

# UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555

June 20, 1988

Project No. 575

APPLICANT:

Combustion Engineering, Inc.

FACILITY:

CESSAR-DC, System 80+ Design

SUBJECT:

SUMMARY OF MEETING WITH COMBUSTION ENGINEERING TO DISCUSS CONTROL ROOM DESIGN - HUMAN FACTORS PROGRAM - SYSTEM 80+

#### INTRODUCTION

A meeting of the staff with representatives of Combustion Engineering (CE) was held at the NRC offices in Rockville, Maryland, on May 19, 1988. The purpose of the meeting was to discuss Combustion Engineers Human Factors Program in the design of the Control Room for CESSAR-DC, System 80+. Enclosure 1 provides the list of attendance to the meeting. Enclosure 2 provides the viewgraphs which CE used during their presentation.

#### DISCUSSION

The meeting was primarily to describe the Human Factors Program as applied to the Control Room design and to obtain NRC feedback early in the design. The Control Room design will follow the concepts the NUPLEX 80 reference design used for the advanced control center for the TVA Yellow Creek 1 and 2. NUPLEX 80+, the instrumentation and controls for System 80+ will be the NUPLEX 80 plus specific changes to improve man-machine interface, reduce construction and maintenance costs and enhance fault tolerance. The viewgraphs provide a clear discussion of the CE philosophy in the design of the control room. Although a full control room layout was presented, it was noted that CE only intended to provide documentation for controls and instrumentation of the reactor coolant system. The staff noted that this was not consistent with what was implied in the draft licensing review basis which indicated that a complete control room design was going to be furnished in the System 80+ design. Also that the philosophy of design of all instrumentation and controls based on the philosophy applied to the RCS may not be relevant.

The staff advised CE that the NUPLEX 80+ design would be evaluated in the context of 10 CFR 50.34 until evaluation criteria for advanced control room design are developed by the NRC. In that context, the staff approval would require ".....a control design that reflects state-of-the-art human principles....." and that provides a display of "a full range of important plant parameters and data trends on demand, and capable of indicating when process limits are approached or exceeded." The design should also "provide for automatic indication of the bypassed and operable status of safety systems." The staff noted that the preliminary design discussed at the meeting did not appear to fully satisfy the requirements, e.g., process limits and alarm setpoints are not provided on the system that is intended to satisfy the safety parameter display function.

8807120374 880620 PDR PROJ 675A PDR It was suggested that the alarm setpoints be shown on the meters. In addition, displays intended to monitor the bypassed and operable status of safety systems are not designed to be fully automatic. Regarding the requirements for "state-of-the-art" human factors design, the staff made two points: (1) CE should survey the operating history of similar CE plants to investigate areas that would benefit from the application of human factors design and the implementation of new technology; and (2) CE should justify and document the basis for final design choices among alternatives, e.g., why retention of conventional technology is preferable to the introduction of new control/display technology, or why the introduction of new technology such as "touch screen" controllers do not represent a greater potential source of operator error than conventional technology.

Overall, the staff was favorably impressed with the proposed CE design methodology and the preliminary design. The staff suggested that CE keep the staff appraised as significant design milestones are met so that further meetings and submittals can be scheduled.

This meeting summary was prepared based on inputs provided by J. Stewart and George Lapinsky.

Guy S. Vissing, Project Manager Standardization and Non-Power

Reactor Project Directorate
Division of Reactor Projects - III, IV,

V and Special Projects

Augh Finning

Enclosures: As stated Attendance List
For
Meeting With Combustion Engineering
Concerning
Human Factors of Control Room Design
for CESSAR-DC, System 80+

#### Name

Guy S. Vissing S. E. Ritterbush Linda T. Tomasi Bob Pearce Ken Scarola

Daryl Harmon

Marty Ebert Jim Stewart Dick Eckenrode George Lapinsky Joe Joyce

#### Organization

NRR/PDSNP
Combustion Engineering/Licensing
Combustion Engineering/Human Factors
Combustion Engineering/Human Factors
Combustion Engineering/Advanced
Instrumentation Design
Combustion Engineering/Advanced
Instrumentation Design
NUS/LIS
NRR/DEST/ICSB
NRR/DLPQ/LHFB
NRR/DLPQ/LHFB
NRR/SISC

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original signed by
Guy S. Vissing, Project Manager
Standardization and Non-Power
Reactor Project Directorate
Division of Reactor Projects - III, IV,
V and Special Projects

Enclosures: As stated

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# CESSAR DESIGN CERTIFICATION PROGRAM



KICKOFF MEETING FOR NRC HUMAN FACTORS REVIEW

MAY 19, 1988




# AGENDA

10:00	INTRODUCTION	S. E. RITTERBUSCH
10:10	OVERVIEW OF THE NUPLEX 80+ DESIGN	D. L. HARMON
10:40	NUPLEX 80+ DESIGN PROCESS	D. L. HARMON
11:15	LUNCH	
12:00	HUMAN FACTORS/FUNCTIONAL TASK ANALYSIS	L. T. TOMASI
12:45	CHAPTER 18 FORMAT	D. L. HARMON
1:00	NUPLEX 80+ FEATURES	D. L. HARMON
2:00	CLOSING	S. E. RITTERBUSCH

OVERVIEW OF THE NUPLEX 80+ DESIGN

SYSTEM TO S



### NUPLEX 80 DESIGN OBJECTIVES

O IMPROVED OPERATOR COMPREHENSION

HUMAN ENGINEERING PRINCIPLES INCORPORATED FROM START SYSTEM FUNCTION/TASK ANALYSIS SIGNIFICANT UTILITY AND OPERATOR INPUT

O SIMPLIFICATION OF FIELD INSTALLATION

MULTIPLEXING TECHNIQUES
PREFABRICATED CABLE

O REDUCED MAINTENANCE TIME

STANDARDIZED COMPONENTS SOLID-STATE COMPONENTS

O IMPROVED RELIABILITY

SYSTEMS APPROACH TO CONTROL COMPLEX

# SYSTEM 80+ INSTRUMENTATION AND CONTROLS

NUPLEX 80+

NUPLEX 80+ = NUPLEX 80 (TVA - YELLOW CREEK)

SPECIFIC CHANGES TO:

