

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

Facility Name (1) Braidwood, Unit 1 Docket Number (2) 0 5 0 0 0 4 5 6 Page (3) 1 of 0 3
 Title (4) Control Room and Auxiliary Building Ventilation Shift to Emergency Makeup Mode Due to Loose Handle on Unit 2 Switch

Event Date (5) 1 2 1 1 8 7 8 7 LER Number (6) 0 6 2 Report Date (7) 1 2 2 3 8 7 Other Facilities Involved (8) NONE

OPERATING MODE (9) 1
 POWER LEVEL (10) 0 7 5
 THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10CFR (Check one or more of the following) (11)

<input type="checkbox"/> 20.402(b)	<input type="checkbox"/> 20.405(c)	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(iv)	<input type="checkbox"/> 73.71(b)
<input type="checkbox"/> 20.405(a)(1)(i)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.36(c)(1)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(v)	<input type="checkbox"/> 73.71(c)
<input type="checkbox"/> 20.405(a)(1)(ii)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.36(c)(2)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(vii)	<input type="checkbox"/> Other (Specify in Abstract below and in Text)
<input type="checkbox"/> 20.405(a)(1)(iii)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(i)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A)	
<input type="checkbox"/> 20.405(a)(1)(iv)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(ii)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B)	
<input type="checkbox"/> 20.405(a)(1)(v)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(iii)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(x)	

LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12)
 Name Joe Doyle, Technical Staff Engineer Ext. 2660 TELEPHONE NUMBER 8 1 5 4 5 8 - 2 8 0 1

COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (13)

CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NPRDS	CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NPRDS

SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (14)
 Yes (If yes, complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE) NO
 Expected Submission Date (15) _____

ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e. approximately fifteen single-space typewritten lines) (16)

On December 11, 1987, operating was preparing to perform the Unit Two Train A Solid State Protection System (SSPS) bi-monthly surveillance. The Input Error Inhibit Switch was placed in the INHIBIT position and the Output Mode Test Switch was placed in the OPERATE position. Immediately upon placing the Output Mode Test switch in the OPERATE position, a Safety Injection (SI) signal was generated. This caused the 2A Diesel Generator and the 2A Essential Service Water Pump to auto start, and actuated Auxiliary Building Charcoal Booster Fans OVA03CA, OVA03CF, and OVA04CA with the associated dampers. In addition, the Control Room Emergency Makeup Unit Filter Fan OVC03CA also started. Control room personnel responded to the SI signal and returned equipment to normal.

Cause of event was insufficient torquing of the set screw on the handle of the Input Error Inhibit Switch, thus allowing the handle to rotate without moving the switch shaft.

To prevent recurrence, all similar switches in both trains of SSPS on Unit Two were checked. Similar actions will be taken on Unit One SSPS during the first outage of opportunity.

JE 22/11

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TEXT Energy Industry Identification System (EIIS) codes are identified in the text as [xx]

A. PLANT CONDITIONS PRIOR TO EVENT:

Unit: Braidwood 1 ; Event Date: December 11, 1987 ; Event Time: 1232
 MODE: 1 - Power Operation ; Rx Power: 75% ; RCS [AB] Temperature/Pressure: 557°F/2235 psig

B. DESCRIPTION OF EVENT:

No systems or components were inoperable at the beginning of the event which contributed to the severity of the event.

At 1232 on December 11, 1987, with Unit 1 in power operation and Unit 2 prior to initial licensing, surveillance 2BwOS 3.1.1-20, Unit 2 Train A Solid State Protection System Bi-monthly Surveillance, was being performed on the Unit 2 Solid State Protection System (SSPS) [JG] Train A by the Nuclear Station Operator (NSO). The Input Error Inhibit Switch was placed in the INHIBIT position and the Output Mode Test Switch was placed in the OPERATE position. During this time, a low steamline pressure signal was present due to the construction status of Unit 2. By system design, this condition generates a Safety Injection signal (SI) [BQ]. At the moment the Output Mode Test Switch was placed in OPERATE, an SI signal was generated which auto started the 2A Diesel Generator, the 2A Essential Service Water Pump [BI], and actuated Auxiliary Building Charcoal Booster Fans [VI] OVA03CA, OVA03CF, and OVA04CA and their associated dampers. In addition, the Control Room Emergency Makeup Unit Filter Fan OVC03CA also started. The NSO responded to the SI signal and returned all equipment to normal.

Operator action neither increased or decreased the impact of the event on Unit 1, and Unit 1 remained in a stable condition with no adverse effects on operation.

The appropriate NRC notifications via the ENS phone system was made at 1357 on December 11, 1987 pursuant to 10CFR50.72(b)(2)(ii).

This event is being reported pursuant to 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(iv) - any event or condition that resulted in manual or automatic actuation of any Engineered Safety Feature, including the Reactor Protection System. Although the signal originated from a unit under construction, common equipment serving Unit 1 was actuated, requiring this report.

C. CAUSE OF EVENT:

The root cause of this event was insufficient torquing of the set screws on the plastic handle of the Input Error Inhibit Switch. This allowed the handle to rotate without moving the switch shaft. This resulted in the operator acting on a false indication of the switch position. When the Input Error Inhibit Switch was placed in the INHIBIT position the handle gave an indication of having changed position while not having done so. With this switch still in the normal position, the low steamline pressure signal then generated an SI signal which actuated the Engineered Safety Feature (EF) [JE] equipment.

D. SAFETY ANALYSIS:

There was no effect on plant or public safety as no valid SI signal was present. Unit 1 remained in a stable condition throughout the event. Under worst case conditions, with Unit 1 at 100% power and a valid SI signal generated, there would be no adverse impact on plant or public safety as all equipment operated as designed, placing the plant in a safe configuration.

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E. CORRECTIVE ACTIONS:

The NSO responded to the SI signal in accordance with station procedures.

To prevent recurrence, all similar switches in both trains of SSSPS on Unit 2 were checked and all set screws tightened to ensure the handles on the switches were secure. Similar corrective actions will be taken on Unit 1 SSSPS trains during the first outage of opportunity. This will be tracked by item number 456-200-87-41501.

F. PREVIOUS OCCURRENCES:

None

G. COMPONENT FAILURE DATA:

None



Commonwealth Edison
Braidwood Nuclear Power Station
Route #1, Box 84
Braceville, Illinois 60407
Telephone 815/458-2801

EEF/87-1987

December 30, 1987

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Document Control Desk
Washington, D.C. 20555

Dear Sir:

The enclosed Licensee Event Report from Braidwood Generating Station is being transmitted to you in accordance with the requirements of 10CFR50.73(a)(2) (iv) which requires a 30 day written report.

This report is number 87-062-00; Docket No. 50-456.

Very truly yours,

E. E. Fitzpatrick 1/2/88
E. E. Fitzpatrick
Station Manager
Braidwood Nuclear Station

EEF/PGH/mje
(6391z)

Enclosure: Licensee Event Report No. 87-062-00

cc: NRC Region III Administrator
T. Tongue, NRC Resident Inspector
INPO Record Center
CECo Distribution List

*EE22
1/1*