

NOTATION VOTE

RESPONSE SHEET

TO: John C. Hoyle, Secretary  
FROM: COMMISSIONER MCGAFFIGAN  
SUBJECT: SECY-97-044 - POLICY AND KEY TECHNICAL  
ISSUES PERTAINING TO THE WESTINGHOUSE  
AP600 STANDARDIZED PASSIVE REACTOR  
DESIGN

Approved  w/cmts Disapproved \_\_\_\_\_ Abstain \_\_\_\_\_  
Not Participating \_\_\_\_\_ Request Discussion \_\_\_\_\_

COMMENTS:

See attached comments.

*Edward M. Griffin Jr.*

\_\_\_\_\_  
SIGNATURE

6/24/97

\_\_\_\_\_  
DATE

Release Vote

Withhold Vote

Entered on "AS" Yes  No \_\_\_\_\_

Commissioner McGaffigan's Comments on SECY-97-044

I approve the staff position that the AP600 should include a containment spray system or equivalent for accident management (both short- and long-term) following a severe accident.

I note that the ACRS in its June 17, 1997 letter stated that "the addition of a spray system to the AP600 containment would significantly increase its effectiveness in fission production control and provide the ability to intervene and control the course of an accident."

The staff points out that there are numerous other active features in the AP600 design that have been considered for severe accidents. These have been deemed consistent with the overall AP600 passive design philosophy. Consequently, the spray system addition does not break new ground.

Finally, I would note that the staff and the ACRS are recommending this additional system because of the large and largely unquantified uncertainties associated with natural removal mechanisms for mitigating severe accidents. The Commission and the staff need to continue to grapple with how to deal with uncertainty in applying probabilistic risk assessment (PRA) to our regulatory framework. This issue has come up previously in Commission briefings on the PRA Implementation Plan.



UNITED STATES  
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555-0001

June 30, 1997

*Defe out*

OFFICE OF THE  
SECRETARY

MEMORANDUM TO: L. Joseph Callan  
Executive Director for Operations

FROM: *J. Hoyle*  
John C. Hoyle, Secretary

SUBJECT: STAFF REQUIREMENTS - SECY-97-044 - POLICY AND  
KEY TECHNICAL ISSUES PERTAINING TO THE  
WESTINGHOUSE AP600 STANDARDIZED PASSIVE  
REACTOR DESIGN

The Commission has approved the staff recommendation that, based on the impact of the uncertainties associated with the performance of passive safety systems, the AP600 include a containment spray system or equivalent for accident management (both short- and long-term) following a severe accident. Should future information be developed that would allow the staff to conclude that adequate bases exist to find that the containment spray system, or equivalent, is not needed in the AP600 design for the purposes addressed in this paper, the staff should inform the Commission.

The staff should continue to work with the ACRS to get a complete understanding of their concerns in their June 17, 1997 letter which noted that the design concept of the spray system as suggested by the staff is "marginally adequate."

The staff should continue to explore methods for dealing with uncertainty in applying probabilistic risk assessments (PRA) in a regulatory framework.

SECY NOTE: SECY-97-044 WAS RELEASED TO THE PUBLIC ON FEBRUARY 26, 1997. THIS SRM AND THE COMMISSION VOTING RECORD CONTAINING THE VOTE SHEETS OF ALL COMMISSIONERS WILL BE MADE PUBLICLY AVAILABLE 5 WORKING DAYS FROM THE DATE OF THIS SRM.

*Defe*  
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cc: Chairman Jackson  
Commissioner Rogers  
Commissioner Dicus  
Commissioner Diaz  
Commissioner McGaffigan  
OGC  
CIO  
CFO  
OCA  
OIG  
Office Directors, Regions, ACRS, ACNW, ASLBP (via E-Mail)  
PDR  
DCS