IMPROVE MAN-MACHINE INTERFACE

PLANT OVERVIEW COMPREHENSION ALARM HANDLING FRIENDLY TRANSITION TO ACR OPERATION WITHOUT CRTS


REDUCE CONSTRUCTION AND MAINTENANCE COSTS


MULTIPLEXING SOFTWARE BASED SYSTEMS


ENHANCE FAULT TOLERANCE

UNNECESSARY TRIPS EXPOSURE FIRES


DATA PROCESSING SYSTEM









**PLANT WIDE INTEGRATION** 



PLANT PROTECTION SYSTEM



INDICATION AND ALARM SYSTEM




COMPONENT CONTROL SYSTEM



### NUPLEX 80+ OPERATOR STAFFING DESIGN BASES FOR THE CONTROL ROOM

- TARGET NUPLEX 80+ OPERATING STAFF:
  - 1 SHIFT SUPERVISOR (SS)
  - 1 SENIOR REACTOR OPERATOR (SRO)
  - 2 ASSISTANT REACTOR OPERATORS (ARO)
  - 1 SHIFT TECHNICAL ADVISOR (STA)
  - 2 NUCLEAR EQUIPMENT OPERATORS (NEO)
- CONTROL ROOM DESIGNED FOR OPERATIONAL FLEXIBILITY TO MEET
  THE VARIETY OF STAFFING ASSIGNMENTS EXPECTED AT VARIOUS
  UTILITIES.
- SELECT WORST CASE STAFFING ASSIGNMENTS TO ESTABLISH DESIGN BASIS CRITERIA FOR CONTROLLING WORKSPACE AND CONTROL ROOM OFFICES.
  - A. OPERATION BY SINGLE OPERATOR WITHIN THE CONTROLLING WORKSPACE BETWEEN HOT STANDBY AND FULL POWER.
  - B. ACCOMMODATE FULL OPERATING STAFF FOR BOTH NORMAL AND EMERGENCY OPERATION IN CONTROLLING WORKSPACE.



NUPLEX 80+ CONTROL ROOM

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57578MI 45

# MI PLAN DISPLAY PHILOSOPHY


- O REDUCE THE NUMBER OF PHYSICAL DISPLAY DEVICES:
  - GROUPED ALARM WINDOWS WITH DYNAMIC MESSAGE DISPLAYS
  - DYNAMIC INDICATORS
  - CRT'S
- O REDUCE THE QUANTITY OF DATA:
  - LIKE SENSOR VALIDATION
  - PARAMETER PRIORITIZATION
  - ALARM ELIMINATION, FILTERING AND PRIORITIZATION
- O PROVIDE REDUNDANCY AND DIVERSITY IN THE DISPLAY SYSTEMS WITH ALL DISPLAYS INTEGRATED SUCH THAT:
  - ALL ELEMENTS OF THE DISPLAY HIERARCHY ARE USED NORMALLY, BUT OPERATION MAY CONTINUE (WITH MINIMAL DEGRADATION TO HUMAN FACTORS) UNDER EQUIPMENT FAILURE CONDITIONS


AND

- EQUIPMENT USED DURING ACCIDENT CONDITIONS IS ALSO USED DURING NORMAL OPERATION

# **INFORMATION DISPLAY HIERARCHY**

**NUPLEX 80+** 







# NUPLEX 80+ ALARM SYSTEM FEATURES

- ALARM FEATURES DESIGNED TO SUPPORT OPERATOR DIAGNOSIS
- THREE PRIORITIES OF ALARMS AND A CATEGORY FOR "OPERATOR AIDS"
- PRIORITY 1 AND 2 ALARMS ARE PROCESSED BY BOTH THE DIAS AND DPS
- PRIORITY 3 ALARMS AND "OPERATOR AIDS" ARE ONLY PROVIDED BY THE DPS
- ALARMS INDICATE PROBLEMS STATUS INFORMATION INDEPENDENT OF ALARM SYSTEM
- ALTERNATE METHODS AVAILABLE FOR ALARM RESPONSE AND DIAGNOSIS


# NUPLEX 80+



1




WHEN A DISTURBANCE AFFECTS A NUMBER OF PLANT FUNCTIONS IPSO INFORMATION HELPS AN OPERATOR ESTABLISH PRIORITIES





# NUPLEX 80+ DISCRETE INDICATORS

- PROVIDE CONTINUOUS DISPLAY OF ALL FREQUENTLY MONITORED PLANT DATA.
- PROVIDE THE OPERATOR WITH THE MOST ACCURATE VALIDATED INFORMATION.
- PROVIDE REDUCTION OF INDICATIONS THROUGH AUTO RANGING AND SIGNAL VALIDATION TECHNIQUES.
- PROVIDE REDUCTION OF INDICATORS COMPARED TO CONVENTIONAL CONTROL ROOMS THROUGH OPERATOR SELECTABLE DISPLAYS.
- PROVIDE DIRECT ACCESS TO RELATED CRT PAGES.
- PROVIDE ACCESS TO PLANT DATA REQUIRED FOR OPERATION WITHOUT THE PLANT COMPUTER; FUNCTIONALLY INDEPENDENT FROM PLANT COMPUTER.




DISCRETE INDICATOR SHOWING NORMALLY INDICATED VALUES FOR PRESSURIZER PRESSURE AND LEVEL



# NUPLEX 80+ CRT DISPLAYS

- CRT DISPLAYS PROVIDE ACCESS TO ESSENTIALLY ALL PLANT INFORMATION FROM ANY LOCATION WITHIN CONTROL ROOM OR REMOTE LOCATIONS:
  - DYNAMIC COLOR GRAPHIC PLANT MIMIC DISPLAYS, INCLUDING IPSO
  - ALARMS AND OPERATOR AID INFORMATION
  - PLANT COMPUTER CALCULATED INFORMATION
  - TRENDS AND REPORTS
- IMPLEMENTATION THROUGH NON-SAFETY PLANT COMPUTER.
- DUPLICATES AND VERIFIES ALL DISCRETE ALARM AND DISPLAY
  SYSTEM PROCESSING AND IDENTIFIES SIGNIFICANT DIFFERENCES.






