up  
4 the interview so they could go back and write up  
5 the interview very quickly then they destroyed the  
6 tapes.

7           Q.       I think what they were doing was making  
8 transcription of the tape recordings. Some of the  
9 files still contain the transcriptions and the  
10 tapes. Others contain transcriptions and as I  
11 said --

12          A.       If you would have been in the same  
13 position I was when you received word of use of  
14 tapes in the Quality First program you would have  
15 done something, too. If you hadn't of, you would  
16 not have been a manager because they were not  
17 doing things proper and legal. It's pretty hard  
18 to give somebody a tape recorder and tell him how  
19 to do it unless you are riding around in his hip  
20 pocket all the time. It was best to take it away  
21 from him and there was no question of how they did  
22 it.

23                   MR. SILBERG: Was there a reason  
24 you didn't ask Chuck Snyder where the tapes were?  
25 He would be the logical person to ask.

1           A.     I've never been in a file.

2                   MR. SILBERG:   He had custody.   He  
3 has custody of all the Quality First files.

4                   MR. GRIFFIN:   Well, my only  
5 explanation to you, Jay, is I must have forgotten.

6                   MR. SILBERG:   That subject didn't  
7 come up.

8                   MR. GRIFFIN:   You can make a list  
9 of things I forgot and you can ask them and call  
10 me on the phone.

11                   MR. SILBERG:   If you want to know  
12 the answers we can certainly get the answers and  
13 provide them to you.   Do you want us to check?

14                   MR. GRIFFIN:   I would appreciate a  
15 call from you if Chuck knows where the tapes are.

16           A.     Chuck would have to know because the  
17 tape recorders were removed right about the same  
18 time Chuck Snyder took charge of the program so he  
19 should know even maybe what happened to the tapes  
20 that were in the recorders at the time.

21           Q.     I understand from both of you that this  
22 is an allegation that tapes may not have actually  
23 been removed but it's been alleged they were and  
24 if they were I would like to know where they  
25 went.

1           Q.     One of the points most often mentioned  
2 by some Q1 people who were critical of the changes  
3 in the Q1 program, particularly in management  
4 changes from Thero to Snyder believed that Thero  
5 as project manager or as the VP nuclear, that the  
6 Q1 program, that juncture in time had become more  
7 of a problem than a solution to getting the plant  
8 on line and this was a motivating force in the  
9 management change and all the resulting changes  
10 that led -- that resulted in the Q1 program at  
11 that period in time, just that four or five months  
12 before the targeted fuel load date.

13                   MR. SILBERG: You are referring to  
14 the period say starting when, August?

15           A.     What targeted fuel load date?

16           Q.     The date I've most often heard from the  
17 Q1 people was December, '84. Obviously --

18           A.     Who gave you that information?

19           Q.     The Q1 people.

20           A.     Why don't you go look at the  
21 schedules? Why would you accept somebody's word  
22 for that that's not even associated with the  
23 project or who had been only for a very short  
24 period of time? I don't understand that.

25           Q.     -I'll explain it to you.

1 A. You'll have to.

2 Q. There were initial meetings that Mr.  
3 Snyder had with his people that said we want to  
4 set these goals and we want to have these cases  
5 essentially closed all that could impede fuel load  
6 by December of 1984. This is what I've heard from  
7 a number of the people I've interviewed.

8 A. When did he say that?

9 Q. In his initial meeting with the staff.

10 A. That would have had to have been about  
11 when?

12 Q. August.

13 A. Talking four or five months a what?

14 Q. There's hundreds of allegations open  
15 and essentially the goal or depending on the  
16 language others have used, the mandate was to have  
17 these cases closed by December so they would not  
18 interfere with fuel load and essentially that was  
19 accomplished.

