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On January 2, 1988, with the reactor op "A", "B", "C", and "D" helium circulate both secondary coolant loops in normal failed to perform the daily linear chan St. Vrain Technical Specification SR-5. adjusted daily to agree with the heat b constitutes operation in violation of t reported per 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(1)(B). When a trip of the "B" helium circulate the linear power channel heat balance of Department Supervisor instructed the Re surveillance that he could proceed home Supervisor, no additional arrangements performed the linear power channel cali The Results Department Supervisor was i completion of this surveillance on a da is needed.	ors operating on t operation, Result and heat balance 4.1.1.4 requires balance calculatio the Technical Spec alibration survei sults Technician bue to an over were made to ensu bration on Januar nstructed on the	heir stea s Departm calibrati the linea n, this e ification elayed pe llance, t assigned sight by re a Resu y 2, 1989 importance	am drives ment pers lon. Sin ar channe event is and is rformance the Resul- to perfo the Resul- its Tech :e of ensi- rective of	, and onnel ce Fort ls be being e of ts rm the lts nician uring action
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NRC Form 388

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTIF UATION

U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION APPROVED ON'S NO 3150-0104

EXPIRES 8/31 88

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EVENT DESCRIPTION:

NOC Form 366A

On January 2, 1987, the reactor was operating at approximately 30% power, with primary coolant being provided by the "A". "B", "C", and "D" helium circulators [AB]* operating on their steam drives, and both secondary coolant loops [AB]* operating on feedwater, supplied from "A" and "C" boiler feedpumps [SJ]*. At approximately 1000 hours, reactor power was increased to 35% power, and held steady. At approximately 1200 hours, the "responsible for" Results Technician began preparations to perform the linear channel [IG]* heat balance calibration. However, at 1204 hours, the "B" helium circulator [AB]* tripped on program speed mismatch while returning its steam drive speed valve (SV-2111) from manual control to automatic control. Reactor power was reduced to 30% at 1215 hours and investigative troubleshooting of SV-2111 was initiated. While troubleshooting SV-2111, reactor operators requested that control room surveillance testing be postponed until the SV-2111 problem was resolved. After waiting several hours for resolution of SV-2111 problems, the Results Technician contacted his supervisor and informed him that the linear channel calibration had not been completed due to SV-2111 problems. At this time, the Results Supervisor instructed the Results Technician to proceed home. At 1950 hours on January 2, 1988, the problem with SV-2111 was resolved, however due to an oversight, the Results Supervisor did not make prior arrangements to ensure that Results personnel were available to complete the linear power channel heat balance calibration and therefore the test was not performed on January 2, 1988. Reactor power was held constant at approximately 30% and on January 3, 1988, at approximately 1600 hours, the linear power channel heat balance calibration was performed. During this calibration, the "AS FOUND" linear power channel indicated average reactor power was less than 1% different than the heat balance calculation of reactor power.

CAUSE DESCRIPTION

Personnel Error

The Results Department Supervisor involved recognized the requirement to complete the daily linear channel calibration, however failed to arrange for completion of the calibration after the Results Technician assigned to complete the test proceeded home.

The Results Supervisor involved is responsible for issuing and assuring completion of Technical Specification surveillances performed by the Results Department. This individual has demonstrated in the past a good understanding of the Technical Specification surveillance requirements and the importance of completing scheduled surveillances within the Technical Specification interval. Therefore, Public Service Company feels that this failure to complete the linear channel heat balance calibration is an isolated incident and not indicative of a deficiency in the surveillance program.

* Energy Industry Identification System (EIIS) Codes

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION

U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION APPROVED OMB NO 3150-0104

EXFIRES 8.31/88

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NRC Form 386.A

ANALYSIS OF EVENT:

Since Fort St. Vrain Technical Specification SR 5.4.1.1.4 requires daily calibration of the linear power channels to agree with the calculated heat balance, this event constitutes operation in violation of the Technical Specifications and is being reported herein per 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(i)(B).

Analysis of actual operating data indicate that the power range neutron detectors are subject to decalibration due to motion of the control rod banks. Control rod motion can alter the radial core flux distribution so that the flux reaching the out-of-core detectors does not vary proportionally with true core thermal power. Withdrawal of a rod bank near the core center line causes the detectors to underindicate the true power change, while the withdrawal of outer bank rods results in overindication. Diffusion calculations have shown that detector decalibration factors are not sensitive to any changes other than changes in control rod position. A reactor scram must always be initiated before true power reaches the scram point prescribed by Technical Specifications. Therefore, a system has been developed in which the high neutron flux scram setpoint is set at a predetermined level below the Technical Specification limiting scram setpoint. Using calculated detector decalibration factors for the various control rod configurations, the configuration which would most delay the PPS trip is determined for each operating control rod group withdrawn in sequence. PPS trip setpoints are then specified, as a function of power, such that signals from the nuclear detectors will activate a rod withdrawal prohibit (RWP) at an actual core power of less than or equal to 120% and a reactor scram at an actual core power of less than or equal to 140%. This system assures that under worst case postulated rod withdrawal accident conditions, a scram will occur before true reactor power exceeds the Technical Specification limiting scram setpoint.