NUPLEX 80+
DESIGN PROCESS




# **ALWR Implementation Logic**

Standard Plant Development



Specific Plant (First ALWR) Design & Construction



#### NUPLEX 80+ LICENSING APPROACH

- O FOLLOW EPRI ALWR IMPLEMENTATION PHILOSOPHY
- O OBTAIN DESIGN CERTIFICATION FOR NUPLEX 80+ CONTROL ROOM THROUGH ACCEPTANCE OF:

GENERIC CONTROL ROOM CONFIGURATION AND PANEL DESIGN


GENERIC INFORMATION PROCESSING AND PRESENTATION METHODS

GENERIC CONTROL INTERFACE METHODS

ANALYSIS PROCESS FOR ESTABLISHING SYSTEM 80+
INFORMATION AND CONTROL REQUIREMENTS

O ACCEPTABILITY OF PROCESS DEMONSTRATED THROUGH DETAILED DESIGN OF RCS PANEL






#### NUPLEX 80+ DESIGN PROCESS

- O ESTABLISH A MULTI-DISCIPLINARY DESIGN TEAM
  - HUMAN FACTORS SPECIALIST
  - REACTOR OPERATOR
    BOB RESCORL
  - NUCLEAR SYSTEM ENGINEERS
    DARYL HARMON, DAVE JAMISON
  - INSTRUMENT AND CONTROLS ENGINEERS
     RICK MANAZIR, FRANK RIDOLFO,
     GARY ALTENHEIN
- O ESTABLISH A MULTI-DISCIPLINARY REVIEW TEAM


HUMAN FACTORS SPECIALIST NUCLEAR ENGINEER FLUID SYSTEMS ENGINEER STARTUP ENGINEER I&C ENGINEERS UTILITY REPRESENTATIVE



#### NUPLEX 80+ DESIGN PROCESS



#### STAFFING AND CONFIGURATION EVALUATION



# NUPLEX 80+ STAFFING AND OPERATIONS PHILOSOPHY

ESTABLISH A TARGET OPERATING STAFF

DESIGN FLEXIBILITY TO MEET A VARIETY OF STAFFING ASSIGNMENTS

SELECT "WORST CASE" ASSIGNMENTS TO ESTABLISH DESIGN BASES CRITERIA

DESIGN TO MAINTAIN A "CLEAN CONTROLLING WORKSPACE"

DESIGN TO PROVIDE CONTINUOUS PLANT OVERVIEW VISIBLE FROM ALL WORKSTATIONS

CONSIDER ENTIRE CONTROL ROOM IN DESIGN - NOT JUST CONTROLLING WORKSPACE



# NUPLEX 80+ CANDIDATE CONFIGURATION FEASIBILITY EVALUATIONS

STAFFING CRITERIA

FUNCTIONAL PERFORMANCE

ANTHROPOMETRIC CRITERIA

MOBILITY CRITERIA

COMMUNICATION CRITERIA

OPERATOR FURNISHINGS LAY DOWN SPACE STORAGE

VISITOR ACCESS



# NUPLEX 80+ CONTROL ROOM ENVIRONMENTAL CRITERIA

ILLUMINATION


ACOUSTICS AND NOISE

COMMUNICATIONS


HABITABILITY

CLIMATIC CONDITIONS

MAINTENANCE ACCESS



#### NUPLEX 80+ MAN-MACHINE INTERFACE PHOLOSOPHY



# NUPLEX 80+ ALARM METHODOLOGY

#### DESIGN NUPLEX 80+ ALARMS TO:

- ALERT OPERATORS THAT A DEVIATION EXISTS.
- INFORM HIM OF THE NATURE AND PRIORITY OF THE DEVIATION.
- GUIDE HIS INITIAL RESPONSE TO THE DEVIATION.
- CONFIRM WHETHER THE RESPONSE HAS CORRECTED THE DEVIATION.
- REDUCE SENSORY OVERLOAD DURING LARGE SCALE PLANT UPSETS.

#### NUPLEX 80+ ALARM METHODOLOGY

ALARMS INDICATE A PROBLEM ONLY.

PLANT MODE AND EQUIPMENT DEPENDENT LOGIC AND SETPOINTS.

AUTOMATICALLY PRIORITIZE ALARMS WITHIN SYSTEMS.

SIMPLIFY OPERATOR PRIORITIZATION BETWEEN SYSTEMS.

REDUCE NUMBER OF ALARM WINDOWS.

REDUCE NUMBER OF ALARMS.

TOTALLY INTEGRATE DISCRETE AND CRT ALARM PRESENTATIONS.

MAINTAIN FUNCTIONAL INDEPENDENCE OF DISCRETE AND CRT ALARMS.

FIRST OUT ALARM INDICATION AT ALL PANELS.

PROVIDE CRITICAL SAFETY FUNCTION AND CRITICAL POWER PRODUCTION FUNCTION ALARMS.

#### NUPLEX 80+ DISPLAY METHODOLOGY

SUPPORT OPERATOR'S TASK INFORMATION NEEDS AND DECISION MAKING PROCESS BY:

PROVIDING CONTINUOUS DISPLAY OF ALL FREQUENTLY MONITORED PLANT DATA

PROVIDING MOST ACCURATE, VALID INFORMATION

REDUCING NUMBER OF DISCRETE INDICATIONS

PROVIDING "ALL" PLANT INFORMATION THROUGH CRT'S

FULLY INTEGRATING DISCRETE AND CRT DISPLAYS

ASSURING OPERABILITY UNDER FAILURE CONDITIONS
THROUGH DISPLAY DIVERSITY

PROVIDING SINGLE LOCATION FOR PLANT OVERVIEW INFORMATION

INTEGRATING ACCIDENT MONITORING AND NORMAL DISPLAYS

PROVIDING CONSISTENT DISPLAY CONVENTIONS IN ALL DISPLAY MEDIA

ENSURING THAT ABNORMAL CONDITIONS ARE ACKNOWLEDGED



#### NUPLEX 80+ INFORMATION PROCESSING

- CALCULATE MOST APPROPRIATE INFORMATION FOR OPERATOR'S USE

E.G., VALIDATED TAVE
ALARM DEPENDENCY

- REDUCE OPERATOR'S NEED FOR PROCESSING LIKE INFORMATION
  - E.G., PRESSURIZER PRESSURE INDICATIONS
- CALCULATE HIGH LEVEL INFORMATION REQUIRING COMPLEX ALGORITHMS
  - E.G., CRITICAL SAFETY FUNCTIONS
    CORE POWER DISTRIBUTION



#### NUPLEX 80+ PANEL LAYOUT HUMAN FACTORS CRITERIA

PANEL ORGANIZATION

FUNCTIONAL GROUPING WITHIN SYSTEMS SPATIAL SEPARATION AND DEDICATION CONTROL/DISPLAY INTEGRATION

LABELING AND DEMARCATION

ANTHROPOMETRICS

USE OF COLOR

CRT DISPLAY CRITERIA

HUMAN FACTORS/
FUNCTIONAL TASK
ANALYSIS



# FUNCTION/TASK ANALYSIS FOR THE NUPLEX 80 + CONTROL ROOM DESIGN

#### Goal:

- To Evaluate the Existing Man-Machine Function Allocation of System 80 Against Nuplex 80 + Philosophy.
- Provide Information and Control Characteristics for Detailed Panel Design.



### METHOD GOALS:

- 1. ESTABLISH TASK ANALYSIS METHODOLOGY TO BE APPLIED TO TOTAL CONTROL ROOM DESIGN.
- 2. APPLY METHODOLOGY FOR RCS DESIGN TO DEMONSTRATE AFFECTIVENESS FOR LICENSING CERTIFICATION.



