

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY  
Sequoyah Nuclear Plant  
Post Office Box 2000  
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January 29, 1988

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
Document Control Desk  
Washington, DC 20555


Gentlemen:

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY - SEQUOYAH NUCLEAR PLANT UNITS 1 AND 2 - DOCKET  
NOS. 50-327 AND 50-328 - FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE DPR-77 AND DPR-79 -  
SPECIAL REPORT 87-22 REVISION 1

The enclosed special report is being revised to provide a new completion  
date for the corrective action for a fire barrier penetration. This event  
was originally reported in accordance with action statement (a) of Limiting  
Conditions for Operation 3.7.12.

Very truly yours,

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY

  
S. J. Smith  
Plant Manager

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cc (Enclosure):

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SEQUOYAH NUCLEAR PLANT  
UNITS 1 AND 2  
SPECIAL REPORT 87-22 REVISION 1

This revision is being submitted to provide a new completion date for the return to service of the fire barrier provided for two main control room ventilation ducts.

DESCRIPTION OF EVENT

On November 28, 1987, with unit 1 in mode 5 (0 percent power, 4 psig, 125 degrees F) and unit 2 in mode 5 (0 percent power, 60 psig, 117 degrees F), a planned extended breach (Breaching Permit No. 5502) for removal of fire retardant pyrocrete around a duct between the cable spreading room and the main control room exceeded the seven-day Technical Specification (TS) Limiting Condition for Operation (LCO) 3.7.12. The breach was required for performance of Engineering Change Notice (ECN) L6860 which was issued on January 26, 1987, to fulfill 10 CFR 73.55, "Requirements for Physical Protection of Licensed Activities in Nuclear Power Reactors Against Radiological Sabotage." Subsequently, Work Plan (WP) 12603 was issued as part of ECN L6860. This WP called for the removal of pyrocrete from around two ducts. In the planning of the pyrocrete removal, the work package addressed the requirements for a fire breach and fire watch and also addressed the modification timeframe exceeding seven days.

CAUSE OF EVENT

The pyrocrete was removed in order to fulfill 10 CFR 73.55 requirements. In the planning stage of the WP, it was realized that the seven-day time limit would be exceeded due to the (1) removal of existing pyrocrete, (2) drilling, installing, welding, and inspection of the modification, and (3) reinstallation of the pyrocrete. The reinstallation of the pyrocrete is in itself a multi-step process involving (1) cleaning the area, (2) reinforcement installation, (3) application of the pyrocrete, (4) curing of the pyrocrete, and (5) inspection.

The scheduled completion date for the work described above was December 19, 1987, however, additional design changes were required. Further the manufacturer recommends a 10-day cure time for an application of 1.5 inches of the pyrocrete. The design required 2-inches of pyrocrete to the duct, therefore, additional cure time is required for the pyrocrete.

ANALYSIS OF EVENT

This event is being reported in accordance with the requirements of action statement (a) of LCO 3.7.12.

According to TS requirements, a roving fire watch was established to inspect the area of the breach on an hourly basis. The existing fire detection and/or suppression systems for the area were operable and would have actuated in the event of a fire. There was no danger to safety-related equipment.

#### CORRECTIVE ACTION

For immediate corrective action, as stated above, the fire watch was established and fire detection and suppression systems were verified operable.

The long-term corrective action is to return the pyrocrete surrounding the ducts to functional status. The pyrocrete surrounding the duct will be tested as the pyrocrete curing process continues. Once the pyrocrete has sufficiently cured it will be functionally tested. The anticipated date to return the pyrocrete to functional status is February 29, 1988.

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