20 A. Did anybody ever tell you, including  
21 Mr. Snyder, that they were pressured to have  
22 anything done by December of 1984 and you tell me  
23 that you don't have to in your own organization,  
24 NRC, give them schedules when you think you are  
25 going to be ready to fuel load, when you think you

1 are going to be ready to go in front of the  
2 Commission, when you think you are going to be  
3 ready to go in front of the staff. It's  
4 absolutely essential to set schedules. Now, if  
5 it's wrong to set a schedule that yes, we may load  
6 fuel in December of '84 and all of my managers  
7 went back and said, hey, fellows we've got a  
8 schedule for December of 1984. I can't even  
9 remember if that's what I said. Is it wrong for  
10 Chuck Snyder to go to his people and say, hey, we  
11 would sure like to have these cases closed by  
12 December of 1984? Because if they are, then we  
13 aren't going to load fuel. It's not an NRC  
14 mandate, KG&E mandate. What was wrong with that  
15 and how could Chuck Snyder or anybody else know  
16 how many allegations I was going to get from  
17 August to December? It could have been a thousand  
18 and fifty.

19 Q. Exactly.

20 A. Or 5,000. So you have to have  
21 something to shoot for and if a schedule is wrong  
22 then we are all wrong. But your folks in the NRC  
23 on the other side made me set a schedule. They  
24 told me when do you think you are going to come to  
25 the Commission. When do you think you are going

1 to fuel load. Dick Denise was in here breaking  
2 his neck himself trying to get things done. Did  
3 Dick -- why don't you talk to Dick and find out?  
4 He was as close to Quality First as you could get.

5 Q. Mr. Koester, you've departed from the  
6 essence of my question here.

7 A. I did not pressure anybody to have  
8 allegations closed by December of 1984. I  
9 don't -- I was not in a meeting with Chuck Snyder  
10 when he said that. If that's what they said I  
11 don't know what Chuck said. Did you ask Chuck  
12 that yesterday maybe? I don't know whether you  
13 can tell me what he said or not.

14 Q. No, that's not necessary.

15 A. Okay, I can call him up when we get  
16 through here and ask him. Anyway, I do not feel  
17 that if Chuck said that, should help or hinder the  
18 program in either way.

19 Q. Well, I'm not being critical of setting  
20 schedules. Obviously you are trying to build a  
21 nuclear plant and you hope to end it some day. I  
22 know you're a manager and you set goals for  
23 people. One of the goals was to get this plant on  
24 line. There's a sequence or series of events or  
25 tens or 50- events that occurred that people in the

1 Q1 program were critical. Mr. Synder's initial  
2 meeting with the staff saying okay, we've got  
3 hundreds of allegations open and we are going to  
4 have them closed in four months and we are going  
5 to increase our staff but not very much. Now it  
6 didn't say that but the people sitting in that  
7 room saying we're going to get this many cases  
8 closed in this period of time, some of them had  
9 strong reservations about the possibility that  
10 these cases could be adequately closed in that  
11 short period of time. And obviously, if you are  
12 going to hire 100 new investigators and no new  
13 allegations had come in, maybe you could set goals  
14 that you could meet with nothing else changing.  
15 I'm not trying to say by setting a goal somebody's  
16 done something wrong. I hope you understand  
17 that.

18 I would like for you to look at a line  
19 chart that I made from the numbers presented to me  
20 by the Q1 management. I've put them on a line  
21 graph. Essentially what it shows is in August  
22 when Mr. Snyder took over, the closure rate which  
23 would be right about here (indicating), the  
24 closure rate which is the blue line, you can see a  
25 dramatic increase in closures. That same month



1 there's a dramatic decrease in the number of  
2 concerns made by exiting employees. Now, some  
3 people who were in the program, some people who  
4 were part of the Q1 investigative staff thought  
5 that Mr. Synder's management changes and  
6 procedures to the program, his style, his  
7 directions to his investigators, resulted in these  
8 two changes, both of them calculated to result in  
9 the Q1 open allegations being closed by December.  
10 And as you look over to December, 1984,  
11 essentially the mission is accomplished.

