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# Technical Specifications

## South Texas Project, Unit No. 1

Docket No. 50-498

Appendix "A" to  
License No. NPF-76

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Issued by the  
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory  
Commission

Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

March 1988



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SECTION 1.0

DEFINITIONS

## 1.0 DEFINITIONS

The defined terms of this section appear in capitalized type and are applicable throughout these Technical Specifications.

### ACTION

1.1 ACTION shall be that part of a Technical Specification that prescribes remedial measures required under designated conditions.

### ACTUATION LOGIC TEST

1.2 An ACTUATION LOGIC TEST shall be the application of various simulated input combinations in conjunction with each possible interlock logic state and verification of the required logic output. The ACTUATION LOGIC TEST shall include a continuity check, as a minimum, of output devices.

### ANALOG CHANNEL OPERATIONAL TEST

1.3 An ANALOG CHANNEL OPERATIONAL TEST shall be the injection of a simulated signal into the channel as close to the sensor as practicable to verify OPERABILITY of alarm, interlock and/or trip functions. The ANALOG CHANNEL OPERATIONAL TEST shall include adjustments, as necessary, of the alarm, interlock and/or Trip Setpoints so that the Setpoints are within the required range and accuracy.

### AXIAL FLUX DIFFERENCE

1.4 AXIAL FLUX DIFFERENCE shall be the difference in normalized flux signals between the top and bottom halves of a 2-section excore neutron detector.

### CHANNEL CALIBRATION

1.5 A CHANNEL CALIBRATION shall be the adjustment, as necessary, of the channel so that it responds within the required range and accuracy to known values of input. The CHANNEL CALIBRATION shall encompass the entire channel including the sensors and alarm, interlock, and/or trip functions and may be performed by any series of sequential, overlapping, or total channel steps so that the entire channel is calibrated.

### CHANNEL CHECK

1.6 A CHANNEL CHECK shall be the qualitative assessment of channel behavior during operation by observation. This determination shall include, where possible, comparison of the channel indication and/or status with other indications and/or status derived from independent instrument channels measuring the same parameter.

## DEFINITIONS

### CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY

1.7 CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY shall exist when:

- a. All penetrations required to be closed during accident conditions are either:
  - 1) Capable of being closed by an OPERABLE containment automatic isolation valve system, or
  - 2) Closed by manual valves, blind flanges, or deactivated automatic valves secured in their closed positions, except as provided in Specification 3.6.3.
- b. All equipment hatches are closed and sealed,
- c. Each air lock is in compliance with the requirements of Specification 3.6.1.3,
- d. The containment leakage rates are within the limits of Specification 3.6.1.2, and
- e. The sealing mechanism associated with each penetration (e.g., welds, bellows, or O-rings) is OPERABLE.

### CONTROLLED LEAKAGE

1.8 CONTROLLED LEAKAGE shall be that seal water flow supplied to the reactor coolant pump seals.

### CORE ALTERATIONS

1.9 CORE ALTERATIONS shall be the movement or manipulation of any component within the reactor pressure vessel with the vessel head removed and fuel in the vessel. Suspension of CORE ALTERATION shall not preclude completion of movement of a component to a safe conservative position.

### DIGITAL CHANNEL OPERATIONAL TEST

1.10 A DIGITAL CHANNEL OPERATIONAL TEST shall consist of injecting simulated process data where available or exercising the digital computer hardware using data base manipulation to verify OPERABILITY of alarm, interlock, and/or trip functions.

### DOSE EQUIVALENT I-131

1.11 DOSE EQUIVALENT I-131 shall be that concentration of I-131 (microCurie/gram) which alone would produce the same thyroid dose as the quantity and isotopic mixture of I-131, I-132, I-133, I-134, and I-135 actually present. The thyroid dose conversion factors used for this calculation shall be those listed in Table E-7 of NRC Regulatory Guide 1.109, Revision 1, October 1977.

## DEFINITIONS

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### E - AVERAGE DISINTEGRATION ENERGY

1.12  $\bar{E}$  shall be the average (weighted in proportion to the concentration of each radionuclide in the sample) of the sum of the average beta and gamma energies per disintegration (MeV/d) for the isotopes, other than iodines, with half lives greater than 15 minutes, making up at least 95% of the total non-iodine activity in the coolant.

### ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURES RESPONSE TIME

1.13 The ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURES (ESF) RESPONSE TIME shall be that time interval from when the monitored parameter exceeds its ESF Actuation Setpoint at the channel sensor until the ESF equipment is capable of performing its safety function (i.e., the valves travel to their required positions, pump discharge pressures reach their required values, etc.). Times shall include diesel generator starting and sequence loading delays where applicable.

### FREQUENCY NOTATION

1.14 The FREQUENCY NOTATION specified for the performance of Surveillance Requirements shall correspond to the intervals defined in Table 1.1.

### GASEOUS WASTE PROCESSING SYSTEM

1.15 A GASEOUS WASTE PROCESSING SYSTEM shall be any system designed and installed to reduce radioactive gaseous effluents by collecting Reactor Coolant System offgases from the Reactor Coolant System and providing for delay or holdup for the purpose of reducing the total radioactivity prior to release to the environment.

### IDENTIFIED LEAKAGE

1.16 IDENTIFIED LEAKAGE shall be:

- a. Leakage (except CONTROLLED LEAKAGE) into closed systems, such as pump seal or valve packing leaks that are captured and conducted to a sump or collecting tank, or
- b. Leakage into the containment atmosphere from sources that are both specifically located and known either not to interfere with the operation of Leakage Detection Systems or not to be PRESSURE BOUNDARY LEAKAGE, or
- c. Reactor Coolant System leakage through a steam generator to the Secondary Coolant System.

## DEFINITIONS

### MASTER RELAY TEST

1.17 A MASTER RELAY TEST shall be the energization of each master relay and verification of OPERABILITY of each relay. The MASTER RELAY TEST shall include a continuity check of each associated slave relay.

### MEMBER(S) OF THE PUBLIC

1.18 MEMBER(S) OF THE PUBLIC shall include all persons who are not occupationally associated with the plant. This category does not include employees of the licensee, its contractors, or vendors. Also excluded from this category are persons who enter the site to service equipment or to make deliveries. This category does include persons who use portions of the site for recreational, occupational, or other purposes not associated with the plant.

### OFFSITE DOSE CALCULATION MANUAL

1.19 The OFFSITE DOSE CALCULATION MANUAL (ODCM) shall contain the methodology and parameters used in the calculation of offsite doses due to radioactive gaseous and liquid effluents, in the calculation of gaseous and liquid effluent monitoring Alarm/Trip Setpoints, and in the conduct of the Environmental Radiological Monitoring Program.

### OPERABLE - OPERABILITY

1.20 A system, subsystem, train, component or device shall be OPERABLE or have OPERABILITY when it is capable of performing its specified function(s), and when all necessary attendant instrumentation, controls, electrical power, cooling or seal water, lubrication or other auxiliary equipment that are required for the system, subsystem, train, component, or device to perform its function(s) are also capable of performing their related support function(s).

### OPERATIONAL MODE - MODE

1.21 An OPERATIONAL MODE (i.e., MODE) shall correspond to any one inclusive combination of core reactivity condition, power level, and average reactor coolant temperature specified in Table 1.2.

### PHYSICS TESTS

1.22 PHYSICS TESTS shall be those tests performed to measure the fundamental nuclear characteristics of the reactor core and related instrumentation: (1) described in Chapter 14.0 of the FSAR, (2) authorized under the provisions of 10 CFR 50.59, or (3) otherwise approved by the Commission.

### PRESSURE BOUNDARY LEAKAGE

1.23 PRESSURE BOUNDARY LEAKAGE shall be leakage (except steam generator tube leakage) through a nonisolable fault in a Reactor Coolant System component body, pipe wall, or vessel wall.

## DEFINITIONS

### PROCESS CONTROL PROGRAM

1.24 The PROCESS CONTROL PROGRAM (PCP) shall contain the current formulas, sampling, analyses, tests, and determinations to be made to ensure that processing and packaging of solid radioactive wastes based on demonstrated processing of actual or simulated wet solid wastes will be accomplished in such a way as to assure compliance with 10 CFR Parts 20, 61, and 71 and Federal and State regulations, burial ground requirements, and other requirements governing the disposal of radioactive waste.

### PURGE - PURGING

1.25 PURGE or PURGING shall be any controlled process of discharging air or gas from a confinement to maintain temperature, pressure, humidity, concentration or other operating condition, in such a manner that replacement air or gas is required to purify the confinement.

### QUADRANT POWER TILT RATIO

1.26 QUADRANT POWER TILT RATIO shall be the ratio of the maximum upper excore detector calibrated output to the average of the upper excore detector calibrated outputs, or the ratio of the maximum lower excore detector calibrated output to the average of the lower excore detector calibrated outputs, whichever is greater. With one excore detector inoperable, the remaining three detectors shall be used for computing the average.

### RATED THERMAL POWER

1.27 RATED THERMAL POWER shall be a total reactor core heat transfer rate to the reactor coolant of 3800 Mwt.

### REACTOR TRIP SYSTEM RESPONSE TIME

1.28 The REACTOR TRIP SYSTEM RESPONSE TIME shall be the time interval from when the monitored parameter exceeds its Trip Setpoint at the channel sensor until loss of stationary gripper coil voltage.

### REPORTABLE EVENT

1.29 A REPORTABLE EVENT shall be any of those conditions specified in Section 50.73 of 10 CFR Part 50.

### SHUTDOWN MARGIN

1.30 SHUTDOWN MARGIN shall be the instantaneous amount of reactivity by which the reactor is subcritical or would be subcritical from its present condition assuming all full-length rod cluster assemblies (shutdown and control) are fully inserted except for the single rod cluster assembly of highest reactivity worth which is assumed to be fully withdrawn.

## DEFINITIONS

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### SITE BOUNDARY

1.31 The SITE BOUNDARY shall be that line beyond which the land is neither owned, nor leased, nor otherwise controlled by the licensee.

### SLAVE RELAY TEST

1.32 A SLAVE RELAY TEST shall be the energization of each slave relay and verification of OPERABILITY of each relay. The SLAVE RELAY TEST shall include a continuity check, as a minimum, of associated testable actuation devices.

### SOLIDIFICATION

1.33 SOLIDIFICATION shall be the conversion of wet wastes into a form that meets shipping and burial ground requirements.

### SOURCE CHECK

1.34 A SOURCE CHECK shall be the qualitative assessment of channel response when the channel sensor is exposed to a source of increased radioactivity.

### STAGGERED TEST BASIS

1.35 A STAGGERED TEST BASIS shall consist of:

- a. A test schedule for n systems, subsystems, trains, or other designated components obtained by dividing the specified test interval into n equal subintervals, and
- b. The testing of one system, subsystem, train, or other designated component at the beginning of each subinterval.

### THERMAL POWER

1.36 THERMAL POWER shall be the total reactor core heat transfer rate to the reactor coolant.

### TRIP ACTUATING DEVICE OPERATIONAL TEST

1.37 A TRIP ACTUATING DEVICE OPERATIONAL TEST shall consist of operating the Trip Actuating Device and verifying OPERABILITY of alarm, interlock and/or trip functions. The TRIP ACTUATING DEVICE OPERATIONAL TEST shall include adjustment, as necessary, of the Trip Actuating Device so that it actuates at the required Setpoint within the required accuracy.

### UNIDENTIFIED LEAKAGE

1.38 UNIDENTIFIED LEAKAGE shall be all leakage which is not IDENTIFIED LEAKAGE or CONTROLLED LEAKAGE.

## DEFINITIONS

---

### UNRESTRICTED AREA

1.39 An UNRESTRICTED AREA shall be any area at or beyond the SITE BOUNDARY access to which is not controlled by the licensee for purposes of protection of individuals from exposure to radiation and radioactive materials, or any area within the SITE BOUNDARY used for residential quarters or for industrial, commercial, institutional, and/or recreational purposes.

### VENTING

1.40 VENTING shall be the controlled process of discharging air or gas from a confinement to maintain temperature, pressure, humidity, concentration, or other operating condition, in such a manner that replacement air or gas is not provided or required during VENTING. Vent, used in system names, does not imply a VENTING process.



TABLE 1.1

FREQUENCY NOTATION

<u>NOTATION</u>	<u>FREQUENCY</u>
S	At least once per 12 hours.
D	At least once per 24 hours.
W	At least once per 7 days.
M	At least once per 31 days.
Q	At least once per 92 days.
SA	At least once per 184 days.
R	At least once per 18 months.
S/U	Prior to each reactor startup.
N.A.	Not applicable.
P	Completed prior to each release.

TABLE 1.2  
OPERATIONAL MODES

<u>MODE</u>	<u>REACTIVITY CONDITION, <math>K_{eff}</math></u>	<u>% RATED THERMAL POWER*</u>	<u>AVERAGE COOLANT TEMPERATURE</u>
1. POWER OPERATION	$\geq 0.99$	$> 5\%$	$\geq 350^{\circ}\text{F}$
2. STARTUP	$\geq 0.99$	$\leq 5\%$	$\geq 350^{\circ}\text{F}$
3. HOT STANDBY	$< 0.99$	0	$\geq 350^{\circ}\text{F}$
4. HOT SHUTDOWN	$< 0.99$	0	$350^{\circ}\text{F} > T_{avg}$ $> 200^{\circ}\text{F}$
5. COLD SHUTDOWN	$< 0.99$	0	$\leq 200^{\circ}\text{F}$
6. REFUELING**	$\leq 0.95$	0	$\leq 140^{\circ}\text{F}$

\*Excluding decay heat.

\*\*Fuel in the reactor vessel with the vessel head closure bolts less than fully tensioned or with the head removed.

SECTION 2.0  
SAFETY LIMITS  
AND  
LIMITING SAFETY SYSTEM SETTINGS

## 2.0 SAFETY LIMITS AND LIMITING SAFETY SYSTEM SETTINGS

### 2.1 SAFETY LIMITS

#### REACTOR CORE

2.1.1 The combination of THERMAL POWER, pressurizer pressure, and the highest operating loop coolant temperature ( $T_{avg}$ ) shall not exceed the limits shown in Figure 2.1-1.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1 and 2.

#### ACTION:

Whenever the point defined by the combination of the highest operating loop average temperature and THERMAL POWER has exceeded the appropriate pressurizer pressure line, be in HOT STANDBY within 1 hour, and comply with the requirements of Specification 6.7.1.

#### REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM PRESSURE

2.1.2 The Reactor Coolant System pressure shall not exceed 2735 psig.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5.

#### ACTION:

MODES 1 and 2:

Whenever the Reactor Coolant System pressure has exceeded 2735 psig, be in HOT STANDBY with the Reactor Coolant System pressure within its limit within 1 hour, and comply with the requirements of Specification 6.7.1.

MODES 3, 4 and 5:

Whenever the Reactor Coolant System pressure has exceeded 2735 psig, reduce the Reactor Coolant System pressure to within its limit within 5 minutes, and comply with the requirements of Specification 6.7.1.




FIGURE 2.1-1  
 REACTOR CORE SAFETY LIMIT - FOUR LOOPS IN OPERATION

## SAFETY LIMITS AND LIMITING SAFETY SYSTEM SETTINGS

### 2.2 LIMITING SAFETY SYSTEM SETTINGS

#### REACTOR TRIP SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION SETPOINTS

2.2.1 The Reactor Trip System Instrumentation and Interlock Setpoints shall be set consistent with the Trip Setpoint values shown in Table 2.2-1.

APPLICABILITY: As shown for each channel in Table 3.3-1.

#### ACTION:

- a. With a Reactor Trip System Instrumentation or Interlock Setpoint less conservative than the value shown in the Trip Setpoint column but more conservative than the value shown in the Allowable Value column of Table 2.2-1, adjust the Setpoint consistent with the Trip Setpoint value.
- b. With the Reactor Trip System Instrumentation or Interlock Setpoint less conservative than the value shown in the Allowable Value column of Table 2.2-1, either:
  1. Adjust the Setpoint consistent with the Trip Setpoint value of Table 2.2-1 and determine within 12 hours that Equation 2.2-1 was satisfied for the affected channel, or
  2. Declare the channel inoperable and apply the applicable ACTION statement requirement of Specification 3.3.1 until the channel is restored to OPERABLE status with its Setpoint adjusted consistent with the Trip Setpoint value.

Equation 2.2-1

$$Z + R + S \leq TA$$

Where:

- Z = The value from Column Z of Table 2.2-1 for the affected channel,
- R = The "as-measured" value (in percent span) of rack error for the affected channel,
- S = Either the "as-measured" value (in percent span) of the sensor error, or the value from Column S (Sensor Error) of Table 2.2-1 for the affected channel, and
- TA = The value from Column TA (Total Allowance) of Table 2.2-1 for the affected channel.

TABLE 2.2-1  
REACTOR TRIP SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION TRIP SETPOINTS

<u>FUNCTIONAL UNIT</u>	<u>TOTAL ALLOWANCE (TA)</u>	<u>Z</u>	<u>SENSOR ERROR (S)</u>	<u>TRIP SETPOINT</u>	<u>ALLOWABLE VALUE</u>
1. Manual Reactor Trip	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.
2. Power Range, Neutron Flux					
a. High Setpoint	7.5	4.56	0	<109% of RTP**	<111.3% of RTP**
b. Low Setpoint	8.3	4.56	0	<25% of RTP**	<27.3% of RTP**
3. Power Range, Neutron Flux, High Positive Rate	1.6	0.5	0	<5% of RTP** with a time constant >2 seconds	<6.3% of RTP** with a time constant >2 seconds
4. Power Range, Neutron Flux, High Negative Rate	1.6	0.5	0	<5% of RTP** with a time constant >2 seconds	<6.3% of RTP** with a time constant >2 seconds
5. Intermediate Range, Neutron Flux	17.0	8.41	0	<25% of RTP**	<31.1% of RTP**
6. Source Range, Neutron Flux	17.0	10.01	0	<10 <sup>5</sup> cps	<1.4 x 10 <sup>5</sup> cps
7. Overtemperature ΔT	6.8	4.66	1.5 + 0.9#	See Note 1	See Note 2
8. Overpower ΔT	5.5	1.74	1.5	See Note 3	See Note 4
9. Pressurizer Pressure-Low	3.1	0.71	2.0	>1870 psig	>1862 psig
10. Pressurizer Pressure-High	3.1	0.71	2.0	<2380 psig	<2388 psig
11. Pressurizer Water Level-High	5.0	2.76	2.0	<92% of instrument span	<93.6% of instrument span
12. Reactor Coolant Flow-Low	4.0	3.19	0.6	>91.8% of loop design flow*	>90.9% of loop design flow*

\*Loop design flow = 95,400 gpm

\*\*RTP = RATED THERMAL POWER

#1.5% span for ΔT; 0.9% span for Pressurizer Pressure

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TABLE 2.2-1 (Continued)

REACTOR TRIP SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION TRIP SETPOINTS

<u>FUNCTIONAL UNIT</u>	<u>TOTAL ALLOWANCE (TA)</u>	<u>Z</u>	<u>SENSOR ERROR (S)</u>	<u>TRIP SETPOINT</u>	<u>ALLOWABLE VALUE</u>
13. Steam Generator Water Level Low-Low	15.0	12.75	2.0 + 0.2##	>33% of narrow range instrument span	>31.5% of narrow range instrument span
14. Undervoltage - Reactor Coolant Pumps	10.5	0.3	0	>10,014 volts	>9408 volts
15. Underfrequency - Reactor Coolant Pumps	3.4	0.01	0	>57.2 Hz	>57.1 Hz
16. Turbine Trip					
a. Low Emergency Trip Fluid Pressure	232.1	100.8	131.3	>1245.8 psig	>1114.5 psig
b. Turbine Stop Valve Closure	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	<Fully closed	Fully closed
17. Safety Injection Input from ESFAS	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.

##2.0% span for Steam Generator Level; 0.2% span for Reference Leg RTDs



TABLE 2.2-1 (Continued)  
 REACTOR TRIP SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION TRIP SETPOINTS

FUNCTIONAL UNIT	TOTAL ALLOWANCE (TA)	Z	SENSOR ERROR (S)	TRIP SETPOINT	ALLOWABLE VALUE
18. Reactor Trip System Interlocks					
a. Intermediate Range Neutron Flux, P-6	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	$\geq 1 \times 10^{-10}$ amp	$\geq 6 \times 10^{-11}$ amp
b. Low Power Reactor Trips Block, P-7					
1) P-10 input	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	$< 10\%$ of RTP**	$< 12.3\%$ of RTP**
2) P-13 input	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	$< 10\%$ RTP** Turbine Impulse Pressure Equivalent	$< 12.3\%$ RTP** Turbine Impulse Pressure Equivalent
c. Power Range Neutron Flux, P-8	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	$< 40\%$ of RTP**	$< 42.3\%$ of RTP**
d. Power Range Neutron Flux, P-9	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	$< 50\%$ of RTP**	$< 52.3\%$ of RTP**
e. Power Range Neutron Flux, P-10	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	$\geq 10\%$ of RTP**	$\geq 7.7\%$ of RTP**
f. Turbine Impulse Chamber Pressure, P-13	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	$< 10\%$ RTP** Turbine Impulse Pressure Equivalent	$< 12.3\%$ RTP** Turbine Impulse Pressure Equivalent
19. Reactor Trip Breakers	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.
20. Automatic Trip and Interlock Logic	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.

\*\*RTP = RATED THERMAL POWER

TABLE 2.2-1 (Continued)

## TABLE NOTATIONS

NOTE 1: OVERTEMPERATURE  $\Delta T$ 

$$\Delta T \frac{(1 + \tau_1 S)}{(1 + \tau_2 S)} \left( \frac{1}{1 + \tau_3 S} \right) \leq \Delta T_0 \left\{ K_1 - K_2 \frac{(1 + \tau_4 S)}{(1 + \tau_5 S)} \left( T \left( \frac{1}{1 + \tau_6 S} \right) - T' \right) + K_3(P - P') - f_1(\Delta I) \right\}$$

- Where:
- $\Delta T$  = Measured  $\Delta T$  by RCS Instrumentation;
  - $\frac{1 + \tau_1 S}{1 + \tau_2 S}$  = Lead-lag compensator on measured  $\Delta T$ ;
  - $\tau_1, \tau_2$  = Time constant utilized in lead-lag compensator for  $\Delta T$ ,  $\tau_1 = 8$  sec,  $\tau_2 = 3$  sec;
  - $\frac{1}{1 + \tau_3 S}$  = Lag compensator on measured  $\Delta T$ ;
  - $\tau_3$  = Time constant utilized in the lag compensator for  $\Delta T$ ,  $\tau_3 = 0$  sec;
  - $\Delta T_0$  = Indicated  $\Delta T$  at RATED THERMAL POWER;
  - $K_1$  = 1.08;
  - $K_2$  = 0.0185/°F;
  - $\frac{1 + \tau_4 S}{1 + \tau_5 S}$  = The function generated by the lead-lag compensator for  $T_{avg}$  dynamic compensation;
  - $\tau_4, \tau_5$  = Time constants utilized in the lead-lag compensator for  $T_{avg}$ ,  $\tau_4 = 33$  sec,  $\tau_5 = 4$  sec;
  - $T$  = Average temperature, °F;
  - $\frac{1}{1 + \tau_6 S}$  = Lag compensator on measured  $T_{avg}$ ;
  - $\tau_6$  = Time constant utilized in the measured  $T_{avg}$  lag compensator,  $\tau_6 = 0$  sec;

TABLE 2.2-1 (Continued)  
 TABLE NOTATIONS (Continued)

## NOTE 1: (Continued)

$T'$	$<$	593.0°F (Nominal $T_{avg}$ at RATED THERMAL POWER);
$K_3$	$=$	0.000857/ $f_{sig}$ ;
$P$	$=$	Pressurizer pressure, psig;
$P'$	$=$	2235 psig (Nominal RCS operating pressure);
$S$	$=$	Laplace transform operator, $sec^{-1}$ ;

and  $f_1(\Delta I)$  is a function of the indicated difference between top and bottom detectors of the power-range neutron ion chambers; with gains to be selected based on measured instrument response during plant startup tests such that:

- (1) For  $q_t - q_b$  between -39% and +10%,  $f_1(\Delta I) = 0$ , where  $q_t$  and  $q_b$  are percent RATED THERMAL POWER in the top and bottom halves of the core respectively, and  $q_t + q_b$  is total THERMAL POWER in percent of RATED THERMAL POWER;
- (2) For each percent that the magnitude of  $q_t - q_b$  exceeds -39%, the  $\Delta T$  Trip Setpoint shall be automatically reduced by 1.55% of its value at RATED THERMAL POWER; and
- (3) For each percent that the magnitude of  $q_t - q_b$  exceeds +10%, the  $\Delta T$  Trip Setpoint shall be automatically reduced by 1.52% of its value at RATED THERMAL POWER.

NOTE 2: The channel's maximum Trip Setpoint shall not exceed its computed Trip Setpoint by more than 1.7%  $\Delta T$  span.

TABLE 2.2-1 (Continued)  
 TABLE NOTATIONS (Continued)

NOTE 3: OVERPOWER  $\Delta T$

$$\Delta T \frac{(1 + \tau_1 S)}{(1 + \tau_2 S)} \left( \frac{1}{1 + \tau_3 S} \right) \leq \Delta T_0 \left\{ K_4 - K_5 \frac{(\tau_7 S)}{(1 + \tau_7 S)} \left( \frac{1}{1 + \tau_6 S} \right) T - K_6 \left( T \left( \frac{1}{1 + \tau_6 S} \right) - T'' \right) - f_2(\Delta I) \right\}$$

- Where:
- $\Delta T$  = As defined in Note 1,
  - $\frac{1 + \tau_1 S}{1 + \tau_2 S}$  = As defined in Note 1,
  - $\tau_1, \tau_2$  = As defined in Note 1,
  - $\frac{1}{1 + \tau_3 S}$  = As defined in Note 1,
  - $\tau_3$  = As defined in Note 1,
  - $\Delta T_0$  = As defined in Note 1,
  - $K_4$  = 1.08,
  - $K_5$  = 0.02/°F for increasing average temperature and 0 for decreasing average temperature,
  - $\frac{\tau_7 S}{1 + \tau_7 S}$  = The function generated by the rate-lag compensator for  $T_{avg}$  dynamic compensation,
  - $\tau_7$  = Time constant utilized in the rate-lag compensator for  $T_{avg}$ ,  $\tau_7 = 10$  sec.
  - $\frac{1}{1 + \tau_6 S}$  = As defined in Note 1,
  - $\tau_6$  = As defined in Note 1,

TABLE 2.2-1 (Continued)  
TABLE NOTATIONS (Continued)

NOTE 3: (Continued)

$K_6$	=	$0.00135/^{\circ}\text{F}$ for $T > T''$ and $K_6 = 0$ for $T \leq T''$ ,
$T$	=	As defined in Note 1,
$T''$	=	Indicated $T_{\text{avg}}$ at RATED THERMAL POWER (Calibration temperature for $\Delta T$ instrumentation, $\leq 593.0^{\circ}\text{F}$ ),
$S$	=	As defined in Note 1, and
$f_2(\Delta I)$	=	0 for all $\Delta I$ .

NOTE 4: The channel's maximum Trip Setpoint shall not exceed its computed Trip Setpoint by more than 3.0%  $\Delta T$  span.

BASES  
FOR  
SECTION 2.0  
SAFETY LIMITS  
AND  
LIMITING SAFETY SYSTEM SETTINGS

NOTE

The BASES contained in succeeding pages summarize the reasons for the Specifications in Section 2.0, but in accordance with 10 CFR 50.36 are not part of these Technical Specifications.

## 2.1 SAFETY LIMITS

### BASES

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#### 2.1.1 REACTOR CORE

The restrictions of this Safety Limit prevent overheating of the fuel and possible cladding perforation which would result in the release of fission products to the reactor coolant. Overheating of the fuel cladding is prevented by restricting fuel operation to within the nucleate boiling regime where the heat transfer coefficient is large and the cladding surface temperature is slightly above the coolant saturation temperature.

Operation above the upper boundary of the nucleate boiling regime could result in excessive cladding temperatures because of the onset of departure from nucleate boiling (DNB) and the resultant sharp reduction in heat transfer coefficient. DNB is not a directly measurable parameter during operation and therefore THERMAL POWER and reactor coolant temperature and pressure have been related to DNB through the W-3 R-Grid correlation. The W-3 R-Grid DNB correlation has been developed to predict the DNB flux and the location of DNB for axially uniform and nonuniform heat flux distributions. The local DNB heat flux ratio (DNBR) is defined as the ratio of the heat flux that would cause DNB at a particular core location to the local heat flux and is indicative of the margin to DNB.

The minimum value of the DNBR during steady-state operation, normal operational transients, and anticipated transients is limited to 1.30. This value corresponds to a 95% probability at a 95% confidence level that DNB will not occur and is chosen as an appropriate margin to DNB for all operating conditions.

The curves of Figure 2.1-1 show the loci of points of THERMAL POWER, Reactor Coolant System pressure and average temperature for which the minimum DNBR is no less than 1.30, or the average enthalpy at the vessel exit is equal to the enthalpy of saturated liquid.

These curves are based on an enthalpy hot channel factor,  $F_{\Delta H}^N$ , of 1.52 and a reference cosine with a peak of 1.61 for axial power shape. An allowance is included for an increase in  $F_{\Delta H}^N$  at reduced power based on the expression:

$$F_{\Delta H}^N = 1.52 [1 + 0.3 (1-P)]$$

Where P is the fraction of RATED THERMAL POWER.

These limiting heat flux conditions are higher than those calculated for the range of all control rods fully withdrawn to the maximum allowable control rod insertion assuming the axial power imbalance is within the limits of the  $f_1(\Delta I)$  function of the Overtemperature trip. When the axial power imbalance is not within the tolerance, the axial power imbalance effect on the Overtemperature  $\Delta T$  trips will reduce the Setpoints to provide protection consistent with core Safety Limits.



## SAFETY LIMITS

### BASES

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#### 2.1.2 REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM PRESSURE

The restriction of this Safety Limit protects the integrity of the Reactor Coolant System (RCS) from overpressurization and thereby prevents the release of radionuclides contained in the reactor coolant from reaching the containment atmosphere.

The reactor vessel, pressurizer, and the RCS piping, valves, and fittings are designed to Section III of the ASME Code for Nuclear Power Plants which permits a maximum transient pressure of 110% (2735 psig) of design pressure. The Safety Limit of 2735 psig is therefore consistent with the design criteria and associated Code requirements.

The entire RCS is hydrotested at 125% (3110 psig) of design pressure, to demonstrate integrity prior to initial operation.

## 2.2 LIMITING SAFETY SYSTEM SETTINGS

### BASES

#### 2.2.1 REACTOR TRIP SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION SETPOINTS

The Reactor Trip Setpoint Limits specified in Table 2.2-1 are the nominal values at which the Reactor trips are set for each functional unit. The Trip Setpoints have been selected to ensure that the core and Reactor Coolant System are prevented from exceeding their safety limits during normal operation and design basis anticipated operational occurrences and to assist the Engineered Safety Features Actuation System in mitigating the consequences of accidents. The Setpoint for a Reactor Trip System or interlock function is considered to be adjusted consistent with the nominal value when the "as-measured" Setpoint is within the band allowed for calibration accuracy.

To accommodate the instrument drift assumed to occur between operational tests and the accuracy to which Setpoints can be measured and calibrated, Allowable Values for the Reactor Trip Setpoints have been specified in Table 2.2-1. Operation with Setpoints less conservative than the Trip Setpoint but within the Allowable Value is acceptable since an allowance has been made in the safety analysis to accommodate this error. An optional provision has been included for determining the OPERABILITY of a channel when its Trip Setpoint is found to exceed the Allowable Value. The methodology of this option utilizes the "as measured" deviation from the specified calibration point for rack and sensor components in conjunction with a statistical combination of the other uncertainties of the instrumentation to measure the process variable and the uncertainties in calibrating the instrumentation. In Equation 2.2-1,  $Z + R + S \leq TA$ , the interactive effects of the errors in the rack and the sensor, and the "as-measured" values of the errors are considered. Z, as specified in Table 2.2-1, in percent span, is the statistical summation of errors assumed in the analysis excluding those associated with the sensor and rack drift and the accuracy of their measurement. TA or Total Allowance is the difference, in percent span, between the Trip Setpoint and the value used in the analysis for Reactor trip. R or Rack Error is the "as-measured" deviation, in percent span, for the affected channel from the specified Trip Setpoint. S or Sensor Error is either the "as-measured" deviation of the sensor from its calibration point or the value specified in Table 2.2-1, in percent span, from the analysis assumptions. Use of Equation 2.2-1 allows for a sensor drift factor and an increased rack drift factor, and provides a threshold value for REPORTABLE EVENTS.

The methodology to derive the Trip Setpoints is based upon combining all of the uncertainties in the channels. Inherent to the determination of the Trip Setpoints are the magnitudes of these channel uncertainties. Sensors and other instrumentation utilized in these channels are expected to be capable of operating within the allowances of these uncertainty magnitudes. Rack drift in excess of the Allowable Value exhibits the behavior that the rack has not met its allowance. Because there is a small statistical chance that this will happen, an infrequent excessive drift is expected. Rack or sensor drift, in excess of the allowance that is more than occasional, may be indicative of more serious problems and should warrant further investigation.

## LIMITING SAFETY SYSTEM SETTINGS

### BASES

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#### REACTOR TRIP SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION SETPOINTS (Continued)

The various Reactor trip circuits automatically open the Reactor trip breakers whenever a condition monitored by the Reactor Trip System reaches a preset or calculated level. In addition to redundant channels and trains, the design approach provides a Reactor Trip System which monitors numerous system variables, therefore providing Trip System functional diversity. The functional capability at the specified trip setting is required for those anticipatory or diverse Reactor trips for which no direct credit was assumed in the safety analysis to enhance the overall reliability of the Reactor Trip System. The Reactor Trip System initiates a Turbine trip signal whenever Reactor trip is initiated. This prevents the reactivity insertion that would otherwise result from excessive Reactor Coolant System cooldown and thus avoids unnecessary actuation of the Engineered Safety Features Actuation System.

#### Manual Reactor Trip

The Reactor Trip System includes manual Reactor trip capability.

#### Power Range, Neutron Flux

In each of the Power Range Neutron Flux channels there are two independent bistables, each with its own trip setting used for a High and Low Range trip setting. The Low Setpoint trip provides protection during subcritical and low power operations to mitigate the consequences of a power excursion beginning from low power, and the High Setpoint trip provides protection during power operations to mitigate the consequences of a reactivity excursion from all power levels.

The Low Setpoint trip may be manually blocked above P-10 (a power level of approximately 10% of RATED THERMAL POWER) and is automatically reinstated below the P-10 Setpoint.

#### Power Range, Neutron Flux, High Rates

The Power Range Positive Rate trip provides protection against rapid flux increases which are characteristic of a rupture of a control rod drive housing. Specifically, this trip complements the Power Range Neutron Flux High and Low trips to ensure that the criteria are met for rod ejection from mid-power.

The Power Range Negative Rate trip provides protection for control rod drop accidents. At high power a single or multiple rod drop accident could cause local flux peaking which could cause an unconservative local DNBR to exist. The Power Range Negative Rate trip will prevent this from occurring by tripping the reactor. No credit is taken for operation of the Power Range Negative Rate trip for those control rod drop accidents for which DNBRs will be greater than 1.30.

## LIMITING SAFETY SYSTEM SETTINGS

### BASES

---

#### Intermediate and Source Range, Neutron Flux

The Intermediate and Source Range, Neutron Flux trips provide core protection during reactor startup to mitigate the consequences of an uncontrolled rod cluster control assembly bank withdrawal from a subcritical condition. These trips provide redundant protection to the Low Setpoint trip of the Power Range, Neutron Flux channels. The Source Range channels will initiate a Reactor trip at about  $10^5$  counts per second unless manually blocked when P-6 becomes active. The Source Range channels are automatically blocked above P-10. The Intermediate Range channels will initiate a Reactor trip at a current level equivalent to approximately 25% of RATED THERMAL POWER unless manually blocked when P-10 becomes active.

#### Overtemperature $\Delta T$

The Overtemperature  $\Delta T$  trip provides core protection to prevent DNB for all combinations of pressure, power, coolant temperature, and axial power distribution, provided that the transient is slow with respect to piping transit delays from the core to the temperature detectors, and pressure is within the range between the Pressurizer High and Low Pressure trips. The Setpoint is automatically varied with: (1) coolant temperature to correct for temperature-induced changes in density and heat capacity of water and includes dynamic compensation for piping delays from the core to the loop temperature detectors, (2) pressurizer pressure, and (3) axial power distribution. With normal axial power distribution, this Reactor trip limit is always below the core Safety Limit as shown in Figure 2.1-1. If axial peaks are greater than design, as indicated by the difference between top and bottom power range nuclear detectors, the Reactor trip is automatically reduced according to the notations in Table 2.2-1.

#### Overpower $\Delta T$

The Overpower  $\Delta T$  trip provides assurance of fuel integrity (e.g., no fuel pellet melting and less than 1% cladding strain) under all possible overpower conditions, limits the required range for Overtemperature  $\Delta T$  trip, and provides a backup to the High Neutron Flux trip. The Setpoint is automatically varied with: (1) coolant temperature to correct for temperature-induced changes in density and heat capacity of water, and (2) rate of change of temperature for dynamic compensation for piping delays from the core to the loop temperature detectors, to ensure that the allowable heat generation rate (kW/ft) is not exceeded. The Overpower  $\Delta T$  trip provides protection to mitigate the consequences of various size steam breaks as reported in WCAP-9226, "Reactor Core Response to Excessive Secondary Steam Releases."

## LIMITING SAFETY SYSTEM SETTINGS

### BASES

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#### Pressurizer Pressure

In each of the pressurizer pressure channels, there are two independent bistables, each with its own trip setting to provide for a High and Low Pressure trip thus limiting the pressure range in which reactor operation is permitted. The Low Setpoint trip protects against low pressure which could lead to DNB by tripping the reactor in the event of a loss of reactor coolant pressure.

On decreasing power, the Low Setpoint trip is automatically blocked by P-7 (a power level of approximately 10% of RATED THERMAL POWER with turbine impulse chamber pressure at approximately 10% of full power equivalent); and on increasing power, automatically reinstated by P-7.

The High Setpoint trip functions in conjunction with the pressurizer relief and safety valves to protect the Reactor Coolant System against system overpressure.

#### Pressurizer Water Level

The Pressurizer High Water Level trip is provided to prevent water relief through the pressurizer safety valves. On decreasing power, the Pressurizer High Water Level trip is automatically blocked by P-7 (a power level of approximately 10% of RATED THERMAL POWER with a turbine impulse chamber pressure at approximately 10% of full power equivalent); and on increasing power, automatically reinstated by P-7.

#### Reactor Coolant Flow

The Low Reactor Coolant Flow trips provide core protection to prevent DNB by mitigating the consequences of a loss of flow resulting from the loss of one or more reactor coolant pumps.

On increasing power above P-7 (a power level of approximately 10% of RATED THERMAL POWER or a turbine impulse chamber pressure at approximately 10% of full power equivalent), an automatic Reactor trip will occur if the flow in more than one loop drops below approximately 92% of nominal full loop flow. Above P-8 (a power level of approximately 40% of RATED THERMAL POWER) an automatic Reactor trip will occur if the flow in any single loop drops below approximately 92% of nominal full loop flow. Conversely, on decreasing power between P-8 and the P-7, an automatic Reactor trip will occur on low reactor coolant flow in more than one loop, and below P-7 the trip function is automatically blocked.

#### Steam Generator Water Level

The Steam Generator Water Level Low-Low trip protects the reactor from loss of heat sink in the event of a sustained steam/feedwater flow mismatch resulting from loss of normal feedwater. The specified Setpoint provides allowances for starting delays of the Auxiliary Feedwater System.

## LIMITING SAFETY SYSTEM SETTINGS

### BASES

#### Undervoltage and Underfrequency - Reactor Coolant Pump Buses

The Undervoltage and Underfrequency Reactor Coolant Pump Bus trips provide core protection against DNB as a result of complete loss of forced coolant flow. The specified Setpoints assure a Reactor trip signal is generated before the Low Flow Trip Setpoint is reached. Time delays are incorporated in the Underfrequency and Undervoltage trips to prevent spurious Reactor trips from momentary electrical power transients. For undervoltage, the delay is set so that the time required for a signal to reach the Reactor trip breakers following the simultaneous trip of two or more reactor coolant pump bus circuit breakers shall not exceed 1.2 seconds. For underfrequency, the delay is set so that the time required for a signal to reach the Reactor trip breakers after the Underfrequency Trip Setpoint is reached shall not exceed 0.3 second. On decreasing power, the Undervoltage and Underfrequency Reactor Coolant Pump Bus trips are automatically blocked by P-7 (a power level of approximately 10% of RATED THERMAL POWER with a turbine impulse chamber pressure at approximately 10% of full power equivalent); and on increasing power, reinstated automatically by P-7.

#### Turbine Trip

A Turbine trip initiates a Reactor trip. On decreasing power, the Reactor trip from the Turbine trip is automatically blocked by P-9 (a power level of approximately 50% of RATED THERMAL POWER); and on increasing power, reinstated automatically by P-9.

#### Safety Injection Input from ESFAS

If a Reactor trip has not already been generated by the Reactor Trip System instrumentation, the ESFAS automatic actuation logic channels will initiate a Reactor trip upon any signal which initiates a Safety Injection. The ESFAS instrumentation channels which initiate a Safety Injection signal are shown in Table 3.3-3.

#### Reactor Trip System Interlocks

The Reactor Trip System interlocks perform the following functions:

- P-6 On increasing power, P-6 allows the manual block of the Source Range trip (i.e., prevents premature block of Source Range trip and deenergizes the high voltage to the detectors). On decreasing power, Source Range Level trips are automatically reactivated and high voltage restored.
- P-7 On increasing power, P-7 automatically enables Reactor trips on low flow in more than one reactor coolant loop, reactor coolant pump bus undervoltage and underfrequency, pressurizer low pressure, and pressurizer high level. On decreasing power, the above listed trips are automatically blocked.

