

**LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)**

(See reverse for required number of digits/characters for each block)

ESTIMATED BURDEN PER RESPONSE TO COMPLY WITH THIS INFORMATION COLLECTION REQUEST: 50.0 HRS. FORWARD COMMENTS REGARDING BURDEN ESTIMATE TO THE INFORMATION AND RECORDS MANAGEMENT BRANCH (MNBB 7714), U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION, WASHINGTON, DC 20555-0001, AND TO THE PAPERWORK REDUCTION PROJECT (3150-0104), OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET, WASHINGTON, DC 20503.

FACILITY NAME (1) Limerick Generating Station, Unit 2	DOCKET NUMBER (2) 05000 353	PAGE (3) 1 OF 3
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TITLE (4) Automatic Closures of the Reactor Core Isolation Cooling Steam Supply Primary Containment Isolation Valves, an ESF, Caused by Personnel Error During Restoration of a Clearance.

EVENT DATE (5)			LER NUMBER (6)			REPORT DATE (7)			OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED (8)	
MONTH	DAY	YEAR	YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	FACILITY NAME	DOCKET NUMBER
06	11	97	97	-- 006 --	00	07	09	97	FACILITY NAME	DOCKET NUMBER 05000
									FACILITY NAME	DOCKET NUMBER 05000

OPERATING MODE (9) 1	THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR §: (Check one or more) (11)									
POWER LEVEL (10) 92	20.402(b)	20.405(c)	X	50.73(a)(2)(iv)	73.71(b)					
	20.405(a)(1)(i)	50.36(c)(1)		50.73(a)(2)(v)	73.71(c)					
	20.405(a)(1)(ii)	50.36(c)(2)		50.73(a)(2)(vii)	OTHER					
	20.405(a)(1)(iii)	50.73(a)(2)(i)		50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A)	(Specify in Abstract below and in Text, NRC Form 366A)					
	20.405(a)(1)(iv)	50.73(a)(2)(ii)		50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B)						
	20.405(a)(1)(v)	50.73(a)(2)(iii)		50.73(a)(2)(x)						

LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12)

NAME T. A. Moore - Manager, Experience Assessment, LGS	TELEPHONE NUMBER (Include Area Code) (610) 718-3400
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COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (13)

CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NPRDS	CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NPRDS

SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (14)				EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE (15)	MONTH	DAY	YEAR
YES (If yes, complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE)	X	NO					

ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e., approximately 15 single-spaced typewritten lines) (16)

On 06/11/97, a Primary Containment and Reactor Vessel Isolation Control System (PCRVICES) actuation initiated, an Engineered Safety Feature (ESF), causing the Reactor Core Isolation Cooling (RCIC) system steam supply line inboard and outboard Primary Containment Isolation Valves (PCIVs) to close. During restoration of the RCIC system from maintenance, the steam supply line outboard PCIV was opened out of sequence. This supplied reactor steam to the depressurized RCIC steam lines, and a high steam line flow isolation signal was initiated. An inspection of the RCIC system was performed and no abnormalities were identified. The isolation was reset and the RCIC system was restored. The cause of this event was personnel error in that a Reactor Operator (RO) restoring RCIC in the Main Control Room (MCR) failed to perform an added step in the clearance to warm the steam lines prior to opening the outboard PCIV. The following factors also contributed to the cause of the event. The RO performing the MCR restoration activities was not the original individual assigned the restoration tasks. Also, the RO did not obtain a pre-job briefing and failed to adequately familiarize himself with the restoration activities and the procedures involved prior to performing the clearance. Corrective actions included counseling of the involved individuals and issuing a briefing sheet on this event to all Operations personnel.

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TEXT CONTINUATION

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FACILITY NAME (1)	DOCKET NUMBER (2)	LER NUMBER (6)		PAGE (3)	
		YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER		REVISION NUMBER
Limerick Generating Station, Unit 2	05000353	97	-- 006 --	00	2 OF 3

TEXT (If more space is required, use additional copies of NRC Form 366A) (17)

Unit Conditions Prior to the Event:

Unit 2 was in Operational Condition 1 (Power Operation) at approximately 92% power level. Restoration of the Unit 2 Reactor Core Isolation Cooling (RCIC, EISS: BN) system was being performed following a scheduled maintenance outage.

Description of the Event:

At 0210 hours on June 11, 1997, a Primary Containment and Reactor Vessel Isolation Control System (PCRVICES, EISS:JM) actuation initiated, an Engineered Safety Feature (ESF), causing the RCIC system steam supply line inboard and outboard Primary Containment Isolation Valves (PCIVs, EISS: ISV) to close. During restoration of the RCIC system, the steam supply line outboard PCIV (HV-049-2F008) was opened out of sequence. This supplied reactor steam to the depressurized RCIC system steam supply lines, and a high steam line flow isolation signal was initiated. The RCIC system steam supply line inboard and outboard PCIVs closed as a result of the signal.

An investigation revealed that a Reactor Operator (RO) performing the Main Control Room (MCR) restoration activities missed an added step in the clearance to warm and pressurize the RCIC system steam supply lines prior to opening the outboard PCIV. An inspection of the RCIC system was performed and no abnormalities were identified. The isolation was reset and the RCIC system was restored without incident.

At 0344 hours on June 11, 1997, a 4-hour notification was made to the NRC per 10CFR50.72(b)(2)(ii), since this event resulted in an ESF actuation. This report is being submitted in accordance with 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(iv).

Analysis:

The consequences of this event were minimal and there was no release of radioactive material to the environment. The event was of short duration and occurred during the restoration of the RCIC system to an operable status. The RCIC system steam supply line inboard and outboard PCIVs isolated as designed in response to the high steam line flow signal. The ESF actuation and subsequent restoration and inspections resulted in a minor increase to the RCIC system unavailability. The RCIC system did not actuate or inject into the reactor coolant system, and this incident did not effect the overall operability of the RCIC system. Emergency Core Cooling Systems were available to respond in the event of a potential Loss of Coolant Accident.

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Limerick Generating Station, Unit 2	05000353	YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER	3 OF 3
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TEXT (If more space is required, use additional copies of NRC Form 366A) (17)

Cause of the Event:

The cause of this event was personnel error in that the RO restoring the RCIC system in the MCR failed to perform an added step in the clearance to warm the RCIC steam lines prior to opening the steam outboard PCIV.

The following factors also contributed to the cause of this event. The RO who completed the MCR restoration activities was not the original RO assigned the restoration tasks, and therefore, was not involved in the initial pre-job briefing when changes to the clearance, including the added step, were discussed. In addition, the RO failed to adequately familiarize himself with the restoration activities and the procedures involved prior to performing the clearance.

Corrective Actions:

The RO involved in this event was counseled on the need to obtain a thorough pre-job briefing and become familiar with the restoration activities and the procedures involved prior to performing restoration of a critical safety system.

The Shift Manager counseled the Control Room Supervisor and the original RO assigned the restoration tasks, on the need to ensure additional pre-job briefings are conducted when changes in personnel performing restoration activities occur. The Shift Manager will ensure the lessons learned from this event are communicated to other appropriate Operations personnel.

A briefing sheet describing this event and the lessons learned was prepared and distributed to all Operations personnel.

Previous Similar Occurrences:

None