12 A. You just did all my work for me.

13 Q. Uh-huh.

14 A. Every bit of it. One thing it really  
15 shows -- you've got another question before I  
16 answer that?

17 Q. Have I asked you a question yet?

18 A. I think I know what your question is  
19 going to be but you go ahead.

20 Q. Some of the people that I interviewed  
21 think that some aspects of the conduct in program  
22 which were not in the spirit of the original  
23 intended program were the results of these things  
24 being closed in this one, you know, closing these  
25 things and to boil it down to one point and that's

1 the essence of what I was asked to investigate by  
2 the Commission was: Were the investigations  
3 conducted in a thorough objective manner, were the  
4 employees' concerns adequately investigated and  
5 reported? Now this line graph does not prove one  
6 way or the other whether that's true or not. But  
7 the numbers influenced some of the people who were  
8 actually performing the investigations believed  
9 that the program lost credibility. Now, going  
10 back five minutes ago to the question that I was  
11 getting to was in your mind, at the time, say  
12 August of 1984 when the management changes were  
13 made, did you perceive that Q1 had become more of  
14 a problem than a solution to closing out employee  
15 concerns?

16 A. If I would have thought that, I would  
17 have never written the NRC Region Four letters and  
18 told them I expected to keep Quality First in  
19 operation if I thought it was a problem. What I  
20 think has been a problem in the last three or four  
21 months, when we keep getting this damn program  
22 investigated.

23 Q. Actually it's been going on for two  
24 years.

25 A. Whatever, you've been pretty quiet

1 about it for a long time. It's pretty obvious it  
2 has become a problem.

3 Q. I have been working on this particular  
4 case now for seven months.

5 A. It has become a problem. It certainly  
6 wasn't a problem at that time because we wrote  
7 that letter voluntarily to the NRC. Nobody called  
8 me from the region and said give me a letter  
9 saying you are going to keep this program in  
10 operation.

11 Q. It's my understanding it's a voluntary  
12 program on your part?

13 A. It's a voluntary program.

14 Q. You are not given direction by the NRC  
15 as to how to conduct it?

16 A. They have come in and looked at it and  
17 written up inspection reports several times which  
18 I'm not sure I agree with but I don't object to.  
19 Now, I'll let Mr. Withers do that because I'm no  
20 longer in charge. I would like to have a copy of  
21 this.

22 Q. Actually, that's my work product. When  
23 the case comes out, you'll be getting a copy of  
24 the case under a cover letter from Mr. Hays.

25 A. You've got a photographic memory?

1 MR. SILBERG: Can we Xerox this?

2 Q. No. I'm not trying to be impolite to  
3 you guys but this is a predecisional document that  
4 will appear in my case file.

5 A. I've only got one thing to say about  
6 this. You have computers, you can reproduce the  
7 numbers.

8 Q. I got them from Mr. Snyder.

9 A. We're great on numbers in this crazy  
10 industry. One number here may mean work this long  
11 and the next one may mean this long.

12 Q. As I say, I'm not prepared to draw  
13 conclusions from this line graph and I don't think  
14 you or anybody else should either.

15 A. Region Four, we've had a lot of  
16 discussion with them about numbers. Number of  
17 open items, some takes five minutes to close and  
18 some takes an hour. What the hell does a number  
19 mean? And that's what I had a little bit to say  
20 there, too. I don't know what numbers mean until  
21 you know what's in the number.

22 Q. I've spent seven months trying to find  
23 out.

24 A. Did you find out?

25 Q. Well, I'm still, even as we speak, in

1 the process.

2 A. I think Quality First program, to me, I  
3 still feel that we did the right thing. I still  
4 feel the program accomplished what we wanted it to  
5 accomplish. We were a lot more competent the day  
6 we considered to have a fuel load license that our  
7 plant was done, done right, to protect the health  
8 and safety of the public rather than finding it  
9 out afterwards.