LIMITING SAFETY SYSTEM SETTINGS

BASES

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Reactor Trip System Interlocks (Continued)

- P-8 On increasing power, P-8 automatically enables Reactor trip on low flow in one or more reactor coolant loops. On decreasing power, the P-8 automatically blocks the above listed trip.
- P-9 On increasing power, P-9 automatically enables Reactor trip on Turbine trip. On decreasing power, P-9 automatically blocks Reactor trip on Turbine trip.
- P-10 On increasing power, P-10 allows the manual block of the Intermediate Range trip and the Low Setpoint Power Range trip; and automatically blocks the Source Range trip and deenergizes the Source Range high voltage power. On decreasing power, the Intermediate Range trip and the Low Setpoint Power Range trip are automatically reactivated. Provides input to P-7.
- P-13 Provides input to P-7.

SECTIONS 3.0 AND 4.0  
LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION  
AND  
SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS



## 3/4 LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION AND SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

### 3/4.0 APPLICABILITY

#### LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

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3.0.1 Compliance with the Limiting Conditions for Operation contained in the succeeding specifications is required during the OPERATIONAL MODES or other conditions specified therein; except that upon failure to meet the Limiting Conditions for Operation, the associated ACTION requirements shall be met.

3.0.2 Noncompliance with a specification shall exist when the requirements of the Limiting Condition for Operation and associated ACTION requirements are not met within the specified time intervals. If the Limiting Condition for Operation is restored prior to expiration of the specified time intervals, completion of the ACTION requirements is not required.

3.0.3 When a Limiting Condition for Operation is not met, except as provided in the associated ACTION requirements, within 1 hour action shall be initiated to place the unit in a MODE in which the specification does not apply by placing it, as applicable, in:

- a. At least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours,
- b. At least HOT SHUTDOWN within the following 6 hours, and
- c. At least COLD SHUTDOWN within the subsequent 24 hours.

Where corrective measures are completed that permit operation under the ACTION requirements, the action may be taken in accordance with the specified time limits as measured from the time of failure to meet the Limiting Condition for Operation. Exceptions to these requirements are stated in the individual specifications.

This specification is not applicable in MODE 5 or 6.

3.0.4 Entry into an OPERATIONAL MODE or other specified condition shall not be made when the conditions for the Limiting Condition for Operation are not met and the associated ACTION requires a shutdown if they are not met within a specified time interval. Entry into an OPERATIONAL MODE or specified condition may be made in accordance with ACTION requirements when conformance to them permits continued operation of the facility for an unlimited period of time. This provision shall not prevent passage through or to OPERATIONAL MODES as required to comply with ACTION requirements. Exceptions to these requirements are stated in the individual specifications.

## APPLICABILITY

### SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

4.0.1 Surveillance Requirements shall be met during the OPERATIONAL MODES or other conditions specified for individual Limiting Conditions for Operation unless otherwise stated in an individual Surveillance Requirement.

4.0.2 Each Surveillance Requirement shall be performed within the specified time interval with:

- a. A maximum allowable extension not to exceed 25% of the surveillance interval, but
- b. The combined time interval for any three consecutive surveillance intervals shall not exceed 3.25 times the specified surveillance interval.

4.0.3 Failure to perform a Surveillance Requirement within the allowed surveillance interval, defined by Specification 4.0.2, shall constitute a failure to meet the OPERABILITY requirements for a Limiting Condition for Operation. The time limits of the ACTION requirements are applicable at the time it is identified that a Surveillance Requirement has not been performed. The ACTION requirements may be delayed for up to 24 hours to permit the completion of the surveillance when the allowed outage time limits of the ACTION requirements are less than 24 hours. Surveillance Requirements do not have to be performed on inoperable equipment.

4.0.4 Entry into an OPERATIONAL MODE or other specified condition shall not be made unless the Surveillance Requirement(s) associated with the Limiting Condition for Operation has been performed within the stated surveillance interval or as otherwise specified. This provision shall not prevent passage through or to OPERATIONAL MODES as required to comply with ACTION requirements.

4.0.5 Surveillance Requirements for inservice inspection and testing of ASME Code Class 1, 2, and 3 components shall be applicable as follows:

- a. Inservice inspection of ASME Code Class 1, 2, and 3 components and inservice testing of ASME Code Class 1, 2, and 3 pumps and valves shall be performed in accordance with Section XI of the ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code and applicable Addenda as required by 10 CFR Part 50, Section 50.55a(g), except where specific written relief has been granted by the Commission pursuant to 10 CFR Part 50, Section 50.55a(g)(6)(i);

APPLICABILITY

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (Continued)

- b. Surveillance intervals specified in Section XI of the ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code and applicable Addenda for the inservice inspection and testing activities required by the ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code and applicable Addenda shall be applicable as follows in these Technical Specifications:

<u>ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code and applicable Addenda terminology for inservice inspection and testing activities</u>	<u>Required frequencies for performing inservice inspection and testing activities</u>
Weekly	At least once per 7 days
Monthly	At least once per 31 days
Quarterly or every 3 months	At least once per 92 days
Semiannually or every 6 months	At least once per 184 days
Every 9 months	At least once per 276 days
Yearly or annually	At least once per 366 days

- c. The provisions of Specification 4.0.2 are applicable to the above required frequencies for performing inservice inspection and testing activities;
- d. Performance of the above inservice inspection and testing activities shall be in addition to other specified Surveillance Requirements; and
- e. Nothing in the ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code shall be construed to supersede the requirements of any Technical Specification.

### 3/4.1 REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS

#### 3/4.1.1 BORATION CONTROL

SHUTDOWN MARGIN -  $T_{avg}$  GREATER THAN 200°F

#### LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.1.1.1 The SHUTDOWN MARGIN shall be greater than or equal to the limit as shown in Figure 3.1-1.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2\*, 3, and 4.

#### ACTION:

With the SHUTDOWN MARGIN less than the limit as shown in Figure 3.1-1, immediately initiate and continue boration at greater than or equal to 30 gpm of a solution containing greater than or equal to 7000 ppm boron or equivalent until the required SHUTDOWN MARGIN is restored.

#### SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

4.1.1.1.1 The SHUTDOWN MARGIN shall be determined to be greater than or equal to the limit as shown in Figure 3.1-1:

- a. Within 1 hour after detection of an inoperable control rod(s) and at least once per 12 hours thereafter while the rod(s) is inoperable. If the inoperable control rod is immovable or untrippable, the above required SHUTDOWN MARGIN shall be verified acceptable with an increased allowance for the withdrawn worth of the immovable or untrippable control rod(s);
- b. When in MODE 2 with  $K_{eff}$  less than 1, within 4 hours prior to achieving reactor criticality by verifying that the predicted critical control rod position is within the limits of Specification 3.1.3.6;
- c. Prior to initial operation above 5% RATED THERMAL POWER after each fuel loading, by consideration of the factors of Specification 4.1.1.1.d. below, with the control banks at the maximum insertion limit of Specification 3.1.3.6; and

\*See Special Test Exceptions Specification 3.10.1.

## REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS

### SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (Continued)

---

- d. When in MODE 3 or 4, at least once per 24 hours by consideration of the following factors:
- 1) Reactor Coolant System boron concentration,
  - 2) Control rod position,
  - 3) Reactor Coolant System average temperature,
  - 4) Fuel burnup based on gross thermal energy generation,
  - 5) Xenon concentration, and
  - 6) Samarium concentration.

4.1.1.1.2 The overall core reactivity balance shall be compared to predicted values to demonstrate agreement within  $\pm 1\% \Delta k/k$  at least once per 31 Effective Full Power Days (EFPD). This comparison shall consider at least those factors stated in Specification 4.1.1.1.d., above. The predicted reactivity values shall be adjusted (normalized) to correspond to the actual core conditions prior to exceeding a fuel burnup of 60 EFPD after each fuel loading.




FIGURE 3.1-1  
REQUIRED SHUTDOWN MARGIN VERSUS RCS CRITICAL BORON CONCENTRATION  
(MODES 1, 2, 3, AND 4)

## REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS

SHUTDOWN MARGIN -  $T_{avg}$  LESS THAN OR EQUAL TO 200°F

### LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.1.1.2 The SHUTDOWN MARGIN shall be greater than or equal to the limit as shown in Figure 3.1-2.

APPLICABILITY: MODE 5.

#### ACTION:

With the SHUTDOWN MARGIN less than the limit as shown in Figure 3.1-2, immediately initiate and continue boration at greater than or equal to 30 gpm of a solution containing greater than or equal to 7000 ppm boron or equivalent until the required SHUTDOWN MARGIN is restored.

### SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

4.1.1.2 The SHUTDOWN MARGIN shall be determined to be greater than or equal to the limit as shown in Figure 3.1-2:

- a. Within 1 hour after detection of an inoperable control rod(s) and at least once per 12 hours thereafter while the rod(s) is inoperable. If the inoperable control rod is immovable or untrippable, the SHUTDOWN MARGIN shall be verified acceptable with an increased allowance for the withdrawn worth of the immovable or untrippable control rod(s); and
- b. At least once per 24 hours by consideration of the following factors:
  - 1) Reactor Coolant System boron concentration,
  - 2) Control rod position,
  - 3) Reactor Coolant System average temperature,
  - 4) Fuel burnup based on gross thermal energy generation,
  - 5) Xenon concentration, and
  - 6) Samarium concentration.




FIGURE 3.1-2  
REQUIRED SHUTDOWN MARGIN VERSUS RCS CRITICAL BORON CONCENTRATION  
(MODE 5)



## REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS

### MODERATOR TEMPERATURE COEFFICIENT

#### LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

---

3.1.1.3 The moderator temperature coefficient (MTC) shall be:

- a. Less positive than  $0 \Delta k/k/^\circ F$  for the all rods withdrawn, beginning of cycle life (BOL), hot zero THERMAL POWER condition; and
- b. Less negative than  $-4.0 \times 10^{-4} \Delta k/k/^\circ F$  for the all rods withdrawn, end of cycle life (EOL), RATED THERMAL POWER condition.

APPLICABILITY: Specification 3.1.1.3a. - MODES 1 and 2\* only\*\*.  
Specification 3.1.1.3b. - MODES 1, 2, and 3 only\*\*.

#### ACTION:

- a. With the MTC more positive than the limit of Specification 3.1.1.3a. above, operation in MODES 1 and 2 may proceed provided:
  1. Control rod withdrawal limits are established and maintained sufficient to restore the MTC to less positive than  $0 \Delta k/k/^\circ F$  within 24 hours or be in HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours. These withdrawal limits shall be in addition to the insertion limits of Specification 3.1.3.6;
  2. The control rods are maintained within the withdrawal limits established above until a subsequent calculation verifies that the MTC has been restored to within its limit for the all rods withdrawn condition; and
  3. A Special Report is prepared and submitted to the Commission, pursuant to Specification 6.9.2, within 10 days, describing the value of the measured MTC, the interim control rod withdrawal limits, and the predicted average core burnup necessary for restoring the positive MTC to within its limit for the all rods withdrawn condition.
- b. With the MTC more negative than the limit of Specification 3.1.1.3b. above, be in HOT SHUTDOWN within 12 hours.

---

\*With  $K_{eff}$  greater than or equal to 1.

\*\*See Special Test Exceptions Specification 3.10.3.

## REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS

### SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

---

4.1.1.3 The MTC shall be determined to be within its limits during each fuel cycle as follows:

- a. The MTC shall be measured and compared to the BOL limit of Specification 3.1.1.3a., above, prior to initial operation above 5% of RATED THERMAL POWER, after each fuel loading; and
- b. The MTC shall be measured at any THERMAL POWER and compared to  $-3.1 \times 10^{-4} \Delta k/k/^{\circ}F$  (all rods withdrawn, RATED THERMAL POWER condition) within 7 EFPD after reaching an equilibrium boron concentration of 300 ppm. In the event this comparison indicates the MTC is more negative than  $-3.1 \times 10^{-4} \Delta k/k/^{\circ}F$ , the MTC shall be remeasured, and compared to the EOL MTC limit of Specification 3.1.1.3b., at least once per 14 EFPD during the remainder of the fuel cycle.

## REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS

### MINIMUM TEMPERATURE FOR CRITICALITY

#### LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

---

3.1.1.4 The Reactor Coolant System lowest operating loop temperature ( $T_{avg}$ ) shall be greater than or equal to 561°F.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1 and 2\* \*\*.

ACTION:

With a Reactor Coolant System operating loop temperature ( $T_{avg}$ ) less than 561°F, restore  $T_{avg}$  to within its limit within 15 minutes or be in HOT STANDBY within the next 15 minutes.

#### SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

---

4.1.1.4 The Reactor Coolant System temperature ( $T_{avg}$ ) shall be determined to be greater than or equal to 561°F:

- a. Within 15 minutes prior to achieving reactor criticality, and
- b. At least once per 30 minutes when the reactor is critical and the Reactor Coolant System  $T_{avg}$  is less than 571°F with the  $T_{avg} - T_{ref}$  Deviation Alarm not reset.

---

\*With  $K_{eff}$  greater than or equal to 1.

\*\*See Special Test Exceptions Specification 3.10.3.

## REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS

### 3/4.1.2 BORATION SYSTEMS

#### FLOW PATHS - SHUTDOWN

#### LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

---

3.1.2.1 As a minimum, one of the following boron injection flow paths shall be OPERABLE and capable of being powered from an OPERABLE emergency power source:

- a. A flow path from the Boric Acid Storage System via either a boric acid transfer pump or a gravity feed connection, and a charging pump to the Reactor Coolant System if the Boric Acid Storage System is OPERABLE as given in Specification 3.1.2.5a. for MODES 5 and 6 or as given in Specification 3.1.2.6a. for MODE 4; or
- b. The flow path from the refueling water storage tank via a charging pump to the Reactor Coolant System if the refueling water storage tank is OPERABLE as given in Specification 3.1.2.5b. for MODES 5 and 6 or as given in Specification 3.1.2.6b. for MODE 4.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 4, 5, and 6.

#### ACTION:

With none of the above flow paths OPERABLE or capable of being powered from an OPERABLE emergency power source, suspend all operations involving CORE ALTERATIONS or positive reactivity changes.

#### SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

---

4.1.2.1 At least one of the above required flow paths shall be demonstrated OPERABLE:

- a. At least once per 7 days by verifying that the temperature of the heat traced portion of the flow path is greater than or equal to 65°F when a flow path from the boric acid tanks is used, and
- b. At least once per 31 days by verifying that each valve (manual, power-operated, or automatic) in the flow path that is not locked, sealed, or otherwise secured in position, is in its correct position.

## REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS

### FLOW PATHS - OPERATING

#### LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

---

3.1.2.2 At least two of the following three boron injection flow paths shall be OPERABLE:

- a. The flow path from the Boric Acid Storage System via either a boric acid transfer pump or a gravity feed connection, and a charging pump to the Reactor Coolant System (RCS), and
- b. Two flow paths from the refueling water storage tank via charging pumps to the RCS.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, and 3.\*

#### ACTION:

With only one of the above required boron injection flow paths to the RCS OPERABLE, restore at least two boron injection flow paths to the RCS to OPERABLE status within 72 hours or be in at least HOT STANDBY and borated to a SHUTDOWN MARGIN equivalent to at least the limit as shown in Figure 3.1-2 at 200°F within the next 6 hours; restore at least two flow paths to OPERABLE status within the next 7 days or be in COLD SHUTDOWN within the next 30 hours.

#### SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

---

4.1.2.2 At least two of the above required flow paths shall be demonstrated OPERABLE:

- a. At least once per 7 days by verifying that the temperature of the heat traced portion of the flow path from the boric acid tanks is greater than or equal to 65°F when it is a required water source;
- b. At least once per 31 days by verifying that each valve (manual, power-operated, or automatic) in the flow path that is not locked, sealed, or otherwise secured in position, is in its correct position;
- c. At least once per 18 months during shutdown by verifying that each automatic valve in the flow path actuates to its correct position on a Safety Injection test signal; and
- d. At least once per 18 months by verifying that the flow path required by Specification 3.1.2.2a. delivers at least 30 gpm to the RCS.

---

\*The provisions of Specifications 3.0.4 and 4.0.4 are not applicable for entry into MODE 3 for the charging pump declared inoperable pursuant to Specification 4.1.2.3.2 provided that the charging pump is restored to OPERABLE status within 4 hours or prior to the temperature of one or more of the RCS cold legs exceeding 375°F, whichever comes first.

## REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS

### CHARGING PUMPS - SHUTDOWN

#### LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

---

3.1.2.3 One charging pump in the boron injection flow path required by Specification 3.1.2.1 shall be OPERABLE and capable of being powered from an OPERABLE emergency power source.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 4\*\*, 5, and 6.

#### ACTION:

With no charging pump OPERABLE or capable of being powered from an OPERABLE emergency power source, suspend all operations involving CORE ALTERATIONS or positive reactivity changes.

#### SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

---

4.1.2.3.1 The above required charging pump shall be demonstrated OPERABLE by verifying, on recirculation flow, that a differential pressure across the pump of greater than or equal to 2300 psid is developed when tested pursuant to Specification 4.0.5.

4.1.2.3.2 All charging pumps, excluding the above required OPERABLE pump, shall be demonstrated inoperable\* at least once per 31 days, except when the reactor vessel head is removed, by verifying that the motor circuit breakers are secured in the open position.

---

\*An inoperable pump may be energized for testing provided the discharge of the pump has been isolated from the RCS by a closed isolation valve with power removed from the valve operator, or by a manual isolation valve secured in the closed position.

\*\*The provisions of Specification 3.0.4 and 4.0.4 are not applicable for entry into MODE 4 from MODE 3 for the charging pumps declared OPERABLE pursuant to Specification 4.1.2.4 provided that a maximum of one charging pump is OPERABLE within 4 hours after entry into MODE 4 from MODE 3 or prior to the temperature of one or more of the RCS cold legs decreasing below 325°F, whichever comes first.

## REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS

### CHARGING PUMPS - OPERATING

#### LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

---

3.1.2.4 At least two charging pumps shall be OPERABLE.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, and 3.\*

#### ACTION:

With only one charging pump OPERABLE, restore at least two charging pumps to OPERABLE status within 72 hours or be in at least HOT STANDBY and borated to a SHUTDOWN MARGIN equivalent to at least the limit as shown in Figure 3.1-2 at 200°F within the next 6 hours; restore at least two charging pumps to OPERABLE status within the next 7 days or be in COLD MARGIN within the next 30 hours.

#### SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

---

4.1.2.4 At least two charging pumps shall be demonstrated OPERABLE by verifying, on recirculation flow, that a differential pressure across each pump of greater than or equal to 2300 psid is developed when tested pursuant to Specification 4.0.5.

---

\*The provisions of Specification 3.0.4 and 4.0.4 are not applicable for entry into MODE 3 for the charging pumps declared inoperable pursuant to Specification 4.1.2.3.2 provided that the charging pump is restored to OPERABLE status within 4 hours or prior to the temperature of one or more of the RCS cold legs exceeding 375°F, whichever comes first.

## REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS

### BORATED WATER SOURCES - SHUTDOWN

#### LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

---

3.1.2.5 As a minimum, one of the following borated water sources shall be OPERABLE:

- a. A Boric Acid Storage System with:
  - 1) A minimum contained borated water volume of 2900 gallons,
  - 2) A minimum boron concentration of 7000 ppm, and
  - 3) A minimum solution temperature of 65°F.
- b. The refueling water storage tank (RWST) with:
  - 1) A minimum contained borated water volume of 122,000 gallons for MODE 5 and 33,000 gallons for MODE 6, and
  - 2) A boron concentration between 2500 ppm and 2700 ppm.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 5 and 6.

#### ACTION:

With no borated water source OPERABLE, suspend all operations involving CORE ALTERATIONS or positive reactivity changes.

#### SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

---

4.1.2.5 The above required borated water source shall be demonstrated OPERABLE at least once per 7 days by:

- a. Verifying the boron concentration of the water,
- b. Verifying the contained borated water volume, and
- c. Verifying the boric acid storage tank solution temperature when it is the source of borated water.



REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS

BORATED WATER SOURCES - OPERATING

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.1.2.6 As a minimum, the following borated water source(s) shall be OPERABLE as required by Specification 3.1.2.2 for MODES 1, 2, and 3 and one of the following borated water sources shall be OPERABLE as required by Specification 3.1.2.1 for MODE 4:

- a. A Boric Acid Storage System with:
  - 1) A minimum contained borated water volume of 27,000 gallons,
  - 2) A minimum boron concentration of 7000 ppm, and
  - 3) A minimum solution temperature of 65°F.
- b. The refueling water storage tank (RWST) with:
  - 1) A minimum contained borated water volume of 458,000 gallons, and
  - 2) A boron concentration between 2500 ppm and 2700 ppm.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4.

ACTION:

- a. With the Boric Acid Storage System inoperable and being used as one of the above required borated water sources, restore the system to OPERABLE status within 72 hours or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours and borated to a SHUTDOWN MARGIN equivalent to at least the limit as shown in Figure 3.1-2 at 200°F; restore the Boric Acid Storage System to OPERABLE status within the next 7 days or be in COLD SHUTDOWN within the next 30 hours.
- b. With the RWST inoperable, restore the tank to OPERABLE status within 1 hour or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours.

## REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS

### SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

---

4.1.2.6 Each borated water source shall be demonstrated OPERABLE at least once per 7 days by:

- a. Verifying the boron concentration in the water,
- b. Verifying the contained borated water volume of the water source, and
- c. Verifying the Boric Acid Storage System solution temperature when it is the source of borated water.

## REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS

### 3/4.1.3 MOVABLE CONTROL ASSEMBLIES

#### GROUP HEIGHT

#### LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

---

3.1.3.1 All full-length shutdown and control rods shall be OPERABLE and positioned within  $\pm 12$  steps (indicated position) of their group step counter demand position.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1\* and 2\*.

#### ACTION:

- a. With one or more full-length rods inoperable due to being immovable as a result of excessive friction or mechanical interference or known to be untrippable, determine that the SHUTDOWN MARGIN requirement of Specification 3.1.1.1 is satisfied within 1 hour and be in HOT STANDBY within 6 hours.
- b. With one full-length rod trippable but inoperable due to causes other than addressed by ACTION a., above, or misaligned from its group step counter demand height by more than  $\pm 12$  steps (indicated position), POWER OPERATION may continue provided that within 1 hour:
  1. The rod is restored to OPERABLE status within the above alignment requirements, or
  2. The rod is declared inoperable and the remainder of the rods in the group with the inoperable rod are aligned to within  $\pm 12$  steps of the inoperable rod while maintaining the rod sequence and insertion limits of Figure 3.1-3. The THERMAL POWER level shall be restricted pursuant to Specification 3.1.3.6 during subsequent operation, or
  3. The rod is declared inoperable and the SHUTDOWN MARGIN requirement of Specification 3.1.1.1 is satisfied. POWER OPERATION may then continue provided that:
    - a) A reevaluation of each accident analysis of Table 3.1-1 is performed within 5 days; this reevaluation shall confirm that the previously analyzed results of these accidents remain valid for the duration of operation under these conditions;
    - b) The SHUTDOWN MARGIN requirement of Specification 3.1.1.1 is determined at least once per 12 hours;

---

\*See Special Test Exceptions Specifications 3.10.2 and 3.10.3.

## REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS

### LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

#### ACTION (Continued)

- c) A power distribution map is obtained from the movable incore detectors and  $F_Q(Z)$  and  $F_{\Delta H}^N$  are verified to be within their limits within 72 hours; and
  - d) The THERMAL POWER level is reduced to less than or equal to 75% of RATED THERMAL POWER within the next hour and within the following 4 hours the High Neutron Flux Trip Setpoint is reduced to less than or equal to 85% of RATED THERMAL POWER.
- c. With more than one rod trippable but inoperable due to causes other than addressed by ACTION a. above, POWER OPERATION may continue provided that:
- 1. Within 1 hour, the remainder of the rods in the bank(s) with the inoperable rods are aligned to within  $\pm 12$  steps of the inoperable rods while maintaining the rod sequence and insertion limits of Figure 3.1-3. The THERMAL POWER level shall be restricted pursuant to Specification 3.1.3.6 during subsequent operation, and
  - 2. The inoperable rods are restored to OPERABLE status within 72 hours.
- d. With more than one rod misaligned from its group step counter demand height by more than  $\pm 12$  steps (indicated position), be in HOT STANDBY within 6 hours.

### SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

4.1.3.1.1 The position of each full-length rod shall be determined to be within the group demand limit by verifying the individual rod positions at least once per 12 hours except during time intervals when the rod position deviation monitor is inoperable, then verify the group positions at least once per 4 hours.

4.1.3.1.2 Each full-length rod not fully inserted in the core shall be determined to be OPERABLE by movement of at least 10 steps in any one direction at least once per 31 days.

TABLE 3.1-1

ACCIDENT ANALYSES REQUIRING REEVALUATION  
IN THE EVENT OF AN INOPERABLE FULL-LENGTH ROD

Rod Cluster Control Assembly Insertion Characteristics

Rod Cluster Control Assembly Misalignment

Loss of Reactor Coolant from Small Ruptured Pipes or from Cracks in Large Pipes Which Actuates the Emergency Core Cooling System

Single Rod Cluster Control Assembly Withdrawal at Full Power

Major Reactor Coolant System Pipe Ruptures (Loss-of-Coolant Accident)

Major Secondary Coolant System Pipe Rupture

Rupture of a Control Rod Drive Mechanism Housing (Rod Cluster Control Assembly Ejection)

## REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS

### POSITION INDICATION SYSTEMS - OPERATING

#### LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

---

3.1.3.2 The Digital Rod Position Indication System and the Demand Position Indication System shall be OPERABLE and capable of determining the control rod positions within  $\pm 12$  steps.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1 and 2.

#### ACTION:

- a. With a maximum of one digital rod position indicator per bank inoperable either:
  1. Determine the position of the nonindicating rod(s) indirectly by the movable incore detectors at least once per 8 hours and immediately after any motion of the nonindicating rod which exceeds 24 steps in one direction since the last determination of the rod's position, or
  2. Reduce THERMAL POWER to less than 50% of RATED THERMAL POWER within 8 hours.
  
- b. With a maximum of one demand position indicator per bank inoperable either:
  1. Verify that all digital rod position indicators for the affected bank are OPERABLE and that the most withdrawn rod and the least withdrawn rod of the bank are within a maximum of 12 steps of each other at least once per 8 hours, or
  2. Reduce THERMAL POWER to less than 50% of RATED THERMAL POWER within 8 hours.

#### SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

---

4.1.3.2 Each digital rod position indicator shall be determined to be OPERABLE by verifying that the Demand Position Indication System and the Digital Rod Position Indication System agree within 12 steps at least once per 12 hours except during time intervals when the rod position deviation monitor is inoperable, then compare the Demand Position Indication System and the Digital Rod Position Indication System at least once per 4 hours.

REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS

POSITION INDICATION SYSTEMS - SHUTDOWN

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

---

3.1.3.3 One digital rod position indicator (excluding demand position indication) shall be OPERABLE and capable of determining the control rod position within  $\pm 12$  steps for each shutdown or control rod not fully inserted.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 3\* \*\*, 4\* \*\*, and 5\* \*\*.

ACTION:

With less than the above required position indicator(s) OPERABLE, immediately open the Reactor Trip System breakers.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

---

4.1.3.3 Each of the above required digital rod position indicator(s) shall be determined to be OPERABLE by verifying that the digital rod position indicators agree with the demand position indicators within 12 steps when exercised over the full-range of rod travel at least once per 18 months.

---

\*With the Reactor Trip System breakers in the closed position.

\*\*See Special Test Exceptions Specification 3.10.5.

## REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS

### ROD DROP TIME

#### LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

---

3.1.3.4 The individual full-length (shutdown and control) rod drop time from the fully withdrawn position shall be less than or equal to 2.8 seconds from beginning of decay of stationary gripper coil voltage to dashpot entry with:

- a.  $T_{avg}$  greater than or equal to 561°F, and
- b. All reactor coolant pumps operating.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1 and 2.

#### ACTION:

With the drop time of any full-length rod determined to exceed the above limit, restore the rod drop time to within the above limit prior to proceeding to MODE 1 or 2.

#### SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

---

4.1.3.4 The rod drop time of full-length rods shall be demonstrated through measurement prior to reactor criticality:

- a. For all rods following each removal of the reactor vessel head,
- b. For specifically affected individual rods following any maintenance on or modification to the Control Rod Drive System which could affect the drop time of those specific rods, and
- c. At least once per 18 months.



REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS

SHUTDOWN ROD INSERTION LIMIT

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

---

3.1.3.5 All shutdown rods shall be fully withdrawn.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1\* and 2\* \*\*.

ACTION:

With a maximum of one shutdown rod not fully withdrawn, except for surveillance testing pursuant to Specification 4.1.3.1.2, within 1 hour either:

- a. Fully withdraw the rod, or
- b. Declare the rod to be inoperable and apply Specification 3.1.3.1.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

---

4.1.3.5 Each shutdown rod shall be determined to be fully withdrawn:

- a. Within 15 minutes prior to withdrawal of any rods in Control Bank A, B, C, or D during an approach to reactor criticality, and
- b. At least once per 12 hours thereafter.

---

\*See Special Test Exceptions Specifications 3.10.2 and 3.10.3.

\*\*With  $K_{eff}$  greater than or equal to 1.

## REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS

### CONTROL ROD INSERTION LIMITS

#### LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

---

3.1.3.6 The control banks shall be limited in physical insertion as shown in Figure 3.1-3.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1\* and 2\* \*\*.

#### ACTION:

With the control banks inserted beyond the above insertion limits, except for surveillance testing pursuant to Specification 4.1.3.1.2:

- a. Restore the control banks to within the limits within 2 hours, or
- b. Reduce THERMAL POWER within 2 hours to less than or equal to that fraction of RATED THERMAL POWER which is allowed by the bank position using the above figure, or
- c. Be in at least HOT STANDBY within 6 hours.

#### SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

---

4.1.3.6 The position of each control bank shall be determined to be within the insertion limits at least once per 12 hours except during time intervals when the rod insertion limit monitor is inoperable, then verify the individual rod positions at least once per 4 hours.

---

\*See Special Test Exceptions Specifications 3.10.2 and 3.10.3.

\*\*With  $K_{eff}$  greater than or equal to 1.




FIGURE 3.1-3

ROD BANK INSERTION LIMITS VERSUS THERMAL POWER  
FOUR-LOOP OPERATION

## 3/4.2 POWER DISTRIBUTION LIMITS

### 3/4.2.1 AXIAL FLUX DIFFERENCE

#### LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.2.1 The indicated AXIAL FLUX DIFFERENCE (AFD) shall be maintained within the following target band (flux difference units) about the target flux difference:

- a.  $\pm 5\%$  for core average accumulated burnup of less than or equal to 3000 MWD/MTU; and
- b.  $+ 3\%$ ,  $-12\%$  for core average accumulated burnup of greater than 3000 MWD/MTU.

The indicated AFD may deviate outside the above required target band at greater than or equal to 50% but less than 90% of RATED THERMAL POWER provided the indicated AFD is within the Acceptable Operation Limits of Figure 3.2-1 and the cumulative penalty deviation time does not exceed 1 hour during the previous 24 hours.

The indicated AFD may deviate outside the above required target band at greater than 15% but less than 50% of RATED THERMAL POWER provided the cumulative penalty deviation time does not exceed 1 hour during the previous 24 hours.

APPLICABILITY: MODE 1, above 15% of RATED THERMAL POWER.\*

#### ACTION:

- a. With the indicated AFD outside of the above required target band and with THERMAL POWER greater than or equal to 90% of RATED THERMAL POWER, within 15 minutes either:
  1. Restore the indicated AFD to within the target band limits, or
  2. Reduce THERMAL POWER to less than 90% of RATED THERMAL POWER.
- b. With the indicated AFD outside of the above required target band for more than 1 hour of cumulative penalty deviation time during the previous 24 hours or outside the Acceptable Operation Limits of Figure 3.2-1 and with THERMAL POWER less than 90% but equal to or greater than 50% of RATED THERMAL POWER, reduce:
  1. THERMAL POWER to less than 50% of RATED THERMAL POWER within 30 minutes, and
  2. The Power Range Neutron Flux\* \*\* - High Setpoint to less than or equal to 55% of RATED THERMAL POWER within the next 4 hours.

\*See Special Test Exceptions Specification 3.10.2.

\*\*Surveillance testing of the Power Range Neutron Flux Channel may be performed pursuant to Specification 4.3.1.1 provided the indicated AFD is maintained within the Acceptable Operation Limits of Figure 3.2-1. A total of 16 hours operation may be accumulated with the AFD outside of the above required target band during testing without penalty deviation.

## POWER DISTRIBUTION LIMITS

### LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

#### ACTION (Continued)

- c. With the indicated AFD outside of the above required target band for more than 1 hour of cumulative penalty deviation time during the previous 24 hours and with THERMAL POWER less than 50% but greater than 15% of RATED THERMAL POWER, the THERMAL POWER shall not be increased equal to or greater than 50% of RATED THERMAL POWER until the indicated AFD is within the above required target band.

### SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

4.2.1.1 The indicated AFD shall be determined to be within its limits during POWER OPERATION above 15% of RATED THERMAL POWER by:

- a. Monitoring the indicated AFD for each OPERABLE excore channel:
  - 1) At least once per 7 days when the AFD Monitor Alarm is OPERABLE, and
  - 2) At least once per hour for the first 24 hours after restoring the AFD Monitor Alarm to OPERABLE status.
- b. Monitoring and logging the indicated AFD for each OPERABLE excore channel at least once per hour for the first 24 hours and at least once per 30 minutes thereafter, when the AFD Monitor Alarm is inoperable. The logged values of the indicated AFD shall be assumed to exist during the interval preceding each logging.

4.2.1.2 The indicated AFD shall be considered outside of its target band when two or more OPERABLE excore channels are indicating the AFD to be outside the target band. Penalty deviation outside of the above required target band shall be accumulated on a time basis of:

- a. One minute penalty deviation for each 1 minute of POWER OPERATION outside of the target band at THERMAL POWER levels equal to or above 50% of RATED THERMAL POWER, and
- b. One-half minute penalty deviation for each 1 minute of POWER OPERATION outside of the target band at THERMAL POWER levels between 15% and 50% of RATED THERMAL POWER.

4.2.1.3 The target flux difference of each OPERABLE excore channel shall be determined by measurement at least once per 92 Effective Full Power Days. The provisions of Specification 4.0.4 are not applicable.

4.2.1.4 The target flux difference shall be updated at least once per 31 Effective Full Power Days by either determining the target flux difference

POWER DISTRIBUTION LIMITS

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (Continued)

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pursuant to Specification 4.2.1.3 above or by linear interpolation between the most recently measured value and the predicted value at the end of the cycle life. The provisions of Specification 4.0.4 are not applicable.




FIGURE 3.2-1

AXIAL FLUX DIFFERENCE LIMITS AS A FUNCTION OF RATED THERMAL POWER

POWER DISTRIBUTION LIMITS

3/4.2.2 HEAT FLUX HOT CHANNEL FACTOR -  $F_Q(Z)$

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

---

3.2.2  $F_Q(Z)$  shall be limited by the following relationships:

$$F_Q(Z) \leq \frac{2.50}{P} [K(Z)] \text{ for } P > 0.5$$

$$F_Q(Z) \leq 5.0 [K(Z)] \text{ for } P \leq 0.5$$

Where:  $P = \frac{\text{THERMAL POWER}}{\text{RATED THERMAL POWER}}$ , and

$K(Z)$  = the function obtained from Figure 3.2-2 for a given core height location.

APPLICABILITY: MODE 1.

ACTION:

With  $F_Q(Z)$  exceeding its limit:

- a. Reduce THERMAL POWER at least 1% for each 1%  $F_Q(Z)$  exceeds the limit within 15 minutes and similarly reduce the Power Range Neutron Flux-High Trip Setpoint within the next 4 hours; POWER OPERATION may proceed for up to a total of 72 hours; subsequent POWER OPERATION may proceed provided the Overpower  $\Delta T$  Trip Setpoint has been reduced at least 1% for each 1%  $F_Q(Z)$  exceeds the limit.
- b. Identify and correct the cause of the out-of-limit condition prior to increasing THERMAL POWER above the reduced limit required by ACTION a., above; THERMAL POWER may then be increased provided  $F_Q(Z)$  is demonstrated through incore mapping to be within its limit.






FIGURE 3.2-2

$K(Z) - \text{NORMALIZED } F_Q(Z)$  AS A FUNCTION OF CORE HEIGHT

## POWER DISTRIBUTION LIMITS

### SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

4.2.2.1 The provisions of Specification 4.0.4 are not applicable.

4.2.2.2  $F_{xy}$  shall be evaluated to determine if  $F_Q(Z)$  is within its limit by:

- a. Using the movable incore detector to obtain a power distribution map at any THERMAL POWER greater than 5% of RATED THERMAL POWER,
- b. Increasing the measured  $F_{xy}$  component of the power distribution map by 3% to account for manufacturing tolerances and further increasing the value by 5% to account for measurement uncertainties,
- c. Comparing the  $F_{xy}$  computed ( $F_{xy}^C$ ) obtained in Specification 4.2.2.2b., above to:
  - 1) The  $F_{xy}$  limits for RATED THERMAL POWER ( $F_{xy}^{RTP}$ ) for the appropriate measured core planes given in Specification 4.2.2.2e. and f., below, and
  - 2) The relationship:

$$F_{xy}^L = F_{xy}^{RTP} [1+0.2(1-P)],$$

Where  $F_{xy}^L$  is the limit for fractional THERMAL POWER operation expressed as a function of  $F_{xy}^{RTP}$  and P is the fraction of RATED THERMAL POWER at which  $F_{xy}$  was measured.

d. Remeasuring  $F_{xy}$  according to the following schedule:

- 1) When  $F_{xy}^C$  is greater than the  $F_{xy}^{RTP}$  limit for the appropriate measured core plane but less than the  $F_{xy}^L$  relationship, additional power distribution maps shall be taken and  $F_{xy}^C$  compared to  $F_{xy}^{RTP}$  and  $F_{xy}^L$  either:
  - a) Within 24 hours after exceeding by 20% of RATED THERMAL POWER or greater, the THERMAL POWER at which  $F_{xy}^C$  was last determined, or
  - b) At least once per 31 Effective Full Power Days (EFPD), whichever occurs first.

## POWER DISTRIBUTION LIMITS

### SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (Continued)

- 2) When the  $F_{xy}^C$  is less than or equal to the  $F_{xy}^{RTP}$  limit for the appropriate measured core plane, additional power distribution maps shall be taken and  $F_{xy}^C$  compared to  $F_{xy}^{RTP}$  and  $F_{xy}^L$  at least once per 31 EFPD.
- e. The  $F_{xy}$  limits used in the Constant Axial Offset Control analysis for RATED THERMAL POWER ( $F_{xy}^{RTP}$ ) shall be provided for all core planes containing Bank "D" control rods and all unrodded core planes in a Radial Peaking Factor Limit Report per Specification 6.9.1.6;
  - f. The  $F_{xy}$  limits of Specification 4.2.2.2e., above, are not applicable in the following core planes regions as measured in percent of core height from the bottom of the fuel:
    - 1) Lower core region from 0 to 15%, inclusive,
    - 2) Upper core region from 85 to 100%, inclusive,
    - 3) Grid plane regions at  $22.4 \pm 2\%$ ,  $34.2 \pm 2\%$ ,  $46.0 \pm 2\%$ ,  $57.8 \pm 2\%$ ,  $69.5 \pm 2\%$  and  $81.3 \pm 2\%$ , inclusive, and
    - 4) Core plane regions within  $\pm 2\%$  of core height ( $\pm 3.36$  inches) about the bank demand position of the Bank "D" control rods.
  - g. With  $F_{xy}^C$  exceeding  $F_{xy}^L$ , the effects of  $F_{xy}$  on  $F_Q(Z)$  shall be evaluated to determine if  $F_Q(Z)$  is within its limits.
- 4.2.2.3 When  $F_Q(Z)$  is measured for other than  $F_{xy}$  determinations, an overall measured  $F_Q(Z)$  shall be obtained from a power distribution map and increased by 3% to account for manufacturing tolerances and further increased by 5% to account for measurement uncertainty.

## POWER DISTRIBUTION LIMITS

### 3/4.2.3 NUCLEAR ENTHALPY RISE HOT CHANNEL FACTOR

#### LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.2.3  $F_{\Delta H}^N$  shall be less than 1.46 [1.0 + 0.3 (1-P)]

$$\text{Where: } P = \frac{\text{THERMAL POWER}}{\text{RATED THERMAL POWER}}$$

APPLICABILITY: MODE 1.

#### ACTION:

With  $F_{\Delta H}^N$  exceeding its limit:

- a. Within 2 hours reduce the THERMAL POWER to the level where the LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION is satisfied.
- b. Identify and correct the cause of the out-of-limit condition prior to increasing THERMAL POWER above the limit required by ACTION a., above; THERMAL POWER may then be increased, provided  $F_{\Delta H}^N$  is demonstrated through incore mapping to be within its limit.

#### SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

4.2.3.1 The provisions of Specification 4.0.4 are not applicable.

4.2.3.2  $F_{\Delta H}^N$  shall be demonstrated to be within its limit prior to operation above 75% RATED THERMAL POWER after each fuel loading and at least once per 31 EFPD thereafter by:

- a. Using the movable incore detectors to obtain a power distribution map at any THERMAL POWER greater than 5% RATED THERMAL POWER.
- b. Using the measured value of  $F_{\Delta H}^N$  which does not include an allowance for measurement uncertainty.