SYSTEM FUNCTION TASK ANALYSIS METHODOLOGY BASED ON APPROACHES OUTLINED IN:

- RASSMUSSEN & LIND (1981)
- EPRI MP-3659 (1984)
- FINE & WILEY (1971)
- NUREG 0700



### FUNDAMENTAL ASSUMPTION

OF

## SYSTEM FUNCTION TASK ANALYSIS

- O OPERATOR'S ROLE IN PLANT IS CONTROL OF THE THERMAL PROCESS BY 4 BASIC STEPS:
  - 1. MONITOR
  - 2. EVALUATE/PLAN
  - 3. PERFORM CONTROL ACTIONS
  - 4. MONITOR FEEDBACK



## **FUNCTION/TASK ANALYSIS PROCESS**

- 1. Establish Allocation Criteria
  - Generic Function Allocation Criteria
  - Nuplex 80 + Staffing Philosophy
- 2. Establish Function/Task Analysis Structure:

**Gross Function** 



**Sub Function** 



**Operations** 



Tasks



**Task Information and Control Characteristics** 



# FUNCTION ALLOCATION GUIDELINES (ADOPTED FROM NU-REG 0700)

#### **Humans Excel In:**

Sensitivity to Ambiguous Stimuli

Perceiving Patterns and Making Generalizations about them

**Detecting Signals in High Noise Levels** 

Ability to Exercise Judgment Where Events Cannot Be Completely Defined

Improvising and Adopting Flexible Procedures

Ability to React to Unexpected Low-Probability Events

#### Machines Excel In:

Monitoring (Personnel and Equipment)

Performing Routine, Repetitive, or Very Precise Operations

Responding Very Quickly to Control Signals

Excerting Great Force, Smoothly and with Precision

Storing and Recalling Large Amou is of Information in Short Periods of Time

Performing Complex and Rapid Computations with High Accuracy



# FUNCTION ALLOCATION GUIDELINES (ADOPTED FROM NU-REG 0700) (Cont'd)

#### **Humans Excel In:**

Applying Originality in Solving Problems: i.e., Alternative Solutions

Ability to Profit from Experience and Alter Course of Action

Ability to Perform Fine Manipulation, Especially Where Misalignment Appears Unexpectedly

Ability to Reason inductively

#### Machines Excel In:

**Doing Many Different Things at Once** 

Collecting Many Different Data Points at Once

Insensitivity to Extraneous Factors

Ability to Repeat Operations Rapidly, Precisely, Continuously, and Consistently Over a Period of Time

Operating in Environments Hostile to Humans

**Deductive Processes** 



# PROCESS (Cont'd)

- 3. Develop Event Sequences to be Analyzed.
  - Steady State Power
  - Transient Power
  - Low Power Operation
  - Shutdown DHR
  - Startup
  - Shutdown
  - Abnormal Ops
  - Reactor Trip

- Loss of Power
- · LOCA
- SG Tube Rupture
- Steam Line Break
- · Loss of Feedwater .
- Station Blackout
  - Refueling
- 4. Define Representative Nuplex 80 + Workstation to Demonstrate Process for Design Certification.
  - RCS Selected Due to its Significance in All Events.



# PROCESS (Cont'd)

- 5. Analyze All Events to the Subfunction Level to Identify All RCS Related Tasks and Operations.
- 6. Analyze 7 Out of 15 Events to the Task Level to Evaluate Plant Wide Function Allocation.
  - Startup
  - Reactor Trip
  - -- LOCA
  - SG Tube Rupture
  - Steady State Power
  - Refueling



SWEETER (1) C.

### LOCA TASK ANALYSIS RESULTS Steady State Power Transient Line Brack EVENT LOCA Startup Power Diagnose Event Perform Standard GROSS Post Trip Actions FUNCTION Maintain Maintain RCS Reactor Shutdown SUS-RCS Pressure Inventory Collect RCS Subcooking Info Collect RCS Subcooling Info Evaluate OPERATIONS Information **RCS** TASKS **Sut pooling** TASK IMPO (Only For RCS)and CONTROL That Subcool Exists CHARACTERISTICS - 57278800 ct =

# PROCESS (Cont'd)

- 7. Apply Generic Allocation Criteria to the Tasks Defined (Considering Staffing Target)
- 8. Evaluate Allocation Based on Historical Operation, Nuplex 80 + Capabilities and Licensing Requirements.
- 9. Define Allocation and Provide Rationalizations.
- 10. Analyze All 15 Events to Define Tasks and Information Characteristics for RCS Only.
- 11. Apply to RCS Panel Design.



#### RESULTS/PRODUCT

SYSTEM FUNCTION TASK ANALYSIS WILL PROVIDE SUPPORT FOR CESSAR-DC CHAPTER 18.

- O FUNCTION ALLOCATION EVALUATION AND RECOMMENDATIONS.
- O LIST OF REQUIRED INSTRUMENTS AND CONTROLS FOR RCS
- O BASIS FOR REVISED EPGS.
- O TASK BASIS FOR USE IN DEVELOPING VERIFICATION AND VALIDATION SCENARIOS.



#### VALIDATION FOR CESSAR-DC

#### PROCESS:

1. PROTOTYPE REPRESENTATIVE DISPLAYS FOR:

**IPSO** 

DISCRETE ALARMS

DISCRETE INDICATORS

CRT DISPLAY PAGE

CONTROLLERS

COMPONENT CONTROLS

- 2. VALIDATE GENERAL INFORMATION PRESENTATION AND CONTROL METHODS BASED ON STANDARD HFE CRITERIA.
- 3. DEVELOP RCS ALARMS AND DISPLAYS AND DATA PROCESSING ALGORITHMS BASED ON SFTA.



- 4. DEVELOP REMAINING MCC ALARMS AND DISPLAYS BASED ON SFTA.
- 5. CREATE DETAILED GRAPHIC REPRESENTATIONS OF RCS PANEL AND REMAINING MCC PANELS.
- 6. LAYOUT PANEL REPRESENTATIONS IN PHYSICAL ARRANGEMENT OF MCC.
- 7. PHYSICALLY AND VERBALLY WALK THROUGH PANEL DESIGN US1 G SFTA
  - VALIDATION OF INFORMATION HANDLING
    TECHNIQUES WILL BE BASED ON REPRESENTATIVE
    RCS INFORMATION PROCESSING.

#### RESULTS:

- O ENSURE THAT ALL INFORMATION AND CONTROLS SUPPORT ONE MAN OPERATION AT THE MCC.
- O ENSURE ALL NECESSARY RCS INFORMATION AND CONTROLS ARE AVAILABLE FOR NECESSARY OPERATOR FUNCTIONS.
- O ENSURE RCS INFORMATION IS IN MOST USABLE FORM.

