

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

FACILITY NAME (1) <b>RIVER BEND STATION</b>	DOCKET NUMBER (2) <b>05000458</b>	PAGE (3) <b>1 OF 3</b>
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TITLE (4)  
**Manual Reactor Scram due to Control Rod Drive Trip - Deficient Procedure**

EVENT DATE (5)			ISR NUMBER (6)			REPORT DATE (7)			OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED (8)																																							
MONTH	DAY	YEAR	YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	FACILITY NAMES		DOCKET NUMBER(S)																																					
12	12	87	78	032	000	01	18	87			05000																																					
<table border="1" style="width:100%; border-collapse: collapse;"> <tr> <td style="width:15%;">OPERATING MODE (9)</td> <td style="width:15%;">2</td> <td colspan="10">THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR § (Check one or more of the following) (11)</td> </tr> <tr> <td rowspan="6">POWER LEVEL (10) 000</td> <td>20.402(a)</td> <td>20.402(a)</td> <td>99.73a(2)(H)</td> <td>73.71(a)</td> </tr> <tr> <td>20.402a(1)(B)</td> <td>99.73a(1)</td> <td>99.73a(2)(H)</td> <td>73.71(a)</td> </tr> <tr> <td>20.402a(1)(B)</td> <td>99.73a(2)</td> <td>99.73a(2)(H)</td> <td>OTHER (Specify in Abstract below and in Text, NRC Form 308A)</td> </tr> <tr> <td>20.402a(1)(B)</td> <td>X 99.73a(2)(H)</td> <td>99.73a(2)(H)(A)</td> <td></td> </tr> <tr> <td>20.402a(1)(B)</td> <td>99.73a(2)(B)</td> <td>99.73a(2)(H)(B)</td> <td></td> </tr> <tr> <td>20.402a(1)(B)</td> <td>99.73a(2)(B)</td> <td>99.73a(2)(H)</td> <td></td> </tr> </table>												OPERATING MODE (9)	2	THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR § (Check one or more of the following) (11)										POWER LEVEL (10) 000	20.402(a)	20.402(a)	99.73a(2)(H)	73.71(a)	20.402a(1)(B)	99.73a(1)	99.73a(2)(H)	73.71(a)	20.402a(1)(B)	99.73a(2)	99.73a(2)(H)	OTHER (Specify in Abstract below and in Text, NRC Form 308A)	20.402a(1)(B)	X 99.73a(2)(H)	99.73a(2)(H)(A)		20.402a(1)(B)	99.73a(2)(B)	99.73a(2)(H)(B)		20.402a(1)(B)	99.73a(2)(B)	99.73a(2)(H)	
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LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12)

NAME	TELEPHONE NUMBER
<b>E. R. Grant - Director-Nuclear Licensing</b>	<b>51043811-4145</b>

COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (13)

CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NPROS	CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NPROS

SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (14)

YES (If yes, complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE)	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> NO	EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE (15)	MONTH	DAY	YEAR

ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e., approximately fifteen single spaced typewritten lines) (16)

On 12/19/87 at 0918 with the unit in startup (operational condition 2) a manual scram was initiated by placing the reactor mode switch in the shutdown position in accordance with Technical Specification 3.1.3.3, "Control Rod Scram Accumulators". With the unit subcritical, the control rod drive hydraulic pump tripped on low suction pressure. Approximately one minute later, two control rod accumulator fault alarms were received, and the operator placed the reactor mode switch in the shutdown position, initiating a reactor scram.

A leak from the short cycle condensate line necessitated a shutdown of the condensate system shutting off the normal supply of water to the control rod drive (CRD) hydraulic pumps. The backup supply of water from the Condensate Storage Tank was unable to supply water due to a closed isolation valve attributed to a deficiency in System Operating Procedure (SOP)-0002, "Control Rod Drive Hydraulics". In addition, the operator failed to obtain proper authorization from the Shift Supervisor prior to repositioning the valve, in violation of Administrative Procedure (ADM)-0020, "Plant Key Control", and Operations Section Procedure (OSP)-0014, and "Control of Locked Valves and Devices". The CRD valve line-up was immediately restored and the pump restarted. The deficient SOP was corrected and revised. The unit responded as expected, and there was no impact on the health and safety of the public as a result of this event.