## POWER DISTRIBUTION LIMITS

### 3/4.2.4 QUADRANT POWER TILT RATIO

#### LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.2.4 The QUADRANT POWER TILT RATIO shall not exceed 1.02.

APPLICABILITY: MODE 1, above 50% of RATED THERMAL POWER\*.

#### ACTION:

With the QUADRANT POWER TILT RATIO determined to exceed 1.02:

- a. Within 2 hours reduce THERMAL POWER at least 3% from RATED THERMAL POWER for each 1% of indicated QUADRANT POWER TILT RATIO in excess of 1 and similarly reduce the Power Range Neutron Flux-High Trip Setpoint within the next 4 hours.
- b. Within 24 hours and every 7 days thereafter, verify that  $F_Q(Z)$  (by  $F_{xy}$  evaluation) and  $F_{\Delta H}^N$  are within their limits by performing Surveillance Requirements 4.2.2.2 and 4.2.3.2. THERMAL POWER and setpoint reductions shall then be in accordance with the ACTION statements of Specifications 3.2.2 and 3.2.3.

#### SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

4.2.4.1 The QUADRANT POWER TILT RATIO shall be determined to be within the limit above 50% of RATED THERMAL POWER by:

- a. Calculating the ratio at least once per 7 days when the alarm is OPERABLE, and
- b. Calculating the ratio at least once per 12 hours during steady-state operation when the alarm is inoperable.

4.2.4.2 The QUADRANT POWER TILT RATIO shall be determined to be within the limit when above 75% of RATED THERMAL POWER with one Power Range channel inoperable by using the movable incore detectors to confirm indicated QUADRANT POWER TILT RATIO at least once per 12 hours by either:

- a. Using the four pairs of symmetric thimble locations, or
- b. Using the movable incore detection system to monitor the QUADRANT POWER TILT RATIO subject to the requirements of Specification 3.3.3.2.

\*See Special Test Exceptions Specification 3.10.2.

## POWER DISTRIBUTION LIMITS

### 3/4.2.5 DNB PARAMETERS

#### LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

---

3.2.5 The following DNB-related parameters shall be maintained within the limits following:

- a. Reactor Coolant System  $T_{avg}$ ,  $\leq 598^{\circ}\text{F}$
- b. Pressurizer Pressure,  $> 2201 \text{ psig}^*$
- c. Reactor Coolant System Flow,  $\geq 395,000 \text{ gpm}^{**}$

APPLICABILITY: MODE 1.

#### ACTION:

With any of the above parameters exceeding its limit, restore the parameter to within its limit within 2 hours or reduce THERMAL POWER to less than 5% of RATED THERMAL POWER within the next 4 hours.

#### SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

---

4.2.5.1 Each of the parameters shown above shall be verified to be within its limits at least once per 12 hours. Additionally, RCS flow shall be demonstrated within its limit prior to operation above 75% RTP after each fuel loading. The provisions of Specification 4.0.4 are not applicable for verification that RCS flow is within its limit.

4.2.5.2 The RCS flow rate indicators shall be subjected to a channel calibration at least once per 18 months.

4.2.5.3 The RCS total flow rate shall be determined by precision heat balance measurements at least once per 18 months. Within 7 days prior to performing the precision heat balance flow measurement, the instrumentation used for performing the precision heat balance shall be calibrated.

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\*Limit not applicable during either a Thermal Power ramp in excess of 5% of RTP per minute or a Thermal Power step in excess of 10% RTP.

\*\*Includes a 3.5% flow measurement uncertainty.

### 3/4.3 INSTRUMENTATION

#### 3/4.3.1 REACTOR TRIP SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION

##### LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

---

3.3.1 As a minimum, the Reactor Trip System instrumentation channels and interlocks of Table 3.3-1 shall be OPERABLE with RESPONSE TIMES as shown in Table 3.3-2.

APPLICABILITY: As shown in Table 3.3-1.

ACTION:

As shown in Table 3.3-1.

##### SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

---

4.3.1.1 Each Reactor Trip System instrumentation channel and interlock and the automatic trip logic shall be demonstrated OPERABLE by the performance of the Reactor Trip System Instrumentation Surveillance Requirements specified in Table 4.3-1.

4.3.1.2 The REACTOR TRIP SYSTEM RESPONSE TIME of each Reactor trip function shall be demonstrated to be within its limit at least once per 18 months. Each test shall include at least one train such that both trains are tested at least once per 36 months and one channel per function such that all channels are tested at least once every N times 18 months where N is the total number of redundant channels in a specific Reactor trip function as shown in the "Total No. of Channels" column of Table 3.3-1.

TABLE 3.3-1

REACTOR TRIP SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION

<u>FUNCTIONAL UNIT</u>	<u>TOTAL NO. OF CHANNELS</u>	<u>CHANNELS TO TRIP</u>	<u>MINIMUM CHANNELS OPERABLE</u>	<u>APPLICABLE MODES</u>	<u>ACTION</u>
1. Manual Reactor Trip	2	1	2	1, 2	1
	2	1	2	3*, 4*, 5*	10
2. Power Range, Neutron Flux					
a. High Setpoint	4	2	3	1, 2	2
b. Low Setpoint	4	2	3	1###, 2	2
3. Power Range, Neutron Flux High Positive Rate	4	2	3	1, 2	2
4. Power Range, Neutron Flux High Negative Rate	4	2	3	1, 2	2
5. Intermediate Range, Neutron Flux	2	1	2	1###, 2	3
6. Source Range, Neutron Flux					
a. Startup	2	1	2	2##	4
b. Shutdown	2	1	2	3*, 4*, 5*	10
7. Extended Range, Neutron Flux	2	0	2	3, 4, 5	4
8. Overtemperature $\Delta T$	4	2	3	1, 2	6
9. Overpower $\Delta T$	4	2	3	1, 2	6
10. Pressurizer Pressure--Low (Interlocked with P-7)	4	2	3	1	6
11. Pressurizer Pressure--High	4	2	3	1, 2	6
12. Pressurizer Water Level--High (Interlocked with P-7)	4	2	3	1	6



TABLE 3.3-1 (Continued)

REACTOR TRIP SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION

<u>FUNCTIONAL UNIT</u>	<u>TOTAL NO. OF CHANNELS</u>	<u>CHANNELS TO TRIP</u>	<u>MINIMUM CHANNELS OPERABLE</u>	<u>APPLICABLE MODES</u>	<u>ACTION</u>
13. Reactor Coolant Flow--Low					
a. Single Loop (Above P-8)	3/loop	2/loop in any operating loop	2/loop in each operating loop	1	6 <sup>(1)</sup>
b. Two Loops (Above P-7 and below P-8)	3/loop	2/loop in two operating loops	2/loop each operating loop	1	6 <sup>(1)</sup>
14. Steam Generator Water Level--Low-Low	4/stm. gen.	2/stm. gen. in any operating stm. gen.	3/stm. gen. each operating stm. gen.	1, 2	6 <sup>(1)</sup>
15. Undervoltage--Reactor Coolant Pumps (Interlocked with P-7)	4-1/bus	2	3	1	6
16. Underfrequency--Reactor Coolant Pumps (Interlocked with P-7)	4-1/bus	2	3	1	6
17. Turbine Trip (Interlocked with P-9)					
a. Low Emergency Trip Fluid Pressure	3	2	2	1	6
b. Turbine Stop Valve Closure	4	2	3	1	6

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TABLE 3.3-1 (Continued)

## REACTOR TRIP SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION

<u>FUNCTIONAL UNIT</u>	<u>TOTAL NO. OF CHANNELS</u>	<u>CHANNELS TO TRIP</u>	<u>MINIMUM CHANNELS OPERABLE</u>	<u>APPLICABLE MODES</u>	<u>ACTION</u>
18. Safety Injection Input from ESFAS	2	1	2	1, 2	9
19. Reactor Trip System Interlocks					
a. Intermediate Range Neutron Flux, P-6	2	1	2	2##	8
b. Low Power Reactor Trips Block, P-7					
P-10 Input	4	2	3	1	8
or					
P-13 Input	2	1	2	1	8
c. Power Range Neutron Flux, P-8	4	2	3	1	8
d. Power Range Neutron Flux, P-9	4	2	3	1	8
e. Power Range Neutron Flux, P-10	4	2	3	1,2	8
f. Turbine Impulse Chamber Pressure, P-13	2	1	2	1	8
20. Reactor Trip Breakers	2	1	2	1, 2	9, 12
	2	1	2	3*, 4*, 5*	10

TABLE 3.3-1 (Continued)

REACTOR TRIP SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION

<u>FUNCTIONAL UNIT</u>	<u>TOTAL NO. OF CHANNELS</u>	<u>CHANNELS TO TRIP</u>	<u>MINIMUM CHANNELS OPERABLE</u>	<u>APPLICABLE MODES</u>	<u>ACTION</u>
21. Automatic Trip and Interlock Logic	2 2	1 1	2 2	1, 2 3*, 4*, 5*	9 10

TABLE 3.3-1 (Continued)

TABLE NOTATIONS

\*When the Reactor Trip System breakers are in the closed position and the Control Rod Drive System is capable of rod withdrawal.

##Below the P-6 (Intermediate Range Neutron Flux Interlock) Setpoint.

###Below the P-10 (Low Setpoint Power Range Neutron Flux Interlock) Setpoint.

(1)The applicable MODES and ACTION statement for these channels noted in Table 3.3-3 are more restrictive and, therefore, applicable.

ACTION STATEMENTS

ACTION 1 - With the number of OPERABLE channels one less than the Minimum Channels OPERABLE requirement, restore the inoperable channel to OPERABLE status within 48 hours or be in HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours.

ACTION 2 - With the number of OPERABLE channels one less than the Total Number of Channels, STARTUP and/or POWER OPERATION may proceed provided the following conditions are satisfied:

- a. The inoperable channel is placed in the tripped condition within 6 hours,
- b. The Minimum Channels OPERABLE requirement is met; however, the inoperable channel may be bypassed for up to 4 hours for surveillance testing of other channels per Specification 4.3.1.1, and
- c. Either, THERMAL POWER is restricted to less than or equal to 75% of RATED THERMAL POWER and the Power Range Neutron Flux Trip Setpoint is reduced to less than or equal to 85% of RATED THERMAL POWER within 4 hours; or, the QUADRANT POWER TILT RATIO is monitored at least once per 12 hours per Specification 4.2.4.2.

TABLE 3.3-1 (Continued)

ACTION STATEMENTS (Continued)

- ACTION 3 - With the number of channels OPERABLE one less than the Minimum Channels OPERABLE requirement and with the THERMAL POWER level:
- a. Below the P-6 (Intermediate Range Neutron Flux Interlock) Setpoint, restore the inoperable channel to OPERABLE status prior to increasing THERMAL POWER above the P-6 Setpoint, and
  - b. Above the P-6 (Intermediate Range Neutron Flux Interlock) Setpoint but below 10% of RATED THERMAL POWER, restore the inoperable channel to OPERABLE status prior to increasing THERMAL POWER above 10% of RATED THERMAL POWER.
- ACTION 4 - With the number of OPERABLE channels one less than the Minimum Channels OPERABLE requirement, suspend all operations involving positive reactivity changes.
- ACTION 5 - (Not Used)
- ACTION 6 - With the number of OPERABLE channels one less than the Total Number of Channels, STARTUP and/or POWER OPERATION may proceed provided the following conditions are satisfied:
- a. The inoperable channel is placed in the tripped condition within 6 hours, and
  - b. The Minimum Channels OPERABLE requirement is met; however, the inoperable channel may be bypassed for up to 4 hours for surveillance testing of other channels per Specification 4.3.1.1.
- ACTION 7 - (Not Used)
- ACTION 8 - With less than the Minimum Number of Channels OPERABLE, within 1 hour determine by observation of the associated permissive annunciator window(s) that the interlock is in its required state for the existing plant condition, or apply Specification 3.0.3.
- ACTION 9 - With the number of OPERABLE channels one less than the Minimum Channels OPERABLE requirement, be in at least HOT STANDBY within 6 hours; however, one channel may be bypassed for up to 2 hours for surveillance testing per Specification 4.3.1.1, provided the other channel is OPERABLE.

TABLE 3.3-1 (Continued)

ACTION STATEMENTS (Continued)

- ACTION 10 - With the number of OPERABLE channels one less than the Minimum Channels OPERABLE requirement, restore the inoperable channel to OPERABLE status within 48 hours or open the Reactor Trip System breakers within the next hour.
- ACTION 11 - (Not Used)
- ACTION 12 - With one of the diverse trip features (undervoltage or shunt trip attachment) inoperable, restore it to OPERABLE status within 48 hours or declare the breaker inoperable and apply ACTION 9. The breaker shall not be bypassed while one of the diverse trip features is inoperable except for the time required for performing maintenance to restore the breaker to OPERABLE status.

TABLE 3.3-2

REACTOR TRIP SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION RESPONSE TIMES

<u>FUNCTIONAL UNIT</u>	<u>RESPONSE TIME</u>
1. Manual Reactor Trip	N.A.
2. Power Range, Neutron Flux	$\leq 0.5$ second*
3. Power Range, Neutron Flux, High Positive Rate	N.A.
4. Power Range, Neutron Flux, High Negative Rate	$\leq 0.5$ second*
5. Intermediate Range, Neutron Flux	N.A.
6. Source Range, Neutron Flux	$\leq 0.5$ second*
7. Extended Range, Neutron Flux	N.A.
8. Overtemperature $\Delta T$	$\leq 8.0$ seconds*
9. Overpower $\Delta T$	$\leq 8.0$ seconds*
10. Pressurizer Pressure--Low	$\leq 2$ seconds
11. Pressurizer Pressure--High	$\leq 2$ seconds
12. Pressurizer Water Level--High	$\leq 2$ seconds

\*Neutron detectors are exempt from response time testing. Response time of the neutron flux signal portion of the channel shall be measured from detector output or input of first electronic component in channel.

TABLE 3.3-2 (Continued)

REACTOR TRIP SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION RESPONSE TIMES

<u>FUNCTIONAL UNIT</u>	<u>RESPONSE TIME</u>
13. Reactor Coolant Flow--Low	
a. Single Loop (Above P-8)	< 1 second
b. Two Loops (Above P-7 and below P-8)	< 1 second
14. Steam Generator Water Level--Low-Low	< 2 seconds
15. Undervoltage - Reactor Coolant Pumps	< 1.5 seconds
16. Underfrequency - Reactor Coolant Pumps	< 0.6 second
17. Turbine Trip	
a. Low Emergency Trip Fluid Pressure	N.A.
b. Turbine Stop Valve Closure	N.A.
18. Safety Injection Input from ESFAS	N.A.
19. Reactor Trip System Interlocks	N.A.
20. Reactor Trip Breakers	N.A.
21. Automatic Trip and Interlock Logic	N.A.



TABLE 4.3-1

REACTOR TRIP SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

<u>FUNCTIONAL UNIT</u>	<u>CHANNEL CHECK</u>	<u>CHANNEL CALIBRATION</u>	<u>ANALOG CHANNEL OPERATIONAL TEST</u>	<u>TRIP ACTUATING DEVICE OPERATIONAL TEST</u>	<u>ACTUATION LOGIC TEST</u>	<u>MODES FOR WHICH SURVEILLANCE IS REQUIRED</u>
1. Manual Reactor Trip	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	R(14)	N.A.	1, 2, 3*, 4*, 5*
2. Power Range, Neutron Flux						
a. High Setpoint	S	D(2, 4), M(3, 4), Q(4, 6), R(4, 5)	Q(17)	N.A.	N.A.	1, 2
b. Low Setpoint	S	R(4)	S/U(1)	N.A.	N.A.	1***, 2
3. Power Range, Neutron Flux, High Positive Rate	N.A.	R(4)	Q(17)	N.A.	N.A.	1, 2
4. Power Range, Neutron Flux, High Negative Rate	N.A.	R(4)	Q(17)	N.A.	N.A.	1, 2
5. Intermediate Range, Neutron Flux	S	R(4, 5)	S/U(1)	N.A.	N.A.	1***, 2
6. Source Range, Neutron Flux	S	R(4, 5)	S/U(1), Q(9)(17)	N.A.	N.A.	2**, 3, 4, 5
7. Extended Range, Neutron Flux	S	R(4)	Q(12, 17)	N.A.	N.A.	3, 4, 5
8. Overtemperature $\Delta T$	S	R	Q(17)	N.A.	N.A.	1, 2
9. Overpower $\Delta T$	S	R	Q(17)	N.A.	N.A.	1, 2
10. Pressurizer Pressure --Low	S	R	Q(17)	N.A.	N.A.	1

TABLE 4.3-1 (Continued)

## REACTOR TRIP SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

SOUTH TEXAS - UNIT 1

3/4 3-12

FUNCTIONAL UNIT	CHANNEL CHECK	CHANNEL CALIBRATION	ANALOG CHANNEL OPERATIONAL TEST	TRIP ACTUATING DEVICE OPERATIONAL TEST	ACT'ATION LOGIC TEST	MODES FOR WHICH SURVEILLANCE IS REQUIRED
11. Pressurizer Pressure --High	S	R	Q(17)	N.A.	N.A.	1, 2
12. Pressurizer Water Level--High	S	R	Q(17)	N.A.	N.A.	1
13. Reactor Coolant Flow --Low	S	R	Q(17, 18)	N.A.	N.A.	1
14. Steam Generator Water Level--Low-Low	S	R	Q(17,18)	N.A.	N.A.	1, 2
15. Undervoltage - Reactor Coolant Pumps	N.A.	R	N.A.	Q(17)	N.A.	1
16. Underfrequency - Reactor Coolant Pumps	N.A.	R	N.A.	Q(17)	N.A.	1
17. Turbine Trip						
a. Low Emergency Trip Fluid Pressure	N.A.	R	N.A.	S/U(1, 10)	N.A.	1
b. Turbine Stop Valve Closure	N.A.	R	N.A.	S/U(1, 10)	N.A.	1
18. Safety Injection Input from ESFAS	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	R	N.A.	1, 2

TABLE 4.3-1 (Continued)

REACTOR TRIP SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

<u>FUNCTIONAL UNIT</u>	<u>CHANNEL CHECK</u>	<u>CHANNEL CALIBRATION</u>	<u>ANALOG CHANNEL OPERATIONAL TEST</u>	<u>TRIP ACTUATING DEVICE OPERATIONAL TEST</u>	<u>ACTUATION LOGIC TEST</u>	<u>MODES FOR WHICH SURVEILLANCE IS REQUIRED</u>
19. Reactor Trip System Interlocks						
a. Intermediate Range Neutron Flux, P-6	N.A.	R(4)	R	N.A.	N.A.	2**
b. Low Power Reactor Trips Block, P-7	N.A.	R(4)	R	N.A.	N.A.	1
c. Power Range Neutron Flux, P-8	N.A.	R(4)	R	N.A.	N.A.	1
d. Power Range Neutron Flux, P-9	N.A.	R(4)	R	N.A.	N.A.	1
e. Power Range Neutron Flux, P-10	N.A.	R(4)	R	N.A.	N.A.	1, 2
f. Turbine Impulse Chamber Pressure, P-13	N.A.	R	R	N.A.	N.A.	1
20. Reactor Trip Breaker	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	M(7, 11)	N.A.	1, 2, 3*, 4*, 5*
21. Automatic Trip and Interlock Logic	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	M(7)	1, 2, 3*, 4*, 5*
22. Reactor Trip Bypass Breaker	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	M(15),R(16)	N.A.	1, 2, 3*, 4*, 5*

TABLE 4.3-1 (Continued)

TABLE NOTATIONS

\*When the Reactor Trip System breakers are closed and the Control Rod Drive System is capable of rod withdrawal.

\*\*Below P-6 (Intermediate Range Neutron Flux Interlock) Setpoint.

\*\*\*Below P-10 (Low Setpoint Power Range Neutron Flux Interlock) Setpoint.

- (1) If not performed in previous 31 days.
- (2) Comparison of calorimetric to excore power indication above 15% of RATED THERMAL POWER. Adjust excore channel gains consistent with calorimetric power if absolute difference is greater than 2%. The provisions of Specification 4.0.4 are not applicable to entry into MODE 2 or 1.
- (3) Single point comparison of incore to excore AXIAL FLUX DIFFERENCE above 15% of RATED THERMAL POWER. Recalibrate if the absolute difference is greater than or equal to 3%. The provisions of Specification 4.0.4 are not applicable for entry into MODE 2 or 1.
- (4) Neutron detectors may be excluded from CHANNEL CALIBRATION.
- (5) Detector plateau curves shall be obtained and evaluated. For the Intermediate Range and Power Range Neutron Flux channels the provisions of Specification 4.0.4 are not applicable for entry into MODE 2 or 1.
- (6) Incore - Excore Calibration, above 75% of RATED THERMAL POWER. The provisions of Specification 4.0.4 are not applicable for entry into MODE 2 or 1.
- (7) Each train shall be tested at least every 62 days on a STAGGERED TEST BASIS.
- (8) (Not Used)
- (9) Quarterly surveillance in MODES 3\*, 4\*, and 5\* shall also include verification that permissives P-6 and P-10 are in their required state for existing plant conditions by observation of the permissive annunciator window.

TABLE 4.3-1 (Continued)

TABLE NOTATIONS (Continued)

- (10) Setpoint verification is not applicable.
- (11) The TRIP ACTUATING DEVICE OPERATIONAL TEST shall independently verify the OPERABILITY of the undervoltage and shunt trip attachments of the Reactor Trip Breakers.
- (12) OPERABILITY shall be verified by a check of memory devices, input accuracies, Boron Dilution Alarm setpoints, output values, and software functions.
- (13) (Not used)
- (14) The TRIP ACTUATING DEVICE OPERATIONAL TEST shall independently verify the OPERABILITY of the undervoltage and shunt trip circuits for the Manual Reactor Trip Function. The test shall also verify the OPERABILITY of the Bypass Breaker trip circuit(s).
- (15) Local manual shunt trip prior to placing breaker in service.
- (16) Automatic undervoltage trip.
- (17) Each channel shall be tested at least every 92 days on a STAGGERED TEST BASIS.
- (18) The surveillance frequency and/or MODES specified for these channels in Table 4.3-2 are more restrictive and, therefore, applicable.

## INSTRUMENTATION

### 3/4.3.2 ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURES ACTUATION SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION

#### LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.3.2 The Engineered Safety Features Actuation System (ESFAS) instrumentation channels and interlocks shown in Table 3.3-3 shall be OPERABLE with their Trip Setpoints set consistent with the values shown in the Trip Setpoint column of Table 3.3-4 and with RESPONSE TIMES as shown in Table 3.3-5.

APPLICABILITY: As shown in Table 3.3-3.

#### ACTION:

- a. With an ESFAS Instrumentation or Interlock Trip Setpoint trip less conservative than the value shown in the Trip Setpoint column but more conservative than the value shown in the Allowable Value column of Table 3.3-4, adjust the Setpoint consistent with the Trip Setpoint value.
- b. With an ESFAS Instrumentation or Interlock Trip Setpoint less conservative than the value shown in the Allowable Value column of Table 3.3-4, either:
  1. Adjust the Setpoint consistent with the Trip Setpoint value of Table 3.3-4, and determine within 12 hours that Equation 2.2-1 was satisfied for the affected channel, or
  2. Declare the channel inoperable and apply the applicable ACTION statement requirements of Table 3.3-3 until the channel is restored to OPERABLE status with its Setpoint adjusted consistent with the Trip Setpoint value.

Equation 2.2-1

$$Z + R + S \leq TA$$

Where:

Z = The value from Column Z of Table 3.3-4 for the affected channel,

R = The "as-measured" value (in percent span) of rack error for the affected channel,

S = Either the "as-measured" value (in percent span) of the sensor error, or the value from Column S (Sensor Error) of Table 3.3-4 for the affected channel, and

TA = The value from Column TA (Total Allowance) of Table 3.3-4 for the affected channel.

- c. With an ESFAS instrumentation channel or interlock inoperable, take the ACTION shown in Table 3.3-3.

## INSTRUMENTATION

### SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

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4.3.2.1 Each ESFAS instrumentation channel and interlock and the automatic actuation logic and relays shall be demonstrated OPERABLE by performance of the ESFAS Instrumentation Surveillance Requirements specified in Table 4.3-2.

4.3.2.2 The ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURES RESPONSE TIME of each ESFAS function shall be demonstrated to be within the limit at least once per 18 months. Each test shall include at least one train so that:

- a. Each logic train is tested at least once per 36 months,
- b. Each actuation train is tested at least once per 54 months\*, and
- c. One channel per function so that all channels are tested at least once per N times 18 months where N is the total number of redundant channels in a specific ESFAS function as shown in the "Total No. of Channels" column of Table 3.3-3.

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\*If an ESFAS instrumentation channel is inoperable due to response times exceeding the limits of Table 3.3-5, perform an engineering evaluation to determine if the test failure is a result of degradation of the actuation relays. If degradation of the actuation relays is determined to be the cause, increase the ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURES RESPONSE TIME surveillance frequency such that all trains are tested at least once per 36 months.

TABLE 3.3-3

## ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURES ACTUATION SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION

<u>FUNCTIONAL UNIT</u>	<u>TOTAL NO. OF CHANNELS</u>	<u>CHANNELS TO TRIP</u>	<u>MINIMUM CHANNELS OPERABLE</u>	<u>APPLICABLE MODES</u>	<u>ACTION</u>
1. Safety Injection (Reactor Trip, Feedwater Isolation, Control Room Emergency Ventilation, Start Standby Diesel Generators, Reactor Containment Fan Coolers, and Essential Cooling Water).					
a. Manual Initiation	2	1	2	1, 2, 3, 4	19
b. Automatic Actuation Logic	2	1	2	1, 2, 3, 4	14
c. Actuation Relays	3	2	3	1, 2, 3, 4	14
d. Containment Pressure--High-1	3	2	2	1, 2, 3, 4	15
e. Pressurizer Pressure--Low	4	2	3	1, 2, 3#	20
f. Compensated Steam Line Pressure-Low	3/steam line	2/steam line any steam line	2/steam line in each steam line	1, 2, 3#	15
g. Compensated T <sub>COLD</sub> Low-Low (interlocked with P-15)	3/loop	2/loop in any loop	2/loop in each loop	1####, 2, 3#	15



TABLE 3.3-3 (Continued)

ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURES ACTUATION SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION

<u>FUNCTIONAL UNIT</u>	<u>TOTAL NO. OF CHANNELS</u>	<u>MINIMUM CHANNELS TO TRIP</u>	<u>MINIMUM CHANNELS OPERABLE</u>	<u>APPLICABLE MODES</u>	<u>ACTION</u>
2. Containment Spray					
a. Manual Initiation	2	1 with 2 coincident switches	2	1, 2, 3, 4	19
b. Automatic Actuation Logic	2	1	2	1, 2, 3, 4	14
c. Actuation Relays	3	2	3	1, 2, 3, 4	14
d. Containment Pressure-- High-3	4	2	3	1, 2, 3	17
3. Containment Isolation					
a. Phase "A" Isolation					
1) Manual Initiation	2	1	2	1, 2, 3, 4	19
2) Automatic Actuation Logic	2	1	2	1, 2, 3, 4	14
3) Actuation Relays	3	2	3	1, 2, 3, 4	14
4) Safety Injection		See Item 1. above for all Safety Injection initiating functions and requirements.			

TABLE 3.3-3 (Continued)

ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURES ACTUATION SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION

<u>FUNCTIONAL UNIT</u>	<u>TOTAL NO. OF CHANNELS</u>	<u>CHANNELS TO TRIP</u>	<u>MINIMUM CHANNELS OPERABLE</u>	<u>APPLICABLE MODES</u>	<u>ACTION</u>
3. Containment Isolation (Continued)					
b. Containment Ventilation Isolation					
1) Automatic Actuation Logic	2	1	2	1, 2, 3, 4	18
2) Actuation Relays***	3	2	3	1, 2, 3, 4	18
3) Safety Injection***	See Item 1. above for all Safety Injection initiating functions and requirements.				
4) RCB Purge Radioactivity-High	2	1	2	1,2,3,4,5 <sup>##</sup> ,6 <sup>##</sup>	18
5) Containment Spray-Manual Initiation	See Item 2. above for Containment Spray manual initiating functions and requirements.				
6) Phase "A" Isolation-Manual Isolation	See Item 3.a. above for Phase "A" Isolation manual initiating functions and requirements.				
c. Phase "B" Isolation					
1) Automatic Actuation Logic	2	1	2	1,2,3,4	14
2) Actuation Relays	3	2	3	1,2,3,4	14
3) Containment Pressure--High-3	4	2	3	1,2,3	17
4) Containment Spray-Manual Initiation	See Item 2. above for Containment Spray manual initiating functions and requirements.				

TABLE 3.3-3 (Continued)

## ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURES ACTUATION SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION

<u>FUNCTIONAL UNIT</u>	<u>TOTAL NO. OF CHANNELS</u>	<u>CHANNELS TO TRIP</u>	<u>MINIMUM CHANNELS OPERABLE</u>	<u>APPLICABLE MODES</u>	<u>ACTION</u>
4. Steam Line Isolation					
a. Manual Initiation					
1) Individual	2/steam line	1/steam line	2/operating steam line	1, 2, 3	24
2) System	2	1	2	1, 2, 3	23
b. Automatic Actuation Logic and Actuation Relays	2	1	2	1, 2, 3	22
c. Steam Line Pressure - Negative Rate--High	3/steam line	2/steam line any steam line	2/steam line in each steam line	3###	15
d. Containment Pressure - High-2	3	2	2	1, 2, 3	15
e. Compensated Steam Line Pressure - Low	3/steam line	2/steam line any steam line	2/steam line in each steam line	1, 2, 3#	15
f. Compensated T <sub>CULD</sub> - Low-Low (interlocked with P-15)	3/loop	2/loop any loop	2/loop in each loop	1####, 2, 3#	15

TABLE 3.3-3 (Continued)

## ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURES ACTUATION SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION

<u>FUNCTIONAL UNIT</u>	<u>TOTAL NO. OF CHANNELS</u>	<u>CHANNELS TO TRIP</u>	<u>MINIMUM CHANNELS OPERABLE</u>	<u>APPLICABLE MODES</u>	<u>ACTION</u>
5. Turbine Trip and Feedwater Isolation					
a. Automatic Actuation Logic and Actuation Relays	2	1	2	1, 2, 3	25
b. Steam Generator Water Level-- High-High (P-14)	4/stm. gen.	2/stm. gen. in any operating stm. gen.	3/stm. gen. in each operating stm. gen.	1, 2, 3	20
c. Compensated $T_{COLD}$ - Low (interlocked with P-15)	3/loop	2/loop in any loop	2/loop in each loop	1####, 2, 3#	15
d. Feedwater Flow - High (interlocked with P-15) coincident with either of the following in 2 of 4 loops: Reactor Coolant Flow-Low	3/stm. gen.	2/stm. gen. in any stm. gen.	2/stm. gen. in each stm. gen.	1####, 2, 3	15
or $T_{avg}$ - Low	3/loop	2/loop in any loop	2/loop in each loop	1, 2, 3	15
e. Safety Injection	See Item 1. for all Safety Injection initiating functions and requirements.				
f. $T_{avg}$ -Low coincident with Reactor Trip (P-4)**	1/loop	1/loop in any loop	1/loop	1, 2, 3	15
	4 (1/loop)	2	3	1, 2, 3	20

TABLE 3.3-3 (Continued)

ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURES ACTUATION SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION

<u>FUNCTIONAL UNIT</u>	<u>TOTAL NO. OF CHANNELS</u>	<u>CHANNELS TO TRIP</u>	<u>MINIMUM CHANNELS OPERABLE</u>	<u>APPLICABLE MODES</u>	<u>ACTION</u>
6. Auxiliary Feedwater					
a. Manual Initiation	1/pump	1/pump	1/pump	1, 2, 3	26
b. Automatic Actuation Logic	2	1	2	1, 2, 3	22
c. Actuation Relays	3	2	3	1, 2, 3	22
d. Stm. Gen. Water Level-- Low-Low Start Motor- Driven Pumps and Turbine- Driven Pump	4/stm. gen.	2/stm. gen. in any stm. gen.	3/stm. gen. in each stm. gen.	1, 2, 3	20
e. Safety Injection	See Item 1. above for all Safety Injection initiating functions and requirements.				
f. Loss of Power (Motor Driven Pumps Only)	See Item 8. below for all Loss of Power initiating functions and requirements.				
7. Automatic Switchover to Containment Sump****					
a. Automatic Actuation Logic and Actuation Relays	3-1/train	1/train	1/train	1, 2, 3, 4	19
b. RWST Level--Low-Low	3-1/train	1/train	1/train	1, 2, 3, 4	19
Coincident With: Safety Injection	See Item 1. above for all Safety Injection initiating functions and requirements.				

TABLE 3.3-3 (Continued)

ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURES ACTUATION SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION

<u>FUNCTIONAL UNIT</u>	<u>TOTAL NO. OF CHANNELS</u>	<u>CHANNELS TO TRIP</u>	<u>MINIMUM CHANNELS OPERABLE</u>	<u>APPLICABLE MODES</u>	<u>ACTION</u>
8. Loss of Power					
a. 4.16 kV ESF Bus Under-voltage-Loss of Voltage	4/bus	2/bus	3/bus	1, 2, 3, 4	20
b. 4.16 kV ESF Bus Under-voltage-Tolerable Degraded Voltage Coincident with SI	4/bus	2/bus	3/bus	1, 2, 3, 4	20
c. 4.16 kV ESF Bus Under-voltage - Sustained Degraded Voltage	4/bus	2/bus	3/bus	1, 2, 3, 4	20
9. Engineered Safety Features Actuation System Interlocks					
a. Pressurizer Pressure, P-11	3	2	2	1, 2, 3	21
b. Low-Low $T_{avg}$ , P-12	4	2	3	1, 2, 3	21
c. Reactor Trip, P-4	2	1	2	1, 2, 3	23
d. Power Range Neutron Flux Input to Excessive Cooldown Protection, P-15	4	2	3	1, 2, 3	21

TABLE 3.3-3 (Continued)

ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURES ACTUATION SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION

<u>FUNCTIONAL UNIT</u>	<u>TOTAL NO. OF CHANNELS</u>	<u>CHANNELS TO TRIP</u>	<u>MINIMUM CHANNELS OPERABLE</u>	<u>APPLICABLE MODES</u>	<u>ACTION</u>
10. Control Room Ventilation					
a. Manual Initiation	3(1/train)	2(1/train)	3(1/train)	All	27
b. Safety Injection	See Item 1. above for all Safety Injection initiating functions and requirements.				
c. Automatic Actuation Logic and Actuation Relays	3	2	3	All	27
d. Control Room Intake Air Radioactivity - High	2	1	2	All	28
e. Loss of Power	See Item 8. above for all Loss of Power initiating functions and requirements.				
11. FHB HVA					
a. Manual Initiation	3(1/train)	2(1/train)	3(1/train)	1, 2, 3, 4 or with irradiated fuel in spent fuel pool	29, 30
b. Automatic Actuation Logic and Actuation Relays	3	2	3	1, 2, 3, 4 or with irradiated fuel in spent fuel pool	29, 30
c. Safety Injection	See Item 1. above for all Safety Injection initiating functions and requirements.				
d. Spent Fuel Pool Exhaust Radioactivity - High	2	1	2	With irradiated fuel in spent fuel pool	30

TABLE 3.3-3 (Continued)

TABLE NOTATIONS

\*\*Feedwater Isolation only.

\*\*\*Function is actuated by either actuation train A or actuation train B. Actuation train C is not used for this function.

\*\*\*\*Automatic switchover to containment sump is accomplished for each train using the corresponding RWST level transmitter.

#Trip function may be blocked in this MODE below the P-11 (Pressurizer Pressure Interlock) Setpoint.

##During CORE ALTERATIONS or movement of irradiated fuel within containment.

###Trip function automatically blocked above P-11 and may be blocked below P-11 when Excessive Cooldown Protection is not blocked.

####Trip function is blocked in MODE 1 above the P-15 (Excessive Cooldown Protection) setpoint.

ACTION STATEMENTS

ACTION 14 - With the number of OPERABLE channels one less than the Minimum Channels OPERABLE requirement, be in at least HOT STANDBY within 6 hours and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours; however, one channel may be bypassed for up to 2 hours for surveillance testing per Specification 4.3.2.1, provided the other channel is OPERABLE.

ACTION 15 - With the number of OPERABLE channels one less than the Total Number of Channels, operation may proceed until performance of the next required ANALOG CHANNEL OPERATIONAL TEST provided the inoperable channel is placed in the tripped condition within 1 hour.

ACTION 16 - (Not Used)

ACTION 17 - With the number of OPERABLE channels one less than the Total Number of Channels, operation may proceed provided the inoperable channel is placed in the bypassed condition and the Minimum Channels OPERABLE requirement is met. One additional channel may be bypassed for up to 2 hours for surveillance testing per Specification 4.3.2.1.

ACTION 18 - With less than the Minimum Channels OPERABLE requirement, operation may continue provided the containment purge supply and exhaust valves are maintained closed.



TABLE 3.3-3 (Continued)

ACTION STATEMENTS (Continued)

- ACTION 19 - With the number of OPERABLE channels one less than the Minimum Channels OPERABLE requirement, restore the inoperable channel to OPERABLE status within 48 hours or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours.
- ACTION 20 - With the number of OPERABLE channels one less than the Total Number of Channels, STARTUP and/or POWER OPERATION may proceed provided the following conditions are satisfied:
- a. The inoperable channel is placed in the tripped condition within 1 hour, and
  - b. The Minimum Channels OPERABLE requirement is met; however, one additional channel may be bypassed for up to 2 hours for surveillance testing of other channels per Specification 4.3.2.1.
- ACTION 21 - With less than the Minimum Number of Channels OPERABLE, within 1 hour determine by observation of the associated permissive annunciator window(s) that the interlock is in its required state for the existing plant condition, or apply Specification 3.0.3.
- ACTION 22 - With the number of OPERABLE channels one less than the Minimum Channels OPERABLE requirement, be in at least HOT STANDBY within 6 hours and in at least HOT SHUTDOWN within the following 6 hours; however, one channel may be bypassed for up to 2 hours for surveillance testing per Specification 4.3.2.1 provided the other channel is OPERABLE.
- ACTION 23 - With the number of OPERABLE channels one less than the Total Number of Channels, restore the inoperable channel to OPERABLE status within 48 hours or be in at least HOT STANDBY within 6 hours and in at least HOT SHUTDOWN within the following 6 hours.
- ACTION 24 - With the number of OPERABLE channels one less than the Total Number of Channels, restore the inoperable channel to OPERABLE status within 48 hours or declare the associated valve inoperable and take the ACTION required by Specification 3.7.1.5.
- ACTION 25 - With the number of OPERABLE channels one less than the Minimum Channels OPERABLE requirement, be in at least HOT STANDBY within 6 hours; however, one channel may be bypassed for up to 2 hours for surveillance testing per Specification 4.3.2.1 provided the other channel is OPERABLE.

TABLE 3.3-3 (Continued)

ACTION STATEMENTS (Continued)

- ACTION 26 - With the number of OPERABLE channels one less than the Minimum Channels OPERABLE requirement, declare the affected Auxiliary Feedwater Pump inoperable and take ACTION required by Specification 3.7.1.2.
- ACTION 27 - MODES 1, 2, 3, 4: With the number of OPERABLE channels one less than the Minimum Channels OPERABLE requirement, restore the inoperable channel to OPERABLE status within 48 hours or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours.
- MODES 5 and 6: With the number of OPERABLE channels less than the Minimum Channels OPERABLE requirement, restore the inoperable Channel to OPERABLE status within 48 hours or initiate and maintain operation of the Control Room Makeup and Cleanup Filtration System (at 100% capacity) in the recirculation and makeup filtration mode.
- ACTION 28 - MODES 1, 2, 3, 4: With the number of OPERABLE channels less than the Minimum Channels OPERABLE requirement, within 1 hour isolate the Control Room Envelope and maintain operation of the ventilation system in the filtered recirculation mode.
- MODES 5 and 6: With the number of OPERABLE channels less than the Minimum Channels OPERABLE requirement, within 1 hour initiate and maintain operation of the Control Room Makeup and Cleanup Filtration System (at 100% capacity) in the recirculation and makeup filtration mode.
- ACTION 29 - MODES 1, 2, 3, 4: With the number of OPERABLE channels one less than the Minimum Channels OPERABLE requirement, restore the inoperable channel to OPERABLE status within 48 hours or either initiate and maintain operation of the FHB exhaust air filtration system (at 100% capacity) or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours.
- ACTION 30 - With irradiated fuel in the spent fuel pool: With the number of OPERABLE channels less than the Minimum Channels OPERABLE requirement, fuel movement within the spent fuel pool or crane operation with loads over the spent fuel pool may proceed provided the FHB exhaust air filtration system is in operation and discharging through at least one train of HEPA filters and charcoal adsorbers.