# VERIFICATION/VALIDATION OF M-MIS

# VALIDATION PROCESS:

- 1. BUILD FULL SIZE MOCK-UP OF CONTROL PANELS.
- 2. WALKTHROUGH OPERATOR FUNCTIONS DURING
  - STARTUP
  - SHUTDOWN
  - STEADY STATE POWER
  - REACTOR TRIP
  - EMERGENCY OPERATIONS



#### RESULTS:

- O ENSURE ALL OPERATOR TASKS CAN BE PERFORMED AT CONTROL PANELS.
- O ENSURE USABILITY
  - INFORMATION ACCESSABILITY
  - ANTHROPOMETRICS
  - SUPPORT FOR OPERATOR DECISION PROCESS
  - SUPPORT FUNCTIONAL NEEDS



CHAPTER 18
FORMAT

SYSTEM OF

## CESSAR-DC CHAPTER 18 ORGANIZATION

18.1	DESIGN TEAM ORGANIZATION AND RESPONSIBILITIE
18.2	DESIGN GOALS AND DESIGN BASES
18.3	DESIGN PROCESS AND APPLICATION OF HEE
18.4	NUPLEX 80+ CONTROL COMPLEX DESIGN ANALYSES
18.4.1	INFORMATION AND CONTROLS REQUIREMENTS
18.4.2	CONTROL ROOM CONFIGURATION ASSESSMENT
18.4.3	PANEL LAYOUT EVALUATION
18.4.4	CONTROL AND MONITORING STATIONS OUTSIDE THE MAIN CONTROL ROOM
18.5	VERIFICATION AND VALIDATION

#### Chapter 18 - Design Certification Deliverables

- 18.1 Design Team Organization and Responsibilities
- 18.2 Design Goals and Design Bases
- 18.3 Design Process and Application of Human Factors Engineering
  - 18.3.1 Information and Controls Requirements
  - 18.3.2 Control Room Configuration Assessment
  - 18.3.3 Panel Layout Evaluation
  - 18.3.4 Control and Monitoring Stations Outside the Main Control Room
  - 18.3.5 Verification and Validation Process
- 18.4 Nuplex 80+ Control Complex Design Analyses
  - 18.4.1 Information and Controls Requirements
    - Systems Functions and Operational Sequences List
    - . Man-Machine Functional Allocation
    - Task List for RCS-Related Functions, Including Categorization by Functions and Operational Sequences
    - Comparison of System 80+ Experienced-based Information and Controls Requirements with Function and Task Lists
    - Final List of Nuplex 80+ Information and Controls Requirements for All Systems
  - 18.4.2 Control Room Configuration Assessment
    - Operational Requirements
    - Human Engineering Criteria for Configuration and Workspace (from NUREG 0700, NP-3659, etc.)
      - Results of Configuration Evaluation
    - Documentation of Nuplex 80+ Configuration, Including:

Panel Arrangement and Configuration Dimensions Results of Workspace Studies

Visibility

Mobility

Access

Operator Furnishings

Console Profiles

Anthropometric and Ergonomic Study Results Allocation of Sit Down/Stand Up Panels

- Control Room Interface (Environmental, Communication, Habitability, etc.) Criteria List
- 18.4.3 Panel Layout Evaluation
  - . Man-Machine Interface Design Bases List
  - Detailed Descriptions of Information Display and Control Methods, Including Characteristics of Presentation Techniques, Operator Interaction, Relationship to Other Panel Display Methods, and Failure Modes
  - Information/Display and Control Allocation Criteria List

#### Charter 18 - Design Certification Deliverables

Results of Allocation Criteria Application

Human Engineering Panel Layout Criteria, Including CRT Display Criteria

Panel Layouts and CRT Displays for the RCS Panel. Including:

#### Panels

Panel Drawings
Alarm Windows List
Alarm Points for Grouped Alarms
Discrete Indicators List with All Parameters.
Channels, and Logic Provided
Operator Module Contents
Process Controls List
Discrete Controls List and Subgroup Control
Allocation

CRT Displays

Content and Layout of System Displays for Selected Systems

Content and Layout of Alarm Displays for Selected
Systems

Integrated Process Status Overview Display Application Program Displays

Panel Layouts for All Other Nuplex 80+ Panels, Including:

Panel Drawings
Representative Alarm Windows List and Grouped
Alarms

Representative Discrete Indicators Parameter List Operator Modules

Representative Process Controls List

Representative Discrete Controls List and Subgroup
Control Allocation

- 18.4.4 Control and Monitoring Stations Outside the Main Control Room
  - Remote Shutdown Panel

Information and Controls Requirements
Human Engineering Criteria (Panel Layout,
Environmer al)

Panel Layout

- EOF Human Engineering Criteria List
- TSC Human Engineering Criteria List
- 18.5 Verification and Validation

NUPLEX 80+

FEATURES

SYSTEM TO -5

## SYSTEM 80+ INSTRUMENTATION AND CONTROLS

NUPLEX 80+

NUPLEX 80+ - NUPLEX 80 (TVA - YELLOW CREEK)

SPECIFIC CHANGES TO:

IMPROVE MAN-MACHINE INTERFACE

PLANT OVERVIEW COMPREHENSION ALARM HANDLING FRIENDLY TRANSITION TO ACR OPERATION WITHOUT CRTS

REDUCE CONSTRUCTION AND MAINTENANCE COSTS


MULTIPLEXING SOFTWARE BASED SYSTEMS


ENHANCE FAULT TOLERANCE


UNNECESSARY TRIPS EXPOSURE FIRES


# ADVANCED CONTROL COMPLEX

NUPLEX,80+











PLANT PROTECTION SYSTEM



INDICATION AND ALARM SYSTEM




COMPONENT CONTROL SYSTEM

SYSTEM IN ST

# NUPLEX 80+ OPERATOR STAFFING DESIGN BASES FOR THE CONTROL ROOM

- TARGET NUPLEX 80+ OPERATING STAFF:
  - 1 SHIFT SUPERVISOR (SS)
  - 1 SENIOR REACTOR OPERATOR (SRO)
  - 2 ASSISTANT REACTOR OPERATORS (ARO)
  - 1 SHIFT TECHNICAL ADVISOR (STA)
  - 2 NUCLEAR EQUIPMENT OPERATORS (NEO)
- CONTROL ROOM DESIGNED FOR OPERATIONAL FLEXIBILITY TO MEET ;
  THE VARIETY OF STAFFING ASSIGNMENTS EXPECTED AT VARIOUS
  UTILITIES.
- SELECT WORST CASE STAFFING ASSIGNMENTS TO ESTABLISH DESIGN BASIS CRITERIA FOR CONTROLLING WORKSPACE AND CONTROL ROOM OFFICES.
  - A. OPERATION BY SINGLE OPERATOR WITHIN THE CONTROLLING WORKSPACE BETWEEN HOT STANDBY AND FULL POWER.
  - B. ACCOMMODATE FULL OPERATING STAFF FOR BOTH NORMAL AND EMERGENCY OPERATION IN CONTROLLING WORKSPACE.



