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Georgia Power

the southern electric system

SL-4080  
0124I  
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February 23, 1988

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
ATTN: Document Control Desk  
Washington, D. C. 20555

PLANT HATCH - UNIT 2  
NRC DOCKET 50-366  
OPERATING LICENSE NPF-5  
SPECIAL REPORT 88-002  
FIRE RATED ASSEMBLIES INOPERABLE FOR LONGER THAN 14  
DAYS RESULTS IN SPECIAL REPORT AS REQUIRED  
BY FIRE HAZARDS REPORT

Gentlemen:

In accordance with the requirements of the Plant Hatch Unit 1 Technical Specifications Section 6.9.2, and the Fire Hazards Analysis (FHA) Appendix B, Georgia Power Company is submitting the enclosed Special Report (SR) concerning an event where fire rated assemblies were inoperable longer than 14 days. This event occurred at Plant Hatch - Unit 2.

Sincerely,

L. T. Gucwa

LGB/lc

Enclosure: SR 50-366/1988-002

c: (see next page)

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U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
February 23, 1988  
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c: Georgia Power Company  
Mr. J. T. Beckham, Jr., Vice President - Plant Hatch  
GO-NORMS

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, D. C.  
Mr. L. P. Crocker, Licensing Project Manager - Hatch

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Region II  
Dr. J. N. Grace, Regional Administrator  
Mr. P. Holmes-Ray, Senior Resident Inspector - Hatch

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ENCLOSURE

PLANT HATCH - UNIT 2  
NRC DOCKET 50-366  
OPERATING LICENSE NPF-5  
SPECIAL REPORT 88-002  
FIRE RATED ASSEMBLIES INOPERABLE FOR LONGER THAN 14  
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A. REQUIREMENT FOR REPORT

This report is required per the Unit 2 Technical Specifications section 6.9.2. This section of the Technical Specifications states that special reports for fire protection equipment operating and surveillance requirements shall be submitted, as required, by the Fire Hazards Analysis (FHA) and its Appendix B requirements.

The FHA section 1.1.1 states that fire rated assemblies ... separating safety related fire areas or separating portions of redundant systems important to safe shutdown within a fire area may be inoperable for up to 14 days. If this time limit is exceeded, a special report is required.

B. UNIT(s) STATUS AT TIME OF EVENTS

On 1/25/88, 1/27/88, 1/29/88, 2/1/88, 2/2/88, and 2/4/88, Unit 2 was in refueling for the unit's seventh refueling outage. The Unit 2 reactor parameters were as follows: thermal power was 0, pressure was atmospheric, reactor coolant temperature was approximately 88 degrees Fahrenheit (°F), and the reactor mode switch was in the refuel position.

ENCLOSURE (Continued)

FIRE RATED ASSEMBLIES INOPERABLE FOR LONGER THAN 14  
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C. DESCRIPTION OF EVENT

This report describes events in which fire rated assemblies were breached in a controlled manner to support Unit 2 outage work and remained breached (inoperable) for more than 14 days.

1. First Event:

On 1/11/88 at 0700 CST, licensed plant operations personnel declared cable trays 2RKA-702, 2RKA-704, 2RCA-904, and 2CLA-701 inoperable. This was done to support outage work activities. This administrative action was performed before breaching fire rated assemblies to ensure compliance with the FHA section 1.1.1, action statement "a". On 1/25/88 at 0700 CST, these fire rated assemblies were still inoperable.

2. Second Event:

On 1/11/88 at 1015 CST, licensed plant operations personnel declared thermo lag 330 barrier 2MB0985 inoperable. This was done to support outage work activities. This administrative action was performed before breaching this fire rated assembly to ensure compliance with the FHA 1.1.1, action statement "a". On 1/25/88 at 1015 CST, this fire rated assembly was still inoperable.

3. Third Event:

On 1/13/88 at 1400 CST, licensed plant operations personnel declared cable trays DBA-902, DDA-902, DDD-901, DDM-901, DDG-905, and DDG-904 inoperable. This was done to support outage work activities. This administrative action was performed before breaching fire rated assemblies to ensure compliance with the FHA section 1.1.1, action statement "a". On 1/27/88 at 1400 CST, these fire rated assemblies were still inoperable.

ENCLOSURE (Continued)

FIRE RATED ASSEMBLIES INOPERABLE FOR LONGER THAN 14  
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4. Fourth Event:

On 1/15/88 at 0650 CST, licensed plant operations personnel declared the recirculation pump motor generator set room walls inoperable. The walls were to be removed as part of the outage related work activities. This administrative action was performed before breaching the walls to ensure compliance with the FHA section 1.1.1, action statement "a". On 1/29/88 at 650 CST, the recirculation pump motor generator set room walls were still breached.