TABLE 3.3-4

## ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURES ACTUATION SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION TRIP SETPOINTS

FUNCTIONAL UNIT	TOTAL ALLOWANCE (TA)	Z	SENSOR ERROR (S)	TRIP SETPOINT	ALLOWABLE VALUE
1. Safety Injection (Reactor Trip, Feedwater Isolation, Control Room Emergency Ventilation, Start Standby Diesel Generators, Reactor Containment Fan Coolers, and Essential Cooling Water)					
a. Manual Initiation	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.
b. Automatic Actuation Logic	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.
c. Actuation Relays	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.
d. Containment Pressure--High 1	3.6	0.71	2.0	$\leq 3.0$ psig	$\leq 4.0$ psig
e. Pressurizer Pressure--Low	13.1	10.71	2.0	$\geq 1850$ psig##	$\geq 1842$ psig##
f. Compensated Steam Line Pressure-Low	13.6	10.71	2.0	$\geq 735$ psig	$\geq 714.7$ psig*
g. Compensated T <sub>COLD</sub> -Low-Low (interlocked with P-15)	4.5	0.5	1.0	$\geq 532^{\circ}\text{F}$	$\geq 528^{\circ}\text{F}^{***}$
2. Containment Spray					
a. Manual Initiation	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.
b. Automatic Actuation Logic	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.
c. Actuation Relays	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.
d. Containment Pressure--High-3	3.6	0.71	2.0	$\leq 9.5$ psig	$\leq 10.5$ psig

TABLE 3.3-4 (Continued)

## ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURES ACTUATION SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION TRIP SETPOINTS

FUNCTIONAL UNIT	TOTAL ALLOWANCE (TA)	Z	SENSOR ERROR (S)	TRIP SETPOINT	ALLOWABLE VALUE
3. Containment Isolation					
a. Phase "A" Isolation					
1) Manual Initiation	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.
2) Automatic Actuation Logic	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.
3) Actuation Relays	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.
4) Safety Injection	See Item 1. above for all Safety Injection Trip Setpoints and Allowable Values.				
b. Containment Ventilation Isolation					
1) Automatic Actuation Logic	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.
2) Actuation Relays	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.
3) Safety Injection	See Item 1. above for all Safety Injection Trip Setpoints and Allowable Values.				
4) RCB Purge Radioactivity-High	$3.1 \times 10^{-4}$ $\mu\text{Ci/cc}$	$1.8 \times 10^{-4}$ $\mu\text{Ci/cc}$	$1.3 \times 10^{-4}$ $\mu\text{Ci/cc}$	$< 5 \times 10^{-4}$ ### $\mu\text{Ci/cc}$	$< 6.4 \times 10^{-4}$ $\mu\text{Ci/cc}$
5) Containment Spray - Manual Initiation	See Item 2. above for Containment Spray manual initiation Trip Setpoints and Allowable Values.				
6) Phase "A" Isolation - Manual Initiation	See Item 3.a. above for Phase "A" Isolation manual initiation Trip Setpoints and Allowable Values.				
c. Phase "B" Isolation					
1) Automatic Actuation Logic	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.
2) Actuation Relays	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.
3) Containment Pressure-- High-3	3.6	0.71	2.0	$\leq 9.5$ psig	$\leq 10.5$ psig
4) Containment Spray- Manual Initiation	See Item 2. above for Containment Spray manual initiation Trip Setpoints and Allowable Values.				

TABLE 3.3-4 (Continued)

## ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURES ACTUATION SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION TRIP SETPOINTS

FUNCTIONAL UNIT	TOTAL ALLOWANCE (TA)	Z	SENSOR ERROR (S)	TRIP SETPOINT	ALLOWABLE VALUE
4. Steam Line Isolation					
a. Manual Initiation	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.
b. Automatic Actuation Logic and Actuation Relays	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.
c. Steam Line Pressure - Negative Rate--High	2.6	0.5	0	< 100 psi	< 126.3 psi**
d. Containment Pressure - High-2	3.6	0.71	2.0	< 3.0 psig	< 4.0 psig
e. Compensated Steam Line Pressure - Low	13.6	10.71	2.0	≥ 735 psig	≥ 714.7 psig*
f. Compensated T <sub>COLD</sub> - Low-Low (interlocked with P-15)	4.5	0.5	1.0	≥ 532°F	≥ 528°F***
5. Turbine Trip and Feedwater Isolation					
a. Automatic Actuation Logic and Actuation Relays	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.
b. Steam Generator Water Level--High-High (P-14)	4.5	2.35	2.0+0.2#	< 87.5% of narrow range instrument span.	< 88.9% of narrow range instrument span.
c. Compensated T <sub>COLD</sub> -Low (interlocked with P-15)	4.5	0.5	1.0	≥ 538°F	≥ 534°F***

TABLE 3.3-4 (Continued)

## ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURES ACTUATION SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION TRIP SETPOINTS

FUNCTIONAL UNIT	TOTAL ALLOWANCE (TA)	Z	SENSOR ERROR (S)	TRIP SETPOINT	ALLOWABLE VALUE
5. Turbine Trip and Feedwater Isolation (Continued)					
d. Feedwater Flow-High (interlocked with P-15) Coincident With Either of the Following in 2 of 4 Loops:	7.2	2.76	4.0	< 30.0% Flow	< 32.2% Flow
RCS Flow-Low	3.0	3.19	0.6	>91.8% of loop design flow****	> 90.9% of loop design flow****
or					
T <sub>avg</sub> -Low	4.5	1.36	0.8	≥ 574°F	≥ 571.1°F
e. Safety Injection	See Item 1 above for all Safety Injection Trip Setpoints and Allowable Values.				
f. T <sub>avg</sub> -Low Coincident with Reactor Trip (P-4) (Feedwater Isolation Only)	4.5	1.36	0.8	≥ 574°F	≥ 571.1°F
6. Auxiliary Feedwater					
a. Manual Initiation	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.
b. Automatic Actuation Logic	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.
c. Actuation Relays	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.
d. Steam Generator Water Level--Low-Low	15.0	12.75	2.0+0.2#	≥ 33.0% of narrow range instrument span.	≥ 31.5% of narrow range instrument span.
e. Safety Injection	See Item 1. above for all Safety Injection Trip Setpoints and Allowable Values.				

TABLE 3.3-4 (Continued)

ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURES ACTUATION SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION TRIP SETPOINTS

FUNCTIONAL UNIT	TOTAL ALLOWANCE (TA)	Z	SENSOR ERROR (S)	TRIP SETPOINT	ALLOWABLE VALUE
6. Auxiliary Feedwater (Continued)					
f. Loss of Power (Motor Driven Pumps Only)	See Item 8. below for all Loss of Power Trip Setpoints and Allowable Values.				
7. Automatic Switchover to Containment Sump					
a. Automatic Actuation Logic and Actuation Relays	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.
b. RWST Level--Low-Low Coincident With: Safety Injection	5.0	1.21	2.0	$\geq 11\%$	$\geq 9.1\%$
	See Item 1. above for all Safety Injection Trip Setpoints and Allowable Values.				
8. Loss of Power					
a. 4.16 kV ESF Bus Undervoltage (Loss of Voltage)	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	> 3107 volts with a < 1.75 second time delay.	> 2979 volts with a < 1.93 second time delay.
b. 4.16 kV ESF Bus Undervoltage (Tolerable Degraded Voltage Coincident with SI)	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	> 3835 volts with a < 35 second time delay.	> 3786 volts with a < 39 second time delay.
c. 4.16 kV ESF Bus Undervoltage (Sustained Degraded Voltage)	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	> 3835 volts with a < 50 second time delay.	> 3786 volts with a < 55 second time delay.

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TABLE 3.3-4 (Continued)

## ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURES ACTUATION SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION TRIP SETPOINTS

FUNCTIONAL UNIT	TOTAL ALLOWANCE (TA)	Z	SENSOR ERROR (S)	TRIP SETPOINT	ALLOWABLE VALUE
9. Engineered Safety Features Actuation System Interlocks					
a. Pressurizer Pressure, P-11	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	< 1985 psig	< 1993 psig
b. Low-Low $T_{avg}$ , P-12	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	> 563°F	> 560.1°F
c. Reactor Trip, P-4	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.
d. Power Range Neutron Flux Input to Excessive Cooldown Protection, P-15	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	< 10% Rated Thermal Power	< 12.3% Rated Thermal Power
10. Control Room Ventilation					
a. Manual Initiation	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.
b. Safety Injection	See Item 1. above for all Safety Injection Trip Setpoints and Allowable Values.				
c. Automatic Actuation Logic and Actuation Relays	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.
d. Control Room Intake Air Radioactivity - High	$3.7 \times 10^{-5}$ $\mu\text{Ci/cc}$	$2.2 \times 10^{-5}$ $\mu\text{Ci/cc}$	$1.6 \times 10^{-5}$ $\mu\text{Ci/cc}$	$< 6.1 \times 10^{-5}$ $\mu\text{Ci/cc}$	$< 7.8 \times 10^{-5}$ $\mu\text{Ci/cc}$
e. Loss of Power	See Item 8. above for all Loss of Power Trip Setpoints and Allowable Values.				
11. FHB HVAC					
a. Manual Initiation	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.



TABLE 3.3-4 (Continued)

ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURES ACTUATION SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION TRIP SETPOINTS

<u>FUNCTIONAL UNIT</u>	<u>TOTAL ALLOWANCE (TA)</u>	<u>Z</u>	<u>SENSOR ERROR (S)</u>	<u>TRIP SETPOINT</u>	<u>ALLOWABLE VALUE</u>
11. FHB HVAC (Continued)					
b. Automatic Actuation Logic and Actuation Relays	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.
c. Safety Injection	See Item 1. above for all Safety Injection Trip Setpoints and Allowable Values.				
d. Spent Fuel Pool Exhaust Radioactivity - High	$3.1 \times 10^{-4}$ $\mu\text{Ci/cc}$	$1.8 \times 10^{-4}$ $\mu\text{Ci/cc}$	$1.3 \times 10^{-4}$ $\mu\text{Ci/cc}$	$<5.0 \times 10^{-4}$ $\mu\text{Ci/cc}$	$<6.4 \times 10^{-4}$ $\mu\text{Ci/cc}$

TABLE 3.3-4 (Continued)

TABLE NOTATIONS

\*Time constants utilized in the lead-lag controller for Steam Line Pressure-Low are  $\tau_1 \geq 50$  seconds and  $\tau_2 \leq 5$  seconds. CHANNEL CALIBRATION shall ensure that these time constants are adjusted to these values.

\*\*The time constant utilized in the rate-lag controller for Steam Line Pressure-Negative Rate-High is greater than or equal to 50 seconds. CHANNEL CALIBRATION shall ensure that this time constant is adjusted to this value.

\*\*\*Time constants utilized in the lead-lag controller for Compensated T<sub>COLD</sub> are  $\tau_1 \geq 12$  seconds and  $\tau_2 \leq 3$  seconds. CHANNEL CALIBRATION shall ensure that these time constants are adjusted to these values.

\*\*\*\*Loop design flow = 95,400 gpm

#2.0% span for Steam Generator Level; 0.2% span for Reference Leg RTDs

##Until resolution of the Veritrak transmitter uncertainty issue, the trip setpoint will be set at  $\geq 1869$  psig, with the allowable value at  $\geq 1861$  psig.

###This setpoint value may be increased up to the equivalent limits of Specification 3.11.2.1 in accordance with the methodology and parameters of the ODCM during containment purge or vent for pressure control, ALARA and respirable air quality considerations for personnel entry.

TABLE 3.3-5

ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURES RESPONSE TIMES

<u>INITIATION SIGNAL AND FUNCTION</u>	<u>RESPONSE TIME IN SECONDS</u>
1. Manual Initiation	
a. Safety Injection (ECCS)	N.A.
b. Containment Spray	N.A.
c. Phase "A" Isolation	N.A.
d. Phase "B" Isolation	N.A.
e. Containment Ventilation Isolation	N.A.
f. Steam Line Isolation	N.A.
g. Feedwater Isolation	N.A.
h. Auxiliary Feedwater	N.A.
i. Essential Cooling Water	N.A.
j. Reactor Containment Fan Coolers	N.A.
k. Control Room Ventilation	N.A.
l. Reactor Trip	N.A.
m. Start Diesel Generator	N.A.
2. Containment Pressure--High-1	
a. Safety Injection (ECCS)	$\leq 27^{(1)}/12^{(5)}$
1) Reactor Trip	$\leq 2^{(3)}$
2) Feedwater Isolation	$\leq 12^{(3)}$
3) Phase "A" Isolation	$\leq 33^{(1)}/23^{(2)}$
4) Containment Ventilation Isolation (18-inch lines)	$\leq 23^{(1)}/13^{(2)}$
5) Auxiliary Feedwater	$\leq 60$
6) Essential Cooling Water	$\leq 62^{(1)}/52^{(2)}$
7) Reactor Containment Fan Coolers	$\leq 38^{(1)}/28^{(2)}$
8) Control Room Ventilation	$\leq 72^{(1)}/62^{(2)}$
9) Start Standby Diesel Generators	$\leq 12$

TABLE 3.3-5 (Continued)

ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURES RESPONSE TIMES

<u>INITIATING SIGNAL AND FUNCTION</u>	<u>RESPONSE TIME IN SECONDS</u>
3. Pressurizer Pressure--Low	
a. Safety Injection (ECCS)	$\leq 27^{(1)}/12^{(5)}$
1) Reactor Trip	$\leq 2^{(3)}$
2) Feedwater Isolation	$\leq 12^{(3)}$
3) Phase "A" Isolation	$\leq 33^{(1)}/23^{(2)}$
4) Containment Ventilation Isolation	N.A.
5) Auxiliary Feedwater	$\leq 60$
6) Essential Cooling Water	$\leq 62^{(1)}/52^{(2)}$
7) Reactor Containment Fan Coolers	$\leq 38^{(1)}/28^{(2)}$
8) Control Room Ventilation	$\leq 72^{(1)}/62^{(2)}$
9) Start Standby Diesel Generators	$\leq 12$
4. Compensated T <sub>COLD</sub> -Low-Low	
a. Safety Injection (ECCS)	N.A.
1) Reactor Trip	N.A.
2) Feedwater Isolation	N.A.
3) Phase "A" Isolation	N.A.
4) Containment Ventilation Isolation	N.A.
5) Auxiliary Feedwater	N.A.
6) Essential Cooling Water	N.A.
7) Reactor Containment Fan Coolers	N.A.
8) Control Room Ventilation	N.A.
9) Start Diesel Generators	N.A.
b. Steam Line Isolation	N.A.
5. Compensated Steam Line Pressure--Low	
a. Safety Injection (ECCS)	$\leq 22^{(4)}/12^{(5)}$
1) Reactor Trip	$\leq 2^{(3)}$
2) Feedwater Isolation	$\leq 12^{(3)}$
3) Phase "A" Isolation	$\leq 33^{(1)}/23^{(2)}$
4) Containment Ventilation Isolation	N.A.
5) Auxiliary Feedwater	$\leq 60$
6) Essential Cooling Water	$\leq 62^{(1)}/52^{(2)}$
7) Reactor Containment Fan Coolers	$\leq 38^{(1)}/28^{(2)}$

TABLE 3.3-5 (Continued)

ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURES RESPONSE TIMES

<u>INITIATING SIGNAL AND FUNCTION</u>	<u>RESPONSE TIME IN SECONDS</u>
5. Compensated Steam Line Pressure--Low (Continued)	
8) Control Room Ventilation	$\leq 72^{(1)}/62^{(2)}$
9) Start Diesel Generators	$\leq 12$
b. Steam Line Isolation	$\leq 8^{(3)}$
6. Containment Pressure--High-3	
a. Containment Spray	$\leq 30^{(1)}/20^{(2)}$
b. Phase "B" Isolation	$\leq 28^{(1)}/18^{(2)}$
7. Containment Pressure--High-2	
Steam Line Isolation	$\leq 7^{(3)}$
8. Steam Line Pressure - Negative Rate--High	
Steam Line Isolation	N.A.
9. Steam Generator Water Level--High-High	
a. Turbine Trip	$\leq 3^{(3)}$
b. Feedwater Isolation	$\leq 12^{(3)}$
10. Steam Generator Water Level--Low-Low	
a. Motor-Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pumps	$\leq 60$
b. Turbine-Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pump	$\leq 60$
11. RWST Level--Low-Low Coincident with Safety Injection	
Automatic Switchover to Containment Sump	$\leq 32^{(2)}$
12. Loss of Power	
a. 4.16 kV ESF Bus Undervoltage (Loss of Voltage)	$\leq 12$
b. 4.16 kV ESF Bus Undervoltage (Tolerable Degraded Voltage Coincident with Safety Injection)	$\leq 49$

TABLE 3.3-5 (Continued)

ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURES RESPONSE TIMES

<u>INITIATING SIGNAL AND FUNCTION</u>	<u>RESPONSE TIME IN SECONDS</u>
12. Loss of Power (Continued)	
c. 4.16 kV ESF Bus Undervoltage (Sustained Degraded Voltage)	≤ 65
13. RCB Purge Radioactivity-High	
a. Containment Ventilation Isolation (48-inch lines)	≤ 73 <sup>(2)</sup>
b. Containment Ventilation Isolation (18-inch lines)	≤ 23 <sup>(2)</sup>
14. Compensated $T_{cold}$ - Low	
a. Turbine Trip	N.A.
b. Feedwater Isolation	N.A.
15. Feedwater Flow - High Coincident with 2 of 4 Loops Having Either Reactor Coolant Flow - Low or $T_{avg}$ - Low	
a. Turbine Trip - Reactor Trip	N.A.
b. Feedwater Isolation	N.A.
16. $T_{avg}$ - Low Coincident with Reactor Trip Feedwater Isolation	N.A.
17. Control Room Intake Air Radioactivity - High Control Room Ventilation	≤ 78 <sup>(2)</sup>
18. Spent Fuel Pool Exhaust Radioactivity - High FHB HVAC Emergency Startup	≤ 42 <sup>(2)</sup>

TABLE 3.3-5 (Continued)

TABLE NOTATIONS

- (1) Diesel generator starting and sequence loading delays included.
- (2) Diesel generator starting delay not included, sequence loading delay is included. Offsite power available.
- (3) Not dependent upon diesel generator starting or sequence loading delays.
- (4) Diesel generator starting and sequence loading delay included. Low Head Safety Injection pumps not included.
- (5) Diesel generator starting delays not included, sequence loading delay is included. Low Head Safety Injection pumps not included.

TABLE 4.3-2

ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURES ACTUATION SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION  
SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

<u>CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL UNIT</u>	<u>CHANNEL CHECK</u>	<u>CHANNEL CALIBRATION</u>	<u>DIGITAL OR ANALOG CHANNEL OPERATIONAL TEST</u>	<u>TRIP ACTUATING DEVICE OPERATIONAL TEST</u>	<u>ACTUATION LOGIC TEST</u>	<u>MASTER RELAY TEST</u>	<u>SLAVE RELAY TEST</u>	<u>MODES FOR WHICH SURVEILLANCE IS REQUIRED</u>
1. Safety Injection (Reactor Trip, Feedwater Isolation, Control Room Emergency Ventilation, Start Standby Diesel Generators, Reactor Containment Fan Coolers, and Essential Cooling Water)								
a. Manual Initiation	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	R	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	1, 2, 3, 4
b. Automatic Actuation Logic	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	M(1)	N.A.	N.A.	1, 2, 3, 4
c. Actuation Relays	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	M(6)	Q(4,5)	1, 2, 3, 4
d. Containment Pressure-High-1	S	R	M	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	1, 2, 3, 4
e. Pressurizer Pressure-Low	S	R	M	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	1, 2, 3
f. Compensated Steam Line Pressure-Low	S	R	M	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	1, 2, 3
g. Compensated T <sub>COLD</sub> <sup>-</sup> Low-Low (interlocked with P-15)	S	R	M	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	1, 2, 3



TABLE 4.3-2 (Continued)

ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURES ACTUATION SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION  
SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

<u>CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL UNIT</u>	<u>CHANNEL CHECK</u>	<u>CHANNEL CALIBRATION</u>	<u>DIGITAL OR ANALOG CHANNEL OPERATIONAL TEST</u>	<u>TRIP ACTUATING DEVICE OPERATIONAL TEST</u>	<u>ACTUATION LOGIC TEST</u>	<u>MASTER RELAY TEST</u>	<u>SLAVE RELAY TEST</u>	<u>MODES FOR WHICH SURVEILLANCE IS REQUIRED</u>
2. Containment Spray								
a. Manual Initiation	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	R	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	1, 2, 3, 4
b. Automatic Actuation Logic	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	M(1)	N.A.	N.A.	1, 2, 3, 4
c. Actuation Relays	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	M(6)	Q	1, 2, 3, 4
d. Containment Pressure-High-3	S	R	M	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	1, 2, 3
3. Containment Isolation								
a. Phase "A" Isolation								
1) Manual Initiation	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	R	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	1, 2, 3, 4
2) Automatic Actuation Logic	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	M(1)	N.A.	N.A.	1, 2, 3, 4
3) Actuation Relays	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	M(6)	Q(4)	1, 2, 3, 4
4) Safety Injection	See Item 1. above for all Safety Injection Surveillance Requirements.							
b. Containment Ventilation Isolation								
1) Automatic Actuation Logic	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	M(1)	N.A.	N.A.	1, 2, 3, 4
2) Actuation Relays	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	M(6)	Q	1, 2, 3, 4

TABLE 4.3-2 (Continued)  
 ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURES ACTUATION SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION  
 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL UNIT	CHANNEL CHECK	CHANNEL CALIBRATION	DIGITAL OR ANALOG CHANNEL OPERATIONAL TEST	TRIP ACTUATING DEVICE OPERATIONAL TEST	ACTUATION LOGIC TEST	MASTER RELAY TEST	SLAVE RELAY TEST	MODES FOR WHICH SURVEILLANCE IS REQUIRED
3. Containment Isolation (Continued)								
3) Safety Injection	See Item 1. above for all Safety Injection Surveillance Requirements.							
4) RCB Purge Radioactivity-High	S	R	M	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	1,2,3,4,5*,6*
5) Containment Spray - Manual Initiation	See Item 2. above for Containment Spray manual initiation Surveillance Requirements.							
6) Phase "A" Isolation- Manual Initiation	See Item 3.a. above for Phase "A" Isolation manual initiation Surveillance Requirements.							
c. Phase "B" Isolation								
1) Automatic Actuation Logic	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	M(1)	N.A.	N.A.	1,2,3,4
2) Actuation Relays	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	M(6)	Q	1,2,3,4
3) Containment Pressure--High-3	S	R	M	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	1,2,3
4) Containment Spray- Manual Initiation	See Item 2. above for Containment Spray manual initiation Surveillance Requirements.							
4. Steam Line Isolation								
a. Manual Initiation	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	R	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	1, 2, 3
b. Automatic Actuation Logic and Actuation Relays	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	M(1)	M(6)	Q	1, 2, 3
c. Steam Line Pressure- Negative Rate-High	S	R	M	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	3
d. Containment Pressure - High-2	S	R	M	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	1, 2, 3

TABLE 4.3-2 (Continued)  
 ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURES ACTUATION SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION  
 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL UNIT	CHANNEL CHECK	CHANNEL CALIBRATION	DIGITAL OR ANALOG CHANNEL OPERATIONAL TEST	TRIP ACTUATING DEVICE OPERATIONAL TEST	ACTUATION LOGIC TEST	MASTER RELAY TEST	SLAVE RELAY TEST	MODES FOR WHICH SURVEILLANCE IS REQUIRED
4. Steam Line Isolation								
e. Compensated Steam Line Pressure-Low	S	R	M	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	1, 2, 3
f. Compensated T <sub>COLD</sub> - Low-Low (interlocked with P-15)	S	R	M	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	1, 2, 3
5. Turbine Trip and Feedwater Isolation								
a. Automatic Actuation Logic and Actuation Relays	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	M(1)	M(6)	Q(4)	1, 2, 3
b. Steam Generator Water Level-High-High (P-14)	S	R	M	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	1, 2, 3
c. Compensated T <sub>COLD</sub> -Low (interlocked with P-15)	S	R	M	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	1, 2, 3
d. Feedwater Flow-High (interlocked with P-15) Coincident with either of the following in 2 of 4 loops: Reactor Coolant Flow-Low or T <sub>avg</sub> -Low	S	R	M	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	1, 2, 3
e. Safety Injection	See Item 1. above for all Safety Injection Surveillance Requirements.							
f. T <sub>avg</sub> -Low Coincident with Reactor Trip (P-4) (Feedwater Isolation Only)	S	R	M	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	1, 2, 3

TABLE 4.3-2 (Continued)

ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURES ACTUATION SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION  
SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

<u>CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL UNIT</u>	<u>CHANNEL CHECK</u>	<u>CHANNEL CALIBRATION</u>	<u>DIGITAL OR ANALOG CHANNEL OPERATIONAL TEST</u>	<u>TRIP ACTUATING DEVICE OPERATIONAL TEST</u>	<u>ACTUATION LOGIC TEST</u>	<u>MASTER RELAY TEST</u>	<u>SLAVE RELAY TEST</u>	<u>MODES FOR WHICH SURVEILLANCE IS REQUIRED</u>
6. Auxiliary Feedwater								
a. Manual Initiation	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	R	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	1, 2, 3
b. Automatic Actuation Logic	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	M(1)	N.A.	N.A.	1, 2, 3
c. Actuation Relays	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	M(6)	Q	1, 2, 3
d. Steam Generator Water Level--Low-Low	S	R	M	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	1, 2, 3
e. Safety Injection	See Item 1. above for all Safety Injection Surveillance Requirements.							
f. Loss of Power	See Item 8. below for all Loss of Power Surveillance Requirements.							
7. Automatic Switchover to Containment Sump								
a. Automatic Actuation Logic and Actuation Relays	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	M(6)	M(6)	Q	1, 2, 3, 4
b. RWST Level--Low-Low	S	R	M	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	1, 2, 3, 4
Coincident With: Safety Injection	See Item 1. above for all Safety Injection Surveillance Requirements.							
8. Loss of Power								
a. 4.16 kV ESF Bus Undervoltage (Loss of Voltage)	N.A.	R	N.A.	M	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	1, 2, 3, 4

TABLE 4.3-2 (Continued)

ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURES ACTUATION SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION  
SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

<u>CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL UNIT</u>	<u>CHANNEL CHECK</u>	<u>CHANNEL CALIBRATION</u>	<u>DIGITAL OR ANALOG CHANNEL OPERATIONAL TEST</u>	<u>TRIP ACTUATING DEVICE OPERATIONAL TEST</u>	<u>ACTUATION LOGIC TEST</u>	<u>MASTER RELAY TEST</u>	<u>SLAVE RELAY TEST</u>	<u>MODES FOR WHICH SURVEILLANCE IS REQUIRED</u>
8. Loss of Power (Continued)								
b. 4.16 kV ESF Bus Undervoltage (Tolerable Degraded Voltage Coincident with SI)	N.A.	R	N.A.	M	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	1, 2, 3, 4
c. 4.16 kV ESF Bus Undervoltage (Sustained Degraded Voltage)	N.A.	R	N.A.	M	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	1, 2, 3, 4
9. Engineered Safety Features Actuation System Interlocks								
a. Pressurizer Pressure, P-11	N.A.	R	M	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	1, 2, 3
b. Low-Low $T_{avg}$ , P-12	N.A.	R	M	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	1, 2, 3
c. Reactor Trip, P-4	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	R	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	1, 2, 3
d. Power Range Neutron Flux Input to Excessive Cooldown Protection, P-15	N.A.	R(2)	M(3)	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	1, 2, 3
10. Control Room Ventilation								
a. Manual Initiation	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	R	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	All

TABLE 4.3-2 (Continued)

ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURES ACTUATION SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION  
SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

<u>CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL UNIT</u>	<u>CHANNEL CHECK</u>	<u>CHANNEL CALIBRATION</u>	<u>DIGITAL ANALOG CHANNEL OPERATIONAL TEST</u>	<u>TRIP ACTUATING DEVICE OPERATIONAL TEST</u>	<u>ACTUATION LOGIC TEST</u>	<u>MASTER RELAY TEST</u>	<u>SLAVE RELAY TEST</u>	<u>MODES FOR WHICH SURVEILLANCE IS REQUIRED</u>
10. Control Room Ventilation (Continued)								
b. Safety Injection	See Item 1. above for all Safety Injection Surveillance Requirements.							
c. Automatic Actuation Logic and Actuation Relays	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	M(6)	N.A.	N.A.	All
d. Control Room Intake Air Radioactivity-High	S	R	M	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	All
e. Loss of Power	See Items 8. above for all Loss of Power Surveillance Requirements.							
11. FHB HVAC								
a. Manual Initiation	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	R	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	1, 2, 3, 4, or with irradiated fuel in the spent fuel pool
b. Automatic Actuation Logic and Actuation Relays	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	M(6)	N.A.	N.A.	1, 2, 3, 4, or with irradiated fuel in the spent fuel pool

TABLE 4.3-2 (Continued)  
ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURES ACTUATION SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION  
SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

<u>CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL UNIT</u>	<u>CHANNEL CHECK</u>	<u>CHANNEL CALIBRATION</u>	<u>DIGITAL OR ANALOG CHANNEL OPERATIONAL TEST</u>	<u>TRIP ACTUATING DEVICE OPERATIONAL TEST</u>	<u>ACTUATION LOGIC TEST</u>	<u>MASTER RELAY TEST</u>	<u>SLAVE RELAY TEST</u>	<u>MODES FOR WHICH SURVEILLANCE IS REQUIRED</u>
11. FHB HVAC (Continued)								
c. Safety Injection	See Item 1. above for all Safety Injection Surveillance Requirements.							
d. Spent Fuel Pool Exhaust Radio-activity-High	S	R	M	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	With irradiated fuel in spent fuel pool.

TABLE NOTATION

- (1) Each train shall be tested at least every 62 days on a STAGGERED TEST BASIS.
- (2) Neutron detectors may be excluded from CHANNEL CALIBRATION.
- (3) With Rated Thermal Power greater than or equal to the P-15 interlock setpoint, the ANALOG CHANNEL OPERATIONAL TEST shall consist of verifying that the P-15 interlock is in the required state by observing the permissive annunciator window.
- (4) Except relays K807, K814, K829 (Train B only), K831, K845, K852 and K854 (Trains B and C only) which shall be tested at least once per 18 months during refueling and during each COLD SHUTDOWN exceeding 24 hours unless they have been tested within the previous 92 days.
- (5) Except relay K815 which shall be tested at indicated interval only when reactor coolant pressure is above 700 psig.
- (6) Each actuation train shall be tested at least every 92 days on a STAGGERED TEST BASIS. Testing of each actuation train shall include master relay testing of both logic trains. If an ESFAS instrumentation channel is inoperable due to failure of the Actuation Logic Test and/or Master Relay Test, increase the surveillance frequency such that each train is tested at least every 62 days on a STAGGERED TEST BASIS unless the failure can be determined by performance of an engineering evaluation to be a single random failure.

\*During CORE ALTERATIONS or movement of irradiated fuel within containment.

## INSTRUMENTATION

### 3/4.3.3 MONITORING INSTRUMENTATION

#### RADIATION MONITORING FOR PLANT OPERATIONS

##### LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

---

3.3.3.1 The radiation monitoring instrumentation channels for plant operations shown in Table 3.3-6 shall be OPERABLE with their Alarm/Trip Setpoints within the specified limits.

APPLICABILITY: As shown in Table 3.3-6.

ACTION:

- a. With a radiation monitoring channel Alarm/Trip Setpoint for plant operations exceeding the value shown in Table 3.3-6, adjust the Setpoint to within the limit within 4 hours or declare the channel inoperable.
- b. With one or more radiation monitoring channels for plant operations inoperable, take the ACTION shown in Table 3.3-6.
- c. The provisions of Specification 3.0.3 are not applicable.

##### SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

---

4.3.3.1 Each radiation monitoring instrumentation channel for plant operations shall be demonstrated OPERABLE by the performance of the CHANNEL CHECK, CHANNEL CALIBRATION and DIGITAL CHANNEL OPERATIONAL TEST for the MODES and at the frequencies shown in Table 4.3-3.



TABLE 3.3-6

RADIATION MONITORING INSTRUMENTATION FOR PLANT OPERATIONS

<u>FUNCTIONAL UNIT</u>	<u>CHANNELS TO TRIP/ALARM</u>	<u>MINIMUM CHANNELS OPERABLE</u>	<u>APPLICABLE MODES</u>	<u>ALARM/TRIP SETPOINT</u>	<u>ACTION</u>
1. Containment					
a. Containment Atmosphere Radioactivity-High	N.A.	3	All	N.A.	31
b. RCS Leakage Detection					
1) Particulate Radioactivity	N.A.	1	1, 2, 3, 4	N.A.	34
2) Gaseous Radioactivity	N.A.	1	1, 2, 3, 4	N.A.	34

TABLE 3.3-6 (Continued)

ACTION STATEMENTS

- ACTION 31 - With less than the Minimum Channels OPERABLE requirement, operation may continue for up to 30 days provided grab samples of the containment atmosphere are obtained and analyzed at least once per 24 hours.
- ACTION 32 - (Not Used)
- ACTION 33 - (Not Used)
- ACTION 34 - Must satisfy the ACTION requirement for Specification 3.4.6.1.

TABLE 4.3-3

RADIATION MONITORING INSTRUMENTATION FOR PLANT  
OPERATIONS SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

<u>FUNCTIONAL UNIT</u>	<u>CHANNEL CHECK</u>	<u>CHANNEL CALIBRATION</u>	<u>DIGITAL CHANNEL OPERATIONAL TEST</u>	<u>MODES FOR WHICH SURVEILLANCE IS REQUIRED</u>
1. Containment				
a. Containment Atmosphere Radioactivity-High	S	R	M	All
b. RCS Leakage Detection				
1) Particulate Radio- activity	S	R	M	1, 2, 3, 4
2) Gaseous Radioactivity	S	R	M	1, 2, 3, 4

## INSTRUMENTATION

### MOVABLE INCORE DETECTORS

#### LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

---

3.3.3.2 The Movable Incore Detection System shall be OPERABLE with:

- a. At least 75% of the detector thimbles,
- b. A minimum of two detector thimbles per core quadrant, and
- c. Sufficient movable detectors, drive, and readout equipment to map these thimbles.

APPLICABILITY: When the Movable Incore Detection System is used for:

- a. Recalibration of the Excore Neutron Flux Detection System, or
- b. Monitoring the QUADRANT POWER TILT RATIO, or
- c. Measurement of  $F_{\Delta H}^N$ ,  $F_Q(Z)$  and  $F_{xy}$ .

#### ACTION:

With the Movable Incore Detection System inoperable, do not use the system for the above applicable monitoring or calibration functions. The provisions of Specification 3.0.3 are not applicable.

#### SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

---

4.3.3.2 The Movable Incore Detection System shall be demonstrated OPERABLE at least once per 24 hours by normalizing each detector output when required for:

- a. Recalibration of the Excore Neutron Flux Detection System, or
- b. Monitoring the QUADRANT POWER TILT RATIO, or
- c. Measurement of  $F_{\Delta H}^N$ ,  $F_Q(Z)$  and  $F_{xy}$ .

## INSTRUMENTATION

### SEISMIC INSTRUMENTATION

#### LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

---

3.3.3.3 The seismic monitoring instrumentation shown in Table 3.3-7\* shall be OPERABLE.

APPLICABILITY: At all times.

ACTION:

- a. With one or more of the above required seismic monitoring instruments inoperable for more than 30 days, prepare and submit a Special Report to the Commission pursuant to Specification 6.9.2 within the next 10 days outlining the cause of the malfunction and the plans for restoring the instrument(s) to OPERABLE status.
- b. The provisions of Specification 3.0.3 are not applicable.

#### SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

---

4.3.3.3.1 Each of the above required seismic monitoring instruments shall be demonstrated OPERABLE by the performance of the CHANNEL CHECK, CHANNEL CALIBRATION, and ANALOG CHANNEL OPERATIONAL TEST at the frequencies shown in Table 4.3-4.

4.3.3.3.2 Each of the above required seismic monitoring instruments actuated during a seismic event shall be restored to OPERABLE status within 24 hours and a CHANNEL CALIBRATION performed within 10 days following the seismic event. Data shall be retrieved from actuated instruments and analyzed to determine the magnitude of the vibratory ground motion. A Special Report shall be prepared and submitted to the Commission pursuant to Specification 6.9.2 within 14 days describing the magnitude, frequency spectrum, and resultant effect upon facility features important to safety.

\*The instrumentation may be shared with additional units at a common site provided seismic instrumentation and corresponding Technical Specifications meet the recommendations of Regulatory Guide 1.12, Revision 1, April 1974.

TABLE 3.3-7

SEISMIC MONITORING INSTRUMENTATION

<u>INSTRUMENTS AND SENSOR LOCATIONS</u>	<u>MEASUREMENT RANGE</u>	<u>MINIMUM INSTRUMENTS OPERABLE</u>
1. Triaxial Time-History Accelerometers***		
a. Free Field	±3g	1
b. Containment Bldg. Foundation (Tendon Gallery El. -36'9")	±3g	1
c. Outside Face Containment Shell (Reactor Containment Building El. 68'0")	±3g	1
d. Steam Generator Upper Lateral Support (Reactor Containment Building El. 66'7½")	±3g	1
e. Fuel Handling Building Foundation (Fuel Handling Building El. -29'0")	±3g	1
f. Mechanical Electrical Auxiliary Building (Mechanical Electrical Auxiliary Building El. 35'0")	±3g	1
2. Triaxial Peak Accelerographs		
a. Spent Fuel Pool Heat Exchanger (Inlet Line Fuel Handling Building El. 64'5¼")	±3g	1
b. Reactor Vessel (Reactor Containment Building El. 68'0")	±3g	1
c. Cold Leg of RC Piping (Reactor Containment Building El. 34'3")	±3g	1
3. Self-Contained Triaxial Accelerograph (At Reactor Containment Building Foundation Tendon Gallery El. -36'9")	±3g	1
4. Triaxial Seismic Switch** #	0.03 to 3g	1*
5. Triaxial Seismic Trigger** ##	0.003 to 0.3g	1*
6. Response Spectrum Analyzer**	1 to 32 Hz	1*
7. Magnetic Tape Recorders**	0.1 to 33 Hz	6
8. Playback System**	N.A.	1

\*With reactor control room indication and alarm

\*\*At seismic monitoring panel in Control Room, Unit 1

\*\*\*Accelerometer data is gathered and analyzed by the Response Spectrum Analyzer (Item 6).

#Triaxial seismic switch is set at the OBE acceleration level of 0.05g horizontal and 0.033g vertical.

##Triaxial seismic trigger is set at 0.02g all axes.

TABLE 4.3-4

SEISMIC MONITORING INSTRUMENTATION SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

<u>INSTRUMENTS AND SENSOR LOCATIONS</u>	<u>CHANNEL CHECK</u>	<u>CHANNEL CALIBRATION</u>	<u>ANALOG CHANNEL OPERATIONAL TEST</u>
1. Triaxial Time-History Accelerometers***			
a. Free Field	M	R	SA
b. Containment Bldg. Foundation (Tendon Gallery El. -36'9")	M	R	SA
c. Outside Face Containment Shell (Reactor Containment Building El. 68'0")	M	R	SA
d. Steam Generator Upper Lateral Support (Reactor Containment Building El. 66'7½")	M	R	SA
e. Fuel Handling Building Foundation (Fuel Handling Building El. -29'0")	M	R	SA
f. Mechanical Electrical Auxiliary Building (Mechanical Electrical Auxiliary Building El. 35'0")	M	R	SA
2. Triaxial Peak Accelerographs			
a. Spent Fuel Pool Heat Exchanger (Inlet Line Fuel Handling Building El. 64'5½")	N.A.	R	N.A.
b. Reactor Vessel (Reactor Containment Building El. 68'0")	N.A.	R	N.A.
c. Cold Leg of RC Piping (Reactor Containment Building El. 34'3")	N.A.	R	N.A.
3. Self-Contained Triaxial Accelerograph (At Reactor Containment Building Foundation Tendon Gallery El. -36'9")	M	R	SA
4. Triaxial Seismic Switch* **	M	R	SA
5. Triaxial Seismic Trigger* **	M	R	SA
6. Response Spectrum Analyzer* **	M	R	SA
7. Magnetic Tape Recorders**	M	R	SA
8. Playback System**	M	R	N.A.

\*With reactor control room indication and alarm

\*\*At seismic monitoring panel in Control Room, Unit 1

\*\*\*Accelerometer data is gathered and analyzed by the Response Spectrum Analyzer (Item 6).

## INSTRUMENTATION

### METEOROLOGICAL INSTRUMENTATION

#### LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

---

3.3.3.4 The meteorological monitoring instrumentation channels shown in Table 3.3-8 shall be OPERABLE.

APPLICABILITY: At all times.

ACTION:

- a. With one or more required meteorological monitoring channels inoperable for more than 7 days, prepare and submit a Special Report to the Commission pursuant to Specification 6.9.2 within the next 10 days outlining the cause of the malfunction and the plans for restoring the channel(s) to OPERABLE status.
- b. The provisions of Specification 3.0.3 are not applicable.

#### SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

---

4.3.3.4 Each of the above meteorological monitoring instrumentation channels shall be demonstrated OPERABLE by the performance of the CHANNEL CHECK and CHANNEL CALIBRATION at the frequencies shown in Table 4.3-5.



TABLE 3.3-8

METEOROLOGICAL MONITORING INSTRUMENTATION

<u>INSTRUMENT</u>	<u>LOCATION</u>	<u>MINIMUM OPERABLE</u>
1. Wind Speed		
a. Primary meteorological tower and backup meteorological tower	Nominal Elev. 10m	1
b. Primary meteorological tower	Nominal Elev. 60m	1
2. Wind Direction		
a. Primary meteorological tower and backup meteorological tower	Nominal Elev. 10m	1
b. Primary meteorological tower	Nominal Elev. 60m	1
3. Air Temperature - $\Delta T$		
a. Primary meteorological tower	Nominal Elev. 10m	1
b. Primary meteorological tower	Nominal Elev. 60m	1

TABLE 4.3-5  
METEOROLOGICAL MONITORING INSTRUMENTATION  
SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

<u>INSTRUMENT</u>	<u>CHANNEL CHECK</u>	<u>CHANNEL CALIBRATION</u>
1. Wind Speed		
a. Nominal Elev. 10m	D	SA
b. Nominal Elev. 60m	D	SA
2. Wind Direction		
a. Nominal Elev. 10m	D	SA
b. Nominal Elev. 60m	D	SA
3. Air Temperature - $\Delta T$		
a. Nominal Elev. 10m	D	SA
b. Nominal Elev. 60m	D	SA

## INSTRUMENTATION

### REMOTE SHUTDOWN SYSTEM

#### LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

---

3.3.3.5 The Remote Shutdown System transfer switches, power, controls and monitoring instrumentation channels shown in Table 3.3-9 shall be OPERABLE.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, and 3.