On January 2, 1988, failure to adjust the linear channels and compensate for detector decalibration following rod withdrawal and an increase in reactor power, resulted in a discrepancy between linear channel reactor power and heat balance reactor power of approximately 1% (linear lower than heat balance). This discrepancy was not significant in affecting the linear power channels capability to initiate an RWP at or below 120% true reactor power, and a reactor scram at or below 140% true reactor power. The linear channel 120% RWP is adjusted as a function of thermal power with the maximum trip setting at 108% indicated (Fuel Cycle 4). The High Neutron Flux 140% Scram also is adjusted as a function of thermal power with a maximum trip setting of 116% indicated (Fuel Cycle 4).

* Energy Industry Identification System (EIIS) Codes

NRC FORM 3864 (8-83)


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	Potential differences betwe channels and the heat balan Overall Plant Operating Pro	nce calculation are admi ocedure (OPOP) IV. Per ilibrated to agree with	this procedure, the linear the heat balance calculation
	 Following full withdraw through 3D). 	val or insertion of each	control rod group (groups 2B
	- When control rod groups	3B and 3D are one-half	withdrawn.
	- Whenever any channel ap	proaches or reaches a R	WP setpoint.
	 With the ISS in "startu rated power. 	p", when heat balance p	ower is between 2% and 4%
	 When increasing reactor power is between 24% and 	power with the ISS in d 28% rated power.	"low power", when heat balance
	 With the JSS in "power" power. 	when the heat balance	power drops below 36% of rated
	- At the reactor operator	s discretion.	
	- When individual nuclear full power.	detectors differ by gro	eater than or equal to 10% of
	These administrative contro requirement for daily calib channels remain operable to limits.	ration, provide assurance	echnical Specification ce that the linear power tion within established safety
	Based on this evaluation, i health and safety of the pu	t is concluded that this blic.	s event posed no threat to the
	Similar events where survei interval were reported in RU in LER's 84-004, 85-006, 86	0's 79-019, 79-021, 80-0	ned within the required 078, 82-039, and 83-050, and
	CORRECTIVE ACTION:		
	The individual supervisor ha	ved and discussed the ne veillance procedures wit as demonstrated, in the uirements and therefore	ecessity in completing thin the specified intervals. past, a good understanding of this is viewed as an isolated

* Energy Industry Identification System (EIIS) Codes

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NRC Form 38RA U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION APPROVED ONE NO 3150-0104 EXPIRES 8.31 58 PACILITY NAME (1) DOCKET NUMBER (2) LER NUMBER (8) PAGE (3) Fort St. Vrain, Unit No. 1 SEQUENTIAL NUMBER APUSION NUMBER YEAR 0 5 0 0 0 2 6 7 8 8 - 0 0 1 - 0 0 0 5 0F 0 5 TEXT (If more spece a required, use additional NRC Form 3864 (2) (17) Jim Hill Senior Technical Services Eggineering Technician lark Mark Joseph Technical Services Supervisor Grame NI Licensing Alt Full-Fuller H. Station Manager * Energy Industry Identification System (EIIS) Codes



Public Service Company of Colorado

16805 WCR 19 1/2, Platteville, Colorado 80651

February 1, 1988 Fort St. Vrain Unit No. 1 P-88049

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ATTN: Document Control Desk Washington, D.C. 20555

Docket No. 50-267

SUBJECT: Licensee Event Report 88-001, Final Report

REFERENCE: Facility Operating License No. DPR-34

Gentlemen:

Enclosed please find a copy of Licensee Event Report No. 50-207/88-001, Final, submitted per the requirements of 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(1)(B).

If you have any questions, please contact Mr. M. H. Holmes at (303) 480-6960.

Sincerely,

R. O. Williams, Jr. Vice President Nuclear Operations

Enclosure

cc: Regional Administrator, Region IV ATTN: Mr. T. F. Westerman, Chief Project Section B

Director Nuclear Reactor Regulation ATTN: Mr. J. A. Calvo, Director Project Directorate IV

Mr. R. E. Farrell Senior Resident Inspector, FSV

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