TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY
Sequoyah Nuclear Plant
Post Office Box 2000
Soddy-Daisy, Tennessee 37379

February 25, 1988

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Document Control Desk
Washington, DC 20555

Gentlemen:

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY - SEQUOYAH NUCLEAR PLANT UNITS 1 AND 2 - DOCKET NOS. 50-327 AND -328 - FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE DPR-77 AND DPR-79 - SPECIAL REPORT 88-07

The enclosed special report provides details concerning a fire barrier being nonfunctional for greater than seven days. This event is reported in accordance with action statement (a) of Limiting Conditions for Operation 3.7.12.

Very truly yours,

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY

S. J. Smith
Plant Manager

Enclosure
cc (Enclosure):

J. Nelson Grace, Regional Administrator
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Suite 2900
101 Marietta Street, NW
Atlanta, Georgia 30323

Records Center
Institute of Nuclear Power Operations
Suite 1500
1100 Circle 75 Parkway
Atlanta, Georgia 30339

NRC Inspector, Sequoyah Nuclear Plant

IE22
1/1

SEQUOYAH NUCLEAR PLANT
UNITS 1 AND 2
SPECIAL REPORT 88-02

DESCRIPTION OF EVENT

On January 29, 1988, with unit 2 in mode 5 (cold shutdown) (0 percent power, 350 psig, 190 degrees F), a fire barrier breaching permit was discovered to have expired. Fire watch personnel found that breaching permit No. 5813 for fire barrier door A-72 had exceeded the seven-day limit allowed by the Sequoyah Nuclear Plant (SQN) Technical Specification (TS) Limiting Condition for Operation (LCO) 3.7.12. Fire barrier door A-72 is to the unit 2 "B" train containment spray and residual heat removal heat exchanger room located on elevation 690 of the Auxiliary Building. The breach of fire barrier door A-72 (January 21, 1988) was required for work being performed to the unit 2 "B" train containment spray heat exchanger. This work required hoses to be routed through the subject door to provide air, drainage, and a demineralized water supply.

CAUSE OF EVENT

The duration required to perform this work exceeded the seven-day interval of the breaching permit as performance of System Operating Instruction (SOI)-67.1.D, "Containment Spray System Heat Exchanger Lay-up," was in progress. This procedure requires the drainage, refilling, flushing, and chemical addition to the heat exchanger which requires a large quanity of water to be processed which took an interval of greater than seven days to implement.

ANALYSIS OF EVENT

The above described event is being reported in accordance with the requirements of action statement (a) of LCO 3.7.12.

Upon issue of the breach permit a roving fire watch was established to inspect the containment spray heat exchanger room 2B on an hourly basis as required by the action statement of LCO 3.7.12. The existing fire detection system for heat exchanger room had been verified operable and would have functioned in the event of a fire. Therefore, there was no danger to redundant safety-related equipment.

CORRECTIVE ACTION

Upon issue of the breach permit, a roving fire watch at a regular interval of one hour was established for the 2B heat exchanger room and maintained until the completion of work. The performance of SOI-67.1 to layup the heat exchanger and the closure of the fire barrier breach (Permit No. 5813) was completed on February 1, 1988. No further action is required.

0873Q