#### ACTION:

- a. With the number of OPERABLE remote shutdown monitoring channels, transfer switches, power or control circuits less than the Minimum Channels OPERABLE as required by Table 3.3-9, restore the inoperable channel(s) to OPERABLE status within 7 days, or be in HOT SHUTDOWN within the next 12 hours.
- b. With the number of OPERABLE remote shutdown monitoring channels, transfer switches, power or control circuits less than the Total Number of Channels as required by Table 3.3-9, within 60 days restore the inoperable channel(s) to OPERABLE status or, pursuant to Specification 6.9.2, submit a Special Report that defines the corrective action to be taken.
- c. The provisions of Specification 3.0.4 are not applicable.

#### SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

---

4.3.3.5.1 Each remote shutdown monitoring instrumentation channel shall be demonstrated OPERABLE by performance of the CHANNEL CHECK and CHANNEL CALIBRATION operations at the frequencies shown in Table 4.3-6.

4.3.3.5.2 Each Remote Shutdown System transfer switch, power and control circuit including the actuated components, shall be demonstrated OPERABLE at least once per 18 months.

TABLE 3.3-9

REMOTE SHUTDOWN SYSTEM

<u>INSTRUMENT</u>	<u>READOUT LOCATION</u>	<u>TOTAL NO. OF CHANNELS</u>	<u>MINIMUM CHANNELS OPERABLE</u>
1. Neutron Flux - Extended Range			
a. Startup Rate	ASP*-QDPS**	2	2
b. Flux Level	ASP-QDPS	2	2
2. Reactor Trip Breaker Indication	ASP-QDPS Reactor Trip Switchgear	1/trip breaker	1/trip breaker
3. Reactor Coolant Temperature-Wide Range			
a. Hot Leg	ASP-QDPS	4-1/loop	1/loop - 3 loops#
b. Cold Leg	ASP-QDPS	4-1/loop	1/loop - 3 loops#
4. Reactor Coolant Pressure-Wide Range/Extended Range	ASP-QDPS	3	2
5. Pressurizer Water Level	ASP-QDPS	4	2
6. Steam Line Pressure	ASP-QDPS	4-1/steam line	1/steam line - 3 steam lines#
7. Steam Generator Water Level-Wide Range	ASP-QDPS	4-1/steam generator	1/steam generator - 3 steam generators#

TABLE 3.3-9 (Continued)

REMOTE SHUTDOWN SYSTEM

<u>INSTRUMENT</u>	<u>READOUT LOCATION</u>	<u>TOTAL NO. OF CHANNELS</u>	<u>MINIMUM CHANNELS OPERABLE</u>
8. Auxiliary Feedwater Flow Rate	ASP-QDPS	4-1/steam generator	1/steam generator - 3 steam generators#
9. Auxiliary Feedwater Storage Tank Water Level	ASP-QDPS	3	2
10. Core Exit Thermocouples	ASP-QDPS	##	4 thermocouples/ core quadrant

TRANSFER SWITCHES AND ASSOCIATED CONTROLSTRANSFER SWITCH LOCATIONSCONTROLS LOCATIONTOTAL NO. OF CHANNELSMINIMUM CHANNELS OPERABLE

1. Steam Generator PORVs	ZLP-653 (Train A) ZLP-654 (Train B) ZLP-655 (Train C) ASP (Train D)	ASP	4	2#
2. Reactor Head Vent Throttle Valves	ZLP-700 (Train A) ZLP-701 (Train B)	ASP	2	1
3. Reactor Head Vent Isolation Valves	ZLP-700 (Train A) ZLP-701 (Train B)	ASP	2 pair	1 pair
4. AFW Pumps and Valves	ZLP-653 (Train A-AFW Pump) ZLP-700 (Train A-AFW Valves) ZLP-654 (Train B-AFW Pump) ZLP-701 (Train B-AFW Valves) ZLP-655 (Train C-AFW Pump) ZLP-709 (Train C-AFW Valves) ASP (Train D)	ASP	4	2#

TABLE 3.3-9 (Continued)

REMOTE SHUTDOWN SYSTEM

<u>TRANSFER SWITCHES AND ASSOCIATED CONTROLS</u>	<u>TRANSFER SWITCH LOCATIONS</u>	<u>CONTROLS LOCATION</u>	<u>TOTAL NO OF CHANNELS</u>	<u>MINIMUM CHANNELS OPERABLE</u>
5. Centrifugal Charging Pumps	ZLP-653 (Train A) ZLP-655 (Train C)	ASP	2	1
6. Boric Acid Transfer Pumps	ZLP-653 (Train A) ZLP-655 (Train C)	ASP	2	1
7. Pressurizer PORVs and Block Valves	ZLP-700 (Train A) ZLP-701 (Train B)	ASP	2	1
8. Accumulator Discharge Isolation Valves and Power Lockouts	ZLP-653 (Train A) ZLP-654 (Train B) ZLP-655 (Train C)	ASP	3	3
9. Letdown Stop Valves	ZLP-700 (Train A) ZLP-709 (Train C)	ASP	2	1
10. CCW Pumps and Heat Exchanger Outlet Valves	ZLP-653 (Train A) ZLP-654 (Train B) ZLP-655 (Train C)	ZLP-653 (Train A) ZLP-654 (Train B) ZLP-655 (Train C)	3	2
11. ECW Pumps	ZLP-653 (Train A) ZLP-654 (Train B) ZLP-655 (Train C)	ZLP-653 (Train A) ZLP-654 (Train B) ZLP-655 (Train C)	3	2
12. EAB HVAC Fans	ZLP-700 (Train A) ZLP-653 (Train A- Battery Room and Electrical Penetration Space Fans)  ZLP-701 (Train B) ZLP-654 (Train B- Battery Room and Electrical Penetration Space Fans)	ZLP-700 (Train A) ZLP-653 (Train A- Battery Room and Electrical Penetration Space Fans)  ZLP-701 (Train B) ZLP-654 (Train B- Battery Room and Electrical Penetration Space Fans)	3	2

TABLE 3.3-9 (Continued)

REMOTE SHUTDOWN SYSTEM

<u>TRANSFER SWITCHES AND ASSOCIATED CONTROLS</u>	<u>TRANSFER SWITCH LOCATIONS</u>	<u>CONTROLS LOCATION</u>	<u>TOTAL NO. OF CHANNELS</u>	<u>MINIMUM CHANNELS OPERABLE</u>
12. EAB HVAC Fans (Continued)	ZLP-709 (Train C) ZLP-655 (Train C- Battery Room and Electrical Penetration Space Fans)	ZLP-709 (Train C) ZLP-655 (Train C- Battery Room and Electrical Penetration Space Fans)		
13. Reactor Containment Fan Coolers	ZLP-700 (Train A) ZLP-701 (Train B) ZLP-709 (Train C)	ZLP-700 (Train A) ZLP-701 (Train B) ZLP-709 (Train C)	6	3

\*ASP - Auxiliary Shutdown Panel

\*\*QDPS - Qualified Display Processing System

#Must be in the same OPERABLE RCS loop/secondary loop.

##A total of 50 thermocouples are provided with 25 thermocouples on each of two trains. Quadrants B and D have 6 thermocouples per train each. Quadrants A and C each have 6 thermocouples on one train and 7 thermocouples on the other train. The provisions of ACTION b. are not applicable as long as each quadrant has 4 thermocouples per train OPERABLE.

TABLE 4.3-6  
REMOTE SHUTDOWN MONITORING INSTRUMENTATION  
SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

<u>INSTRUMENT</u>	<u>CHANNEL CHECK</u>	<u>CHANNEL CALIBRATION</u>
1. Neutron Flux - Extended Range		
a. Startup Rate	M	R
b. Flux Level	M	R
2. Reactor Trip Breaker Indication	M	N.A.
3. Reactor Coolant Temperature- Wide Range		
a. Hot Leg	M	R
b. Cold Leg	M	R
4. Reactor Coolant Pressure- Wide Range/Extended Range	M	R
5. Pressurizer Water Level	M	R
6. Steam Line Pressure	M	R
7. Steam Generator Water Level-Wide Range	M	R
8. Auxiliary Feedwater Flow Rate	M	R
9. Auxiliary Feedwater Storage Tank Water Level	M	R
10. Core Exit Thermocouples	M	R



INSTRUMENTATION

ACCIDENT MONITORING INSTRUMENTATION

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

---

3.3.3.6 The accident monitoring instrumentation channels shown in Table 3.3-10 shall be OPERABLE.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, and 3.

ACTION:

- a. As shown in Table 3.3-10.
- b. The provisions of Specification 3.0.4 are not applicable.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

---

4.3.3.6 Each accident monitoring instrumentation channel shall be demonstrated OPERABLE by performance of the CHANNEL CHECK and CHANNEL CALIBRATION at the frequencies shown in Table 4.3-7.

TABLE 3.3-10

ACCIDENT MONITORING INSTRUMENTATION

<u>INSTRUMENT</u>	<u>TOTAL NO. OF CHANNELS</u>	<u>MINIMUM CHANNELS OPERABLE</u>	<u>ACTION</u>
1. Containment Pressure	4	1	38
2. Reactor Coolant Outlet Temperature - T <sub>HOT</sub> (Wide Range)	1/loop	1/loop	35
3. Reactor Coolant Inlet Temperature - T <sub>COLD</sub> (Wide Range)	1/loop	1/loop	35
4. Reactor Coolant Pressure - Wide Range and Extended Range	3	1	37
5. Pressurizer Water Level	4	1	38
6. Steam Line Pressure	4/steam generator	1/steam generator	38
7. Steam Generator Water Level - Narrow Range	4/steam generator	1/steam generator	38
8. Steam Generator Water Level - Wide Range	1/steam generator	1/steam generator	35
9. Refueling Water Storage Tank Water Level	3	1	37
10. Auxiliary Feedwater Storage Tank Water Level	3	1	37
11. Auxiliary Feedwater Flow	1/steam generator	1/steam generator	35
12. Reactor Coolant System Subcooling Margin Monitor	2	1	36

TABLE 3.3-10 (Continued)

ACCIDENT MONITORING INSTRUMENTATION

<u>INSTRUMENT</u>	<u>TOTAL NO. OF CHANNELS</u>	<u>MINIMUM CHANNELS OPERABLE</u>	<u>ACTION</u>
13. Containment Water Level (Narrow Range)	2	1	36
14. Containment Water Level (Wide Range)	3	1	37
15. Core Exit Thermocouples	**	4 thermocouples/core quadrant	42
16. Steam Line Radiation Monitor	1/steam line	1/steam line	40
17. Containment - High Range Radiation Monitor	2	1	39
18. Reactor Vessel Water Level (RVWL)	2*	1*	41
19. Neutron Flux (Extended Range)	2	1	36
20. Containment Hydrogen Concentration	2	1	36
21. Containment Pressure (Extended Range)	2	1	36
22. Steam Generator Blowdown Radiation Monitor	1/blowdown line	1/blowdown line	40
23. Neutron Flux - Startup Rate (Extended Range)	2	1	36

\*A channel is eight sensors in a probe. A channel is OPERABLE if four or more sensors, one or more in the upper section and three or more in the lower section, are OPERABLE.

\*\*A total of 50 thermocouples are provided with 25 thermocouples on each of two trains. Quadrants B and D have 6 thermocouples per train each. Quadrants A and C each have 6 thermocouples on one train and 7 thermocouples on the other train. No ACTION is required as long as each quadrant has 4 thermocouples per train OPERABLE.

TABLE 3.3-10 (Continued)

ACTION STATEMENTS

- ACTION 35 - With the number of OPERABLE channels less than the Minimum Channels Operable requirement, restore at least one inoperable channel to OPERABLE status within 48 hours, or be in at least HOT SHUTDOWN within the next 12 hours.
- ACTION 36 - a. With the number of OPERABLE channels one less than the Total Number of Channels requirements, restore one inoperable channel to OPERABLE status within 7 days, or be in at least HOT SHUTDOWN within the next 12 hours.
- b. With the number of OPERABLE channels less than the Minimum Channels Operable requirements, restore at least one inoperable channel to OPERABLE status within 48 hours, or be in at least HOT SHUTDOWN within the next 12 hours.
- ACTION 37 - a. With the number of OPERABLE channels one less than the Total Number of Channels requirements, restore the inoperable channel to OPERABLE status within 31 days, or be in at least HOT SHUTDOWN within the next 12 hours.
- b. With the number of OPERABLE channels two less than the Total Number of Channels requirement, restore at least one inoperable channel to OPERABLE status within 7 days, or be in at least HOT SHUTDOWN within the next 12 hours.
- c. With the number of OPERABLE channels less than the Minimum Channels Operable requirement, restore at least one inoperable channel to OPERABLE status within 48 hours or be in at least HOT SHUTDOWN within the next 12 hours.
- ACTION 38 - a. With the number of OPERABLE channels one less than the Total Number of Channels requirements, restore the inoperable channel to OPERABLE status within 90 days, or be in at least HOT SHUTDOWN within the next 12 hours.
- b. With the number of OPERABLE channels two less than the Total Number of Channels requirements, restore the inoperable channel to OPERABLE status within 31 days, or be in at least HOT SHUTDOWN within the next 12 hours.
- c. With the number of OPERABLE channels three less than the Total Number of Channels requirement, restore at least one inoperable channel to OPERABLE status within 7 days, or be in at least HOT SHUTDOWN within the next 12 hours.
- d. With the number of OPERABLE channels less than the Minimum Channels Operable requirement, restore at least one inoperable channel to OPERABLE status within 48 hours or be in at least HOT SHUTDOWN within the next 12 hours.

TABLE 3.3-10 (Continued)

ACTION STATEMENTS (Continued)

- ACTION 39 - a. With the number of OPERABLE channels one less than the Total Number of Channels requirements, restore one inoperable channel to OPERABLE status within 7 days, or be in at least HOT SHUTDOWN within the next 12 hours.
- b. With the number of OPERABLE channels less than the Minimum Channels Operable requirements, restore at least one inoperable channel to OPERABLE status within 72 hours, or be in at least HOT SHUTDOWN within the next 12 hours.
- ACTION 40 - With the number of OPERABLE channels less than the Minimum Channels Operable requirements, restore at least one inoperable channel to OPERABLE status within 72 hours, or be in at least HOT SHUTDOWN within the next 12 hours.
- ACTION 41 - a. With the number of OPERABLE channels one less than the Required Number of Channels, either restore the system to OPERABLE status within 7 days if repairs are feasible without shutting down or prepare and submit a Special Report to the Commission pursuant to Specification 6.9.2 within 30 days following the event outlining the action taken, the cause of the inoperability and the plans and schedule for restoring the system to OPERABLE status.
- b. With the number of OPERABLE Channels one less than the Minimum Channels OPERABLE in Table 3.3-10, either restore the inoperable channel(s) to OPERABLE status within 48 hours if repairs are feasible without shutting down or:
1. Initiate an alternate method of monitoring the reactor vessel inventory;
  2. Prepare and submit a Special Report to the Commission pursuant to Specification 6.9.2 within 30 days following the event outlining the action taken, the cause of the inoperability and the plans and schedule for restoring the system to OPERABLE status; and
  3. Restore the system to OPERABLE status at the next scheduled refueling.
- ACTION 42 - a. With the number of OPERABLE channels less than 4 thermocouples per quadrant per train, restore these thermocouples to OPERABLE status within 31 days, or be in at least HOT SHUTDOWN within the next 12 hours.
- b. With the number of OPERABLE channels less than 6 thermocouples per quadrant, restore these thermocouples to OPERABLE status within 7 days, or be in at least HOT SHUTDOWN within the next 12 hours.

TABLE 3.3-10 (Continued)

ACTION STATEMENTS (Continued)

- c. With the number of OPERABLE channels less than 4 thermocouples per quadrant, restore these thermocouples to OPERABLE status within 48 hours, or be in at least HOT SHUTDOWN within the next 12 hours.

TABLE 4.3-7

ACCIDENT MONITORING INSTRUMENTATION SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

<u>INSTRUMENT</u>	<u>CHANNEL CHECK</u>	<u>CHANNEL CALIBRATION</u>
1. Containment Pressure	M	R
2. Reactor Coolant Outlet Temperature - $T_{HOT}$ (Wide Range)	M	R
3. Reactor Coolant Inlet Temperature - $T_{COLD}$ (Wide Range)	M	R
4. Reactor Coolant Pressure - Wide Range and Extended Range	M	R
5. Pressurizer Water Level	M	R
6. Steam Line Pressure	M	R
7. Steam Generator Water Level - Narrow Range	M	R
8. Steam Generator Water Level - Wide Range	M	R
9. Refueling Water Storage Tank Water Level	M	R
10. Auxiliary Feedwater Storage Tank Water Level	M	R
11. Auxiliary Feedwater Flow	M	R
12. Reactor Coolant System Subcooling Margin Monitor	M	R
13. Containment Water Level (Narrow Range)	M	R
14. Containment Water Level (Wide Range)	M	R
15. Core Exit Thermocouples	M	R
16. Steam Line Radiation Monitor	M	R
17. Containment - High Range Radiation Monitor	M	R

TABLE 4.3-7 (Continued)

ACCIDENT MONITORING INSTRUMENTATION SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

<u>INSTRUMENT</u>	<u>CHANNEL CHECK</u>	<u>CHANNEL CALIBRATION</u>
18. Reactor Vessel Water Level (RWL)	M	R
19. Neutron Flux (Extended Range)	M	R
20. Containment Hydrogen Concentration	M	R
21. Containment Pressure (Extended Range)	M	R
22. Steam Generator Blowdown Radiation Monitor	M	R
23. Neutron Flux - Startup Rate (Extended Range)	M	R

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## INSTRUMENTATION

### CHEMICAL DETECTION SYSTEMS

#### LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

---

3.3.3.7 Two independent Chemical Detection Systems shall be OPERABLE with their Alarm/Trip Setpoints adjusted to actuate at the following concentrations:

- a. Vinyl Acetate  $\leq$  10 ppm
- b. Anhydrous Ammonia/  
Ammonium Hydroxide/  
Hydrazine  $\leq$  5 ppm

APPLICABILITY: All MODES.

#### ACTION:

- a. With one Chemical Detection System inoperable, restore the inoperable system to OPERABLE status within 7 days or within the next 6 hours initiate and maintain operation of the Control Room Emergency Ventilation System in the recirculation mode of operation.
- b. With both Chemical Detection Systems inoperable, within 1 hour initiate and maintain operation of the Control Room Emergency Ventilation System in the recirculation mode of operation.

#### SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

---

4.3.3.7 Each Chemical Detection System shall be demonstrated OPERABLE by performance of a CHANNEL CHECK at least once per 12 hours, an ANALOG CHANNEL OPERATIONAL TEST at least once per 31 days and a CHANNEL CALIBRATION at least once per 18 months.

INSTRUMENTATION

3.3.3.8 (This specification number is not used.)

TABLE 3.3-11

(This table number is not used.)

INSTRUMENTATION

3.3.3.9 (This specification number is not used.)

## INSTRUMENTATION

### RADIOACTIVE LIQUID EFFLUENT MONITORING INSTRUMENTATION

#### LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.3.3.10 The radioactive liquid effluent monitoring instrumentation channels shown in Table 3.3-12 shall be OPERABLE with their Alarm/Trip Setpoints set to ensure that the limits of Specification 3.11.1.1 are not exceeded. The Alarm/Trip Setpoints of these channels shall be determined and adjusted in accordance with the methodology and parameters in the OFFSITE DOSE CALCULATION MANUAL (ODCM).

APPLICABILITY: At all times.

#### ACTION:

- a. With a radioactive liquid effluent monitoring instrumentation channel Alarm/Trip Setpoint less conservative than required by the above specification, immediately suspend the release of radioactive liquid effluents monitored by the affected channel, or declare the channel inoperable.
- b. With less than the minimum number of radioactive liquid effluent monitoring instrumentation channels OPERABLE, take the ACTION shown in Table 3.3-12. Restore the inoperable instrumentation to OPERABLE status within the time specified in the ACTION, or explain in the next Semiannual Radioactive Effluent Release Report pursuant to Specification 6.9.1.4 why this inoperability was not corrected within the time specified.
- c. The provisions of Specification 3.0.3 are not applicable.

#### SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

4.3.3.10 Each radioactive liquid effluent monitoring instrumentation channel shall be demonstrated OPERABLE by performance of the CHANNEL CHECK, SOURCE CHECK, CHANNEL CALIBRATION, and DIGITAL CHANNEL OPERATIONAL TEST at the frequencies shown in Table 4.3-8.

TABLE 3.3-12

RADIOACTIVE LIQUID EFFLUENT MONITORING INSTRUMENTATION

<u>INSTRUMENT</u>	<u>MINIMUM CHANNELS OPERABLE</u>	<u>ACTION</u>
1. Radioactivity Monitors Providing Alarm and Automatic Termination of Release		
Liquid Waste Processing Discharge Monitor	1	43
2. Flow Rate Measurement Devices		
Liquid Waste Processing Discharge Line	1	46

TABLE 3.3-12 (Continued)

ACTION STATEMENTS

- ACTION 43 - With the number of channels OPERABLE less than required by the Minimum Channels OPERABLE requirement, effluent releases via this pathway may continue for up to 14 days provided that prior to initiating a release:
- a. At least two independent samples are analyzed in accordance with Specification 4.11.1.1.1, and
  - b. At least two technically qualified members of the facility staff independently verify the release rate calculations and discharge line valving.

Otherwise, suspend release of radioactive effluents via this pathway.

ACTION 44 - (Not Used)

ACTION 45 - (Not Used)

ACTION 46 - With the number of channels OPERABLE less than required by the Minimum Channels OPERABLE requirement, effluent releases via this pathway may continue for up to 30 days provided the flow rate is estimated at least once per 4 hours during actual releases. Pump performance curves generated in place may be used to estimate flow.

TABLE 4.3-8

RADIOACTIVE LIQUID EFFLUENT MONITORING INSTRUMENTATION SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

<u>INSTRUMENT</u>	<u>CHANNEL CHECK</u>	<u>SOURCE CHECK</u>	<u>CHANNEL CALIBRATION</u>	<u>DIGITAL CHANNEL OPERATIONAL TEST</u>
1. Radioactivity Monitors Providing Alarm and Automatic Termination of Release				
Liquid Waste Processing Discharge Monitor	D	P	R(3)	Q(1)
2. Flow Rate Measurement Devices				
Liquid Waste Processing Discharge Line	D(4)	N.A.	R	N.A.



TABLE 4.3-8 (Continued)

TABLE NOTATIONS

- (1) The DIGITAL CHANNEL OPERATIONAL TEST shall also demonstrate that automatic isolation of this pathway and control room alarm annunciation occur if any of the following conditions exists:
  - a. Instrument indicates measured levels above the Alarm/Trip Setpoint, or
  - b. Monitor failure.
- (2) (Not Used)
- (3) The initial CHANNEL CALIBRATION shall be performed using one or more of the reference standards certified by the National Bureau of Standards (NBS) or using standards that have been obtained from suppliers that participate in measurement assurance activities with NBS. These standards shall permit calibrating the system over its intended range of energy and measurement range. For subsequent CHANNEL CALIBRATION, sources that have been related to the initial calibration shall be used.
- (4) CHANNEL CHECK shall consist of verifying indication of flow during periods of release. CHANNEL CHECK shall be made at least once per 24 hours on days on which continuous, periodic, or batch releases are made.

## INSTRUMENTATION

### RADIOACTIVE GASEOUS EFFLUENT MONITORING INSTRUMENTATION

#### LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.3.3.11 The radioactive gaseous effluent monitoring instrumentation channels shown in Table 3.3-13 shall be OPERABLE with their Alarm/Trip Setpoints set to ensure that the limits of Specifications 3.11.2.1 and 3.11.2.5 are not exceeded. The Alarm/Trip Setpoints of these channels meeting Specification 3.11.2.1 shall be determined and adjusted in accordance with the methodology and parameters in the ODCM.

APPLICABILITY: As shown in Table 3.3-13

#### ACTION:

- a. With a radioactive gaseous effluent monitoring instrumentation channel Alarm/Trip Setpoint less conservative than required by the above specification, immediately suspend the release of radioactive gaseous effluents monitored by the affected channel, or declare the channel inoperable.
- b. With the number of OPERABLE radioactive gaseous effluent monitoring instrumentation channels less than the Minimum Channels OPERABLE, take the ACTION shown in Table 3.3-13. Restore the inoperable instrumentation to OPERABLE status within the time specified in the ACTION, or explain in the next Semiannual Radioactive Effluent Release Report pursuant to Specification 6.9.1.4 why this inoperability was not corrected within the time specified.
- c. The provisions of Specification 3.0.3 are not applicable.

#### SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

4.3.3.11 Each radioactive gaseous effluent monitoring instrumentation channel shall be demonstrated OPERABLE by performance of the CHANNEL CHECK, SOURCE CHECK, CHANNEL CALIBRATION and ANALOG CHANNEL OPERATIONAL TEST or DIGITAL CHANNEL OPERATIONAL TEST, as applicable, at the frequencies shown in Table 4.3-9.

TABLE 3.3-13

RADIOACTIVE GASEOUS EFFLUENT MONITORING INSTRUMENTATION

	<u>INSTRUMENT</u>	<u>MINIMUM CHANNELS OPERABLE</u>	<u>APPLICABILITY</u>	<u>ACTION</u>
1.	GASEOUS WASTE PROCESSING SYSTEM Explosive Gas Monitoring System			
	Oxygen Monitor (Process)	1	**	51
2.	Condenser Evacuation System			
	a. Condenser Air Removal System Discharge Header Noble Gas Activity Monitor	1	*	49
	b. Flow Rate Monitor	1	*	48
	c. Sampler Flow Rate Monitor	1	*	48
3.	Unit Vent			
	a. Noble Gas Activity Monitor	1	*	49
	b. Iodine Monitor or Iodine Sampler	1	*	53
	c. Particulate Monitor or Particulate Sampler	1	*	53
	d. Flow Rate Monitor	1	*	48
	e. Sampler Flow Rate Monitor	1	*	48

TABLE 3.3-13 (Continued)

TABLE NOTATIONS

\* At all times.

\*\* During GASEOUS WASTE PROCESSING SYSTEM operation.

ACTION STATEMENTS

ACTION 47 - (Not used)

ACTION 48 - With the number of channels OPERABLE less than required by the Minimum Channels OPERABLE requirement, effluent releases via this pathway may continue for up to 30 days provided the flow rate is estimated at least once per 4 hours.

ACTION 49 - With the number of channels OPERABLE less than required by the Minimum Channels OPERABLE requirement, effluent releases via this pathway may continue for up to 30 days provided grab samples are taken at least once per 12 hours and these samples are analyzed for radioactivity within 24 hours.

ACTION 50 - (Not used)

ACTION 51 - With the number of channels OPERABLE less than required by the Minimum Channels OPERABLE requirement, operation of this GASEOUS WASTE PROCESSING SYSTEM may continue provided grab samples are collected at least once per 4 hours and analyzed within the following 4 hours.

ACTION 52 - (Not used)

ACTION 53 - With the number of channels OPERABLE less than required by the Minimum Channels OPERABLE requirement, effluent releases via the affected pathway may continue for up to 30 days provided samples are continuously collected with auxiliary sampling equipment as required in Part A of the ODCM.

TABLE 4.3-9

RADIOACTIVE GASEOUS EFFLUENT MONITORING INSTRUMENTATION SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

<u>INSTRUMENT</u>	<u>CHANNEL CHECK</u>	<u>SOURCE CHECK</u>	<u>CHANNEL CALIBRATION</u>	<u>ANALOG OR DIGITAL CHANNEL OPERATIONAL TEST</u>	<u>MODES FOR WHICH SURVEILLANCE IS REQUIRED</u>
1. GASEOUS WASTE PROCESSING SYSTEM Explosive Gas Monitoring System					
Oxygen Monitor (Process)	D	N.A.	Q(5)	M	**
2. Condenser Evacuation System					
a. Condenser Air Removal System Discharge Header Noble Gas Activity Monitor	D	M	R(3)	Q(2)	*
b. Flow Rate Monitor	D	N.A.	R	N.A.	*
c. Sampler Flow Rate Monitor	D	N.A.	R	Q	*
3. Unit Vent					
a. Noble Gas Activity Monitor	D	M	R(3)	Q(2)	*
b. Iodine Monitor or Iodine Sampler	D W	M N.A.	R(3) N.A.	Q(2) N.A.	*
c. Particulate Monitor or Particulate Sampler	D W	M N.A.	R(3) N.A.	Q(2), N.A.	*
d. Flow Rate Monitor	D	N.A.	R	N.A.	*
e. Sampler Flow Rate Monitor	D	N.A.	R	Q	*

TABLE 4.3-9 (Continued)

TABLE NOTATIONS

- \* At all times.
- \*\* During GASEOUS WASTE PROCESSING SYSTEM operation.
- (1) (Not Used)
- (2) The DIGITAL CHANNEL OPERATIONAL TEST shall also demonstrate that control room alarm annunciation occurs if any of the following conditions exists:
  - a. Instrument indicates measured levels above the Alarm Setpoint, or
  - b. Monitor failure.
- (3) The initial CHANNEL CALIBRATION shall be performed using one or more of the reference standards certified by the National Bureau of Standards (NBS) or using standards that have been obtained from suppliers that participate in measurement assurance activities with NBS. These standards shall permit calibrating the system over its intended range of energy and measurement range. For subsequent CHANNEL CALIBRATION, sources that have been related to the initial calibration shall be used.
- (4) (Not Used)
- (5) The CHANNEL CALIBRATION shall include the use of a standard gas sample containing a nominal two volume percent oxygen, balance nitrogen.

## INSTRUMENTATION

### 3/4.3.4 TURBINE OVERSPEED PROTECTION

#### LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.3.4 At least one Turbine Overspeed Protection System shall be OPERABLE.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, and 3.

#### ACTION:

- a. With one stop valve or one governor valve per high pressure turbine steam line inoperable and/or with one reheat stop valve or one reheat intercept valve per low pressure turbine steam line inoperable, restore the inoperable valve(s) to OPERABLE status within 72 hours, or close at least one valve in the affected steam line(s) or isolate the turbine from the steam supply within the next 6 hours.
- b. With the above required Turbine Overspeed Protection System otherwise inoperable, within 6 hours isolate the turbine from the steam supply.

#### SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

4.3.4.1 The provisions of Specification 4.0.4 are not applicable.

4.3.4.2 The above required Turbine Overspeed Protection System shall be demonstrated OPERABLE:

- a. At least once per 31 days in MODES 1 and 2 when the main turbine is operating by cycling each of the following valves through at least one complete cycle from the running position:
  - 1) Four high pressure turbine stop valves,
  - 2) Four high pressure turbine governor valves,
  - 3) Six low pressure turbine reheat stop valves, and
  - 4) Six low pressure turbine reheat intercept valves.
- b. At least once per 31 days in MODES 1 and 2 when the main turbine is operating by direct observation of the movement of each of the above valves through one complete cycle from the running position,
- c. At least once per 18 months by performance of a CHANNEL CALIBRATION on the Turbine Overspeed Protection Systems, and
- d. At least once per 40 months by disassembling at least one of each of the above valves and performing a visual and surface inspection of valve seats, disks, and stems and verifying no unacceptable flaws or excessive corrosion. If unacceptable flaws or excessive corrosion are found, all other valves of that type shall be inspected.\*

\*Disassembly and inspection of the low pressure turbine reheat intercept valves are not required prior to the end of the first 40 month interval.

3/4.4 REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM

3/4.4.1 REACTOR COOLANT LOOPS AND COOLANT CIRCULATION

STARTUP AND POWER OPERATION

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

---

3.4.1.1 All reactor coolant loops shall be in operation.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1 and 2.\*

ACTION:

With less than the above required reactor coolant loops in operation, be in at least HOT STANDBY within 6 hours.

VERIFICATION REQUIREMENTS

---

1.1 The above required reactor coolant loops shall be verified in operation and circulating reactor coolant at least once per 12 hours.

---

\*See Special Test Exceptions Specification 3.10.4.



## REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM

### HOT STANDBY

#### LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.4.1.2 At least two of the reactor coolant loops listed below shall be OPERABLE and with two reactor coolant loops in operation when the Reactor Trip System breakers are closed and one reactor coolant loop in operation when the Reactor Trip System breakers are open:\*

- a. Reactor Coolant Loop A and its associated steam generator and reactor coolant pump,
- b. Reactor Coolant Loop B and its associated steam generator and reactor coolant pump,
- c. Reactor Coolant Loop C and its associated steam generator and reactor coolant pump, and
- d. Reactor Coolant Loop D and its associated steam generator and reactor coolant pump.

APPLICABILITY: MODE 3.

#### ACTION:

- a. With less than the above required reactor coolant loops OPERABLE, restore the required loops to OPERABLE status within 72 hours or be in HOT SHUTDOWN within the next 12 hours.
- b. With only one reactor coolant loop in operation and the Reactor Trip System breakers in the closed position, within 1 hour open the Reactor Trip System breakers.
- c. With no reactor coolant loop in operation, suspend all operations involving a reduction in boron concentration of the Reactor Coolant System and immediately initiate corrective action to return the required reactor coolant loop to operation.

#### SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

4.4.1.2.1 At least the above required reactor coolant pumps, if not in operation, shall be determined OPERABLE once per 7 days by verifying correct breaker alignments and indicated power availability.

4.4.1.2.2 The required steam generators shall be determined OPERABLE by verifying secondary side water level to be greater than or equal to 10% narrow range at least once per 12 hours.

4.4.1.2.3 The required reactor coolant loops shall be verified in operation and circulating reactor coolant at least once per 12 hours.

\*All reactor coolant pumps may be deenergized for up to 1 hour provided: (1) no operations are permitted that would cause dilution of the Reactor Coolant System boron concentration, and (2) core outlet temperature is maintained at least 10°F below saturation temperature.

## REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM

### HOT SHUTDOWN

#### LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

---

3.4.1.3 At least two of the loops listed below shall be OPERABLE and at least one of these loops shall be in operation:\*

- a. Reactor Coolant Loop A and its associated steam generator and reactor coolant pump,\*\*
- b. Reactor Coolant Loop B and its associated steam generator and reactor coolant pump,\*\*
- c. Reactor Coolant Loop C and its associated steam generator and reactor coolant pump,\*\*
- d. Reactor Coolant Loop D and its associated steam generator and reactor coolant pump,\*\*
- e. RHR Loop A with valve CV0198 locked or pinned in position to limit flow to 125 gpm,
- f. RHR Loop B with valve CV0198 locked or pinned in position to limit flow to 125 gpm, and
- g. RHR Loop C with valve CV0198 locked or pinned in position to limit flow to 125 gpm.

APPLICABILITY: MODE 4.

#### ACTION:

- a. With less than the above required loops OPERABLE, immediately initiate corrective action to return the required loops to OPERABLE status as soon as possible; if the remaining OPERABLE loop is an RHR loop, be in COLD SHUTDOWN within 24 hours.
- b. With no loop in operation, suspend all operations involving a reduction in boron concentration of the Reactor Coolant System and immediately initiate corrective action to return the required loop to operation.

---

\*All reactor coolant pumps and RHR pumps may be deenergized for up to 1 hour provided: (1) no operations are permitted that would cause dilution of the Reactor Coolant System boron concentration, and (2) core outlet temperature is maintained at least 10°F below saturation temperature.

\*\*A reactor coolant pump shall not be started with one or more of the Reactor Coolant System cold leg temperatures less than or equal to 350°F unless the secondary water temperature of each steam generator is less than 50°F above each of the Reactor Coolant System cold leg temperatures.

REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM

HOT SHUTDOWN

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

---

4.4.1.3.1 The required reactor coolant pump(s) and/or RHR pump(s), if not in operation, shall be determined OPERABLE once per 7 days by verifying correct breaker alignments and indicated power availability.

4.4.1.3.2 The required steam generator(s) shall be determined OPERABLE by verifying secondary side water level to be greater than or equal to 10% narrow range at least once per 12 hours.

4.4.1.3.3 At least one reactor coolant loop, or one RHR loop with valve CV0198 locked or pinned in position to limit flow to 125 gpm shall be verified in operation and circulating reactor coolant at least once per 12 hours.

## REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM

### COLD SHUTDOWN - LOOPS FILLED

#### LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.4.1.4.1 At least one residual heat removal (RHR) loop with valve CV0198 locked or pinned in position to limit flow to 125 gpm shall be OPERABLE and in operation\*, and either:

- a. One additional RHR loop shall be OPERABLE\*\*, or
- b. The secondary side water level of at least two steam generators shall be greater than 10% narrow range.

APPLICABILITY: MODE 5 with reactor coolant loops filled\*\*\*.

#### ACTION:

- a. With two of the RHR loops inoperable and with less than the required steam generator water level, immediately initiate corrective action to return one of the inoperable RHR loops to OPERABLE status or restore the required steam generator water level as soon as possible.
- b. With no RHR loop in operation, suspend all operations involving a reduction in boron concentration of the Reactor Coolant System and immediately initiate corrective action to return the required RHR loop to operation.

#### SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

4.4.1.4.1.1 The secondary side water level of at least two steam generators when required shall be determined to be within limits at least once per 12 hours.

4.4.1.4.1.2 At least one RHR loop with valve CV0198 locked or pinned in position to limit flow to 125 gpm shall be determined to be in operation and circulating reactor coolant at least once per 12 hours.

---

\*The RHR pump may be deenergized for up to 1 hour provided: (1) no operations are permitted that would cause dilution of the Reactor Coolant System boron concentration, and (2) core outlet temperature is maintained at least 10°F below saturation temperature.

\*\*Two RHR loops may be inoperable for up to 2 hours for surveillance testing provided the other RHR loop is OPERABLE and in operation.

\*\*\*A reactor coolant pump shall not be started with one or more of the Reactor Coolant System cold leg temperatures less than or equal to 350°F unless the secondary water temperature of each steam generator is less than 50°F above each of the Reactor Coolant System cold leg temperatures.

## REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM

### COLD SHUTDOWN - LOOPS NOT FILLED

#### LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

---

3.4.1.4.2 At least two residual heat removal (RHR) loops shall be OPERABLE\* and at least one RHR loop shall be in operation.\*\*

APPLICABILITY: MODE 5 with reactor coolant loops not filled.

#### ACTION:

- a. With less than the above required RHR loops OPERABLE, immediately initiate corrective action to return the required RHR loops to OPERABLE status as soon as possible.
- b. With no RHR loop in operation, suspend all operations involving a reduction in boron concentration of the Reactor Coolant System and immediately initiate corrective action to return the required RHR loop to operation.

#### SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

---

4.4.1.4.2.1 At least one RHR loop shall be determined to be in operation and circulating reactor coolant at least once per 12 hours.

4.4.1.4.2.2 Valves FCV-110B, FCV-111B, CV0201A, and CV0221 shall be verified closed and secured in position by mechanical stops or removal of air or electrical power at least once per 31 days.

---

\*Two RHR loops may be inoperable for up to 2 hours for surveillance testing provided the other RHR loop is OPERABLE and in operation.

\*\*The RHR pump may be deenergized for up to 1 hour provided: (1) no operations are permitted that would cause dilution of the Reactor Coolant System boron concentration, and (2) core outlet temperature is maintained at least 10°F below saturation temperature.

REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM

3/4.4.2 SAFETY VALVES

SHUTDOWN

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

---

3.4.2.1 A minimum of one pressurizer Code safety valve shall be OPERABLE with a lift setting of 2485 psig  $\pm$  1%.\*

APPLICABILITY: MODES 4 and 5.

ACTION:

With no pressurizer Code safety valve OPERABLE, immediately suspend all operations involving positive reactivity changes and place an OPERABLE RHR loop into operation in the shutdown cooling mode.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

---

4.4.2.1 No additional requirements other than those required by Specification 4.0.5.

---

\*The lift setting pressure shall correspond to ambient conditions of the valve at nominal operating temperature and pressure.

REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM

OPERATING

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

---

3.4.2.2 All pressurizer Code safety valves shall be OPERABLE with a lift setting of 2485 psig  $\pm$  1%.\*

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, and 3.

ACTION:

With one pressurizer Code safety valve inoperable, either restore the inoperable valve to OPERABLE status within 15 minutes or be in at least HOT STANDBY within 6 hours and in at least HOT SHUTDOWN within the following 6 hours.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

---

4.4.2.2 No additional requirements other than those required by Specification 4.0.5.

---

\*The lift setting pressure shall correspond to ambient conditions of the valve at nominal operating temperature and pressure.

## REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM

### 3/4.4.3 PRESSURIZER

#### LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

---

3.4.3 The pressurizer shall be OPERABLE with a water volume of less than or equal to 1816 cubic feet, and at least two groups of pressurizer heaters supplied by ESF power each having a capacity of at least 175 kW.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, and 3.

#### ACTION:

- a. With only one group of pressurizer heaters supplied by ESF power OPERABLE, restore at least two groups to OPERABLE status within 72 hours or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours and in HOT SHUTDOWN within the following 6 hours.
- b. With the pressurizer otherwise inoperable, be in at least HOT STANDBY with the Reactor Trip System breakers open within 6 hours and in HOT SHUTDOWN within the following 6 hours.

#### SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

---

4.4.3.1 The pressurizer water volume shall be determined to be within its limit at least once per 12 hours.

4.4.3.2 The capacity of each of the above required groups of pressurizer heaters supplied by ESF power shall be verified by energizing the heaters and measuring circuit current at least once per 92 days.



## REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM

### 3/4.4.4 RELIEF VALVES

#### LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

---

3.4.4 All power-operated relief valves (PORVs) and their associated block valves shall be OPERABLE.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, and 3.

