OYSTER CREEK NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION FORKED RIVER, NEW JERSEY 08731

> Abnormal Occurrence Report No. 50-219/74/ 34

IDENTIFICATION OF OCCURRENCE:

Violation of the Technical Specifications, paragraph N/A, Indications of coolant leakage existing in the area of an incore flux monitor reactor vessel housing located at core coordinate 28-05.

AFFRE TALLER

This event is considered to be an abnormal occurrence as defined in the Technical Specifications, paragraph 1.152

CONDITIONS PRIOR TO OCCURRENCE:

	Steady State Power Hot Standby	. dedical-managements	Routine Shutdown Operation
×	Cold Shutdown Refueling Shutdown		Load Changes During Routine Power Operation
Bedforforeforences \$2000000000000000000000000000000000000	Routine Startup Operation	audica valorem	Other (Specify)

The reactor was in the REFUEL mode during a hydrostatic test at 850 psig pressure and with coolant temperature approximately 155°F.

DÉSCRIPTION OF OCCURRENCE: On Tuesday, May 28, 1974, during a scheduled reactor vessel hydrostatic test to inspect the pressure boundary following refueling maintenance activities, leakage was observed in the vicinity of an incore flux monitor tube located at the bottom of the reactor vessel. Further investigation conducted on Wednesday, May 29, 1974, showed evidence of possible leakage in the area of an incore flux monitor housing penetration

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located in the reactor vessel bottom head. A second hydrostatic test was conducted at a pressure of 850 psig at approximately 7:00 p.m. on May 29, 1974, whereupon, water was observed leaking between the monitor housing and the reactor vessel. The leakage was measured under the conditions of 850 psig with a temperature of 164°F, and calculated to be on the order of approximately 0.02 gallons per hour.

APPARENT CAUSE OF OCCURRENCE: Design
Manufacture
Installation/
Construction
Operator

Procedure
Unusual Service Condition
Inc. Environmental
Corponent Failure
Other (Specify)

ANALYSIS OF OCCURRENCE: The cause of this event has yet to be determined.

As stated in FDSAR Amendment #37, a postulated failure of the flux monitor tube would result in vessel leakage at a rate which would not cause excessive cladding temperatures and for which core reflooding is possible by engineered safety features. This situation is less severe than the design basis accident. To determine the consequences of a weld failure at a housing for an in-core monitor tube, it is assumed that the weld between the housing and the reactor vessel bottom head fails, allowing the housing and the in-core monitor tube to be ejected from the vessel. The hole provided in the bottom head for the housing has a diameter of two inches; this is the assumed break size. The hole has a break area of .0218 ft². Assuming worst conditions, this results in peak clad temperatures less than 1000°F, as updated in FDSAR An indment #67. This value is well within acceptable limits of the applicable ECCS criteria.

CORRECTIVE ACTION: The notear steam supply vendor and the reactor vessel manufacturer have been contacted with regard to this condition.

Discussion will ensue as to the proper course of action to be taken to resolve this matter. Recommendations will be forthcoming pending complete review of this event by the Plant Operations Review Committee.

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Date:

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