5. Fifth Event:

On 1/18/88 at 0530 CST, licensed plant operations personnel declared Nelson Frame ZZ1A-25 inoperable. This was done to support outage to support outage work activities. This administrative action was performed before the Nelson Frame was breached, to ensure compliance with the FHA section 1.1.1, action statement "a". On 2/1/88 at 0530 CST, this Nelson Frame was still inoperable.

6. Sixth Event:

On 1/19/88 at 1418 CST, licensed plant operations personnel declared Nelson Frame LL1A-12 and cable trays REA-801, REA-802, REA-803, RGE-801, RGF-801, RBH-803, and RBK-801 inoperable. This was done to support outage work activities. This administrative action was performed before breaching these fire rated assemblies to ensure compliance with the FHA section 1.1.1, action statement "a". On 2/2/88 at 1418 CST, these fire rated assemblies were still inoperable.

ENCLOSURE (Continued)

FIRE RATED ASSEMBLIES INOPERABLE FOR LONGER THAN 14  
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7. Seventh Event:

On 1/21/88 at 0550 CST, licensed plant operations personnel declared cable trays RAA-902, RAA-903, RAA-904, RAB-901, and RAB-902 inoperable. This was done to support outage work activities. This administrative action was performed before breaching these fire rated assemblies to ensure compliance with FHA section 1.1.1, action statement "a". On 2/4/88 at 0550 CST, these fire rated assemblies were still inoperable.

8. Eighth Event:

On 1/25/88 at 1430 CST, licensed plant operations personnel declared the reactor building side of drywell junction boxes 2T52-X104F, 2T52-X104G, and 2T52-X104H inoperable. This was done to support outage related work activities. This administrative action was performed before breaching the thermo lag 330 (fire rated) assemblies to ensure compliance with the FHA section 1.1.1, action statement "a". On 2/8/88 at 1430 CST, these fire rated assemblies were still inoperable.

D. CAUSE OF EVENT

The cable tray cover removal, Nelson Frame removal, thermo lag 330 barrier removal, and recirculation pump motor generator set room wall removal supported necessary outage related work. This work included installing new cables and performing maintenance on plant equipment.

ENCLOSURE (Continued)

FIRE RATED ASSEMBLIES INOPERABLE FOR LONGER THAN 14  
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E. ANALYSIS OF EVENT

Licensed plant operations personnel declared the fire rated assemblies inoperable and established the required fire watches before breaching fire rated assemblies to ensure compliance with the FHA section 1.1.1, action statement "a". Action statement "a" requires that:

"With one or more of the . . . required fire rated assemblies and/or sealing devices inoperable, within one hour establish a continuous fire watch on at least one side of the affected assembly(s) and/or sealing device(s) or verify the OPERABILITY of fire detectors on at least one side of the inoperable assembly(s) and sealing device(s) and establish an hourly fire watch patrol."

The fire rated assemblies were breached in a controlled manner using approved administrative controls. Fire watches were established and all requirements of the FHA were met. These steps ensured that, were a fire to occur, it would be promptly detected and extinguished.

Based on the above information, it is concluded that this event did not have any adverse nuclear safety impact.

F. CORRECTIVE ACTIONS

The corrective actions for these events included:

1. Declaring the affected fire rated assemblies inoperable, and initiating an hourly fire watch for the cable trays, Nelson Frame, and thermo lag JCO barrier. A continuous fire watch was established for the recirculation pump motor generator set room wall.

ENCLOSURE (Continued)

FIRE RATED ASSEMBLIES INOPERABLE FOR LONGER THAN 14  
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2. On 1/26/88 the following pieces of equipment were returned to an operable status: cable tray 2RKA-702, cable tray 2CLA-701, and thermo lag 330 barrier 2MB0985.
3. On 2/8/88 the following pieces of equipment were returned to an operable status: Nelson Frame LL1A-12, and cable trays REA-801, REA-802, REA-803, RGE-801, RGF-801, RBH-803 and RBK-801.
4. Cable trays 2RKA-704, 2RCA-904, DBA-902, DDA-902, DDD-901, DDM-901, DDG-905, DDG-904, RAA-902, RAA-903, RAA-904, RAB-901, and RAB-902; Nelson Frames ZZ1A-25 and LL1A-12; recirculation pump motor generator set room walls; and reactor building side of drywell junction boxes 2T52-X104F, 2T52-X104G, and 2T52-X104H will be returned to operable status upon completion of outage work. This will occur prior to the startup of the unit.