#### ACTION:

- a. With one or more PORV(s) inoperable, because of excessive seat leakage, within 1 hour either restore the PORV(s) to OPERABLE status or close the associated block valve(s); otherwise, be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours.
- b. With one PORV inoperable due to causes other than excessive seat leakage, within 1 hour either restore the PORV to OPERABLE status or close the associated block valve and remove power from the block valve; restore the PORV to OPERABLE status within the following 72 hours or be in HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours.
- c. With both PORV(s) inoperable due to causes other than excessive seat leakage, within 1 hour either restore each of the PORV(s) to OPERABLE status or close their associated block valve(s) and remove power from the block valve(s) and be in HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours and COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours.
- d. With one or more block valve(s) inoperable, within 1 hour:  
(1) restore the block valve(s) to OPERABLE status, or close the block valve(s) and remove power from the block valve(s), or close the PORV and remove power from the PORV; and (2) apply the ACTION b. or c. above, as appropriate, for the isolated PORV(s).
- e. The provisions of Specification 3.0.4 are not applicable.

REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM

RELIEF VALVES

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

---

4.4.4.1 In addition to the requirements of Specification 4.0.5, each PORV shall be demonstrated OPERABLE at least once per 18 months by:

- a. Performing a CHANNEL CALIBRATION, and
- b. Operating the valve through one complete cycle of full travel.

4.4.4.2 Each block valve shall be demonstrated OPERABLE at least once per 92 days by operating the valve through one complete cycle of full travel unless the block valve is closed with power removed in order to meet the requirements of ACTION b. or c. in Specification 3.4.4.

## REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM

### 3/4.4.5 STEAM GENERATORS

#### LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

---

3.4.5 Each steam generator shall be OPERABLE.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4.

ACTION:

With one or more steam generators inoperable, restore the inoperable generator(s) to OPERABLE status prior to increasing  $T_{avg}$  above 200°F.

#### SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

---

4.4.5.0 Each steam generator shall be demonstrated OPERABLE by performance of the following augmented inservice inspection program and the requirements of Specification 4.0.5.

4.4.5.1 Steam Generator Sample Selection and Inspection - Each steam generator shall be determined OPERABLE during shutdown by selecting and inspecting at least the minimum number of steam generators specified in Table 4.4-1.

4.4.5.2 Steam Generator Tube Sample Selection and Inspection - The steam generator tube minimum sample size, inspection result classification, and the corresponding action required shall be as specified in Table 4.4-2. The inservice inspection of steam generator tubes shall be performed at the frequencies specified in Specification 4.4.5.3 and the inspected tubes shall be verified acceptable per the acceptance criteria of Specification 4.4.5.4. The tubes selected for each inservice inspection shall include at least 3% of the total number of tubes in all steam generators; the tubes selected for these inspections shall be selected on a random basis except:

- a. Where experience in similar plants with similar water chemistry indicates critical areas to be inspected, then at least 50% of the tubes inspected shall be from these critical areas;
- b. The first sample of tubes selected for each inservice inspection (subsequent to the preservice inspection) of each steam generator shall include:
  - 1) All nonplugged tubes that previously had detectable wall penetrations (greater than 20%),
  - 2) Tubes in those areas where experience has indicated potential problems, and

REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM

STEAM GENERATORS

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (Continued)

---

- 3) A tube inspection (pursuant to Specification 4.4.5.4a.8) shall be performed on each selected tube. If any selected tube does not permit the passage of the eddy current probe for a tube inspection, this shall be recorded and an adjacent tube shall be selected and subjected to a tube inspection.
- c. The tubes selected as the second and third samples (if required by Table 4.4-2) during each inservice inspection may be subjected to a partial tube inspection provided:
- 1) The tubes selected for these samples include the tubes from those areas of the tube sheet array where tubes with imperfections were previously found, and
  - 2) The inspections include those portions of the tubes where imperfections were previously found.

The results of each sample inspection shall be classified into one of the following three categories:

<u>Category</u>	<u>Inspection Results</u>
C-1	Less than 5% of the total tubes inspected are degraded tubes and none of the inspected tubes are defective.
C-2	One or more tubes, but not more than 1% of the total tubes inspected are defective, or between 5% and 10% of the total tubes inspected are degraded tubes.
C-3	More than 10% of the total tubes inspected are degraded tubes or more than 1% of the inspected tubes are defective.

Note: In all inspections, previously degraded tubes must exhibit significant (greater than 10%) further wall penetrations to be included in the above percentage calculations.

REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM

STEAM GENERATORS

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (Continued)

4.4.5.3 Inspection Frequencies - The above required inservice inspections of steam generator tubes shall be performed at the following frequencies:

- a. The first inservice inspection shall be performed after 6 Effective Full Power Months but within 24 calendar months of initial criticality. Subsequent inservice inspections shall be performed at intervals of not less than 12 nor more than 24 calendar months after the previous inspection. If two consecutive inspections, not including the preservice inspection, result in all inspection results falling into the C-1 category or if two consecutive inspections demonstrate that previously observed degradation has not continued and no additional degradation has occurred, the inspection interval may be extended to a maximum of once per 40 months;
- b. If the results of the inservice inspection of a steam generator conducted in accordance with Table 4.4-2 at 40-month intervals fall in Category C-3, the inspection frequency shall be increased to at least once per 20 months. The increase in inspection frequency shall apply until the subsequent inspections satisfy the criteria of Specification 4.4.5.3a.; the interval may then be extended to a maximum of once per 40 months; and
- c. Additional, unscheduled inservice inspections shall be performed on each steam generator in accordance with the first sample inspection specified in Table 4.4-2 during the shutdown subsequent to any of the following conditions:
  - 1) Primary-to-secondary tube leaks (not including leaks originating from tube-to-tube sheet welds) in excess of the limits of Specification 3.4.6.2, or
  - 2) A seismic occurrence greater than the Operating Basis Earthquake, or
  - 3) A loss-of-coolant accident requiring actuation of the Engineered Safety Features, or
  - 4) A main steam line or feedwater line break.

## REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM

### STEAM GENERATORS

#### SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (Continued)

---

##### 4.4.5.4 Acceptance Criteria

a. As used in this specification:

- 1) Imperfection means an exception to the dimensions, finish, or contour of a tube from that required by fabrication drawings or specifications. Eddy-current testing indications below 20% of the nominal tube wall thickness, if detectable, may be considered as imperfections;
- 2) Degradation means a service-induced cracking, wastage, wear, or general corrosion occurring on either inside or outside of a tube;
- 3) Degraded Tube means a tube containing imperfections greater than or equal to 20% of the nominal wall thickness caused by degradation;
- 4) % Degradation means the percentage of the tube wall thickness affected or removed by degradation;
- 5) Defect means an imperfection of such severity that it exceeds the plugging limit. A tube containing a defect is defective;
- 6) Plugging Limit means the imperfection depth at or beyond which the tube shall be removed from service and is equal to 40% of the nominal tube wall thickness;
- 7) Unserviceable describes the condition of a tube if it leaks or contains a defect large enough to affect its structural integrity in the event of an Operating Basis Earthquake, a loss-of-coolant accident, or a steam line or feedwater line break as specified in Specification 4.4.5.3c., above;
- 8) Tube Inspection means an inspection of the steam generator tube from the point of entry (hot leg side) completely around the U-bend to the top support of the cold leg; and
- 9) Preservice Inspection means an inspection of the full length of each tube in each steam generator performed by eddy current techniques prior to service to establish a baseline condition of the tubing. This inspection shall be performed prior to initial POWER OPERATION using the equipment and techniques expected to be used during subsequent inservice inspections.

## REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM

### STEAM GENERATORS

#### SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (Continued)

---

- b. The steam generator shall be determined OPERABLE after completing the corresponding actions (plug all tubes exceeding the plugging limit and all tubes containing through-wall cracks) required by Table 4.4-2.

#### 4.4.5.5 Reports

- a. Within 15 days following the completion of each inservice inspection of steam generator tubes, the number of tubes plugged in each steam generator shall be reported to the Commission in a Special Report pursuant to Specification 6.9.2;
- b. The complete results of the steam generator tube inservice inspection shall be submitted to the Commission in a Special Report pursuant to Specification 6.9.2 within 12 months following the completion of the inspection. This Special Report shall include:
  - 1) Number and extent of tubes inspected,
  - 2) Location and percent of wall-thickness penetration for each indication of an imperfection, and
  - 3) Identification of tubes plugged.
- c. Results of steam generator tube inspections which fall into Category C-3 shall be reported in a Special Report to the Commission pursuant to Specification 6.9.2 within 30 days and prior to resumption of plant operation. This report shall provide a description of investigations conducted to determine cause of the tube degradation and corrective measures taken to prevent recurrence.

TABLE 4.4-1

MINIMUM NUMBER OF STEAM GENERATORS TO BE  
INSPECTED DURING INSERVICE INSPECTION

Preservice Inspection	No			Yes		
	Two	Three	Four	Two	Three	Four
No. of Steam Generators per Unit				One	Two	Two
First Inservice Inspection	All			One	Two	Two
Second & Subsequent Inservice Inspections	One <sup>1</sup>			One <sup>1</sup>	One <sup>2</sup>	One <sup>3</sup>

TABLE NOTATIONS

1. The inservice inspection may be limited to one steam generator on a rotating schedule encompassing 3 N % of the tubes (where N is the number of steam generators in the plant) if the results of the first or previous inspections indicate that all steam generators are performing in a like manner. Note that under some circumstances, the operating conditions in one or more steam generators may be found to be more severe than those in other steam generators. Under such circumstances the sample sequence shall be modified to inspect the most severe conditions.
2. The other steam generator not inspected during the first inservice inspection shall be inspected. The third and subsequent inspections should follow the instructions described in 1 above.
3. Each of the other two steam generators not inspected during the first inservice inspections shall be inspected during the second and third inspections. The fourth and subsequent inspections shall follow the instructions described in 1 above.



**TABLE 4.4-2**

**STEAM GENERATOR TUBE INSPECTION**

1ST SAMPLE INSPECTION			2ND SAMPLE INSPECTION		3RD SAMPLE INSPECTION	
Sample Size	Result	Action Required	Result	Action Required	Result	Action Required
A minimum of S Tubes per S. G.	C-1	None	N. A.	N. A.	N. A.	N. A.
	C-2	Plug defective tubes and inspect additional 2S tubes in this S. G.	C-1	None	N. A.	N. A.
			C-2	Plug defective tubes and inspect additional 4S tubes in this S. G.	C-1	None
					C-2	Plug defective tubes
					C-3	Perform action for C-3 result of first sample
	C-3	Perform action for C-3 result of first sample	N. A.	N. A.		
	C-3	Inspect all tubes in this S. G., plug defective tubes and inspect 2S tubes in each other S. G.  Notification to NRC pursuant to §50.72 (b)(2) of 10 CFR Part 50	All other S. G.s are C-1	None	N. A.	N. A.
			Some S. G.s C-2 but no additional S. G. are C-3	Perform action for C-2 result of second sample	N. A.	N. A.
			Additional S. G. is C-3	Inspect all tubes in each S. G. and plug defective tubes. Notification to NRC pursuant to §50.72 (b)(2) of 10 CFR Part 50	N. A.	N. A.

$S = 3 \frac{N}{n} \%$  Where N is the number of steam generators in the unit, and n is the number of steam generators inspected during an inspection

## REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM

### 3/4.4.6 REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM LEAKAGE

#### LEAKAGE DETECTION SYSTEMS

#### LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

---

3.4.6.1 The following Reactor Coolant System Leakage Detection Systems shall be OPERABLE:

- a. The Containment Atmosphere Gaseous Radioactivity Monitoring System,
- b. The Containment Normal Sump Level and Flow Monitoring System, and
- c. The Containment Atmosphere Particulate Radioactivity Monitoring System.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4.

#### ACTION:

- a. With a. or c. of the above required Leakage Detection Systems inoperable, operation may continue for up to 30 days provided grab samples of the containment atmosphere are obtained and analyzed for gaseous and particulate radioactivity at least once per 24 hours when the required Gaseous or Particulate Radioactive Monitoring System is inoperable; otherwise, be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours.
- b. With b. of the above required Leakage Detection Systems inoperable, be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours.
- c. With a. and c. of the above required Leakage Detection Systems inoperable:
  - 1) Restore either Monitoring System (a. or c.) to OPERABLE status within 72 hours and
  - 2) Obtain and analyze a grab sample of the containment atmosphere for gaseous and particulate radioactivity at least once per 24 hours, and
  - 3) Perform a Reactor Coolant System water inventory balance at least once per 8 hours.

Otherwise, be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours.

#### SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

---

4.4.6.1 The Leakage Detection Systems shall be demonstrated OPERABLE by:

- a. Containment Atmosphere Gaseous and Particulate Monitoring Systems performance of CHANNEL CHECK, CHANNEL CALIBRATION, and DIGITAL CHANNEL OPERATIONAL TEST at the frequencies specified in Table 4.3-3, and
- b. Containment Normal Sump Level and Flow Monitoring System performance of CHANNEL CALIBRATION at least once per 18 months.

## REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM

### OPERATIONAL LEAKAGE

#### LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

---

3.4.6.2 Reactor Coolant System leakage shall be limited to:

- a. No PRESSURE BOUNDARY LEAKAGE,
- b. 1 gpm UNIDENTIFIED LEAKAGE,
- c. 1 gpm total reactor-to-secondary leakage through all steam generators and 500 gallons per day through any one steam generator,
- d. 10 gpm IDENTIFIED LEAKAGE from the Reactor Coolant System, and
- e. 0.5 gpm leakage per nominal inch of valve size up to a maximum of 5 gpm at a Reactor Coolant System pressure of  $2235 \pm 20$  psig from any Reactor Coolant System Pressure Isolation Valve specified in Table 3.4-1.\*

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4.

#### ACTION:

- a. With any PRESSURE BOUNDARY LEAKAGE, be in at least HOT STANDBY within 6 hours and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours.
- b. With any Reactor Coolant System leakage greater than any one of the above limits, excluding PRESSURE BOUNDARY LEAKAGE and leakage from Reactor Coolant System Pressure Isolation Valves, reduce the leakage rate to within limits within 4 hours or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours.
- c. With any Reactor Coolant System Pressure Isolation Valve leakage greater than the above limit, isolate the high pressure portion of the affected system from the low pressure portion within 4 hours by use of at least two closed manual or deactivated automatic valves, or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours.

---

\*Test pressures less than 2235 psig but greater than 150 psig are allowed. Observed leakage shall be adjusted for the actual test pressure up to 2235 psig assuming the leakage to be directly proportional to pressure differential to the one-half power.

## REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM

### OPERATIONAL LEAKAGE

#### SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (Continued)

---

4.4.6.2.1 Reactor Coolant System leakages shall be demonstrated to be within each of the above limits by:

- a. Monitoring the containment atmosphere gaseous radioactivity and particulate radioactivity channels at least once per 12 hours;
- b. Monitoring the containment normal sump inventory and discharge at least once per 12 hours;
- c. Performance of a Reactor Coolant System water inventory balance at least once per 72 hours; and
- d. Monitoring the Reactor Head Flange Leakoff System at least once per 24 hours.

4.4.6.2.2 Each Reactor Coolant System Pressure Isolation Valve specified in Table 3.4-1 shall be demonstrated OPERABLE by verifying leakage to be within its limit:

- a. At least once per 18 months,
- b. Prior to entering MODE 2 whenever the plant has been in COLD SHUTDOWN for 72 hours or more and if leakage testing has not been performed in the previous 9 months,
- c. Prior to returning the valve to service following maintenance, repair or replacement work on the valve, and
- d. Within 24 hours following valve actuation due to automatic or manual action or flow through the valve except for valves XRH0060 A,B,C and XRH0061 A,B,C.
- e. As outlined in the ASME Code, Section XI, paragraph IWV-3427(b).

The provisions of Specification 4.0.4 are not applicable for entry into MODE 3 or 4.

TABLE 3.4-1

REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM PRESSURE ISOLATION VALVES

<u>VALVE NUMBER</u>	<u>FUNCTION</u>
XSI0007 A, B, C	HHSI Cold Leg Injection Check Valves (RCS Loops 1, 2, 3)
XSI0009 A, B, C	HHSI Hot Leg Recirculation Check Valves (RCS Loops 1, 2, 3)
XS 0010 A, B, C	LHSI/HHSI Hot Leg Recirculation Check Valves (RCS Loops 1, 2, 3)
XRH0020 A, B, C	LHSI Hot Leg Recirculation Check Valves (RCS Loops 1, 2, 3)
XRH0032 A, B, C	LHSI/RHR Cold Leg Injection Check Valves (RCS Loops 1, 2, 3)
XSI0038 A, B, C	LHSI/HHSI/RHR/Accumulator Cold Leg Injection Check Valves (RCS Loops 1, 2, 3)
XSI0046 A, B, C	Accumulator Cold Leg Injection Check Valves (RCS Loops 1, 2, 3)
XRH0060 A, B, C	RHR Suction Isolation Valves (RCS Loops 1, 2, 3)
XRH0061 A, B, C	RHR Suction Isolation Valves (RCS Loops 1, 2, 3)

## REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM

### 3/4.4.7 CHEMISTRY

#### LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

---

3.4.7 The Reactor Coolant System chemistry shall be maintained within the limits specified in Table 3.4-2.

APPLICABILITY: At all times.

ACTION:

MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4:

- a. With any one or more chemistry parameter in excess of its Steady-State Limit but within its Transient Limit, restore the parameter to within its Steady-State Limit within 24 hours or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours; and
- b. With any one or more chemistry parameter in excess of its Transient Limit, be in at least HOT STANDBY within 6 hours and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours.

At All Other Times:

With the concentration of either chloride or fluoride in the Reactor Coolant System in excess of its Steady-State Limit for more than 24 hours or in excess of its Transient Limit, reduce the pressurizer pressure to less than or equal to 500 psig, if applicable, and perform an engineering evaluation to determine the effects of the out-of-limit condition on the structural integrity of the Reactor Coolant System; determine that the Reactor Coolant System remains acceptable for continued operation prior to increasing the pressurizer pressure above 500 psig or prior to proceeding to MODE 4.

#### SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

---

4.4.7 The Reactor Coolant System chemistry shall be determined to be within the limits by analysis of those parameters at the frequencies specified in Table 4.4-3.

TABLE 3.4-2  
REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM  
CHEMISTRY LIMITS

<u>PARAMETER</u>	<u>STEADY-STATE LIMIT</u>	<u>TRANSIENT LIMIT</u>
Dissolved Oxygen*	< 0.10 ppm	≤ 1.00 ppm
Chloride	< 0.15 ppm	≤ 1.50 ppm
Fluoride	≤ 0.15 ppm	≤ 1.50 ppm

\*Limit not applicable with  $T_{avg}$  less than or equal to 250°F.

TABLE 4.4-3

REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM

CHEMISTRY LIMITS SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

<u>PARAMETER</u>	<u>SAMPLE AND ANALYSIS FREQUENCY</u>
Dissolved Oxygen*	At least once per 72 hours
Chloride	At least once per 72 hours
Fluoride	At least once per 72 hours

---

\*Not required with  $T_{avg}$  less than or equal to 250°F.



REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM

3/4.4.8 SPECIFIC ACTIVITY

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

---

3.4.8 The specific activity of the reactor coolant shall be limited to:

- a. Less than or equal to 1 microCurie per gram DOSE EQUIVALENT I-131, and
- b. Less than or equal to  $100/\bar{E}$  microCuries per gram of gross radioactivity.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5.

ACTION:

MODES 1, 2 and 3\*:

- a. With the specific activity of the reactor coolant greater than 1 microCurie per gram DOSE EQUIVALENT I-131 for more than 48 hours during one continuous time interval, or exceeding the limit line shown on Figure 3.4-1, be in at least HOT STANDBY with  $T_{avg}$  less than 500°F within 6 hours; and
- b. With the gross specific activity of the reactor coolant greater than  $100/\bar{E}$  microCuries per gram, be in at least HOT STANDBY with  $T_{avg}$  less than 500°F within 6 hours.

MODES 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5:

With the specific activity of the reactor coolant greater than 1 microCurie per gram DOSE EQUIVALENT I-131 or greater than  $100/\bar{E}$  microCuries per gram, perform the sampling and analysis requirements of Item 4.a) of Table 4.4-4 until the specific activity of the reactor coolant is restored to within its limits.

---

\*With  $T_{avg}$  greater than or equal to 500°F.

REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM

SPECIFIC ACTIVITY

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

---

4.4.8 The specific activity of the reactor coolant shall be determined to be within the limits by performance of the sampling and analysis program of Table 4.4-4.




FIGURE 3.4-1

DOSE EQUIVALENT I-131 REACTOR COOLANT SPECIFIC ACTIVITY LIMIT VERSUS PERCENT OF RATED THERMAL POWER WITH THE REACTOR COOLANT SPECIFIC ACTIVITY  $>1 \mu\text{Ci}/\text{gram}$  DOSE EQUIVALENT I-131

TABLE 4.4-4

REACTOR COOLANT SPECIFIC ACTIVITY SAMPLE  
AND ANALYSIS PROGRAM

<u>TYPE OF MEASUREMENT AND ANALYSIS</u>	<u>SAMPLE AND ANALYSIS FREQUENCY</u>	<u>MODES IN WHICH SAMPLE AND ANALYSIS REQUIRED</u>
1. Gross Radioactivity Determination	At least once per 72 hours.	1, 2, 3, 4
2. Isotopic Analysis for DOSE EQUIVALENT I-131 Concentration	1 per 14 days.	1
3. Radiochemical for E Determination*	1 per 6 months**	1
4. Isotopic Analysis for Iodine Including I-131, I-133, and I-135	a) Once per 4 hours, whenever the specific activity exceeds 1 $\mu\text{Ci}/\text{gram}$ DOSE EQUIVALENT I-131 or $100/\bar{E}$ $\mu\text{Ci}/\text{gram}$ of gross radioactivity, and	1#, 2#, 3#, 4#, 5#
	b) One sample between 2 and 6 hours following a THERMAL POWER change exceeding 15% of the RATED THERMAL POWER within a 1-hour period.	1, 2, 3

TABLE 4.4-4 (Continued)

TABLE NOTATIONS

\*A radiochemical analysis for  $\bar{E}$  shall consist of the quantitative measurement of the specific activity for each radionuclide, except for radionuclides with half-lives less than 15 minutes and all radioiodines, which is identified in the reactor coolant. The specific activities for these individual radionuclides shall be used in the determination of  $\bar{E}$  for the reactor coolant sample. Determination of the contributors to  $\bar{E}$  shall be based upon those energy peaks identifiable with a 95% confidence level.

\*\*Sample to be taken after a minimum of 2 EFPD and 20 days of POWER OPERATION have elapsed since reactor was last subcritical for 48 hours or longer.

#Until the specific activity of the Reactor Coolant System is restored within its limits.

## REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM

### 3/4.4.9 PRESSURE/TEMPERATURE LIMITS

## REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM

### LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

---

3.4.9.1 The Reactor Coolant System (except the pressurizer) temperature and pressure shall be limited in accordance with the limit lines shown on Figures 3.4-2 and 3.4-3 during heatup, cooldown, criticality, and inservice leak and hydrostatic testing with:

- a. A maximum heatup of 100°F in any 1-hour period,
- b. A maximum cooldown of 100°F in any 1-hour period, and
- c. A maximum temperature change of less than or equal to 10°F in any 1-hour period during inservice hydrostatic and leak testing operations above the heatup and cooldown limit curves.

APPLICABILITY: At all times.

#### ACTION:

With any of the above limits exceeded, restore the temperature and/or pressure to within the limit within 30 minutes; perform an engineering evaluation to determine the effects of the out-of-limit condition on the structural integrity of the Reactor Coolant System; determine that the Reactor Coolant System remains acceptable for continued operation or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours and reduce the RCS  $T_{avg}$  and pressure to less than 200°F and 500 psig, respectively, within the following 30 hours.

### SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

---

4.4.9.1.1 The Reactor Coolant System temperature and pressure shall be determined to be within the limits at least once per 30 minutes during system heatup, cooldown, and inservice leak and hydrostatic testing operations.

4.4.9.1.2 The reactor vessel material irradiation surveillance specimens shall be removed and examined, to determine changes in material properties, as required by 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix H, in accordance with the schedule in Table 4.4-5. The results of these examinations shall be used to update Figures 3.4-2 and 3.4-3.

MATERIAL PROPERTY BASIS

CONTROLLING MATERIAL - RV  
INTERMEDIATE SHELL R-1606-3  
COPPER CONTENT: CONSERVATIVELY  
ASSUMED AS 0.10 WT%

RT<sub>NDT</sub> INITIAL: 10°F  
RT<sub>NDT</sub> AFTER 32 EPFY  
1/4, 91°F  
3/4T, 64°F

CURVE APPLICABLE FOR HEATUP RATES UP TO 100°/HR FOR  
THE SERVICE PERIOD UP TO 32 EPFY AND CONTAINS MARGINS OF  
10°F AND 60 PSIG FOR POSSIBLE INSTRUMENT ERRORS




FIGURE 3.4-2

REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM HEATUP LIMITATIONS - APPLICABLE UP TO 32 EPFY

MATERIAL PROPERTY BASIS

CONTROLLING MATERIAL - RV  
INTERMEDIATE SHELL R-1606-3  
COPPER CONTENTS: CONSERVATIVELY  
ASSUMED AS 0.10 WT%

RT<sub>NDT</sub> INITIAL: 10°F  
RT<sub>NDT</sub> AFTER 32 EFPY  
1/4, 91°F  
3/4T, 64°F

SINGLE CURVE APPLICABLE FOR COOLDOWN RATES UP TO 100°/HR FOR  
THE SERVICE PERIOD UP TO 32 EFPY, AND CONTAINS MARGINS OF  
10°F AND 60 PSIG FOR POSSIBLE INSTRUMENT ERRORS




FIGURE 3.4-3

REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM COOLDOWN LIMITATIONS - APPLICABLE UP TO 32 EFPY



TABLE 4.4-5

REACTOR VESSEL MATERIAL SURVEILLANCE PROGRAM - WITHDRAWAL SCHEDULE

<u>CAPSULE NUMBER</u>	<u>VESSEL LOCATION</u>	<u>LEAD FACTOR</u>	<u>WITHDRAWAL TIME (EFPY)</u>
U	58.5°	4.00	First Refueling
Y	241°	3.69	5
V	61°	3.69	9
X	238.5°	4.00	15
W	121.5°	4.00	Standby
Z	301.5°	4.00	Standby

## REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM

### PRESSURIZER

#### LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

---

3.4.9.2 The pressurizer temperature shall be limited to:

- a. A maximum heatup of 100°F in any 1-hour period,
- b. A maximum cooldown of 200°F in any 1-hour period, and
- c. A maximum spray water temperature differential of 621°F.

APPLICABILITY: At all times.

#### ACTION:

With the pressurizer temperature limits in excess of any of the above limits, restore the temperature to within the limits within 30 minutes; perform an engineering evaluation to determine the effects of the out-of-limit condition on the structural integrity of the pressurizer; determine that the pressurizer remains acceptable for continued operation or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours and reduce the pressurizer pressure to less than 500 psig within the following 30 hours.

#### SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

---

4.4.9.2 The pressurizer temperatures shall be determined to be within the limits at least once per 30 minutes during system heatup or cooldown. The spray water temperature differential shall be determined to be within the limit at least once per 12 hours during auxiliary spray operation.

## REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM

### OVERPRESSURE PROTECTION SYSTEMS

#### LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

---

3.4.9.3 At least one of the following Overpressure Protection Systems shall be OPERABLE:

- a. Two power-operated relief valves (PORVs) with lift settings which do not exceed the limit established in Figure 3.4-4, or
- b. The Reactor Coolant System (RCS) depressurized with an RCS vent of greater than or equal to 2.0 square inches.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 4 and 5, and MODE 6 with the reactor vessel head on.

#### ACTION:

- a. With one PORV inoperable, restore the inoperable PORV to OPERABLE status within 7 days or depressurize and vent the RCS through at least a 2.0 square inch vent within the next 8 hours.
- b. With both PORVs inoperable, depressurize and vent the RCS through at least a 2.0 square inch vent within 8 hours.
- c. In the event either the PORVs or the RCS vent(s) are used to mitigate an RCS pressure transient, a Special Report shall be prepared and submitted to the Commission pursuant to Specification 6.9.2 within 30 days. The report shall describe the circumstances initiating the transient, the effect of the PORVs or RCS vent(s) on the transient, and any corrective action necessary to prevent recurrence.




FIGURE 3.4-4

NOMINAL MAXIMUM ALLOWABLE PORV  
SETPOINT FOR THE COLD OVERPRESSURE SYSTEM

REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM

OVERPRESSURE PROTECTION SYSTEMS

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

---

4.4.9.3.1 Each PORV shall be demonstrated OPERABLE by:

- a. Performance of an ANALOG CHANNEL OPERATIONAL TEST on the PORV actuation channel, but excluding valve operation, within 31 days prior to entering a condition in which the PORV is required OPERABLE and at least once per 31 days thereafter when the PORV is required OPERABLE;
- b. Performance of a CHANNEL CALIBRATION on the PORV actuation channel at least once per 18 months; and
- c. Verifying the PORV block valve is open at least once per 72 hours when the PORV is being used for overpressure protection.

4.4.9.3.2 The RCS vent(s) shall be verified to be open at least once per 12 hours\* when the vent(s) is being used for overpressure protection.

---

\*Except when the vent pathway is provided with a valve which is locked, sealed, or otherwise secured in the open position, then verify these valves open at least once per 31 days.

## REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM

### 3/4.4.10 STRUCTURAL INTEGRITY

#### LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

---

3.4.10 The structural integrity of ASME Code Class 1, 2, and 3 components shall be maintained in accordance with Specification 4.4.10.

APPLICABILITY: All MODES.

#### ACTION:

- a. With the structural integrity of any ASME Code Class 1 component(s) not conforming to the above requirements, restore the structural integrity of the affected component(s) to within its limit or isolate the affected component(s) prior to increasing the Reactor Coolant System temperature more than 50°F above the minimum temperature required by NDT considerations.
- b. With the structural integrity of any ASME Code Class 2 component(s) not conforming to the above requirements, restore the structural integrity of the affected component(s) to within its limit or isolate the affected component(s) prior to increasing the Reactor Coolant System temperature above 200°F.
- c. With the structural integrity of any ASME Code Class 3 component(s) not conforming to the above requirements, restore the structural integrity of the affected component(s) to within its limit or isolate the affected component(s) from service.

#### SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

---

4.4.10 In addition to the requirements of Specification 4.0.5, each reactor coolant pump flywheel shall be inspected per the recommendations of Regulatory Position C.4.b of Regulatory Guide 1.14, Revision 1, August 1975.

## REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM

### 3/4.4.11 REACTOR VESSEL HEAD VENTS

#### LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

---

3.4.11 Two reactor vessel head vent paths each consisting of two vent valves and a control valve powered from emergency busses shall be OPERABLE and closed.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4.

ACTION:

- a. With one of the above reactor vessel head vent paths inoperable, STARTUP and/or POWER OPERATION may continue provided the inoperable vent path is maintained closed with power removed from the valve actuators of all the vent valves in the inoperable vent path; restore the inoperable vent path to OPERABLE status within 30 days, or, be in HOT STANDBY within 6 hours and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours.
- b. With two reactor vessel head vent paths inoperable, maintain the inoperable vent paths closed with power removed from the valve actuators of all the vent valves in the inoperable vent paths, and restore at least one of the vent paths to OPERABLE status within 72 hours or be in HOT STANDBY within 6 hours and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours.

#### SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

---

4.4.11 Each reactor vessel head vent path shall be demonstrated OPERABLE at least once per 18 months by:

- a. Verifying all manual isolation valves in each vent path are locked in the open position,
- b. Cycling each vent valve through at least one complete cycle of full travel from the control room, and
- c. Verifying flow through the reactor vessel head vent paths during venting.

### 3/4.5 EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEMS

#### 3/4.5.1 ACCUMULATORS

##### LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.5.1 Each Safety Injection System accumulator shall be OPERABLE with:

- a. The isolation valve open and power removed,
- b. A contained borated water volume of between 8800 and 9100 gallons,
- c. A boron concentration of between 2400 and 2700 ppm, and
- d. A nitrogen cover-pressure of between 590 and 670 psig.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, and 3\*.

##### ACTION:

- a. With one accumulator inoperable, except as a result of a closed isolation valve or the boron concentration outside the required limits, restore the inoperable accumulator to OPERABLE status within 1 hour or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours and reduce pressurizer pressure to less than 1000 psig within the following 6 hours.
- b. With one accumulator inoperable due to the isolation valve being closed, either open the isolation valve within 1 hour or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours and reduce pressurizer pressure to less than 1000 psig within the following 6 hours.
- c. With the boron concentration of one accumulator outside the required limit, restore the boron concentration to within the required limits within 72 hours or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours and reduce pressurizer pressure to less than 1000 psig within the following 6 hours.

##### SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

4.5.1.1 Each accumulator shall be demonstrated OPERABLE:

- a. At least once per 24 hours by:
  - 1) Verifying, by the absence of alarms, the contained borated water volume and nitrogen cover-pressure in the tanks, and
  - 2) Verifying that each accumulator isolation valve is open.
- b. At least once per 31 days and within 6 hours after each solution volume increase of greater than or equal to 1% of tank volume by verifying the boron concentration of the accumulator solution; and

\*Pressurizer pressure above 1000 psig.



EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEMS

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (Continued)

---

- c. At least once per 31 days when the RCS pressure is above 1000 psig by verifying that power to the isolation valve operator is removed.
- d. At least once per 18 months by verifying that each accumulator isolation valve opens automatically under each of the following conditions:
  - 1) When an actual or a simulated RCS pressure signal exceeds the P-11 (Pressurizer Pressure Block of Safety Injection) Setpoint, and
  - 2) Upon receipt of a Safety Injection test signal.

4.5.1.2 Each accumulator water level and pressure channel shall be demonstrated OPERABLE:

- a. At least once per 31 days by the performance of an ANALOG CHANNEL OPERATIONAL TEST, and
- b. At least once per 18 months by the performance of a CHANNEL CALIBRATION.

## EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEMS

### 3/4.5.2 ECCS SUBSYSTEMS - $T_{avg}$ GREATER THAN OR EQUAL TO 350°F

#### LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.5.2 Three independent Emergency Core Cooling System (ECCS) subsystems shall be OPERABLE with each subsystem comprised of:

- a. One OPERABLE High Head Safety Injection pump,
- b. One OPERABLE Low Head Safety Injection pump
- c. One OPERABLE RHR heat exchanger, and
- d. An OPERABLE flow path capable of taking suction from the refueling water storage tank on a Safety Injection signal and automatically transferring suction to the containment sump during the recirculation phase of operation through a High Head Safety Injection pump and into the Reactor Coolant System and through a Low Head Safety Injection pump and its respective RHR heat exchanger into the Reactor Coolant System.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, and 3.\*

#### ACTION:

- a. With less than the above subsystems OPERABLE, but with at least two High Head Safety Injection pumps in an OPERABLE status, two Low Head Safety Injection pumps and associated RHR heat exchangers in an OPERABLE status, and sufficient flow paths to accommodate these OPERABLE Safety Injection pumps and RHR heat exchangers, restore the inoperable subsystem(s) to OPERABLE status within 72 hours or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours and in HOT SHUTDOWN within the following 6 hours.
- b. In the event the ECCS is actuated and injects water into the Reactor Coolant System, a Special Report shall be prepared and submitted to the Commission pursuant to Specification 6.9.2 within 90 days describing the circumstances of the actuation and the total accumulated actuation cycles to date. The current value of the usage factor for each affected Safety Injection nozzle shall be provided in this Special Report whenever its value exceeds 0.70.

---

\*The provisions of Specifications 3.0.4 and 4.0.4 are not applicable for entry into MODE 3 for the Safety Injection pumps declared inoperable pursuant to Specification 4.5.3.2 provided that the Safety Injection pumps are restored to OPERABLE status within 4 hours or prior to the temperature of one or more of the RCS cold legs exceeding 375°F, whichever comes first.

## EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEMS

### SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

4.5.2 Each ECCS subsystem shall be demonstrated OPERABLE:

- a. At least once per 24 hours by verifying that the following valves are in the indicated positions with power to the valve operators removed:

<u>Valve Number</u>	<u>Valve Function</u>	<u>Valve Position</u>
XSI0008 A,B,C	High Head Hot Leg Recirculation Isolation	Closed
XRH0019 A,B,C	Low Head Hot Leg Recirculation Isolation	Closed

- b. At least once per 31 days by:
- 1) Verifying that the ECCS piping is full of water by venting the ECCS pump casings and accessible discharge piping high points, and
  - 2) Verifying that each valve (manual, power-operated, or automatic) in the flow path that is not locked, sealed or otherwise secured in position, is in its correct position.
- c. By a visual inspection which verifies that no loose debris (rags, trash, clothing, etc.) is present in the containment which could be transported to the containment sump and cause restriction of the pump suction during LOCA conditions. This visual inspection shall be performed:
- 1) For all accessible areas of the containment prior to establishing CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY, and
  - 2) Of the areas affected within containment at the completion of each containment entry when CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY is established.
- d. At least once per 18 months by a visual inspection of the containment sump and verifying that the subsystem suction inlets are not restricted by debris and that the sump components (trash racks, screens, etc.) show no evidence of structural distress or abnormal corrosion.

## EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEMS

### SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (Continued)

---

- e. At least once per 18 months, during shutdown, by:
  - 1) Verifying that each automatic valve in the flow path actuates to its correct position on an Automatic Switchover to Containment Sump test signal, and
  - 2) Verifying that each of the following pumps start automatically upon receipt of a Safety Injection test signal:
    - a) High Head Safety Injection pump, and
    - b) Low Head Safety Injection pump.
  
- f. By verifying that each of the following pumps develops the indicated differential pressure on recirculation flow when tested pursuant to Specification 4.0.5:
  - 1) High Head Safety Injection pump  $\geq$  1480 psid, and
  - 2) Low Head Safety Injection pump  $\geq$  286 psid.
  
- g. By performing a flow test, during shutdown, following completion of modifications to the ECCS subsystems that alter the subsystem flow characteristics and verifying that:
  - 1) For High Head Safety Injection pump lines, with the High Head Safety Injection pump running, the pump flow rate is greater than 1470 gpm and less than 1620 gpm.
  - 2) For Low Head Safety Injection pump lines, with the Low Head Safety Injection pump running, the pump flow rate is greater than 2550 gpm and less than 2800 gpm.

## EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEMS

### 3/4.5.3 ECCS SUBSYSTEMS - $T_{avg}$ LESS THAN 350°F

#### LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.5.3.1 As a minimum, the following ECCS components shall be OPERABLE:

- a. Two OPERABLE High Head Safety Injection pumps,\*
- b. Two OPERABLE Low Head Safety Injection pumps and their associated RHR heat exchangers, and
- c. Two OPERABLE flow paths capable of taking suction from the refueling water storage tank upon being manually realigned and transferring suction to the containment sump during the recirculation phase of operation through a High Head Safety Injection pump and into the Reactor Coolant System and through a Low Head Safety Injection pump and its respective RHR heat exchanger into the Reactor Coolant System.

APPLICABILITY: MODE 4.

#### ACTION:

- a. With less than the above-required ECCS components OPERABLE because of the inoperability of either the High Head Safety Injection pumps or the flow paths from the refueling water storage tank, restore at least the required ECCS components to OPERABLE status within 1 hour or be in COLD SHUTDOWN within the next 20 hours.
- b. With less than the above-required ECCS components OPERABLE because of the inoperability of either the residual heat removal heat exchangers or the Low Head Safety Injection pumps, restore at least the required ECCS components to OPERABLE status or maintain the Reactor Coolant System  $T_{avg}$  less than 350°F by use of alternate heat removal methods.
- c. In the event the ECCS is actuated and injects water into the Reactor Coolant System, a Special Report shall be prepared and submitted to the Commission pursuant to Specification 6.9.2 within 90 days describing the circumstances of the actuation and the total accumulated actuation cycles to date. The current value of the usage factor for each affected Safety Injection nozzle shall be provided in this Special Report whenever its value exceeds 0.70.

---

\*A maximum of one High Head Safety Injection pump shall be OPERABLE and a second High Head Safety Injection pump shall be OPERABLE except that its breaker shall be racked out (the third HHSI pump shall have its breaker racked out) within:  
(1) 4 hours after entering MODE 4 from MODE 3 or prior to the temperature of one or more of the RCS cold legs decreasing below 325°F, whichever comes first;  
or (2) 4 hours after entering MODE 4 from MODE 5 or prior to the temperature of one or more of the RCS cold legs exceeding 225°F, whichever comes first.

EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEMS

ECCS SUBSYSTEMS -  $T_{avg}$  LESS THAN 350°F

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

4.5.3.1.1 The ECCS components shall be demonstrated OPERABLE per the applicable requirements of Specification 4.5.2.

4.5.3.1.2 All High Head Safety Injection pumps, except the above allowed OPERABLE pumps, shall be demonstrated inoperable\* by verifying that the motor circuit breakers are secured in the open position within 4 hours after entering MODE 4 from MODE 3 or prior to the temperature of one or more of the RCS cold legs decreasing below 325°F, whichever comes first, and at least once per 31 days thereafter.

---

\*An inoperable pump may be energized for testing or for filling accumulators provided the discharge of the pump has been isolated from the RCS by a closed isolation valve with power removed from the valve operator, or by a manual isolation valve secured in the closed position.

EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEMS

ECCS SUBSYSTEMS -  $T_{avg}$  LESS THAN 350°F

ECCS SUBSYSTEMS -  $T_{avg}$  LESS THAN OR EQUAL TO 200°F

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

---

3.5.3.2 All High Head Safety Injection pumps shall be inoperable.

APPLICABILITY: MODE 5 and MODE 6 with the reactor vessel head on.