10 Q. I understand. Glenn, one other aspect  
11 of the operation of the Q1 program I wanted to ask  
12 you about since this is one aspect of it you might  
13 know something about. As I was doing the file  
14 reviews and the interviews with the Q1  
15 investigators, I found out that a number of the  
16 allegations that were originally taken by Q1 and  
17 to some degree others investigated by Q1, some of  
18 these were eventually transferred to legal and  
19 closed out on the Q1 files. These were things  
20 that primarily had to do with harassment,  
21 intimidation, discrimination. I'm making a  
22 presumption here but a presumption I'm making is  
23 maybe Wichita legal here anticipated Department of  
24 Labor filings or Kansas Human Resource filings for  
25 discrimination or whatever, for reinstatement or

1 wages lost or whatever. However, the one concern  
2 I had was I saw an inconsistency in the  
3 treatment. Some of the cases were fully  
4 investigated and conclusions were made by Q1, Mr.  
5 [REDACTED] acting -- I guess he handled at least  
6 early on the majority of them. Others were simply  
7 transferred to legal and there was no real  
8 resolution or conclusion made by Q1. In other  
9 words, it's as though it went to legal, we're not  
10 going to investigate that issue anymore. My  
11 question to you is: Was there a conscious  
12 decision to switch from an investigative posture  
13 where you're going to try to find out whether your  
14 own people did something wrong to a defensive  
15 posture in preparing for litigation and going to  
16 this defensive posture, was it intentional that  
17 these cases not be fully investigated and fully  
18 reported in the Q1 files?

19 MR. SILBERG: Are you saying that  
20 cases that were transferred to legal were not  
21 fully investigated but the cases that remained in  
22 Quality First were.

23 Q. The cases referred to legal may have  
24 been fully investigated but not for the purposes  
25 of Q1.

1 MR. SILBERG: I don't know how  
2 Glenn can speculate as to what legal --

3 Q. What I'm anticipating here, and I may  
4 be completely wrong, you may not have had any  
5 contact with legal about these cases, these people  
6 that were filing with the Department of Labor.  
7 You may not have had any contact or any knowledge  
8 or any feedback or any day-to-day knowledge of it  
9 but the one aspect of this that I'm curious about  
10 is whether there was a conscious decision on the  
11 part of Q1 to not fully investigate these cases  
12 and show resolution or draw a conclusion as they  
13 did on other wrongdoing issues once it went to  
14 legal?

15 A. I'm sure I can't answer your question.  
16 I think earlier I stated that if that Quality  
17 First allegation had nothing to do with quality, I  
18 don't think Quality First should have had any  
19 business investigating it because I did not have  
20 only that one investigator that was loaned to us,  
21 Mr. [REDACTED] that could look at anything in my  
22 estimation. I felt that I could go out and do a  
23 harassment intimidation interview better than  
24 anybody in Quality First. I'm not trained,  
25 neither were they, but I think I've got more

1 management ability and been associated with people  
2 longer to be able to go do that. That's personal  
3 opinion. But I don't know why if they weren't  
4 investigated fully in legal because I didn't  
5 follow those either. I didn't follow those any  
6 closer than I did the ones in Quality First and I  
7 didn't get involved. I tried to stay out of that  
8 portion of it because to me that kept it more  
9 confidential.

10 Q. I had no information that you had  
11 involvement. I was just wanting to ask you if  
12 maybe that you had been.

13 A. I was not.

14 Q. One other aspect on this same issue,  
15 not so much the transfers to legal but the  
16 wrongdoing cases falsification, harassment,  
17 intimidation, discrimination and related issues  
18 that were investigated by Q1 and reported,  
19 particularly those that were substantiated in the  
20 interviews I've done and the file reviews, I  
21 haven't found any evidence to indicate that there  
22 were any repercussions to those individuals proven  
23 where it was established by Q1 that they had been  
24 harassers, intimidators, falsifiers,  
25 discriminators, whatever. Do you have any



1 information as to why no apparent action was taken  
2 as a result of these types of findings whereas in  
3 the hardware, if hardware was found deficient,  
4 they would fix that but there was no what you  
5 might call corrective action related to the people  
6 problems?

