

U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
OFFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT

Region I

Report No. 50-219/78-25

Docket No. 50-219

License No. DPR-16 Priority -- Category C

Licensee: Jersey Central Power and Light Company

Madison Avenue at Punch Bowl Road

Morristown, New Jersey 07960

Facility Name: Oyster Creek Unit 1

Inspection at: Forked River, New Jersey

Inspection conducted: September 26-29, 1978

Inspectors: *L. Briggs*

L. Briggs, Reactor Inspector

10/13/78
date signed

G. Kalman

G. Kalman, Reactor Inspector

10/13/78
date signed

date signed

Approved by: *EJ Brunner*

for E. McCabe, Jr., Chief, Reactor Projects
Section No. 2, RO & NS Branch

10/20/78
date signed

Inspection Summary:

Inspection on September 26-29, 1978 (Report No. 50-219/78-25)

Areas Inspected: Routine, unannounced inspection by two regional based inspectors of followup on IE Bulletin 78-03; refueling outage maintenance procedures; followup of Non-routine Event Report 78-18; refueling activities; and, a control room and facility tour. The inspection was started on September 26, 1978 during the 12 to 8 shift and involved 57 inspection-hours onsite by two NRC inspectors.

Results: No items of noncompliance were identified.

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DETAILS

1. Persons Contacted

- *J. Carroll, Station Superintendent
- K. Fickeissen, Technical Engineer
- F. Kossatz, Maintenance Supervisor
- T. Quintenz, Staff Engineer
- **D. Ross, Manager, Generating Stations
- *E. Scalsky, Radiation Protection Supervisor
- *L. Smialek, Health Physicist
- *J. Sullivan, Chief Engineer

The inspector also interviewed several other licensee employees during the course of the inspection, including Group Shift Supervisors, Control Room Operators, Auxiliary Operators, and Engineering Staff Personnel.

*present at the exit interview

**exit interview participation via telephone

2. IE Bulletins

a. Scope of Review

Licensee action concerning the following IE Bulletin was reviewed by the inspector to verify that: the Bulletin was forwarded to appropriate onsite management; a review for applicability was performed; information discussed and licensee's reply was accurate; corrective action taken was as described in the reply; and the reply was within the time period described in the Bulletin.

- IEB 78-03, Potential Explosive Gas Mixture Accumulations Associated with BWR Offgas System Operations. The inspector reviewed the licensee's March 22, 1978 response to IEB 78-03, and performed a detailed system verification as compared to system flow and piping diagrams. Loop seals were physically inspected to insure that hydrogen could not, through normal

operation, be released to the Augmented Off-Gas Building or Pipe Chase Tunnel atmosphere. In addition the inspector verified that Hydrogen detectors were located, as shown on plant diagrams, in areas that could accumulate Hydrogen if a loop seal were lost. As stated in the licensee's reply, several areas required actual ventilation flow measurements to be taken. The measurements have been performed; however, actual data correlation has not been completed.

This item will be reexamined after licensee action is complete.(219/78-BU-03)

3. Refueling Outage Maintenance Procedures

a. Scope of Review

Refueling maintenance procedures were reviewed to verify that:

- Administrative approval was required prior to removal from and return to service;
- Inspection and audit points were identified in the procedure; and,
- Provisions for testing following maintenance were provided.

b. Documents Reviewed

- Procedure No. 702.1.002, Removal of Reactor Safety Valves Revision 3, August 11, 1978;
- Procedure No. 702.1.005, Reactor Safety Valve Installation, Revision 5, August 11, 1978;
- Procedure No. 702.1.006, Main Steam Isolation Valve Inspection and Repair, Revision 4, August 11, 1978;
- Procedure No. 702.1.015, Main Steam Isolation Valve Seat Repair, Revision 1, August 21, 1978;
- Procedure No. 702.1.016, Main Steam Isolation Valve Seat Replacement, Revision 1, August 21, 1978; and,
- Special Procedure No. 78-27, Containment Spray Heat Exchanger Removal, Revision 0, September 6, 1978.

c. Maintenance Activity Review

The inspector reviewed the documentation and activities associated with the removal of the Containment Spray Heat Exchangers.