ACTION:

With a Safety Injection pump OPERABLE, restore all High Head Safety Injection pumps to an inoperable status within 4 hours.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

---

4.5.3.2 All High Head Safety Injection pumps shall be demonstrated inoperable\* by verifying that the motor circuit breakers are secured in the open position at least once per 31 days.

---

\*An inoperable pump may be energized for testing or for filling accumulators provided the discharge at the pump has been isolated from the RCS by a closed isolation valve with power removed from the valve operator, or by a manual isolation valve secured in the closed position.

EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEMS

3/4.5.4 (This specification number is not used.)



EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEMS

3/4.5.5 REFUELING WATER STORAGE TANK

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

---

3.5.5 The refueling water storage tank (RWST) shall be OPERABLE with:

- a. A minimum contained borated water volume of 458,000 gallons, and
- b. A boron concentration between 2500 ppm and 2700 ppm.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4.

ACTION:

With the RWST inoperable, restore the tank to OPERABLE status within 1 hour or be in at least HOT STANDBY within 6 hours and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

---

4.5.5 The RWST shall be demonstrated OPERABLE at least once per 7 days by:

- a. Verifying the contained borated water volume in the tank, and
- b. Verifying the boron concentration of the water.

## EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEMS

### 3/4.5.6 RESIDUAL HEAT REMOVAL (RHR) SYSTEM

#### LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.5.6 Three independent Residual Heat Removal (RHR) loops shall be OPERABLE with each loop comprised of:

- a. One OPERABLE RHR pump,
- b. One OPERABLE RHR heat exchanger, and
- c. One OPERABLE flowpath capable of taking suction from its associated RCS hot leg and discharging to its associated RCS cold leg.\*

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2 and 3.

#### ACTION:

- a. With one RHR loop inoperable, restore the required loop to OPERABLE status within 72 hours or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours and in HOT SHUTDOWN within the following 6 hours.
- b. With two RHR loops inoperable, restore at least two RHR loops to OPERABLE status within 24 hours or be in at least HOT STANDBY within 6 hours and in HOT SHUTDOWN within the following 6 hours.
- c. With three RHR loops inoperable, immediately initiate corrective action to restore at least one RHR loop to OPERABLE status as soon as possible.

#### SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

4.5.6.1 Each RHR loop shall be demonstrated OPERABLE pursuant to the requirements of Specification 4.0.5.

4.5.6.2 At least once per 18 months by verifying automatic isolation and interlock action of the RHR system from the Reactor Coolant System to ensure that:

- a. With a simulated or actual Reactor Coolant System pressure signal greater than or equal to 350 psig, the interlocks prevent the valves from being opened, and
- b. With a simulated or actual Reactor Coolant System pressure signal less than or equal to 700 psig, the interlocks will cause the valves to automatically close.

\*Valves MOV-60 A, B, and C and MOV-61 A, B, and C may have power removed to support the FHAR assumptions.

### 3/4.6 CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS

#### 3/4.6.1 PRIMARY CONTAINMENT

##### CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY

##### LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

---

3.6.1.1 Primary CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY shall be maintained.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4.

ACTION:

Without primary CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY, restore CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY within 1 hour or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours.

##### SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

---

4.6.1.1 Primary CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY shall be demonstrated:

- a. At least once per 31 days by verifying that all penetrations\* not capable of being closed by OPERABLE containment automatic isolation valves and required to be closed during accident conditions are closed by valves, blind flanges, or deactivated automatic valves secured in their positions, except as provided in Specification 3.6.3;
- b. By verifying that each containment air lock is in compliance with the requirements of Specification 3.6.1.3; and
- c. After each closing of each penetration subject to Type B testing, except the containment air locks, if opened following a Type A or B test, by leak rate testing the seal with gas at a pressure not less than  $P_a$ , 37.5 psig, and verifying that when the measured leakage rate for these seals is added to the leakage rates determined pursuant to Specification 4.6.1.2d. for all other Type B and C penetrations, the combined leakage rate is less than  $0.60 L_a$ .

---

\*Except valves, blind flanges, and deactivated automatic valves which are located inside the containment and are locked, sealed or otherwise secured in the closed position. These penetrations shall be verified closed during each COLD SHUTDOWN except that such verification need not be performed more often than once per 92 days.

## CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS

### CONTAINMENT LEAKAGE

#### LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

---

3.6.1.2 Containment leakage rates shall be limited to:

- a. An overall integrated leakage rate of less than or equal to  $L_a$ , 0.30% by weight of the containment air per 24 hours at  $P_a$ , 37.5 psig.
- b. A combined leakage rate of less than  $0.60 L_a$  for all penetrations and valves subject to Type B and C tests, when pressurized to  $P_a$ .

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4.

#### ACTION:

With either the measured overall integrated containment leakage rate exceeding  $0.75 L_a$  or the measured combined leakage rate for all penetrations and valves subject to Types B and C tests exceeding  $0.60 L_a$ , restore the overall integrated leakage rate to less than  $0.75 L_a$  and the combined leakage rate for all penetrations subject to Type B and C tests to less than  $0.60 L_a$  prior to increasing the Reactor Coolant System temperature above 200°F.

#### SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

---

4.6.1.2 The containment leakage rates shall be demonstrated at the following test schedule and shall be determined in conformance with the criteria specified in Appendix J of 10 CFR Part 50 using the methods and provisions of ANSI N45.4-1972:

- a. Three Type A tests (Overall Integrated Containment Leakage Rate) shall be conducted at  $40 \pm 10$  month intervals during shutdown at a pressure not less than  $P_a$ , 37.5 psig, during each 10-year service period. The third test of each set shall be conducted during the shutdown for the 10-year plant inservice inspection;

## CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS

### SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (Continued)

- b. If any periodic Type A test fails to meet  $0.75 L_a$ , the test schedule for subsequent Type A tests shall be reviewed and approved by the Commission. If two consecutive Type A tests fail to meet  $0.75 L_a$ , a Type A test shall be performed at least every 18 months until two consecutive Type A tests meet  $0.75 L_a$  at which time the above test schedule may be resumed;
- c. The accuracy of each Type A test shall be verified by a supplemental test which:
- 1) Confirms the accuracy of the test by verifying that the supplemental test result,  $L_c$ , is in accordance with the appropriate following equation:
$$|L_c - (L_{am} + L_o)| \leq 0.25 L_a$$
where  $L_{am}$  is the measured Type A test leakage and  $L_o$  is the superimposed leak;
  - 2) Has a duration sufficient to establish accurately the change in leakage rate between the Type A test and the supplemental test; and
  - 3) Requires that the rate at which gas is injected into the containment or bled from the containment during the supplemental test is between  $0.75 L_a$  and  $1.25 L_a$ .
- d. Type B and C tests shall be conducted with gas at a pressure not less than  $P_a$ , 37.5 psig, at intervals no greater than 24 months except for tests involving:
- 1) Air locks,
  - 2) Purge supply and exhaust isolation valves with resilient material seals, and
  - 3) Penetrations using continuous Leakage Monitoring Systems.
- e. Air locks shall be tested and demonstrated OPERABLE by the requirements of Specification 4.6.1.3;
- f. Purge supply and exhaust isolation valves with resilient material seals shall be tested and demonstrated OPERABLE by the requirements of Specification 4.6.1.7.2 or 4.6.1.7.3, as applicable;

CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (Continued)

---

- g. Leakage from isolation valves that are sealed with fluid from a Seal System may be excluded, subject to the provisions of Appendix J, Section III.C.3, when determining the combined leakage rate provided the Seal System and valves are pressurized to at least  $1.10 P_a$ , 41.25 psig, and the seal system capacity is adequate to maintain system pressure for at least 30 days;
- h. Type B tests for penetrations employing a continuous Leakage Monitoring System shall be conducted at  $P_a$ , 37.5 psig, at intervals no greater than once per 3 years; and<sup>a</sup>
- i. The provisions of Specification 4.0.2 are not applicable.

## CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS

### CONTAINMENT AIR LOCKS

#### LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

---

3.6.1.3 Each containment air lock shall be OPERABLE with:

- a. Both doors closed except when the air lock is being used for normal transit entry and exit through the containment, then at least one air lock door shall be closed, and
- b. An overall air lock leakage rate of less than or equal to  $0.05 L_a$  at  $P_a$ , 37.5 psig.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4.

#### ACTION:

- a. With one containment air lock door inoperable:
  1. Maintain at least the OPERABLE air lock door closed and either restore the inoperable air lock door to OPERABLE status within 24 hours or lock the OPERABLE air lock door closed;
  2. Operation may then continue until performance of the next required overall air lock leakage test provided that the OPERABLE air lock door is verified to be locked closed at least once per 31 days;
  3. Otherwise, be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours; and
  4. The provisions of Specification 3.0.4 are not applicable.
- b. With the containment air lock inoperable, except as the result of an inoperable air lock door, maintain at least one air lock door closed; restore the inoperable air lock to OPERABLE status within 24 hours or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours.

## CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS

### SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

4.6.1.3 Each containment air lock shall be demonstrated OPERABLE:

- a. Within 72 hours following each closing, except when the air lock is being used for multiple entries, then at least once per 72 hours, by verifying seal leakage is less than  $0.01 L_a$  as determined by precision flow measurements when measured for at least 30 seconds with the volume between the seals at a constant pressure of 37.5 psig;
- b. By conducting overall air lock leakage tests at not less than  $P_a$ , 37.5 psig, and verifying the overall air lock leakage rate is within its limit:
  - 1) At least once per 6 months,\* and
  - 2) Prior to establishing CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY when maintenance has been performed on the air lock that could affect the air lock sealing capability.\*\*
- c. At least once per 6 months by verifying that only one door in each air lock can be opened at a time.
- d. By verifying at least once per 7 days that the instrument air pressure in the header to the personnel airlock seals is  $\geq 90$  psig.
- e. By verifying the door seal pneumatic system OPERABLE at least once per 18 months by conducting a seal pneumatic system leak test and verifying that system pressure does not decay more than 1.5 psi from 90 psig minimum within 24 hours.

---

\*The provisions of Specification 4.0.2 are not applicable.

\*\*This represents an exemption to Appendix J, paragraph III.D.2 of 10 CFR Part 50.



CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS

INTERNAL PRESSURE

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

---

3.6.1.4 Primary containment internal pressure shall be maintained between -0.1 and +0.3 psig.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4.

ACTION:

With the containment internal pressure outside of the limits above, restore the internal pressure to within the limits within 1 hour or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

---

4.6.1.4 The primary containment internal pressure shall be determined to be within the limits at least once per 12 hours.

CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS

AIR TEMPERATURE

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

---

3.6.1.5 Primary containment average air temperature shall not exceed 120°F.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4.

ACTION:

With the containment average air temperature greater than 120°F, reduce the average air temperature to within the limit within 8 hours, or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

---

4.6.1.5 The primary containment average air temperature shall be the arithmetical average of a minimum of four RCFC inlet temperatures and shall be determined at least once per 24 hours.

## CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS

### CONTAINMENT STRUCTURAL INTEGRITY

#### LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.6.1.6 The structural integrity of the containment shall be maintained at a level consistent with the acceptance criteria in Specification 4.6.1.6.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4.

#### ACTION:

- a. With more than one tendon with an observed lift-off force between the predicted lower limit and 90% of the predicted lower limit or with one tendon below 90% of the predicted lower limit, restore the tendon(s) to the required level of integrity within 15 days and perform an engineering evaluation of the containment and provide a Special Report to the Commission within 30 days in accordance with Specification 6.9.2 or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours.
- b. With any abnormal degradation of the structural integrity other than ACTION a. at a level below the acceptance criteria of Specification 4.6.1.6, restore the containment to the required level of integrity within 72 hours and perform an engineering evaluation of the containment and provide a Special Report to the Commission within 15 days in accordance with Specification 6.9.2 or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours.

#### SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

4.6.1.6.1 Containment Tendons. The containment tendons' structural integrity shall be demonstrated at the end of 1, 3, and 5 years following the initial containment structural integrity test and at 5-year intervals thereafter. The tendons' structural integrity shall be demonstrated by:

- a. Determining that a random but representative sample of at least 13 tendons (4 inverted U and 9 hoop) each have an observed lift-off force within predicted limits for each. For each subsequent inspection, one tendon from each group may be kept unchanged to develop a history and to correlate the observed data. If the observed lift-off force of any one tendon in the original sample population lies between the predicted lower limit and 90% of the predicted lower limit, two tendons, one on each side of this tendon, should be checked for their lift-off forces. If both of these adjacent tendons are found to be within their predicted limits, all three tendons should be restored to the required level of integrity. This single deficiency may be considered unique and acceptable. Unless there is abnormal degradation of the containment during the first three inspections, the sample population for subsequent inspections shall include at least 5 tendons (2 inverted U and 3 hoop);

## CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS

### SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (Continued)

- b. Performing tendon detensioning, inspections, and material tests on a previously stressed tendon from each group (inverted U and hoop). A randomly selected tendon from each group shall be completely detensioned in order to identify broken or damaged wires and determining that over the entire length of the removed wire that:
- 1) The tendon wires are free of corrosion, cracks, and damage,
  - 2) There are not changes in the presence or physical appearance of the sheathing filler grease, and
  - 3) A minimum tensile strength of 240,000 psi (guaranteed ultimate strength of the tendon material) for at least three wire samples (one from each end and one at mid-length) cut from each removed wire. Failure of any one of the wire samples to meet the minimum tensile strength test is evidence of abnormal degradation of the containment structure.
- c. Performing tendon retensioning of those tendons detensioned for inspection to their observed lift-off force with a tolerance limit of +6%. During retensioning of these tendons, the changes in load and elongation should be measured simultaneously at 20%, 60%, and 100% of the maximum jacking force. If the elongation corresponding to a specific load differs by more than 5% from that recorded during installation, an investigation should be made to ensure that the difference is not related to wire failures or slip of wires in anchorages;
- d. Assuring the observed lift-off stresses exceed the average minimum design value given below, which are adjusted to account for elastic and time dependent losses; and
- |                |         |
|----------------|---------|
| Inverted U     | 126 ksi |
| Hoop: Cylinder | 128 ksi |
| Dome           | 123 ksi |
- e. Verifying the OPERABILITY of the sheathing filler grease by:
- 1) No voids in excess of 5% of the net duct volume i,
  - 2) Minimum grease coverage exists for the different parts of the anchorage system, and
  - 3) The chemical properties of the filler material are within the tolerance limits as specified by the manufacturer.

## CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS

### SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (Continued)

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4.6.1.6.2 End Anchorages and Adjacent Concrete Surfaces. The structural integrity of the end anchorages of all tendons inspected pursuant to Specification 4.6.1.6.1 and the adjacent concrete surfaces shall be demonstrated by determining through inspection that no apparent changes have occurred in the visual appearance of the end anchorage or the concrete crack patterns adjacent to the end anchorages. Inspections of the concrete shall be performed during the Type A containment leakage rate tests (reference Specification 4.6.1.2) while the containment is at its maximum test pressure.

4.6.1.6.3 Containment Surfaces. The structural integrity of the exposed accessible interior and exterior surfaces of the containment, including the liner plate, shall be determined during the shutdown for each Type A containment leakage rate test (reference Specification 4.6.1.2) by a visual inspection of these surfaces. This inspection shall be performed prior to the Type A containment leakage rate test to verify no apparent changes in appearance or other abnormal degradation.

## CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS

### CONTAINMENT VENTILATION SYSTEM

#### LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

---

3.6.1.7 Each containment purge supply and exhaust isolation valve shall be OPERABLE and:

- a. Each 48-inch containment shutdown purge supply and exhaust isolation valve shall be closed and sealed closed, and
- b. The 18-inch supplementary containment purge supply and exhaust isolation valves shall be closed to the maximum extent practicable but may be open for supplementary purge system operation for pressure control, for ALARA and respirable air quality considerations for personnel entry and for surveillance tests that require the valves to be open.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4.

#### ACTION:

- a. With a 48-inch containment purge supply and/or exhaust isolation valve open or not sealed closed, close and/or seal close that valve or isolate the penetration(s) within 4 hours, otherwise be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours.
- b. With the 18-inch supplementary containment purge supply and/or exhaust isolation valve(s) open for reasons other than given in Specification 3.6.1.7.b. above, close the open 18-inch valve(s) or isolate the penetration(s) within 4 hours, otherwise be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours, and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours.
- c. With a containment purge supply and/or exhaust isolation valve(s) having a measured leakage rate in excess of the limits of Specifications 4.6.1.7.2 and/or 4.6.1.7.3, restore the inoperable valve(s) to OPERABLE status or isolate the penetrations so that the measured leakage rate does not exceed the limits of Specifications 4.6.1.7.2 and/or 4.6.1.7.3 within 24 hours, otherwise be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours, and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours.

## CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS

### SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

---

4.6.1.7.1 Each 48-inch containment purge supply and exhaust isolation valve shall be verified to be sealed closed at least once per 31 days.

4.6.1.7.2 At least once per 6 months on a STAGGERED TEST BASIS, the inboard and outboard isolation valves with resilient material seals in each sealed closed 48-inch containment purge supply and exhaust penetration shall be demonstrated OPERABLE by verifying that the measured leakage rate is less than  $0.05 L_a$  when pressurized to  $P_a$ .

4.6.1.7.3 At least once per 3 months each 18-inch supplementary containment purge supply and exhaust isolation valve with resilient material seals shall be demonstrated OPERABLE by verifying that the measured leakage rate is less than  $0.01 L_a$  when pressurized to  $P_a$ .

4.6.1.7.4 At least once per 31 days each 18-inch supplementary containment purge supply and exhaust isolation valve shall be verified to be closed or open in accordance with Specification 3.6.1.7.b.

## CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS

### 3/4.6.2 DEPRESSURIZATION AND COOLING SYSTEMS

#### CONTAINMENT SPRAY SYSTEM

##### LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.6.2.1 Three independent Containment Spray Systems shall be OPERABLE with each Spray System capable of taking suction from the RWST and transferring suction to the containment sump.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4.

##### ACTION:

With one Containment Spray System inoperable, restore the inoperable Spray System to OPERABLE status within 72 hours or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours; restore the inoperable Spray System to OPERABLE status within the next 48 hours or be in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours.

##### SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

4.6.2.1 Each Containment Spray System shall be demonstrated OPERABLE:

- a. At least once per 31 days by verifying that each valve (manual, power-operated, or automatic) in the flow path that is not locked, sealed, or otherwise secured in position, is in its correct position;
- b. By verifying, that on recirculation flow, each pump develops a differential pressure of greater than or equal to 283 psid when tested pursuant to Specification 4.0.5;
- c. At least once per 18 months during shutdown, by:
  - 1) Verifying that each automatic valve in the flow path actuates to its correct position on a Containment Pressure High 3 test signal, and
  - 2) Verifying that each spray pump starts automatically on a Containment Pressure High 3 test signal coincident with a sequencer start signal.
- d. At least once per 5 years by performing an air or smoke flow test through each spray header and verifying each spray nozzle is unobstructed.



## CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS

### SPRAY ADDITIVE SYSTEM

#### LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

---

3.6.2.2 The Spray Additive System shall be OPERABLE with:

- a. Three spray additive tanks each containing a volume of between 1061 and 1342 gallons of between 30 and 32% by weight NaOH solution, and
- b. Three spray additive eductors each capable of adding NaOH solution from its associated spray additive tank to its Containment Spray System pump flow.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4.

#### ACTION:

With the Spray Additive System inoperable, restore the system to OPERABLE status within 72 hours or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours; restore the Spray Additive System to OPERABLE status within the next 48 hours or be in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours.

#### SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

---

4.6.2.2 The Spray Additive System shall be demonstrated OPERABLE:

- a. At least once per 31 days by verifying that each valve (manual, power-operated, or automatic) in the flow path that is not locked, sealed, or otherwise secured in position, is in its correct position;
- b. At least once per 6 months by:
  - 1) Verifying the contained solution volume in each spray additive tank, and
  - 2) Verifying the concentration of the NaOH solution by chemical analysis.
- c. At least once per 18 months during shutdown, by verifying that each automatic valve in the flow path actuates to its correct position on a Containment Pressure High 3 test signal; and

## CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS

### SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (Continued)

---

- d. At least once per 5 years by verifying:
- 1) Each eductor suction flow rate is greater than or equal to 30 gpm using the RWST as the test source to the eductor inlet, and under the following conditions:
    - a) CS pump suction pressure is  $\geq$  15 psig,
    - b) Valve CS0019A, B, or C, as applicable, is in the full open position, and
    - c) CS pump recirculation flow rate to the RWST is 800 gpm  $\pm$  100 gpm.
  - 2) The lines between the spray additive tank and the eductors are not blocked by verifying flow.

## CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS

### CONTAINMENT COOLING SYSTEM

#### LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

---

3.6.2.3 Three independent groups of Reactor Containment Fan Coolers (RCFC) shall be OPERABLE with a minimum of two units in two groups and one unit in the third group.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4.

#### ACTION:

With one group of the above required Reactor Containment Fan Coolers inoperable, restore the inoperable group of RCFC to OPERABLE status within 72 hours or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours.

#### SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

---

4.6.2.3 Each group of Reactor Containment Fan Coolers shall be demonstrated OPERABLE:

- a. At least once per 31 days by:
  - 1) Starting each non-operating fan group from the control room, and verifying that each fan group operates for at least 15 minutes, and
  - 2) Verifying a cooling water flow rate of greater than or equal to 550 gpm to each cooler.
- b. At least once per 18 months by verifying that each fan group starts automatically on a Safety Injection test signal.

## CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS

### 3/4.6.3 CONTAINMENT ISOLATION VALVES

#### LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.6.3 The containment isolation valves shall be OPERABLE with isolation times less than or equal to the required isolation times.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4.

#### ACTION:

With one or more of the isolation valve(s) inoperable, maintain at least one isolation valve OPERABLE in each affected penetration that is open and:

- a. Restore the inoperable valve(s) to OPERABLE status within 4 hours, or
- b. Isolate each affected penetration within 4 hours by use of at least one deactivated automatic valve secured in the isolation position, or
- c. Isolate each affected penetration within 4 hours by use of at least one closed manual valve or blind flange, or
- d. Be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours.

#### SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

4.6.3.1 The isolation valves shall be demonstrated OPERABLE prior to returning the valve to service after maintenance, repair or replacement work is performed on the valve or its associated actuator, control or power circuit by performance of a cycling test, and verification of isolation time.

4.6.3.2 Each isolation valve shall be demonstrated OPERABLE during the COLD SHUTDOWN or REFUELING MODE at least once per 18 months by:

- a. Verifying that on a Phase "A" Isolation test signal, each Phase "A" isolation valve actuates to its isolation position;
- b. Verifying that on a Containment Ventilation Isolation test signal, each purge and exhaust valve actuates to its isolation position; and
- c. Verifying that on a Phase "B" Isolation test signal, each Phase "B" isolation valve actuates to its isolation position.

4.6.3.3 The isolation time of each power-operated or automatic valve shall be determined to be within its limit when tested pursuant to Specification 4.0.5.

## CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS

### 3/4.6.4 COMBUSTIBLE GAS CONTROL

#### HYDROGEN ANALYZERS

#### LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

---

3.6.4.1 Two independent containment hydrogen analyzers shall be OPERABLE.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1 and 2.

#### ACTION:

- a. With one hydrogen analyzer inoperable, restore the inoperable analyzer to OPERABLE status within 30 days or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours.
- b. With both hydrogen analyzers inoperable, restore at least one analyzer to OPERABLE status within 72 hours or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours.

#### SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

---

4.6.4.1 Each hydrogen analyzer shall be demonstrated OPERABLE by the performance of a CHANNEL CHECK at least once per 12 hours, an ANALOG CHANNEL OPERATIONAL TEST at least once per 31 days, a channel OPERABILITY verification at least once per 92 days on a STAGGERED TEST BASIS using sample gas containing one volume percent hydrogen, balance nitrogen, and by performing a CHANNEL CALIBRATION at least once per 18 months using sample gas containing ten volume percent hydrogen, balance nitrogen.

## CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS

### ELECTRIC HYDROGEN RECOMBINERS

#### LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

---

3.6.4.2 Two independent Hydrogen Recombiner Systems shall be OPERABLE.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1 and 2.

ACTION:

With one Hydrogen Recombiner System inoperable, restore the inoperable system to OPERABLE status within 30 days or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours.

#### SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

---

4.6.4.2 Each Hydrogen Recombiner System shall be demonstrated OPERABLE:

- a. At least once per 6 months by verifying, during a Hydrogen Recombiner System functional test, that the minimum heater sheath temperature increases to greater than or equal to 1000°F within 90 minutes at 52 kW. Upon reaching 1000°F, increase the power setting to maximum power for 2 minutes and verify that the power meter reads greater than or equal to 65 kW, and
- b. At least once per 18 months by:
  - 1) Performing a CHANNEL CALIBRATION of all recombiner instrumentation and control circuits,
  - 2) Verifying through a visual examination that there is no evidence of abnormal conditions within the recombiner enclosure (i.e., loose wiring or structural connections, deposits of foreign materials, etc.), and
  - 3) Verifying the integrity of all heater electrical circuits by performing a resistance to ground test following the above required functional test. The resistance to ground for any heater phase shall be greater than or equal to 10,000 ohms.

### 3/4.7 PLANT SYSTEMS

#### 3/4.7.1 TURBINE CYCLE

##### SAFETY VALVES

##### LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

---

3.7.1.1 All main steam line Code safety valves associated with each steam generator shall be OPERABLE with lift settings as specified in Table 3.7-2.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, and 3.

ACTION:

- a. With four reactor coolant loops and associated steam generators in operation and with one or more main steam line Code safety valves inoperable, operation in MODES 1, 2, and 3 may proceed provided that within 4 hours, either the inoperable valve is restored to OPERABLE status or the Power Range Neutron Flux High Trip Setpoint is reduced per Table 3.7-1; otherwise, be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours.
- b. The provisions of Specification 3.0.4 are not applicable.

##### SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

---

4.7.1.1 No additional requirements other than those required by Specification 4.0.5.

TABLE 3.7-1

MAXIMUM ALLOWABLE POWER RANGE NEUTRON FLUX HIGH SETPOINT WITH  
INOPERABLE STEAM LINE SAFETY VALVES DURING 4 LOOP OPERATION

MAXIMUM NUMBER OF INOPERABLE  
SAFETY VALVES ON ANY  
OPERATING STEAM GENERATOR

MAXIMUM ALLOWABLE POWER RANGE  
NEUTRON FLUX HIGH SETPOINT  
(PERCENT OF RATED THERMAL POWER)

1	87
2	65
3	43



TABLE 3.7-2

STEAM LINE SAFETY VALVES PER LOOP

<u>VALVE NUMBER</u>					<u>LIFT SETTING (<math>\pm 1\%</math>)*</u>	<u>ORIFICE SIZE</u>
	<u>LOOP A</u>	<u>LOOP B</u>	<u>LOOP C</u>	<u>LOOP D</u>		
1.	PSV-7410	PSV-7420	PSV-7430	PSV-7440	1285 psig	16 in. <sup>2</sup>
2.	PSV-7410A	PSV-7420A	PSV-7430A	PSV-7440A	1295 psig	16 in. <sup>2</sup>
3.	PSV-7410B	PSV-7420B	PSV-7430B	PSV-7440B	1305 psig	16 in. <sup>2</sup>
4.	PSV-7410C	PSV-7420C	PSV-7430C	PSV-7440C	1315 psig	16 in. <sup>2</sup>
5.	PSV-7410D	PSV-7420D	PSV-7430D	PSV-7440D	1325 psig	16 in. <sup>2</sup>

\*The lift setting pressure shall correspond to ambient conditions of the valve at nominal operating temperature and pressure.

## PLANT SYSTEMS

### AUXILIARY FEEDWATER SYSTEM

#### LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

---

3.7.1.2 At least four independent steam generator auxiliary feedwater pumps and associated flow paths shall be OPERABLE with:

- a. Three motor-driven auxiliary feedwater pumps, each capable of being powered from separate emergency busses, and
- b. One steam turbine-driven auxiliary feedwater pump capable of being powered from an OPERABLE steam supply system.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, and 3.

#### ACTION:

- a. With the Train A motor-driven auxiliary feedwater pump inoperable, initiate corrective actions to restore the pump to OPERABLE status as soon as possible. The provisions of Specification 4.0.4 are not applicable.
- b. With any of the following combinations of auxiliary feedwater pumps inoperable:
  - 1) Train B or Train C motor-driven pump,
  - 2) Train D turbine-driven pump and any one motor-driven pump,
  - 3) Train A and either Train B or Train C motor-driven pump, or
  - 4) Train D turbine-driven pump

Restore the affected auxiliary feedwater pump(s) to OPERABLE status within 72 hours or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours and in HOT SHUTDOWN within the following 6 hours.

- c. With Train B and Train C motor driven pumps, or any three auxiliary feedwater pumps inoperable, be in at least HOT STANDBY within 6 hours and in HOT SHUTDOWN within the following 6 hours.
- d. With four auxiliary feedwater pumps inoperable, immediately initiate corrective action to restore at least one auxiliary feedwater pump to OPERABLE status as soon as possible.

#### SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

---

4.7.1.2.1 Each auxiliary feedwater pump shall be demonstrated OPERABLE:

- a. At least once per 31 days on a STAGGERED TEST BASIS by:
  - 1) Verifying that each motor-driven pump develops a discharge pressure of greater than or equal to 1454 psig at a flow of greater than or equal to 540 gpm;
  - 2) Verifying that the steam turbine-driven pump develops a discharge pressure of greater than or equal to 1454 psig at a flow of greater than or equal to 540 gpm when the secondary steam supply pressure is greater than 1000 psig. The provisions of Specification 4.0.4 are not applicable for entry into MODE 3;

## PLANT SYSTEMS

### SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (Continued)

---

- 3) Verifying that each non-automatic valve in the flow path that is not locked, sealed, or otherwise secured in position is in its correct position; and
  - 4) Verifying that each automatic valve in the flow path is in the correct position whenever the Auxiliary Feedwater System is placed in automatic control or when above 10% RATED THERMAL POWER.
- b. At least once per 18 months during shutdown by:
- 1) Verifying that each automatic valve in the flow path actuates to its correct position upon receipt of an Auxiliary Feedwater Actuation test signal, and
  - 2) Verifying that each auxiliary feedwater pump starts as designed automatically upon receipt of an Auxiliary Feedwater Actuation test signal.
  - 3) Verifying that each auxiliary feedwater flow regulating valve limits the flow to each steam generator between 550 gpm and 675 gpm.

4.7.1.2.2 An auxiliary feedwater flow path to each steam generator shall be demonstrated OPERABLE following each COLD SHUTDOWN of greater than 30 days prior to entering MODE 2 by verifying normal flow to each steam generator.

PLANT SYSTEMS

AUXILIARY FEEDWATER STORAGE TANK

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

---

3.7.1.3 The auxiliary feedwater storage tank (AFST) shall be OPERABLE with a contained water volume of at least 518,000 gallons of water.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, and 3.

ACTION:

With the AFST inoperable, within 4 hours restore the AFST to OPERABLE status or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours and in HOT SHUTDOWN within the following 6 hours.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

---

4.7.1.3 The AFST shall be demonstrated OPERABLE at least once per 12 hours by verifying the contained water volume is within its limits.

PLANT SYSTEMS

SPECIFIC ACTIVITY

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

---

3.7.1.4 The specific activity of the Secondary Coolant System shall be less than or equal to 0.1 microCurie/gram DOSE EQUIVALENT I-131.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4.

ACTION:

With the specific activity of the Secondary Coolant System greater than 0.1 microCurie/gram DOSE EQUIVALENT I-131, be in at least HOT STANDBY within 6 hours and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

---

4.7.1.4 The specific activity of the Secondary Coolant System shall be determined to be within the limit by performance of the sampling and analysis program of Table 4.7-1.

TABLE 4.7-1

SECONDARY COOLANT SYSTEM SPECIFIC ACTIVITY

SAMPLE AND ANALYSIS PROGRAM

<u>TYPE OF MEASUREMENT AND ANALYSIS</u>	<u>SAMPLE AND ANALYSIS FREQUENCY</u>
1. Gross Radioactivity Determination	At least once per 72 hours.
2. Isotopic Analysis for DOSE EQUIVALENT I-131 Concentration	a) Once per 31 days, when- ever the gross radio- activity determination indicates concentrations greater than 10% of the allowable limit for radioiodines.  b) Once per 6 months, when- ever the gross radio- activity determination indicates concentrations less than or equal to 10% of the allowable limit for radioiodines.

## PLANT SYSTEMS

### MAIN STEAM LINE ISOLATION VALVES

#### LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

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3.7.1.5 Each main steam line isolation valve (MSIV) shall be OPERABLE.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, and 3.

#### ACTION:

##### MODE 1:

With one MSIV inoperable but open, POWER OPERATION may continue provided the inoperable valve is restored to OPERABLE status within 4 hours; otherwise be in HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours and in HOT SHUTDOWN within the following 6 hours.

##### MODES 2 and 3:

With one MSIV inoperable, subsequent operation in MODE 2 or 3 may proceed provided the isolation valve is maintained closed. Otherwise, be in HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours and in HOT SHUTDOWN within the following 6 hours.

#### SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

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4.7.1.5 Each MSIV shall be demonstrated OPERABLE by verifying full closure within 5 seconds when tested pursuant to Specification 4.0.5. The provisions of Specification 4.0.4 are not applicable for entry into MODE 3.

## PLANT SYSTEMS

### ATMOSPHERIC STEAM RELIEF VALVES

#### LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

---

3.7.1.6 At least four atmospheric steam relief valves and associated manual controls shall be OPERABLE.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4.\*

ACTION:

- a. With one less than the required atmospheric steam relief valves OPERABLE, restore the required atmospheric steam relief valves to OPERABLE status within 7 days; or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours and in HOT SHUTDOWN within the following 6 hours and place the required RCS/RHR loops in operation for decay heat removal.
- b. With two less than the required atmospheric relief valves OPERABLE, restore at least three atmospheric relief valves to OPERABLE status within 72 hours or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours and in HOT SHUTDOWN within the following 6 hours and place the required RCS/RHR loops in operation for decay heat removal.

#### SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

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4.7.1.6 Each atmospheric relief valve and associated manual controls shall be demonstrated OPERABLE prior to startup following any refueling shutdown or COLD SHUTDOWN of 30 days or longer, verify that all valves will open and close fully by operations of manual controls.

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\*When steam generators are being used for decay heat removal.



## PLANT SYSTEMS

### 3/4.7.2 STEAM GENERATOR PRESSURE/TEMPERATURE LIMITATION

#### LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

---

3.7.2 The temperatures of both the reactor and secondary coolants in the steam generators shall be greater than 70°F when the pressure of either coolant in the steam generator is greater than 200 psig.

APPLICABILITY: At all times.

#### ACTION:

With the requirements of the above specification not satisfied:

- a. Reduce the steam generator pressure of the applicable side to less than or equal to 200 psig within 30 minutes, and
- b. Perform an engineering evaluation to determine the effect of the overpressurization on the structural integrity of the steam generator. Determine that the steam generator remains acceptable for continued operation prior to increasing its temperatures above 200°F.

#### SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

---

4.7.2 The pressure in each side of the steam generator shall be determined to be less than 200 psig at least once per hour when the temperature of either the reactor or secondary coolant is less than 70°F.

## PLANT SYSTEMS

### 3/4.7.3 COMPONENT COOLING WATER SYSTEM

#### LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

---

3.7.3 At least three independent component cooling water loops shall be OPERABLE.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4.

ACTION:

With only two component cooling water loops OPERABLE, restore at least three loops to OPERABLE status within 72 hours or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours.

#### SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

---

4.7.3 At least three component cooling water loops shall be demonstrated OPERABLE:

- a. At least once per 31 days by verifying that each valve outside containment (manual, power-operated, or automatic) servicing safety-related equipment that is not locked, sealed, or otherwise secured in position is in its correct position; and
- b. At least once per 18 months during shutdown, by verifying that:
  - 1) Each automatic valve servicing safety-related equipment or isolating the non-nuclear safety portion of the system actuates to its correct position on a Safety Injection, Loss of Offsite Power, Containment Phase "B" Isolation, or Low Surge Tank test signal, as applicable,
  - 2) Each Component Cooling Water System pump starts automatically on a Safety Injection or Loss of Offsite Power test signal, and
  - 3) The surge tank level instrumentation which provides automatic isolation of the non-safety-related portion of the system is demonstrated OPERABLE by performance of a CHANNEL CALIBRATION test.
- c. By verifying that each valve inside containment (manual, power-operated, or automatic) servicing safety-related equipment that is not locked, sealed, or otherwise secured in position is in its correct position prior to entering MODE 4 following each COLD SHUTDOWN of greater than 72 hours if not performed within the previous 31 days.

PLANT SYSTEMS

3/4.7.4 ESSENTIAL COOLING WATER SYSTEM

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.7.4 At least three independent essential cooling water loops shall be OPERABLE.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4.

ACTION:

With only two essential cooling water loops OPERABLE, restore at least three loops to OPERABLE status within 72 hours or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

4.7.4 At least three essential cooling water loops shall be demonstrated OPERABLE:

- a. At least once per 31 days by verifying that each valve (manual, power-operated, or automatic) servicing safety-related equipment that is not locked, sealed, or otherwise secured in position is in its correct position;
- b. At least once per 18 months during shutdown, by verifying that:
  - 1) Each automatic valve servicing safety-related equipment actuates to its correct position on a Safety Injection, ECW pump start, screen wash booster pump start and essential chiller start test signals, as applicable,
  - 2) Each Essential Cooling Water pump starts automatically on a Safety Injection or a Loss of Offsite Power test signal, and
  - 3) Each screen wash booster pump and the traveling screen start automatically on a Safety Injection test signal.

## PLANT SYSTEMS

### 3/4.7.5 ULTIMATE HEAT SINK

#### LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

---

3.7.5 The ultimate heat sink shall be OPERABLE with:

- a. A minimum water level at or above elevation 25.5 feet Mean Sea Level, USGS datum, and
- b. An Essential Cooling Water intake temperature of less than or equal to 99°F.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4.

#### ACTION:

With the requirements of the above specification not satisfied, be in at least HOT STANDBY within 6 hours and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours.

#### SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

---

4.7.5 The ultimate heat sink shall be determined OPERABLE at least once per 24 hours by verifying the intake water temperature and water level to be within their limits.

PLANT SYSTEMS

3/4.7.6 (This specification number is not used.)

## PLANT SYSTEMS

### 3/4.7.7 CONTROL ROOM MAKEUP AND CLEANUP FILTRATION SYSTEM

#### LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.7.7 Three independent Control Room Makeup and Cleanup Filtration Systems shall be OPERABLE.

APPLICABILITY: All MODES.

#### ACTION:

MODES 1, 2, 3 and 4:

- a. With one Control Room Makeup and Cleanup Filtration System inoperable, restore the inoperable system to OPERABLE status within 7 days or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours.
- b. With two Control Room Makeup and Cleanup Filtration Systems inoperable, restore at least two systems to OPERABLE status within 24 hours or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours.

MODES 5 and 6:

- a. With one Control Room Makeup and Cleanup Filtration System inoperable, restore the inoperable system to OPERABLE status within 7 days or initiate and maintain operation of the remaining OPERABLE Control Room Makeup and Cleanup Filtration Systems in the recirculation and makeup air filtration mode.
- b. With two Control Room Makeup and Cleanup Filtration Systems inoperable, or with the OPERABLE Control Room Makeup and Cleanup Filtration System, required to be in the recirculation and makeup air filtration mode by ACTION a., not capable of being powered by an OPERABLE emergency power source, suspend all operations involving CORE ALTERATIONS or positive reactivity changes.

#### SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

4.7.7 Each Control Room Makeup and Cleanup Filtration System shall be demonstrated OPERABLE:

- a. At least once per 12 hours by verifying that the control room air temperature is less than or equal to 78°F;
- b. At least once per 31 days on a STAGGERED TEST BASIS by initiating, from the control room, flow through the HEPA filters and charcoal adsorbers of the makeup and cleanup air filter units and verifying that the system operates for at least 10 continuous hours with the makeup filter unit heaters operating;

## PLANT SYSTEMS

### SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (Continued)

- c. At least once per 18 months or (1) after any structural maintenance on the HEPA filter or charcoal adsorber housings, or (2) following painting, fire, or chemical release in any ventilation zone communicating with the system by:
- 1) Verifying that the makeup and cleanup systems satisfy the in-place penetration and bypass leakage testing acceptance criteria of less than 0.05% for HEPA filter banks and 0.10% for charcoal adsorber banks and uses the test procedure guidance in Regulatory Positions C.5.a, C.5.c, and C.5.d of Regulatory Guide 1.52, Revision 2, March 1978, and the system flow rate is 6000 cfm  $\pm$  10% for the cleanup units and 1000 cfm  $\pm$  10% for the makeup units;
  - 2) Verifying, within 31 days after removal, that a laboratory analysis of a representative carbon sample obtained in accordance with Regulatory Position C.6.b of Regulatory Guide 1.52, Revision 2, March 1978, meets the laboratory testing criteria of Regulatory Position C.6.a of Regulatory Guide 1.52, Revision 2, March 1978, for a methyl iodide penetration of less than 1.0% when tested at a temperature of 30°C and a relative humidity of 70%; and
  - 3) Verifying a system flow rate of 6000 cfm  $\pm$  10% for the cleanup units and 1000 cfm  $\pm$  10% for the makeup units during system operation when tested in accordance with ANSI N510-1980.
- d. After every 720 hours of charcoal adsorber operation, by verifying, within 31 days after removal, that a laboratory analysis of a representative carbon sample obtained in accordance with Regulatory Position C.6.b of Regulatory Guide 1.52, Revision 2, March 1978, meets the laboratory testing criteria of Regulatory Position C.6.a of Regulatory Guide 1.52, Revision 2, March 1978, for a methyl iodide penetration of less than 1.0% when tested at a temperature of 30°C and a relative humidity of 70%;
- e. At least once per 18 months by:
- 1) Verifying that the pressure drop across the combined HEPA filters and charcoal adsorber banks is less than 6.1 inches Water Gauge for the makeup units and 6.0 inches Water Gauge for the cleanup units while operating the system at a flow rate of 6000 cfm  $\pm$  10% for the cleanup units and 1000 cfm  $\pm$  10% for the makeup units;
  - 2) Verifying that on a control room emergency ventilation test signal (High Radiation and/or Safety Injection test signal), the system automatically switches into a recirculation and makeup air filtration mode of operation with flow through the HEPA filters and charcoal adsorber banks of the cleanup and makeup units;

## PLANT SYSTEMS

### SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (Continued)

- 3) Verifying that the system maintains the control room envelope at a positive pressure of greater than or equal to 1/8 inch Water Gauge at less than or equal to a pressurization flow of 2000 cfm relative to adjacent areas during system operation;
  - 4) Verifying that the makeup filter unit heaters dissipate  $4.5 \pm 0.45$  kW when tested in accordance with ANSI N510-1980; and
  - 5) Verifying that on a High Toxic Gas test signal, the system automatically switches into a recirculation mode of operation by isolating the normal supply and exhaust flow within 25 seconds.
- f. After each complete or partial replacement of a HEPA filter bank, by verifying that the HEPA filter bank satisfies the in-place penetration and bypass leakage testing acceptance criteria of less than 0.05% in accordance with ANSI N510-1980 for a DOP test aerosol while operating the system at a flow rate of  $6000 \text{ cfm} \pm 10\%$  for the cleanup units and  $1000 \text{ cfm} \pm 10\%$  for the makeup units; and
- g. After each complete or partial replacement of a charcoal adsorber bank, by verifying that the charcoal adsorber bank satisfies the in-place penetration and bypass leakage testing acceptance criteria of less than 0.10% in accordance with ANSI N510-1980 for a halogenated hydrocarbon refrigerant test gas while operating the system at a flow rate of  $6000 \text{ cfm} \pm 10\%$  for the cleanup units and  $1000 \text{ cfm} \pm 10\%$  for the makeup units.