7 A. I have no direct knowledge except in my  
8 own mind again, the Quality First programs were  
9 never set up, designed and not in force to do the  
10 same thing to an individual said we were  
11 going to do to that piece of , out there.

12 Q. Let me make an observation, Glenn, and  
13 I would like you to comment on it. NRC does  
14 investigate these areas of wrongdoing and we do  
15 believe they can adversely affect safety. If a QC  
16 supervisor or harasses his people in not doing the  
17 jobs correctly, we think it affects safety. If a  
18 person discriminates against somebody, it  
19 ultimately results in not doing the job and  
20 equally, if a person is working on site under the  
21 influence of drugs, there is a potential safety  
22 problem. The NRC, we don't investigate drugs but  
23 we investigate these other aspects of it and we do  
24 see a direct link and I can understand if you  
25 share a different opinion on it but that's the --

1           A.       I didn't say I shared a different  
2 opinion. If it affects safety, we should look into  
3 it. I agree wholeheartedly. If it does not  
4 affect safety, as another example I gave you the  
5 guys out in the damn parking blacktopping the  
6 parking lot it has not a thing to do with making  
7 the plant run.

8           Q.       I'll tell you this. There were some Q1  
9 investigative finding on wrongdoing that involved  
10 people other than laying blacktop.

11          A.       I wouldn't be a bit surprised. There  
12 probably was and I cannot answer you why if they  
13 found, they were substantiated, why the people  
14 were not reprimanded in some way and you have  
15 indicated to me they were not.

16          Q.       I can't find any evidence of it.

17          A.       Evidence where?

18          Q.       Evidence in the files with the people  
19 who were doing the investigation.

20                   MR. SILBERG: When you say the  
21 files, what files?

22          A.       Q1 files? It might not have come back  
23 to Q1.

24          Q.       It originated in Q1. They made the  
25 investigation and made the report.

1           A.     Early on our system didn't require for  
2     it to come back into Q1 if you read our  
3     procedures. They were transferred out and there  
4     was nothing that said you had to transfer it back  
5     in. If it did not relate to safety --

6                     MR. SILBERG: Unless you go back  
7     through the personnel records, I don't think you  
8     can really definitively say there either was or  
9     wasn't personnel action taken.

10           Q.     I will agree with both of you that I  
11     have not exhausted every avenue of information  
12     available to me. However, I talked to probably 30  
13     people who worked in the program who believed that  
14     they would know if this occurred, including the  
15     maker of the Q1 and so far I haven't found anybody  
16     that knows. There may be information available  
17     somewhere unknown that may exist indicating there  
18     was some repercussions for this type of activity.

19                     MR. SILBERG: For instance, in the  
20     case of the break-in of the vehicle, I know that  
21     there were personnel actions taken.

22           A.     Do you know that? Is it in the Q1  
23     file?

24           Q.     No.

25           A.     -Of course not.

1 Q. Q1 file, there is no Q1 file. It's a  
2 legal file which I don't have access to.

3 MR. SILBERG: I'm telling you  
4 there were personnel actions taken.

5 A. There were personnel actions taken  
6 because I was instigator of them. And I can  
7 almost bet you that no one on site knows that.