NUPLEX 80+ CONTROL ROOM

5757EM ] = =

#### NUPLEX 80+ REMOTE SHUTDOWN PANEL

O RSP PROVIDES INSTRUMENTATION AND CONTROLS NECESSARY TO ACCOMMODATE GETTING TO AND MAINTAINING:


HOT SHUTDOWN - WITH SAME MMI AS CONTROL ROOM


COLD SHUTDOWN - WITH CRT INFORMATION AND SOFT CONTROLS


- O RSP COMPLETELY ISOLATED FROM CONTROL ROOM.
- O RSP PROVIDES TWO CONTROL TRAINS.
- O CONTROL TRANSFERRED BY SEPARATE CHANNEL SWITCHES LOCATED IN EQUIPMENT ROOM. ALL TRANSFERS ARE BUMPLESS.

# INFORMATION DISPLAY HIERARCHY

**NUPLEX 80+** 







IPSO INFORMATION HELPS AN OPERATOR ESTABLISH PRIORITIES WHEN A DISTURBANCE AFFECTS A NUMBER OF PLANT FUNCTIONS



#### IPS0

- O IPSO PROVIDES A SINGLE LOCATION TO ALLOW QUICK ASSESSMENT OF KEY INFORMATION INDICATIVE OF CRITICAL PLANT POWER PRODUCTION AND SAFETY FUNCTIONS.
- O IPSO INFORMATION INCLUDES:
  - TRENDS, DEVIATIONS, NUMERIC VALUES OF MOST REPRESENTATIVE PARAMETERS
  - SYSTEM AVAILABILITY AND PERFORMANCE FOR SYSTEMS
    SUPPORTING CRITICAL FUNCTIONS
  - EXISTENCE AND RELATIVE LOCATION OF PRIORITY 1 ALARMS
- O IPSO BRIDGES THE GAP BETWEEN AN OPERATOR'S TENDENCY TOWARD SYSTEM THINKING AND THE MORE DESIRABLE ASSESSMENT OF CRITICAL FUNCTIONS.

# PLANT CRITICAL FUNCTIONS

	CRITI	CAL TO
FUNCTION	POWER	SAFETY
POWER DISTRIBUTION CONTROL	X	
REACTIVITY CONTROL		X
CORE HEAT REMOVAL	X	X
RCS HEAT REMOVAL	X	X
RCS INVENTORY CONTROL	X	X
RCS PRESSURE CONTROL	X	X
STEAM/FEED CONVERSION	X	
ELECTRIC GENERATION	X	
HEAT REJECTION	X	
CONTAINMENT ENVIRONMENT CONTROL		X
CONTAINMENT ISOLATION		X
RADIOLOGICAL EMISSIONS CONTROL	X	X
VITAL AUXILIARIES	X	X

#### IPSO DISPLAY

- ONE 6.5' X 4' LARGE PANEL IN CONTROL ROOM
- DISPLAY PAGE FORMAT ALSO AVAILABLE ON ANY CONTROL ROOM/TSC/EOF CRT.

#### IPSO INFORMATION PROCESSING

THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION IS PROCESSED BY THE DIAS AND USED NORMALLY BY IPSO FOR DISPLAY:

- O PRIORITY 1 ALARMS
- O PARAMETER VALUES AND TRENDS
- THE REMAINING INFORMATION IS PROCESSED BY THE DPS AND USED BY THE IPSO FOR DISPLAY.
- IN THE EVENT OF DIAS FAILURE THE DIAS INFORMATION IS PROVIDED TO IPSO BY DPS.

Red

SYSTEM ON

Green

Yellow

SYSTEM OFF

CVCS

POOR SYSTEM PERFORMANCE



RHR

SYSTEM UNAVAILABLE



CVCS

SYSTEM ALARM STATE (PRIORITY 1)

SYSTEMS 'N IPSO:

CONTAINMENT SPRAY - CS

CONDENSATE - CD

**REACTOR COOLANT - RC** 

CHEM VOLUME & CONTROL - CVCS

SAFETY INJECTION - SI

RESIDUAL HEAT REMOVAL - RHR

**EMERGENCY FEEDWATER - EF** 

MAIN FEEDWATER - FW

TURBINE BYPASS - TB

INSTRUMENT AIR - IA

COMPONENT COOLING - CCW


**SERVICE WATER - SW** 

CIRCULATING WATER - CW

CONTAINMENT ISOLATION - CI .



## **IPSO FEATURES - PARAMETER VALUES**



PARAMETERS ON IPSO

HOT LEG TEMP - TH

COLD LEG TEMP - TC

REACTOR POWER - R x P


PLANT POWEP. OUTPUT - MWe



#### IPSO PARAMETER REPRESENTATIONS

**NUPLEX 80+** 

TRENDS, DEVIATIONS AND ALARMS



#### IPSO PARAMETERS USING THESE REPRESENTATIONS:

CORE EXIT TEMPERATURE

RCS SATURATION MARGIN

PRESSURIZER LEVEL & PRESSURE

S/G LEVEL NO. 1 & 2

CONTAINMENT | & P

RCS T<sub>AVE</sub>




IPSO

#### NUPLEX 80+ INFORMATION DISPLAY PHILOSOPHY

- O REDUCE THE NUMBER OF PHYSICAL DISPLAY DEVICES:
  - GROUPED ALARM WINDOWS WITH DYNAMIC MESSAGE DISPLAYS
  - DYNAMIC INDICATORS
  - CRT'S
- O REDUCE THE QUANTITY OF DATA:
  - LIKE SENSOR VALIDATION
  - PARAMETER PRIORITIZATION
  - ALARM ELIMINATION, FILTERING AND PRIORITIZATION
- O PROVIDE REDUNDANCY AND DIVERSITY IN THE DISPLAY SYSTEMS WITH ALL DISPLAYS INTEGRATED SUCH THAT:
  - ALL ELEMENTS OF THE DISPLAY HIERARCHY ARE USED NORMALLY, BUT OPERATION MAY CONTINUE (WITH MINIMAL DEGRADATION TO HUMAN FACTORS) UNDER EQUIPMENT FAILURE CONDITIONS

