PRECURSOR DESCRIPTION SHEET

LER No.:	285/86-001
Event Description:	Trip occurs, and automatic depressurization and turbine bypass sytem fails to open
Date of Event: Plant:	July 2, 1986 Ft. Calhoun

EVENT DESCRIPTION

Sequence

At 0534 h, during normal operation while the reactor was at 100% power, an instrument inverter trouble alarm was received in the control room. Control room operators quickly diagnosed a failed instrument inverter feeding bus AI-40A. They dispatched an equipment operator to the switchgear room to reenergize the bus manually by closing the breaker on a bypass transformer also feeding bus AI-40A. The inverter failure placed the RPS in a half-trip condition because the RPS operates on a two-out-of-four logic and the failed inverter was one of four feeding the independent channels of the RPS. About 10 s after the inverter failure, a reactor trip occurred when a second channel trip was received on the SG B low-level trip unit.

Several unusual transients were noted in the moments following the trip:

- 1. RCS pressure increased to ~ 2400 psia for a short period of time. This caused PORVs to be actuated.
- 2. SG pressure increased to the set point of the secondary safety valves, causing them to be actuated.
- 3. Overfeeding the SG resulted in abnormally high level and subsequent overcooling of the primary system. As a result, RCS pressure decreased to a low of ~1725 psia. The overfeeding occurred because the main feed regulating valves failed to ramp down; the failure was due to loss of power to a relay when the inverter failed.
- 4. Steam dump and bypass valves could not be opened because the inverter power was lost to their controllers as well as to a relay that causes the dump valve to open.
- 5. The operating charging pump stopped, and the two backup pumps could not be started because of loss of inverter power to the relay that controls the backup pump's operations. Although the operating pump should not have stopped, for an unknown reason it did.

Within 1 min of the reactor trip, the equipment operator had reenergized the lost instrument bus, and control room operators were soon able to restore the plant to normal shutdown condition.

A diagnosis of the information revealed the following. The deenergized instrument bus AI-40A supplies power to electrohydraulic-control panel AI-50 with no alternate power. A turbine first-stage pressure transmitter that sends a signal to the electrohydraulic-control loadcontrol circuitry is powered from AI-50. Loss of power caused a loss of signal to the load-control unit, resulting in the turbine control valves closing without a reactor trip. This explains the high pressure seen in the primary system and the low SG level earlier in the transient.

Corrective Action

Modification was made to the bus and inverter power transfer controls to provide backup power.

Plant/Event Data

Systems Involved: Atmospheric steam dump, turbine bypass, charging, and electrical

Components and Failure Modes Involved:

Inverter — failed in operation

Automatic depressurization and turbine bypass system — failed on demand

Charging — failed in operation

Component Unavailability Duration: Plant Operating Mode: 1 (100% power) Discovery Method: Operational event Reactor Age: 12.9 years Plant Type: PWR

Comments

None

MODELING CONSIDERATIONS AND DECISIONS

\mathbf{I}_{1}	niti	lators	Modeled	and	Initiator	Nonrecovery	7 Estimate

Transient 1.0 No recovery

Branches Impacted and Branch Nonrecovery Estimate

SS depressuri- 0.34 Recoverable locally at the valves zation

Plant Models Utilized

PWR plant Class G

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CONDITIONAL CORE DAMAGE PROBABILITY CALCULATIONS

Event Identifier: 285/86-001 Event Description: Trip and ADS/TBS/ Fails to Open Event Date: 7/2/86 Plant: Fort Calhoun

INITIATING EVENT

NON-RECOVERABLE INITIATING EVENT PROBABILITIES

TRANS

SEQUENCE CONDITIONAL PROBABILITY SUMS

1.0E+00

1911 A. 198

REQUENCE CONVISIONME PRODUCTS DUN

End State/Initiator

Probability

3.4E-05

CV

 TRANS
 1.5E-06

 Total
 1.5E-06

 CD
 1.5E-06

 TRANS
 4.1E-05

 Total
 4.1E-05

 ATWS
 3.4E-05

DOMINANT SEQUENCES

Total

End State:CVConditional Probability:1.3E-06101TRANS -RT -AFW PORV.OR.SRV.CHALL -PORV.OR.SRV.RESEAT SS.RELEAS.TERN HPIEnd State:CDConditional Probability:4.0E-05102TRANS -RT -AFW PORV.OR.SRV.CHALL PORV.OR.SRV.RESEAT -HPI HPR/-HPIEnd State:ATWSConditional Probability:3.4E-05

121 TRANS RT

SEQUENCE CONDITIONAL PROBABILITIES

		Sequence		End State	Prob	N Rec**
101	TRANS -RT -AFW PORV. As.term HPI	OR.SRV.CHALL -PORV.OR.SRV.RESEA	T SS.RELE	CV	1.3E-06 *	2.9E-01
102		OR.SRV.CHALL PORV.OR.SRV.RESEA	T-HPI HP	CD	4.0E-05 +	5.0E-02
115		HPI(F/B) HPR/-HPI -SS.DEPRESS	-COND/HFW	CV	1.1E-07	3.9E-02
118	TRANS -RT AFW MFW	HPI(F/B) -SS.DEPRESS -COND/MFW	. e	CV	1.2E-07	3.2E-02
121	TRANS RT			ATWS	3.4E-05 #	1.2E-01
* da	painant sequence for en	d state				
	on-recovery credit for					
crour		\		<i>.</i>	x	
		\newmodel\pwrgtree.cmp \newmodel\calhoun.txt				
	,	\newmodel\pwr_b.pro				
TROOP	<i></i>	("EM#00E1 (PM0) p) 0				
No Re	covery Limit					
BRANC	H FREQUENCIES/PROBABIL	ITIES				
Branc	ħ	System	Non-Reco	v	Opr Fail	
TRANS)	4.8E-04	1.0E+00			
LOOP		4.6E-06	3.9E-01			
LOCA		2.4E-06	4.3E-01			
RT		2.9E-04	1.2E-01			
RT/LO		0.0E+00	1.0E+00			
	, POWER	5.4E-04	8.0E-01		÷.,	
AFN		3.8E-04	2.6E-01		-	
	NERG.POWER	5.0E-02	3.4E-01			
MFW		2.0E-01	3.4E-01			
	DR.SRV.CHALL ranch Model: 1.DF.1	4.0E-02 > 1.0E+00 **	1.0E+00			
	rain 1 Cond Prob:	4.0E-02			. • • •	
	OR.SRV.RESEAT	2.0E-02	5.0E-02			
	OR.SRV.RESEAT/EMERG.PDI	and the second sec	1.0E+00		, t	ie.
	LEAS. TERM	1.5E-02	3.4E-01			
	LEAS.TERN/-MFW	1.5E-02	3.4E-01	• • •	•	
SS.DE		3.6E-02 > 1.0E+00		> 3.4E-01		
	ranch Model: 1.OF.1		, 		· · · · ·	•
	rain 1 Cond Prob:	3.6E-02 > Failed			منت بينون	
COND/I		1.0E+00	3.4E-01		11. · ·	
HPI		3.0E-04	8.4E-01		· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·	
HP1(F	/8)	3.0E-04	8.4E-01		4.0E-02	· •

PORV.OPEN	1.0E-02	1.0E+00
HPR/-HPI	1.5E-04	1.0E+00
CSR	2.0E-03	3.4E-01

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branch model file
forced

Austin 09-11-1987 12:25:00

Event Identifier: 285/86-001

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