8 Q. I think you are right.

9 A. Because we don't go around broadcasting  
10 corrective action to personnel.

11 Q. I had heard, somebody on site told me  
12 that they thought a couple of security guards got  
13 reprimands but that was the extent and then I've  
14 had other people who were in a better position to  
15 know say no, nobody had any reprimands, there was  
16 no action taken against anybody

17 MR. SILBERG: There were  
18 reprimands.

19 Q. Okay. Another quick one. You may not  
20 know anything about this, Glenn, but it's possible  
21 it may have been brought to your attention. There  
22 was one of the Q1 investigators, a fellow by the  
23 name of [REDACTED] 70

24 A. He was what?

25 Q. Q1 investigator had done a rather

1 lengthy investigation on the deficiencies in the  
2 CAR Program. He worked on this investigation for  
3 like five or six weeks and turned in his  
4 investigative report to the Q1 supervisor, the one  
5 under Mr. Snyder, Mr. Scott. Mr. Scott, based on  
6 the testimony I've received, did not accept Mr.  
7 [REDACTED] investigative report and Mr. Snyder promptly  
8 terminated Mr. [REDACTED] for not having met the mission  
9 or having met the terms of what they expected of  
10 him. To simplify this, were you ever made aware  
11 of Mr. [REDACTED] determination or his situation or the  
12 fact that his report on this safety-related issue  
13 was not accepted by Q1 management?

14 A. I don't recall. I remember the name  
15 but that's all I remember.

16 Q. No details?

17 A. No details. I remember the name and  
18 only because you mentioned it. If you had asked  
19 me to remember that name I would not have. If I  
20 did, I certainly don't recall.

21 Q. One other area I wanted to ask you  
22 about. From the testimony I've taken, it has been  
23 conveyed to members of the NRC, myself and then  
24 other NRC members who have been on site reviewing  
25 the Q1 program that the concept of reportability

1 under 50-55E as interpreted by KG&E back during  
2 this time period, 1984, required a two-part  
3 evaluation of an issue before it was deemed  
4 reportable. The first part being a construction  
5 deficiency which if uncorrected could adversely  
6 affect the safety or operations during the life of  
7 the plant and two, a significant breakdown in the  
8 Quality Assurance program. That these two parts  
9 had to be met before it constituted a reportable  
10 item. Were you ever involved in any discussions  
11 to set or interpret the reportability aspects of a  
12 deficiency?

13 A. No, not directly. I accepted the  
14 criteria that -- excuse me, I believe the criteria  
15 we had was evidently sufficient or I believe we  
16 would have been cited more by the Region.

17 They were here. They didn't help us  
18 interpret but they certainly could do their own  
19 interpretation.

20 Q. Apparently, I don't know if there  
21 continues to be a difference in opinion on this  
22 subject between the main body of the NRC, the  
23 Region Four staff and KG&E, but the interpretation  
24 back in '84 that was received at least by one of  
25 the OI people up here evaluating this was that

1 both criteria, both of these situations had to be  
2 in existence before reportability was --

3 A. That was Bill Ward's letter.

4 MR. SILBERG: I'm looking at  
5 50-55E and there is no way on earth you can read  
6 this as a lawyer or even as a non-lawyer and say  
7 that you don't have to meet both criteria because  
8 it says: "The holder of a permit shall notify the  
9 Commission of each deficiency found in design and  
10 construction which were to have remained  
11 uncorrected could adversely affect the safety of  
12 operations to the nuclear power plant at any time  
13 throughout the expected lifetime of the plant, and  
14 which represents --" and you've got three choices,  
15 I'm sorry four choices, the first of which is: "A  
16 significant breakdown in any portion of the  
17 Quality Assurance program." So it's clearly two  
18 separate and independent tests.

19 Q. So that's still the standard has been  
20 applied throughout the plant that a significant  
21 breakdown in the Quality Assurance program in and  
22 of itself is not a reportable item?

23 MR. SILBERG: As I read this as a  
24 lawyer and if I'm giving advice to my clients on  
25 this, I would say absolutely and if the Commission

1 thinks that's wrong and if Bill Ward thinks that's  
2 wrong he has an obligation to tell the Commission  
3 to change its rules.

