



UNITED STATES  
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION  
REGION III  
799 ROOSEVELT ROAD  
GLEN ELLYN, ILLINOIS 60137

JUN 20 1988

MEMORANDUM FOR: A. Bert Davis, Regional Administrator  
FROM: H. J. Miller, Director, Division of Reactor Safety  
SUBJECT: DRESDEN SITE VISIT

On June 8, I visited the Dresden Plant to attend the exit meeting for an inspection of emergency operating procedures (EOPs) performed by the assigned Region I EOP team. The EOP inspection identified deficiencies and weaknesses in Dresden's EOPs that must be addressed by the licensee. However, none of the findings raised immediate safety concerns. Summary notes from the EOP exit meeting are attached.

While at the site, I toured the facility with the resident inspector, Paul D. Kaufman. Unit 2 was operating at 90% power while Unit 3 was shutdown in a refueling outage. I toured the Unit 3 drywell and other contaminated areas as well as readily accessible areas to get a good, overall picture of material conditions. I also visited the control room and spoke to operators. The following summarizes my observations:

1. While significant progress has been made in cleaning and painting the plant, I noted numerous oil and potentially contaminated water/steam leaks. There was, for example, significant leakage occurring at the Unit 2 (operating unit) EHC station. A significant amount of EHC fluid was observed standing inside the weir wall surrounding the EHC pumps and heat exchangers. In some cases, it appears some of the leaks or pumps were actually painted over; the oil leaks have finally worked their way through the paint, however.
2. We noted several deficient situations involving ongoing maintenance. In one instance, maintenance was being performed on a flow control valve in a condensate/feedwater recirculation line using hoists rigged from safety related electrical conduit. This repeats a problem which was recently raised by the RI's with licensee management. Another problem involved maintenance being performed on equipment without adequate cleanliness controls (e.g., unattended condensate system flow control valve with bonnet and valve intervals removed without protection). Combined with recent fires, which were attributable to contractor activities, these situation raise strong questions about CECO's control of contractors doing maintenance and modification work at the plant.
3. From discussions with several operators, it appears that operator morale has improved at the plant over the past year or so. They said they are pleased with steps being taken to upgrade material condition. They said they saw management (e.g., the plant manager) in the plant more often


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than in the past. However, several nuisance alarms or annunciators and other indicator problems (steam flow and reactor vessel water levels) were pointed out to me by one operator as examples of problems still being experienced in maintaining a high level of material readiness.

4. The control room was quite noisy and not in very good, overall condition in large part because of major modifications being made in overhead spaces. Modifications underway to improve lighting, altering the ceiling to (among other things) quiet the room, and wall-off the Unit 3 control room, appear to be needed.

Some of the poor housekeeping conditions observed may have been due to the fact that an outage in Unit 2 was just completed simultaneously with the Unit 3 refueling outage sapping plant resources. In any event, the items above present concerns which I talked to the plant manager about.

Separately, and after my visit, the monthly management meeting with CECO on Dresden was held. The issues identified in my tour were among those discussed. Specifically, for example, the problem of contractor control was raised. My impression from the plant tour and recent events (e.g., fires, maintenance problems associated with the MSIV failures) is that these periodic visits and management meetings are important steps as we follow CECO's efforts to improve maintenance and material conditions at Dresden, operating both units at the same time.



H. J. Miller, Director  
Division of Reactor Safety

Attachment: As stated

cc w/o attachment:

J. Taylor, NRR  
J. Clifford, EDO  
C. J. Paperiello, RIII  
E. G. Greenman, RIII  
J. J. Harrison, RIII  
G. C. Wright, RIII  
W. L. Forney, RIII  
G. G. Dupont, SRI  
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