#### AND

- EQUIPMENT USED DURING ACCIDENT CONDITIONS IS ALSO USED DURING NORMAL OPERATION



#### NUPLEX 80+ DISCRETE ALARMS

- PROVIDES STATIC ALARM PRIORITIZATION WITHIN INDIVIDUAL PLANT SYSTEMS WITH MODE DEPENDENT LOGIC AND SETPOINTS.
- ALARMS INDICATE A PROBLEM ONLY STATUS INFORMATION INDEPENDENT OF ALARM SYSTEM.
- NUMBER OF DISCRETE ALARM WINDOWS SIGNIFICANTLY REDUCED BY ALARM GROUPING WITH DYNAMIC MESSAGE DISPLAYS.
- NUMBER OF ALARMS SIGNIFICANTLY REDUCED THROUGH SIGNAL VALIDATION AND DYNAMIC ALARM PROCESSING.
- DIRECT ACCESS TO CRT PAGES PROVIDED FOR OBTAINING DIAGNOSTIC INFORMATION.
- FIRST-OUT INDICATION PROVIDED FOR REACTOR AND TURBINE TRIPS.
- CRITICAL SAFETY FUNCTION ALARMS PROVIDED FOR POST-TRIP CONDITIONS.
- INDEPENDENT FROM PLANT COMPUTER TO SUPPORT CONTINUED OPERATION.



#### NUPLEX 80+ ALARM PRIORITIZATION

#### PRIORITY 1

IMMEDIATE ACTION

INDICATED BY:

MOMENTARY AUDIBLE
ALARM TILES
DISPLAY PAGE FEATURES
IPSO

- ALARM CONDITIONS GROUPED WITHIN TILES RELATED TO SPECIFIC EQUIPMENT OR PROCESSES
- CONDITIONS ALARMED:

MAY CAUSE TRIP IN < 10 MINUTES
MAY CAUSE MAJOR EQUIPMENT DAMAGE
PERSONNEL/RADIATION HAZARD
CRITICAL SAFETY FUNCTIONS
IMMEDIATE TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION ACTION
FIRST OUT REACTOR/TURBINE TRIP

#### NUPLEX 80+ ALARM PRIORITIZATION

#### PRIORITY 2

PROMPT ACTION

INDICATED BY:

MOMENTARY AUDIBLE

ALARM TILES

DISPLAY PAGE FEATURES

ALARM PRIORITY 1

- ALARM CONDITIONS GROUPED WITHIN TILES RELATED TO SPECIFIC EQUIPMENT OR PROCESSES
- CONDITIONS ALARMED:

MAY CAUSE TRIP IN>10 MINUTES

CHNICAL SPECIFICATION ACTION NOT IN PRIORITY 1

LUJIPMENT DAMAGE POSSIBLE

REG. GUIDE 1.47 BYPASSED AND INOPERABLE STATUS

#### NUPLEX 80+ ALARM PRIORITIZATION

## PRIORITY 3

CAUTION

- INDICATED BY CRT DISPLAYS WITH ALARM TILE CUE (NO AUDIBLE)
- CONDITIONS ALARMED:

SENSOR DEVIATIONS
EQUIPMENT STATUS DEVIATIONS
EQUIPMENT FAILURES NOT CRITICAL TO OPERATION


#### OPERATOR AID

INFORMATION


- INDICATED BY CRT DISPLAY WITH ALARM TILE CUE (NO AUDIBLE)
- CONDITIONS IDENTIFIED:

EQUIPMENT STATUS CHANGE PERMISSIVE CHANNEL BYPASS CONDITIONS











NUPLEX 80+





SI/SDC PANEL


NUPLEX 80+

SYSTEM IN CO










#### **OPERATOR RESPONSE**

- DEPRESS ALARM TILES

#### **ALARM SYSTEM SUPPORT**

- (1) ALARM DESCRIPTOR ON MESSAGE WINDOW (PRI 1 & 2)
- (2) COMPLETE ALARM MESSAGE ON CRT
- 3 MENU OPTIONS INDICATE USEFUL SUPPORTING DISPLAY PAGES
- 4 DIRECT ACCESS TO LISTING OF ALL ALARMS IN GROUP






#### **ALARM RESPONSE ON CRT**

**NUPLEX 80+** 

#### **ALARM TILE REPRESENTATIONS**



**OPERATOR SELECTS** -

ALARM TILES MENU OPTION (A)

FOLLOWED BY PRIMARY (A 1st LEVEL DISPLAY PAGE IN ALARM) (B)

RESULT: REPRESENTATION OF ALARMING TILES IN SELECTED CATEGORY





#### **ALARM RESPONSE ON CRT**

**NUPLEX 80+** 

#### (USING ALARM TILE REPRESENTATION - CONTINUED)

OPERATOR CAN ACKNOWLEDGE USING 1 OF 2 OPTIONS OPTION 1: SELECT/TOUCH ALARM TILE REPRESENTATION (A) RESULT - OBTAIN CRT ALAHM MESSAGE (B) 12:42 HI CTL BLEEDOFF PRESS 389/315 2 (B) TRES LIST ALARM **OPTION 2: OPERATOR SELECTS FOLLOWED BY** LIST SYS TROUBLE RESULT - OBTAINS CATAGORIZED LIST STARTING AT SEAL/BLEED ALARMS CATAGORIZED ALARM LIST PRIMARY **RCS** SEAL/BLEED SYS TROUBLE 12:20 HI-CTL BLEEDOFF PRESS 389/315 12:42 LO-RCP 1A SEAL FLOW 3.5/3.9

# REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM

# ALARMS

SYSTEM 80		NUPLEX 80+		
ALARM TILES	ALARMS	ALARM TILES ALARMS		
6	46	PRIORITY 1 - 8 11		
		PRIORITY 2 - 1 6		
		PRIORITY 3 - 1 41		
		OPERATOR AID - 1 6		
		(NEW SENSOR DEVIATION		
		ALARMS)		

# REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM ALARMS

#### NUPLEX 80+/SYSTEM 80 COMPARISON

- ALARMS REDUCE OPERATOR PROCESSING TIME BY MORE ACCURATELY
  IDENTIFYING CAUSE
  - SYSTEM 80 HAS A "HIGH, LOW PRESSURIZER PRESSURE" ALARM


#### POSSIBLE CAUSES

- . CHANNEL X SENSOR FAILURE
- . CHANNEL Y SENSOR FAILURE
- . NUISANCE HIGH PRESSURIZER PRESS AFTER TRIP
- . NUISANCE LOW PRESSURIZER PRESS AFTER TRIP
- . HIGH PRESSI'RE ON PROCESS
- . LOW PRESSURE ON PROCESS
- REPLACE ON NUPLEX 80+ WITH FOUR ALARMS
  - . MODE DEPENDENT ABNORMAL HIGH VALIDATED PRESS (P1)
  - . MODE DEPENDENT ABNORMAL LOW VALIDATED PRESS (P1)
  - PRESS CONTROLLING CHANNEL FAILURE (P1)
  - . SENSOR DEVIATION (P3)

#### 2. EASIER CLARIFICATION OF PROBLEMS


- ONLY 11 CONDITIONS CAN CAUSE PRIORITY 1 ALARMS ON NUPLEX 80+
- ALL 46 RCS ALARM CONDITIONS HAVE EQUAL IMPORTANCE ON SYSTEM 80





DISCRETE INDICATOR SHOWING NORMALLY INDICATED VALUES FOR PRESSURIZER PRESSURE AND LEVEL.