4 Q. I understand what you are saying, Jay.  
5 I noticed that and I used his example in one of  
6 the interviews I did yesterday, Glenn, I think  
7 with Mr. Snyder, there was a significant issue on  
8 site that required a great deal of corrective  
9 action rework and was very expensive to you guys  
10 and the use of the hydrolasing on <sup>steel</sup> Stanley steel to  
11 remove Dissolve tape or chloride residues. I  
12 noticed the <sup>NCR</sup> ~~NRC~~, that closed out that massive  
13 effort, that was done to correct this problem  
14 indicated, that they didn't consider that that was  
15 a reportable item. I throw that on the table only  
16 as an example of what I must conclude is a fairly  
17 strict interpretation of what is reportable. If  
18 such a significant technical concern could be  
19 deemed not reportable to the NRC --

20 MR. SILBERG: I don't know that  
21 that has anything to do with Quality First.

22 Q. It didn't. That was just a document  
23 that was part of part of the allegations and that  
24 was just one I happened to be familiar with so I  
25 could use that as evidence or as an example that



1 I'm familiar with of what I would refer to as a  
2 strict interpretation of what is reportable  
3 because by the statements I've received from KG&E  
4 people was a very serious problem and a very  
5 expensive problem to correct.

6 MR. SILBERG: Without getting into  
7 a lot of arguments, you can have very expensive  
8 problems which may not be plant safety related or  
9 which may not be reportable.

10 Q. To be honest with you, Jay, I'm  
11 certainly not technically qualified to evaluate  
12 the seriousness of chloride on stainless steel.  
13 However, I have been told that it can be a serious  
14 condition. Obviously not serious enough to be  
15 reportable?

16 MR. SILBERG: You have to look at  
17 the specific <sup>AKR</sup>~~NRC~~ and make that determination. I  
18 can't do it here in a vacuum.

19 Q. I have looked at the <sup>AKR</sup>~~NRC~~ and I'll say  
20 I'll have the inspection staff look at it.

21 Mr. Koester, have I threatened you in  
22 any manner or offered you any rewards in return  
23 for this statement?

24 A. No, sir.

25 Q. Have you given this statement freely

1 and voluntarily?

2 A. Yes, sir.

3 Q. Is there anything else that you would  
4 care to add to this record?

5 A. Yes. I just wish you would get this  
6 investigation done so we can run Wolf Creek  
7 without worrying about what we consider to be a  
8 good program. Still yet today do except it gets  
9 very little use and I believe it's going to get  
10 less and less use as long as the people knows that  
11 the NRC is in there looking at every damn little  
12 thing. Confidentiality as far as they are  
13 concerned is going down the tube. It's no longer  
14 confidential. You are looking in there at  
15 everybody who makes an allegation by name, they  
16 think. I don't know whether you are or not, I  
17 don't know.

18 Q. I was going to give you the last word,  
19 Glenn, but I want to let you know where I'm coming  
20 from.

21 A. I think I know.

22 Q. I interviewed quite a few members of  
23 the Q1 program.

24 A. Ex-Q1 program.

25 Q. - Ex.

1 MR. SILBERG: Ex-members of the Q1  
2 program.

3 Q. There's only about two of them left so  
4 almost every one of them were ex. The concerns  
5 I've raised to you are their concerns. When the  
6 NRC gets a majority of the people in an  
7 organization who find great deficiencies within  
8 that organization, of course we are going to pay  
9 attention to it. I appreciate you coming here yet  
10 today and answering some of these questions that  
11 are kind of pointed. Some of them would indicate  
12 that maybe you might have known some or could have  
13 something and I'm sure they are not pleasant to  
14 answer. I do appreciate your candor and your  
15 straightforwardness in answering these because it  
16 will help me get resolution on this.

17 A. I wish I could remember better  
18 sometimes, too.

19 Q. I thank you for your effort.

20 A. Are we off the record yet?

21 Q. Off the record.

22 (Off-the-record discussion at  
23 4:00 p.m.)  
24  
25

