



Carolina Power & Light Company

Brunswick Steam Electric Plant
P. O. Box 10429
Southport, NC 28461-0429

February 11, 1988

FILE: B09-13510C
SERIAL: BSEP/88-0103

10CFR 2.201

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
ATTN: Document Control Desk
Washington, DC 20555

BRUNSWICK STEAM ELECTRIC PLANT UNITS 1 AND 2
DOCKET NOS. 50-325 AND 50-324
LICENSE NOS. DPR-71 AND DPR-62
SUPPLEMENTAL RESPONSE TO INFRACTIONS OF NRC REQUIREMENTS

Gentlemen:

The Brunswick Steam Electric Plant (BSEP) has received I&E Inspection Reports 50-325/87-36 and 50-324/87-37 and finds they do not contain information of a proprietary nature.

This report identified one item that appeared to be in noncompliance with NRC requirements. BSEP provided a response to that report on December 21, 1987 (Serial No. BSEP/87-1384). As requested in a telephone call between Mr. P. Fredrickson and Mr. E. Enzor on January 29, 1988, this response is being resubmitted to provide additional actions which are ongoing to ensure other problems do not exist. Enclosed please find Carolina Power & Light Company's revised response to this violation.

Very truly yours,

S. R. Dietz for
C. R. Dietz, General Manager
Brunswick Steam Electric Plant

RMP/jfm

Enclosure

cc: Dr. J. N. Grace (NRC RII)
Mr. E. D. Sylvester (NRR)
BSEP NRC Resident Office

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VIOLATION A

10CFR50, Appendix B, Criterion V, Instructions, Procedures, and Drawings, as implemented by Chapter 17.2.5 of the FSAR, requires that activities affecting quality shall be prescribed by documented drawings and shall be accomplished in accordance with those drawings.

Contrary to the above, activities affecting quality were not accomplished in accordance with drawings in that an Allen bolt was placed in the preset pin hole of hanger 1-E11-98VH555, preventing hanger movement 1/4 inch as required by drawing BP-15555-1, revision 1.

This is a Severity Level V violation (Supplement I).

RESPONSE

I. Admission or Denial of the Alleged Violation

Carolina Power & Light Company acknowledges the subject violation as described.

II. Reason for the Violation

An investigation of this event could not determine when the bolt was placed in the hanger. The bolt had been painted in a manner consistent with the support, indicating that the condition had existed for some time. The Allen bolt is believed to have come from the limit switch compartment cover of the adjacent valve 1-E11-F104B, an RHR heat exchanger inboard vent, which was missing a bolt of the same type. A review of plant Work Request/Job Orders (WR/JO) indicates that this valve was last serviced prior to January 31, 1986. Informal records maintained by Maintenance painters and pipe coverers do not show any recent work on the affected support. Also, an inquiry of the Brunswick Engineering Support Unit found no record of recent modifications to this support. As this support is not subject to regular inspections under the plant ISI program, other documentation is not available for determining time or method initiating this event. Finally, as noted in the inspection report, the vent piping associated with this hanger is no longer used and may well be removed at a later date.

III. Corrective Steps Taken/Planned and When Full Compliance Will be Achieved

Inspection of the bolt revealed it was not bound (i.e., no mechanical loading was evident) and it was removed. WR/JO 87-BIPG1 has been initiated to ensure the limit switch cover bolting is correct on the valve as well as inspect the components internal to the compartment. This inspection identified no apparent damage due to moisture resulting from the missing bolt. An inspection found no similar problems in the

corresponding pipe hanger for the Unit 1 RHR A loop or the Unit 2 RHR A and B loops. In addition, a routine Inservice Inspection (ISI) of 68 spring can supports on Unit 2 is being performed during the refueling outage currently in progress. This inspection will include verification that pins or other obstructions are not installed in the spring can's preset pin holes (25 spring cans have been inspected with no preset pin hole problems identified). Pending the final results of the ISI inspection, this occurrence is felt to be isolated; consequently, further action regarding this event is not considered necessary.