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*1/1*

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION

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		YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER			

TEXT (if more space is required, use additional NRC Form 366A's) (17)

REPORTED CONDITION

On 12/19/87 at 0918 with the unit in startup (operational condition 2) following a refueling outage, a manual scram was initiated by placing the reactor mode switch in the shutdown position in accordance with Technical Specification 3.1.3.3, "Control Rod Scram Accumulators."

The control rod drive (CRD) hydraulic pumps (\*P\*) are normally supplied a source of water from the condensate system (\*KA\*) with a backup from the Condensate Storage Tank (CST) (\*TK\*). With the unit subcritical, a leak from the short cycle condensate line developed that necessitated a shutdown of the condensate system. This secured the primary source of water to the suction of the CRD pump. The CST was unable to supply water due to a closed isolation valve (V123) (\*ISV\*). This valve was closed on the previous shift in accordance with System Operating Procedure (SOP)-0002, "Control Rod Drive Hydraulics," while verifying that a CRD pump suction transfer had properly occurred. This was later determined to be a procedural deficiency. Isolation valve V123 is a normally locked open valve. In addition, the operator failed to obtain proper authorization from the Shift Supervisor prior to repositioning the valve, in violation of Administrative Procedure (ADM)-0020, "Plant Key Control", and Operations Section Procedure (OSP)-0014, "Control of Locked Valves and Devices."

With V123 closed, the CRD pump tripped on low suction pressure. Approximately one minute later, control rod accumulator fault alarms (\*ALM\*) were received, and the operator placed the reactor mode switch in the shutdown position, initiating a reactor scram. The unit responded as expected.

A review of previously submitted LERs from River Bend Station revealed three events reported in which errors in procedures that were performed as written caused an Engineered Safety Feature actuation. LERs 85-055 and 85-062 identified incorrect terminal locations for the placement of jumpers which led to an unintended Reactor Protection System (RPS) actuation and Reactor Water Cleanup (RWC) isolation, respectively. LER 87-022 identified improperly sequenced steps which led to a loss of Shutdown Cooling due to a Residual Heat Removal (RHR) System isolation. Corrective actions for these events could not have detected the procedural error which led to the event reported here.

CORRECTIVE ACTION

The CRD lineup was immediately restored and the pump restarted. The deficient SOP was revised to clarify the steps improperly performed. Other SOP's used during the current startup were reviewed for similar deficiencies. Operations personnel were briefed on the circumstances of the scram and provided required reading on the SOP-0002 revision, ADM-0020 and OSP-0014. Operations personnel were also reminded, by

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		8   7	-   0   3   2	-   0   0	0   3	OF	0   3

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memorandum, of their responsibility to control evolutions and follow procedures. Finally, the Training Department will review the current training program for Nuclear Equipment Operators to determine the adequacy of training on CRD integrated operation and Administrative Procedures.

SAFETY ASSESSMENT

At the time of the event, the unit was subcritical with moderator temperature less than 150 degrees F. The unit was shutdown in accordance with the Action statement of the Technical Specification, and responded as expected. Therefore, there was no impact on the health and safety of the public as a result of this event.

NOTE: Energy Industry Identification Codes are identified in the text as (\*XX\*).



**GULF STATES UTILITIES COMPANY**

RIVER BEND STATION      POST OFFICE BOX 220      ST. FRANCISVILLE, LOUISIANA 70775  
AREA CODE 504      635-6094      346-8651

January 18, 1988  
RBG-37302  
File Nos. G9.5, G9.25.1.3

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
Document Control Desk  
Washington, D.C. 20555

Gentlemen:

River Bend Station - Unit 1  
Docket No. 50-458

Please find enclosed Licensee Event Report No. 87-032 for River Bend Station - Unit 1. This report is being submitted pursuant to 10CFR50.73.

Sincerely,

J. E. Booker *by RJK*  
Manager-River Bend Oversight  
River Bend Nuclear Group

JEB/TFP/DRD/<sup>RRS</sup>ch

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