DISCRETE PZR PRESS INDICATOR AFTER DEPRESSING "MENU" BUTTON




# DISCRETE INDICATOR VALIDATION APPLICATION

NUPLEX 80+



# DISCRETE INDICATOR FLOW PATH APPLICATION

NUPLEX 80+



#### REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM

#### INDICATORS

SYSTEM 80

NUPLEX 80+

43

(INCLUDES PAMI INDICATOR ON ACSC)

#### SYSTEM 80

- ALL PARAMETERS NEEDED FOR OPERATION CONTINUOUSLY DISPLAYED
- INFREQUENTLY VIEWED PARAMETERS TAKE UP BOARD SPACE (I.E., ; PRESSURIZER SURGE LINE TEMPERATURE)
- MANY METERS MEASURING THE SAME PARAMETER (I.E., THREE INDICATORS FOR PRESSURIZER LEVEL)

#### NUPLEX 80+

- ONLY FREQUENTLY VIEWED PARAMETER CONTINUOUSLY DISPLAYED (I.E., PRESSURIZER PRESSURE, T<sub>COLD</sub>, ETC.)
- INFREQUENTLY VIEWED PARAMETERS AVAILABLE USING THE DISCRETE
   INDICATOR PAGING SYSTEM OR THE CRT
- ONE SINGLE VALIDATED INDICATOR TAKES THE PLACE OF MANY
  METERS MEASURING THE SAME PARAMETER (I.E., ONE VALIDATED
  PRESSURIZER LEVEL METER REPLACES THREE INDIVIDUAL
  PRESSURIZER LEVEL METERS ON THE RCS PANEL)


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#### NUPLEX 80+ CRT DISPLAYS


- CRT DISPLAYS PROVIDE ACCESS TO ESSENTIALLY ALL PLANT INFORMATION FROM ANY LOCATION WITHIN CONTROL ROOM OR REMOTE LOCATIONS:
  - DYNAMIC COLOR GRAPHIC PLANT MIMIC DISPLAYS, INCLUDING IPSO
  - ALARMS AND OPERATOR AID INFORMATION
  - PLANT COMPUTER CALCULATED INFORMATION
  - TRENDS AND REPORTS
- IMPLEMENTATION THROUGH NON-SAFETY PLANT COMPUTER.
- DUPLICATES AND VERIFIES ALL DISCRETE ALARM AND DISPLAY SYSTEM PROCESSING AND IDENTIFIES SIGNIFICANT DIFFERENCES.

# **NUPLEX 80+ CRT DISPLAY HIERARCHY**

NUPLEX 80+



# PESIGN PHILOSOPHY




# **CRITICAL FUNCTIONS**

CORE REACTIVITY  - CEA DROP MALFCTN  HI POST TRIP PWR  - THERMAL REACT ADD  - LO BORON CONC	RCS INVENTORY  "LO PZR LEV  - QUENGH TANK LEV  - QUENGH TANK PRES  - QUENCH TANK TEMP  - RELIEF VLV DISCH	RCS PRESSURE  -COLD STRESS TEMP HI PZR PRES/RATE -LO SUBGOOLEG MAR
CORE HEAT REMOVAL  - HI CORE DT  - LO RCTR VES LEV  - HI CORE EXIT TEMP  - CORE SAT MARGIN  - LO RCP LOAD	PCR HEAT REMOVAL  - SDCS NOT COOLING - LO SIS PUMP FLOW ECCS NOT COOLING  - SG NOT COOLING - LO SI/FW, COOLING	CNMT ISOLATION  - CNMT ISOLATION - CNMT PURGE ISO SAFETY INJ ISO MAIN STEAM ISO
CNMT TEMP / PRESS  - FAIL COGLERS  - LO SPRAY FLOW  - CHMT PRESS CHANGE  HI CNMT PRES  - LO CHMT PRES  - HI CNMT TEMP	RADIATION EMISSIONS  - HI COND AIR, EJEC - HI CHIMT - HI CHIMT DOME HI VENT/STACK	

が行うという。





## NUPLEX 80+ SAFETY-RELATED DISPLAY INFORMATION

NUPLEX 80+ HAS THREE METHODS OF REG.GUIDE 1.97 PARAMETER DISPLAY:

- DIAS CHANNEL Y SAFETY MONITORING PANEL
  SEISMIC DISPLAY DEDICATED TO CATEGORY 1 PARAMETERS
- DIAS CHANNEL X CATEGORIES 1 AND 2 PARAMETERS INTEGRATED INTO NORMAL WORKSTATION DISPLAYS.

DISPLAYS ARE SEISMIC, SELECTABLE TO PAMI CHANNELS AND INDEPENDENT FROM DIAS-Y.

FIVE SEGMENTS DIVIDED BY PLANT AREA.

- PMDS - CRT'S DISPLAY ALL REG. GUIDE 1.97 VARIABLES.


INDEPENDENT FROM DIAS X AND Y.

PROVIDES TRENDING.

ALL DISPLAYS SHOW VALIDATED DATA FROM CROSS-CHANNEL INPUT CHECKS. PMDS ALARMS DISCREPANCIES.


## **INFORMATION DISPLAY HIERARCHY**

**NUPLEX 80+** 




# CENTRALIZED CONTROL WITH MAXIMUM MULTIPLEXING

**NUPLEX 80+** 




# FLASHING DISCREPANCY INDICATION


#### COMPONENT DISCREPANCY IN MANUAL MODE




# ESF SYSTEM STATUS MONITORING AND DISCREPANCY INDICATION



OR




SIAS INOPERABLE & COMPONENT DISCREPANCY ALARM BY TRAIN



OR

SIAS INOPERABLE



SIAS INOPERABLE & COMPONENT INOPERABLE ALARM BY TRAIN

SYSTEM

# CLOSING

- O SUMMARY OF ACTION ITEMS
- O NEXT MEETING