

Public Service
Electric and Gas
Company

Corbin A. McNeill, Jr.
Vice President
Nuclear

Public Service Electric and Gas Company P.O. Box 236, Hancocks Bridge, NJ 08038 609-339-4800

August 21, 1986

NLR-N86106

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Region I
631 Park Avenue
King of Prussia, PA 19406

Attention: Dr. Thomas E. Murley, Administrator
Office of Inspection and Enforcement

Gentlemen:

NRC INSPECTION REPORT #86-32
DOCKET NO. 50-354
HOPE CREEK GENERATING STATION

Public Service Electric and Gas Company (PSE&G) is in receipt of your letter dated July 28, 1986, which transmitted a Notice of Violation concerning a failure to comply with the requirements of 10CFR50 Appendix B, Criterion XI.

Pursuant to the provisions of 10CFR2.201, our response to the Notice of Violation is provided in Attachment 1.

Sincerely,



Attachment

Mr. James M. Taylor, Director
Office of Inspection and Enforcement
Washington, DC 20555

NRC Resident Inspector
P.O. Box 241
Hancocks Bridge, NJ 08038

ATTACHMENT 1

10 CFR 2.201 INFORMATION
PUBLIC SERVICE ELECTRIC AND GAS COMPANY
HOPE CREEK GENERATING STATION
RESPONSE TO NOTICE OF VIOLATION

Your letter dated July 27, 1986 identified one Violation of the requirements of 10CFR50 Appendix B, Criterion XI. As stated therein, the Violation involved failure to perform the startup tests for Full Core Shutdown Margin and Source Range Monitor Response To Rod Withdrawal in conformance with the approved procedures.

1. PUBLIC SERVICE ELECTRIC AND GAS COMPANY DOES NOT DISPUTE THE VIOLATION.
2. THE ROOT CAUSE OF THE VIOLATION WAS PERSONNEL ERROR WHEREIN MISSED COMMUNICATIONS BETWEEN DATA-TAKERS RESULTED IN THE OMISSION OF A SINGLE DATA POINT ASSOCIATED WITH A 1/M PLOT DURING ROD WITHDRAWAL TO INITIAL CRITICALITY.
3. IMMEDIATE CORRECTIVE ACTIONS:
 - a) As noted in the inspection report, upon identification of a deficiency in the performance of the startup tests, the the Senior Nuclear Shift Supervisor (SNSS) placed the tests on "Hold" and the shift test personnel were counseled by the SNSS who instituted strict communication requirements to ensure adequate test coordination and to prevent recurrence. The Lead Shift Test Coordinator also provided additional counseling to the shift test personnel and directed that the control rod being currently manipulated during the conduct of the startup test procedure be indicated in the comments section of an attachment to the procedure. These actions were deemed appropriate and sufficient to correct the problem and allow continuation of the startup testing.
 - b) Additionally, an audit of all Power Ascension procedures in progress was conducted to ensure that there were no other open items and an Occurrence List Item was initiated by the Shift Test Coordinator in accordance with Administrative Procedure SA-AP.ZZ-036(Q).
 - c) The remainder of the initial criticality testing progressed smoothly.
4. FULL COMPLIANCE WAS ACHIEVED ON JUNE 28, 1986.