d. Findings

During the review of Special Procedure No 78-27 being used by the licensee's contracted Project Manager, several changes appeared to have been made to the procedure without PORC approval. Several steps had lines drawn through the paragraph identifying numbers with the Project Manager's initials and the word "ignore" in the margin. When questioned, the Project Manager stated that he had intended to make the changes via the temporary procedure change method and had then changed his mind. The word "ignore" meant to ignore the change, not the procedural step. He explained that he was aware of the method employed to obtain procedure changes and showed the inspector several examples of previous correctly made changes. Inspection indicated all procedural steps had been completed properly without change.

The inspector had no further questions.

4. Review of Nonroutine Event Report by the Licensee

The inspector discussed with the licensee the recent problem of excessive Main Steam Isolation Valve (MSIV) leakage identified on September 17, 1978, in prompt Licensee Event Report (LER) No. 78-18. The licensee was in the process of disassembling MSIV NS-04A during the initial inquiry. Subsequent inspection showed that a crack had developed in the valve seat in an area that had been previously repaired (1974 outage) by welding the valve seat. The licensee has decided to replace the entire valve seat during the present refueling outage to prevent recurrence.

MSIV NS-03A exhibited a different problem when disassembled. Excessive wear between the main poppet alignment pad and the lower guide, on which it slides, allowed the main poppet to shift. This condition caused the poppet not to seat properly. The licensee is evaluating the cause of excessive guide wear in an effort to determine the best repair measure to be employed.

LER 78-18 remains open and will be further reviewed subsequent to licensee evaluation and repair.

5. Refueling Activities

a. Documents Reviewed

- (1) Procedure 656.4.001, Revision 0, September 21, 1977, Refueling Interlock Circuit Surveillance;

(2) Special Procedure 78-36, Revision 0, August 31, 1978,
Oyster Creek Refueling Bridge Test Procedure

(3) Crane Inspection Reports

b. Scope of Review

During the course of this inspection, the Oyster Creek refueling operations did not progress sufficiently to fully evaluate all the refueling activities normally inspected. Actual fuel movement was not observed and refueling equipment interlock checks were not monitored. The inspection reports for refueling cranes were reviewed and general refueling floor housekeeping was inspected. Refueling activities will be further reviewed during a subsequent inspection.

c. Findings

With the exception of the item described below, the inspectors did not identify any discrepancies. It was noted that the inspection report for the 100 ton reactor building crane indicated that the bridge brakes were defective. Additional investigation revealed that the brakes were not repaired and that the crane was used for drywell and reactor disassembly. Cognizant licensee personnel stated that the bridge brakes were not required for the disassembly operations and that their repair was not a prerequisite to commencing refueling activities. The licensee further commented that the brakes are not normally used at all since the bridge is easier to control with its electric motor.

The inspector left this matter unresolved pending further review.
(78-25-01)

6. Control Room Tour

The inspector started the inspection on September 26, 1978 on the 12 to 8 shift and observed and discussed the following with shift personnel:

- Proper control room manning;
- Proper shift relief/turnover;
- Various annunciators and T.S. requirements;
- Refueling preparations; and,
- Current plant status and problems.

No items of noncompliance were identified.

7. Plant Tour

a. Scope of Tour

The inspector, accompanied by a licensee representative, conducted a tour of the facility. Particular attention was directed to housekeeping, posting of radiation areas, step off pads and general health physics practices. The following areas were toured:

- Reactor Drywell, all levels;
- Reactor Torus;
- Reactor Building;
- Turbine Building; and,
- Base of the Discharge Stack.

b. Findings

Actual area radiation readings were taken by the inspector which agreed with area postings. Housekeeping was acceptable in the areas toured.

8. Unresolved Items

Unresolved items are matters about which more information is required in order to ascertain whether they are acceptable items, items of noncompliance, or deviations. Unresolved items disclosed during the inspection are discussed in Paragraph 5c.

9. Exit Interview

The inspector met with licensee representatives (see Detail 1 for attendees) at the conclusion of the inspection on September 29, 1978. The inspector summarized the scope and findings of the inspection at that time.