## PLANT SYSTEMS

### 3/4.7.8 FUEL HANDLING BUILDING (FHB) EXHAUST AIR SYSTEM

#### LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

---

3.7.8 The FHB Exhaust Air System comprised of the following components shall be OPERABLE:

- a. Two independent exhaust air filter trains,
- b. Three independent exhaust booster fans,
- c. Three independent main exhaust fans, and
- d. Associated dampers.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4.

#### ACTION:

With less than the above FHB Exhaust Air System components OPERABLE but with at least one FHB exhaust air filter train, two FHB exhaust booster fans, two FHB main exhaust fans and associated dampers OPERABLE, restore the inoperable system to OPERABLE status within 7 days or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours.

#### SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

---

4.7.8 The Fuel Handling Building Exhaust Air System shall be demonstrated OPERABLE:

- a. At least once per 31 days on a STAGGERED TEST BASIS by initiating, from the control room, flow through the HEPA filters and charcoal adsorbers and verifying that the system operates for at least 10 continuous hours with the heaters operating with two of the three exhaust booster fans and two of the three main exhaust fans operating to maintain adequate air flow rate;
- b. At least once per 18 months and (1) after any structural maintenance on the HEPA filter or charcoal adsorber housings, or (2) following painting, fire, or chemical release in any ventilation zone communicating with the system by:
  - 1) Verifying that the cleanup system satisfies the in-place penetration and bypass leakage testing acceptance criteria of less than 0.05% for HEPA filter banks and 0.10% for charcoal adsorber banks and uses the test procedure guidance in Regulatory Positions C.5.a, C.5.c, and C.5.d of Regulatory Guide 1.52, Revision 2, March 1978, and the system flow rate is 29,000 cfm  $\pm$  10%;
  - 2) Verifying, within 31 days after removal, that a laboratory analysis of a representative carbon sample obtained in accordance with Regulatory Position C.6.b of Regulatory Guide 1.52,

## PLANT SYSTEMS

### SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (Continued)

Revision 2, March 1978, meets the laboratory testing criteria of Regulatory Position C.6.a of Regulatory Guide 1.52, Revision 2, March 1978, for a methyl iodide penetration of less than 1.0% when tested at a temperature of 30°C and a relative humidity of 70%; and

- 3) Verifying a system flow rate of 29,000 cfm  $\pm$  10% during system operation with two of the three exhaust booster fans and two of the three main exhaust fans operating when tested in accordance with ANSI N510-1980. All combinations of two exhaust booster fans and two main exhaust fans shall be tested.
- c. After every 720 hours of charcoal adsorber operation, by verifying, within 31 days after removal, that a laboratory analysis of a representative carbon sample obtained in accordance with Regulatory Position C.6.b of Regulatory Guide 1.52, Revision 2, March 1978, meets the laboratory testing criteria of Regulatory Position C.6.a of Regulatory Guide 1.52, Revision 2, March 1978, for a methyl iodide penetration of less than 1.0% when tested at a temperature of 30°C and a relative humidity of 70%;
- d. At least once per 18 months by:
- 1) Verifying that the pressure drop across the combined HEPA filters and charcoal adsorber banks is less than 6 inches Water Gauge while operating the system at a flow rate of 29,000 cfm  $\pm$  10%.
  - 2) Verifying that the system starts on High Radiation and Safety Injection test signals and directs flow through the HEPA filters and charcoal adsorbers.
  - 3) Verifying that the system maintains the FHB at a negative pressure of greater than or equal to 1/8 inch Water Gauge relative to the outside atmosphere, and
  - 4) Verifying that the heaters dissipate 50  $\pm$  5 kW when tested in accordance with ANSI N510-1980.
- e. After each complete or partial replacement of a HEPA filter bank, by verifying that the HEPA filter bank satisfies the in-place penetration and bypass leakage testing acceptance criteria of less than 0.05% in accordance with ANSI N510-1980 for a DOP test aerosol while operating the system at a flow rate of 29,000 cfm  $\pm$  10%; and
- f. After each complete or partial replacement of a charcoal adsorber bank, by verifying that the charcoal adsorber bank satisfies the in-place penetration and bypass leakage testing acceptance criteria of less than 0.10% in accordance with ANSI N510-1980 for a halogenated hydrocarbon refrigerant test gas while operating the system at a flow rate of 29,000 cfm  $\pm$  10%.

## PLANT SYSTEMS

### 3/4.7.9 SNUBBERS

#### LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.7.9 All snubbers shall be OPERABLE. The only snubbers excluded from the requirements are those installed on nonsafety-related systems and then only if their failure or failure of the system on which they are installed would have no adverse effect on any safety-related system.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4. MODES 5 and 6 for snubbers located on systems required OPERABLE in those MODES.

#### ACTION:

With one or more snubbers inoperable on any system, within 72 hours replace or restore the inoperable snubber(s) to OPERABLE status and perform an engineering evaluation per Specification 4.7.9g. on the attached component or declare the attached system inoperable and follow the appropriate ACTION statement for that system.

#### SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

4.7.9 Each snubber shall be demonstrated OPERABLE by performance of the following augmented inservice inspection program in lieu of the requirements of Specification 4.0.5.

a. Inspection Types

As used in this specification, type of snubber shall mean snubbers of the same design and manufacturer, irrespective of capacity.

b. Visual Inspections

Snubbers are categorized as inaccessible or accessible during reactor operation. Each of these groups (inaccessible and accessible) may be inspected independently according to the schedule below. The first inservice visual inspection of each type of snubber shall be performed after 4 months but within 10 months of commencing POWER OPERATION and shall include all snubbers. If all snubbers of each type are found OPERABLE during the first inservice visual inspection, the second inservice visual inspection shall be performed at the first refueling outage. Otherwise, subsequent visual inspections shall be performed in accordance with the following schedule:

PLANT SYSTEMS

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (Continued)

b. Visual Inspections (Continued)

<u>No. of Inoperable Snubbers of Each Type per Inspection Period</u>	<u>Subsequent Visual Inspection Period* **</u>
0	18 months $\pm$ 25%
1	12 months $\pm$ 25%
2	6 months $\pm$ 25%
3,4	124 days $\pm$ 25%
5,6,7	62 days $\pm$ 25%
8 or more	31 days $\pm$ 25%

c. Visual Inspection Acceptance Criteria

Visual inspections shall verify that: (1) there are no visible indications of damage or impaired OPERABILITY, (2) attachments to the foundation or supporting structure are functional, and (3) fasteners for attachment of the snubber to the component and to the snubber anchorage are functional. Snubbers which appear inoperable as a result of visual inspections may be determined OPERABLE for the purpose of establishing the next visual inspection interval, provided that: (1) the cause of the rejection is clearly established and remedied for that particular snubber and for other snubbers irrespective of type that may be generically susceptible; and (2) the affected snubber is functionally tested in the as-found condition and determined OPERABLE per Specification 4.7.9f. All snubbers connected to an inoperable common hydraulic fluid reservoir shall be counted as inoperable snubbers.

d. Transient Event Inspection

An inspection shall be performed of all snubbers attached to sections of systems that have experienced unexpected, potentially damaging transients as determined from a review of operational data and a visual inspection of the systems within 6 months following such an event. In addition to satisfying the visual inspection acceptance criteria, freedom-of-motion of mechanical snubbers shall be verified using at least one of the following: (1) manually induced snubber movement; or (2) evaluation of in-place snubber piston setting; or (3) stroking the mechanical snubber through its full range of travel.

\*The inspection interval for each type of snubber shall not be lengthened more than one step at a time unless a generic problem has been identified and corrected; in that event the inspection interval may be lengthened one step the first time and two steps thereafter if no inoperable snubbers of that type are found.

\*\*The provisions of Specification 4.0.2 are not applicable.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (Continued)

e. Functional Tests

During the first refueling shutdown and at least once per 18 months thereafter during shutdown, a representative sample of snubbers of each type shall be tested using one of the following sample plans. The sample plan for each type shall be selected prior to the test period and cannot be changed during the test period. The NRC Regional Administrator shall be notified in writing of the sample plan selected for each snubber type prior to the test period or the sample plan used in the prior test period shall be implemented:

- 1) At least 10% of the total of each type of snubber shall be functionally tested either in-place or in a bench test. For each snubber of a type that does not meet the functional test acceptance criteria of Specification 4.7.9f., an additional 10% of that type of snubber shall be functionally tested until no more failures are found or until all snubbers of that type have been functionally tested; or
- 2) A representative sample of each type of snubber shall be functionally tested in accordance with Figure 4.7-1. "C" is the total number of snubbers of a type found not meeting the acceptance requirements of Specification 4.7.9f. The cumulative number of snubbers of a type tested is denoted by "N". At the end of each day's testing, the new values of "N" and "C" (previous day's total plus current day's increments) shall be plotted on Figure 4.7-1. If at any time the point plotted falls in the "Reject" region, all snubbers of that type shall be functionally tested. If at any time the point plotted falls in the "Accept" region, testing of snubbers of that type may be terminated. When the point plotted lies in the "Continue Testing" region, additional snubbers of that type shall be tested until the point falls in the "Accept" region or the "Reject" region, or all the snubbers of that type have been tested; or
- 3) An initial representative sample of 55 snubbers shall be functionally tested. For each snubber type which does not meet the functional test acceptance criteria, another sample of at least one-half the size of the initial sample shall be tested until the total number tested is equal to the initial sample size multiplied by the factor,  $1 + C/2$ , where "C" is the number of snubbers found which do not meet the functional test acceptance criteria. The results from this sample plan shall be plotted using an "Accept" line which follows the equation  $N = 55(1 + C/2)$ . Each snubber point should be plotted as soon as the snubber is tested. If the point plotted falls on or below the "Accept" line, testing of that type of snubber may be terminated.

## PLANT SYSTEMS

### SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (Continued)

#### e. Functional Tests (Continued)

If the point plotted fails above the "Accept" line, testing must continue until the point falls in the "Accept" region or all the snubbers of that type have been tested.

Testing equipment failure during functional testing may invalidate that day's testing and allow that day's testing to resume anew at a later time provided all snubbers tested with the failed equipment during the day of equipment failure are retested. The representative sample selected for the functional test sample plans shall be randomly selected from the snubbers of each type and reviewed before beginning the testing. The review shall ensure, as far as practicable, that they are representative of the various configurations, operating environments, range of size, and capacity of snubbers of each type. Snubbers placed in the same location as snubbers which failed the previous functional test shall be retested at the time of the next functional test but shall not be included in the sample plan. If during the functional testing, additional sampling is required due to failure of only one type of snubber, the functional test results shall be reviewed at that time to determine if additional samples should be limited to the type of snubber which has failed the functional testing.

#### f. Functional Test Acceptance Criteria

The snubber functional test shall verify that:

- 1) Activation (restraining action) is achieved within the specified range in both tension and compression;
- 2) Snubber bleed, or release rate where required, is present in both tension and compression, within the specified range;
- 3) Where required, the force required to initiate or maintain motion of the snubber is within the specified range in both directions of travel; and
- 4) For snubbers specifically required not to displace under continuous load, the ability of the snubber to withstand load without displacement.

Testing methods may be used to measure parameters indirectly or parameters other than those specified if those results can be correlated to the specified parameters through established methods.

## PLANT SYSTEMS .

### SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (Continued)

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#### g. Functional Test Failure Analysis

An engineering evaluation shall be made of each failure to meet the functional test acceptance criteria to determine the cause of the failure. The results of this evaluation shall be used, if applicable, in selecting snubbers to be tested in an effort to determine the OPERABILITY of other snubbers irrespective of type which may be subject to the same failure mode.

For the snubbers found inoperable, an engineering evaluation shall be performed on the components to which the inoperable snubbers are attached. The purpose of this engineering evaluation shall be to determine if the components to which the inoperable snubbers are attached were adversely affected by the inoperability of the snubbers in order to ensure that the component remains capable of meeting the designed service.

If any snubber selected for functional testing either fails to lock up or fails to move, i.e., frozen in place, the cause will be evaluated and, if caused by manufacturer or design deficiency, all snubbers of the same type subject to the same defect shall be functionally tested. This testing requirement shall be independent of the requirements stated in Specification 4.7.9e. for snubbers not meeting the functional test acceptance criteria.

#### h. Functional Testing of Repaired and Replaced Snubbers

Snubbers which fail the visual inspection or the functional test acceptance criteria shall be repaired or replaced. Replacement snubbers and snubbers which have repairs which might affect the functional test results shall be tested to meet the functional test criteria before installation in the unit. Mechanical snubbers shall have met the acceptance criteria subsequent to their most recent service, and the freedom-of-motion test must have been performed within 12 months before being installed in the unit.

#### i. Snubber Service Life Program

The service life of hydraulic and mechanical snubbers shall be monitored to ensure that the service life is not exceeded between surveillance inspections. The maximum expected service life for various seals, springs, and other critical parts shall be determined and established based on engineering information and shall be extended or shortened based on monitored test results and failure history. Critical parts shall be replaced so that the maximum service life will not be exceeded during a period when the snubber is required to be OPERABLE. The parts replacements shall be documented and the documentation shall be retained in accordance with Specification 6.10.3.




FIGURE 4.7-1  
 SAMPLE PLAN 2) FOR SNUBBER FUNCTIONAL TEST



## PLANT SYSTEMS

### 3/4.7.10 SEALED SOURCE CONTAMINATION

#### LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

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3.7.10 Each sealed source containing radioactive material either in excess of 100 microCuries of beta and/or gamma emitting material or 5 microCuries of alpha emitting material shall be free of greater than or equal to 0.005 microCurie of removable contamination.

APPLICABILITY: At all times.

#### ACTION:

- a. With a sealed source having removable contamination in excess of the above limits, immediately withdraw the sealed source from use and either:
  1. Decontaminate and repair the sealed source, or
  2. Dispose of the sealed source in accordance with Commission Regulations.
- b. The provisions of Specification 3.0.3 are not applicable.

#### SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

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4.7.10.1 Test Requirements - Each sealed source shall be tested for leakage and/or contamination by:

- a. The licensee, or
- b. Other persons specifically authorized by the Commission or an Agreement State.

The test method shall have a detection sensitivity of at least 0.005 microCurie per test sample.

4.7.10.2 Test Frequencies - Each category of sealed sources (excluding startup sources and fission detectors previously subjected to core flux) shall be tested at the frequency described below.

- a. Sources in use - At least once per 6 months for all sealed sources containing radioactive materials:
  - 1) With a half-life greater than 30 days (excluding Hydrogen 3), and
  - 2) In any form other than gas.

PLANT SYSTEMS

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (Continued)

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- b. Stored sources not in use - Each sealed source and fission detector shall be tested prior to use or transfer to another licensee unless tested within the previous 6 months. Sealed sources and fission detectors transferred without a certificate indicating the last test date shall be tested prior to being placed into use; and
- c. Startup sources and fission detectors - Each sealed startup source and fission detector shall be tested within 31 days prior to being subjected to core flux or installed in the core and following repair or maintenance to the source.

4.7.10.3 Reports - A report shall be prepared and submitted to the Commission on an annual basis if sealed source or fission detector leakage tests reveal the presence of greater than or equal to 0.005 microCurie of removable contamination.

PLANT SYSTEMS

3.7.11 (This specification number is not used.)

PLANT SYSTEMS

3.7.12 (This specification number is not used.)

## PLANT SYSTEMS

### 3/4.7.13 AREA TEMPERATURE MONITORING

#### LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

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3.7.13 The temperature of each area shown in Table 3.7-3 shall not be exceeded for more than 8 hours or by more than 30°F.

APPLICABILITY: Whenever the equipment in an affected area is required to be OPERABLE.

#### ACTION:

- a. With the temperature inside any QDPS auxiliary processing cabinet exceeding 110°F for more than 12 hours, prepare an engineering evaluation within the next 24 hours to determine the temperature effects on QDPS OPERABILITY and service life. The provisions of Specification 3.0.3 are not applicable.
- b. With one or more areas exceeding the temperature limit(s) shown in Table 3.7-3 for more than 8 hours, prepare and submit to the Commission within 30 days, pursuant to Specification 6.9.2, a Special Report that provides a record of the cumulative time and the amount by which the temperature in the affected area(s) exceeded the limit(s) and an analysis to demonstrate the continued OPERABILITY of the affected equipment. The provisions of Specification 3.0.3 are not applicable.
- c. With one or more areas exceeding the temperature limit(s) shown in Table 3.7-3 by more than 30°F, prepare and submit a Special Report as required by ACTION a. above and within 4 hours either restore the area(s) to within the temperature limit(s) or declare the equipment in the affected area(s) inoperable.

#### SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

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4.7.13 The temperature in each of the areas shown in Table 3.7-3 shall be determined to be within its limit at least once per 12 hours.

TABLE 3.7-3

AREA TEMPERATURE MONITORING

<u>AREA</u>	<u>TEMPERATURE LIMIT (°F)</u>
1. Relay Room (Electrical Auxiliary Building El. 35'0")	≤ 78
2. Switchgear Rooms (Electrical Auxiliary Building El. 10'0", 35'0", 60'0")	≤ 85
3. Electrical Penetration Spaces (Electrical Auxiliary Building El. 10'0", 35'0", 60'0")	≤ 103
4. Safety Injection and Containment Spray Pump Cubicles(Fuel Handling Building El. -29'0")	≤ 101
5. Component Cooling Water Pump Cubicles (Mechanical Auxiliary Building El. 10'0")	≤ 112
6. Centrifugal Charging Pump Cubicles (Mechanical Auxiliary Building El. 10'0")	≤ 132
7. Hydrogen Analyzer Room (Mechanical Auxiliary Building El. 60'0")	≤ 102
8. Boric Acid Transfer Pump Cubicles (Mechanical Auxiliary Building El. 10'0")	≤ 101
9. Standby Diesel Generator Rooms (Diesel Generator Building El. 25'0")	≤ 101*
10. Essential Cooling Water Pump Rooms (Essential Cooling Water Intake Structure El. 34'0")	≤ 101
11. Isolation Valve Cubicles (Isolation Valve Cubicle El. 10' 0")	≤ 101
12. Qualified Display Processing System Rooms (Electrical Auxiliary Building El. 10'0")	≤ 94**

\*Temperature limit is < 120°F when testing the standby diesel generator pursuant to Surveillance Requirement 4.8.1.1.2.e.7).

\*\*Measurement inside QDPS auxiliary processing cabinets.

PLANT SYSTEMS

3/4.7.14 ESSENTIAL CHILLED WATER SYSTEM

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

---

3.7.14 At least three independent Essential Chilled Water System loops shall be OPERABLE.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4.

ACTION:

With only two Essential Chilled Water System loops OPERABLE, restore three loops to OPERABLE status within 72 hours or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

---

4.7.14 The Essential Chilled Water System shall be demonstrated OPERABLE by:

- a. Performance of surveillances as required by Specification 4.0.5, and
- b. At least once per 18 months by demonstrating that the system starts automatically on a Safety Injection test signal.

### 3/4.8 ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS

#### 3/4.8.1 A.C. SOURCES

##### OPERATING

##### LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.8.1.1 As a minimum, the following A.C. electrical power sources shall be OPERABLE:

- a. Two physically independent circuits between the offsite transmission network and the onsite Class 1E Distribution System\*\*, and
- b. Three separate and independent standby diesel generators, each with a separate fuel tank containing a minimum volume of 60,500 gallons of fuel.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4.

##### ACTION:

- a. With one offsite circuit of the above-required A.C. electrical power sources inoperable, demonstrate the OPERABILITY of the remaining A.C. sources by performing Surveillance Requirement 4.8.1.1.1.a within 1 hour and at least once per 8 hours thereafter. Demonstrate the OPERABILITY of each standby diesel generator that has not been successfully tested within the past 24 hours by performing Surveillance Requirement 4.8.1.1.2.a.2) for each such standby diesel generator, separately, within 24 hours. Restore the offsite circuit to OPERABLE status within 72 hours or be in at least HOT SHUTDOWN within the next 12 hours and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 24 hours.
- b. With a standby diesel generator inoperable, demonstrate the OPERABILITY of the above-required A.C. offsite sources by performing Surveillance Requirement 4.8.1.1.1.a within 1 hour and at least once per 8 hours thereafter. If the standby diesel generator became inoperable due to any cause other than preplanned preventive maintenance or testing, demonstrate the OPERABILITY of the remaining OPERABLE standby diesel generators by performing Surveillance Requirement 4.8.1.1.2.a.2) and for each such standby diesel generator, separately, within 24 hours.\* Restore the inoperable standby diesel generator to OPERABLE status within 72 hours or be in at least HOT SHUTDOWN within the next 12 hours and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 24 hours.
- c. With one offsite circuit and one standby diesel generator of the above required A.C. electrical power sources inoperable, demonstrate the OPERABILITY of the remaining A.C. sources by performing Specification 4.8.1.1.1a. within 1 hour and at least once per 8 hours thereafter; and if the standby diesel generator became inoperable due to

\*This test is required to be completed regardless of when the inoperable standby diesel generator is restored to OPERABILITY.

\*\*Loss of one 13.8 kV Standby bus to 4.16 kV ESF bus line constitutes loss of one offsite source. Loss of two 13.8 kV Standby busses to 4.16 kV ESF bus lines constitutes loss of two offsite sources.



## ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS

### LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

#### ACTION (Continued)

any cause other than preplanned preventive maintenance or testing, demonstrate the OPERABILITY of the remaining OPERABLE standby diesel generators by performing Surveillance Requirement 4.8.1.1.2a.2) within 8 hours\*; restore at least one of the inoperable sources to OPERABLE status within 12 hours or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours. Restore at least two offsite circuits and three standby diesel generators to OPERABLE status within 72 hours from the time of initial loss or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours.

- d. With one standby diesel generator inoperable in addition to ACTION b. or c. above, verify that:
1. All required systems, subsystems, trains, components, and devices that depend on the remaining OPERABLE diesel generator as a source of emergency power are also OPERABLE, and
  2. When in MODE 1, 2, or 3, the steam-driven auxiliary feedwater pump is OPERABLE.

If these conditions are not satisfied within 2 hours be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours.

- e. With two of the above required offsite A.C. circuits inoperable, demonstrate the OPERABILITY of three standby diesel generators by performing the requirements of Specification 4.8.1.1.2a.2) within 8 hours unless the standby diesel generators are already operating; restore at least one of the inoperable offsite sources to OPERABLE status within 24 hours or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours. With only one offsite source restored, restore at least two offsite circuits to OPERABLE status within 72 hours from time of initial loss or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours.
- f. With two or three of the above required standby diesel generators inoperable, demonstrate the OPERABILITY of two offsite A.C. circuits by performing the requirements of Specification 4.8.1.1.1a. within 1 hour and at least once per 8 hours thereafter; restore at least two standby diesel generators to OPERABLE status within 2 hours or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours. Restore at least three standby diesel generators to OPERABLE status within 72 hours from time of initial loss or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours.

\*This test is required to be completed regardless of when the inoperable standby diesel generator is restored to OPERABILITY.

## ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS

### SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

4.8.1.1.1 Each of the above required independent circuits between the offsite transmission network and the Onsite Class 1E Distribution System shall be:

- a. Determined OPERABLE at least once per 7 days by verifying correct breaker alignments, indicated power availability, and
- b. Demonstrated OPERABLE at least once per 18 months during shutdown by transferring the unit power supply from the normal circuit to each of the alternate circuits.

4.8.1.1.2 Each standby diesel generator shall be demonstrated OPERABLE:

- a. In accordance with the frequency specified in Table 4.8-1 on a STAGGERED TEST BASIS by:
  - 1) Verifying the fuel level in its associated fuel tank,
  - 2) Verifying the diesel starts from ambient condition and accelerates to 600 rpm (nominal) in less than or equal to 10 seconds.\* The generator voltage and frequency shall be  $4160 \pm 416$  volts and  $60 \pm 1.2$  Hz within 10 seconds\* after the start signal. The diesel generator shall be started for this test by using one of the following signals:
    - a) Manual, or
    - b) Simulated loss-of-offsite power by itself, or
    - c) Simulated loss-of-offsite power in conjunction with a Safety Injection test signal, or
    - d) A Safety Injection test signal by itself.
  - 3) Verifying the generator is synchronized, loaded to greater than or equal to 5500 kW in less than or equal to 10 minutes\*, and operates with a load greater than or equal to 5500 kW for at least 60 minutes, and
  - 4) Verifying the standby diesel generator is aligned to provide standby power to the associated emergency busses.

\*These diesel generator starts from ambient conditions shall be performed only once per 184 days in these surveillance tests and all other engine starts for the purpose of this surveillance testing shall be preceded by an engine prelube period and/or other warmup procedures such as gradual loading (>150 sec) recommended by the manufacturer so that the mechanical stress and wear on the diesel engine is minimized.

## ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS

### SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (Continued)

- b. At least once per 31 days and after each operation of the diesel where the period of operation was greater than or equal to 1 hour by checking for and removing accumulated water from its associated fuel tank;
- c. By sampling new fuel oil in accordance with ASTM-D4057 prior to addition to storage tanks and:
  - 1) By verifying in accordance with the tests specified in ASTM-D975-81 prior to addition to the storage tanks that the sample has:
    - a) An API Gravity of within 0.3 degrees at 60°F, or a specific gravity of within 0.0016 at 60/60°F, when compared to the supplier's certificate, or an absolute specific gravity at 60/60°F of greater than or equal to 0.83 but less than or equal to 0.89, or an API gravity of greater than or equal to 27 degrees but less than or equal to 39 degrees;
    - b) A kinematic viscosity at 40°C of greater than or equal to 1.9 centistokes, but less than or equal to 4.1 centistokes if gravity was not determined by comparison with the supplier's certification;
    - c) A flash point equal to or greater than 125°F; and
    - d) A clear and bright appearance with proper color when tested in accordance with ASTM-D4176-82.
  - 2) By verifying within 30 days of obtaining the sample that the other properties specified in Table 1 of ASTM-D975-81 are met when tested in accordance with ASTM-D975-81 except that the analysis for sulfur may be performed in accordance with ASTM-D1552-79, ASTM-D2622-82, or ASTM-D4294-83.
- d. At least once every 31 days by obtaining a sample of fuel oil in accordance with ASTM-D2276-78, and verifying that total particulate contamination is less than 10 mg/liter when checked in accordance with ASTM-D2276-78, Method A;
- e. At least once per 18 months, during shutdown, by:
  - 1) Subjecting the diesel to an inspection in accordance with procedures prepared in conjunction with its manufacturer's recommendations for this class of standby service;
  - 2) Verifying the generator capability to reject a load of greater than or equal to 785.3 kW while maintaining voltage at  $4160 \pm 416$  volts and frequency at  $60 \pm 4.5$  Hz;

## ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS

### SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (Continued)

- 3) Verifying the generator capability to reject a load of 5500 kW without tripping. The generator voltage shall not exceed 5262 volts during and following the load rejection;
- 4) Simulating a loss-of-offsite power by itself, and:
  - a) Verifying deenergization of the ESF busses and load shedding from the ESF busses, and
  - b) Verifying the diesel starts on the auto-start signal within 10 seconds, energizes the auto-connected shutdown loads through the load sequencer and operates for greater than or equal to 5 minutes while its generator is loaded with the shutdown loads. After energization, the steady-state voltage and frequency of the ESF busses shall be maintained at  $4160 \pm 416$  volts and  $60 \pm 1.2$  Hz during this test.
- 5) Verifying that on a Safety Injection test signal, without loss-of-offsite power, the diesel generator starts on the auto-start signal and operates on standby for greater than or equal to 5 minutes. The generator voltage and frequency shall be  $4160 \pm 416$  volts and  $60 \pm 1.2$  Hz within 10 seconds after the auto-start signal; the steady-state generator voltage and frequency shall be maintained within these limits during this test;
- 6) Simulating a loss-of-offsite power in conjunction with a Safety Injection test signal, and:
  - a) Verifying deenergization of the ESF busses and load shedding from the ESF busses;
  - b) Verifying the diesel starts on the auto-start signal within 10 seconds, energizes the auto-connected ESF (accident) loads through the load sequencer and operates for greater than or equal to 5 minutes while its generator is loaded with the ESF loads. After energization, the steady-state voltage and frequency of the ESF busses shall be maintained at  $4160 \pm 416$  volts and  $60 \pm 1.2$  Hz during this test; and
  - c) Verifying that all automatic diesel generator trips, except engine overspeed, generator differential, and low lube oil pressure are automatically bypassed upon loss of voltage on the ESF bus concurrent with a Safety Injection Actuation signal.
- 7) Verifying the standby diesel generator operates for at least 24 hours. During the first 2 hours of this test, the diesel

## ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS

### SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (Continued)

generator shall be loaded to greater than or equal to 5935 kW\* and during the remaining 22 hours of this test, the diesel generator shall be loaded to greater than or equal to 5500 kW. The generator voltage and frequency shall be 4160 + 416 volts and 60 + 1.2 Hz within 10 seconds after the start signal; the steady-state generator voltage and frequency shall be maintained within these limits during this test. Within 5 minutes after completing this 24-hour test, perform Specification 4.8.1.1.2e.6)b);\*\*

- 8) Verifying that the auto-connected loads to each standby diesel generator do not exceed the 2000-hour rating of 5935 kW;
- 9) Verifying the standby diesel generator's capability to:
  - a) Synchronize with the offsite power source while the generator is loaded with its ESF loads upon a simulated restoration of offsite power,
  - b) Transfer its loads to the offsite power source, and
  - c) Be restored to its standby status.
- 10) Verifying that with the standby diesel generator operating in a test mode, connected to its bus, a simulated Safety Injection signal overrides the test mode by: (1) returning the diesel generator to standby operation, and (2) automatically energizing the ESF loads with offsite power;
- 11) Verifying that the automatic load sequence timer is OPERABLE with the first sequenced load verified to be loaded between 1.0 second and 1.6 seconds, and all other load blocks within  $\pm 10\%$  of its design interval;
- 12) Verifying that the standby diesel generator emergency stop lock-out feature prevents diesel generator starting; and

\*If future load conditions exceed the 2000-hour rating (5935 kW) of the diesel generator, the diesel generator will be tested at the 2-hour rating (6050 kW) thereafter.

\*\*If Specification 4.8.1.1.2e.6)b) is not satisfactorily completed, it is not necessary to repeat the preceding 24-hour test. Instead, the standby diesel generator may be operated at 5500 kW for 1 hour or until operating temperature has stabilized.

## ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS

### SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (Continued)

- 13) Demonstrating the OPERABILITY of the automatic load shed bypass and the manual load shed reinstatement features of the load sequencer.
- f. At least once per 10 years or after any modifications which could affect standby diesel generator interdependence by starting all standby diesel generators simultaneously, during shutdown, and verifying that all standby diesel generators accelerate to at least 600 rpm in less than or equal to 10 seconds; and
- g. At least once per 10 years by:
  - 1) Draining each fuel tank, removing the accumulated sediment and cleaning the tank using a sodium hypochlorite solution, or equivalent, and
  - 2) Performing a pressure test of those portions of the diesel fuel oil system designed to Section III, subsection ND of the ASME Code at a test pressure equal to 110% of the system design pressure.

4.8.1.1.3 Reports - All standby diesel generator failures, valid or nonvalid, shall be reported to the Commission in a Special Report pursuant to Specification 6.9.2 within 30 days. Reports of standby diesel generator failures shall include the information recommended in Regulatory Position C.3.b of Regulatory Guide 1.108, Revision 1, August 1977. If the number of failures in the last 100 valid tests (on a per nuclear unit basis) is greater than or equal to 7, the report shall be supplemented to include the additional information recommended in Regulatory Position C.3.b of Regulatory Guide 1.108, Revision 1, August 1977.

Table 4.8-1

DIESEL GENERATOR TEST SCHEDULE

<u>NUMBER OF FAILURES IN LAST 20 VALID TESTS*</u>	<u>NUMBER OF FAILURES IN LAST 100 VALID TESTS*</u>	<u>TEST FREQUENCY</u>
$\leq 1$	$\leq 4$	Once per 31 days
$\geq 2^{**}$	$\geq 5$	Once per 7 days

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\* Criteria for determining number of failures and number of valid tests shall be in accordance with Regulatory Position C.2.e of Regulatory Guide 1.108, but determined on a per diesel generator basis.

For the purpose of determining the required test frequency, the previous test failure count may be reduced to zero if a complete diesel overhaul to like-new condition is completed, provided that the overhaul, including appropriate post-maintenance operation and testing, is specifically approved by the manufacturer and if acceptable reliability has been demonstrated. The reliability criterion shall be the successful completion of 14 consecutive tests in a single series. Ten of these tests shall be in accordance with the routine Surveillance Requirements 4.8.1.1.2.a.2 and 4.8.1.1.2.a.3 and four tests in accordance with the 184-day testing requirement of Surveillance Requirements 4.8.1.1.2.a.2 and 4.8.1.1.2.a.3. If this criterion is not satisfied during the first series of tests, any alternate criterion to be used to transvalue the failure count to zero requires NRC approval.

\*\* The associated test frequency shall be maintained until seven consecutive failure free demands have been performed and the number of failures in the last 20 valid demands has been reduced to one.

## ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS

### A.C. SOURCES

#### SHUTDOWN

#### LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

---

3.8.1.2 As a minimum, the following A.C. electrical power sources shall be OPERABLE:

- a. One circuit between the offsite transmission network and the Onsite Class 1E Distribution System, and
- b. Two standby diesel generators each with a separate fuel tank containing a minimum volume of 60,500 gallons of fuel.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 5 and 6.

#### ACTION:

With less than the above minimum required A.C. electrical power sources OPERABLE, immediately suspend all operations involving CORE ALTERATIONS, positive reactivity changes, movement of irradiated fuel, or crane operation with loads over the spent fuel pool, and within 8 hours, depressurize and vent the Reactor Coolant System through a greater than or equal to 2.0 square inch vent. In addition, when in MODE 5 with the reactor coolant loops not filled, or in MODE 6 with the water level less than 23 feet above the reactor vessel flange, immediately initiate corrective action to restore the required sources to OPERABLE status as soon as possible.

#### SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

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4.8.1.2 The above required A.C. electrical power sources shall be demonstrated OPERABLE by the performance of each of the requirements of Specifications 4.8.1.1.1, 4.8.1.1.2 (except for Specification 4.8.1.1.2a.3), and 4.8.1.1.3.



## ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS

### 3/4.8.2 D.C. SOURCES

#### OPERATING

#### LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.8.2.1 As a minimum, the following D.C. electrical sources shall be OPERABLE:

- a. Channel I 125-volt Battery Bank (E1A11), and its two associated chargers,
- b. Channel II 125-volt Battery Bank (E1D11), and its associated full capacity charger,
- c. Channel III 125-volt Battery Bank (E1B11) and its associated full capacity charger, and
- d. Channel IV 125-volt Battery Bank (E1C11) and its two associated chargers.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4.

#### ACTION:

- a. With one of the required battery banks, and/or one of the required chargers for the Channels II or III inoperable, restore the inoperable battery bank and/or charger to OPERABLE status within 2 hours or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours.
- b. With only one charger on Channel I or IV OPERABLE, demonstrate the OPERABILITY of the associated battery bank by performing Surveillance Requirement 4.8.2.1.a.1) within 1 hour and at least once per 8 hours thereafter. If any Category A limit in Table 4.8-2 is not met, declare the battery inoperable. Restore the inoperable charger to OPERABLE status within 24 hours or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours.

#### SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

4.8.2.1 Each 125-volt battery bank and charger shall be demonstrated OPERABLE:

- a. At least once per 7 days by verifying that:
  - 1) The parameters in Table 4.8-2 meet the Category A limits, and
  - 2) The total battery terminal voltage is greater than or equal to 129 volts on float charge.

## ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS

### SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (Continued)

- b. At least once per 92 days and within 7 days after a battery discharge with battery terminal voltage below 110 volts, or battery overcharge with battery terminal voltage above 135 volts, by verifying that:
- 1) The parameters in Table 4.8-2 meet the Category B limits,
  - 2) There is no visible corrosion at either terminals or connectors, or the connection resistance of these items is less than  $150 \times 10^{-6}$  ohm, and
  - 3) The average electrolyte temperature of six connected cells is above 65° F.
- c. At least once per 18 months by verifying that:
- 1) The cells, cell plates, and battery racks show no visual indication of physical damage or abnormal deterioration,
  - 2) The cell-to-cell and terminal connections are clean, tight, and coated with anticorrosion material,
  - 3) The resistance of each cell-to-cell and terminal connection is less than or equal to  $150 \times 10^{-6}$  ohm, and
  - 4) The battery charger will supply at least 300 amperes at 125 volts for at least 8 hours.
- d. At least once per 18 months, during shutdown, by verifying that the battery capacity is adequate to supply and maintain in OPERABLE status all of the actual or simulated ESF loads for the design duty cycle when the battery is subjected to a battery service test;
- e. At least once per 60 months, during shutdown, by verifying that the battery capacity is at least 80% of the manufacturer's rating when subjected to a performance discharge test. Once, per 60-month interval this performance discharge test may be performed in lieu of the battery service test required by Specification 4.8.2.1d.; and
- f. At least once per 18 months, during shutdown, by giving performance discharge tests of battery capacity to any battery that shows signs of degradation or has reached 85% of the service life expected for the application. Degradation is indicated when the battery capacity drops more than 10% of rated capacity from its average on previous performance tests, or is below 90% of the manufacturer's rating.

TABLE 4.8-2  
BATTERY SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

PARAMETER	CATEGORY A <sup>(1)</sup>		CATEGORY B <sup>(2)</sup>	
	LIMITS FOR EACH DESIGNATED PILOT CELL	LIMITS FOR EACH CONNECTED CELL	LIMITS FOR EACH CONNECTED CELL	ALLOWABLE <sup>(3)</sup> VALUE FOR EACH CONNECTED CELL
Electrolyte Level	>Minimum level indication mark, and < 1/4" above maximum level indication mark	>Minimum level indication mark, and < 1/4" above maximum level indication mark	>Minimum level indication mark, and < 1/4" above maximum level indication mark	Above top of plates, and not overflowing
Float Voltage	≥ 2.13 volts	≥ 2.13 volts <sup>(6)</sup>	≥ 2.13 volts <sup>(6)</sup>	> 2.07 volts
Specific Gravity <sup>(4)</sup>	≥ 1.200 <sup>(5)</sup>	≥ 1.195	Average of all connected cells	Not more than 0.020 below the average of all connected cells
		> 1.205	Average of all connected cells	Average of all connected cells ≥ 1.195 <sup>(5)</sup>

TABLE NOTATIONS

- (1) For any Category A parameter(s) outside the limit(s) shown, the battery may be considered OPERABLE provided that within 24 hours all Category B measurements are taken and found to be within their allowable values, and provided all Category A and B parameter(s) are restored to within limits within the next 6 days.
- (2) For any Category B parameter(s) outside the limit(s) shown, the battery may be considered OPERABLE provided that the Category B parameters are within their allowable values and provided that Category B parameters(s) are restored to within limits within 7 days.
- (3) Any Category B parameter not within its allowable value indicates an inoperable battery.
- (4) Corrected for electrolyte temperature and level.
- (5) Or battery charging current is less than 2 amps when on charge.
- (6) Corrected for average electrolyte temperature.

## ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS

### D.C. SOURCES

#### SHUTDOWN

### LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

---

3.8.2.2 As a minimum, Channel I and Channel IV 125-volt battery banks and their two associated chargers shall be OPERABLE.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 5 and 6.

#### ACTION:

With the required battery banks and/or charger(s) inoperable, immediately suspend all operations involving CORE ALTERATIONS, positive reactivity changes, or movement of irradiated fuel; initiate corrective action to restore the required battery banks and/or chargers to OPERABLE status as soon as possible, and within 8 hours, depressurize and vent the Reactor Coolant System through a 2.0 square inch vent.

### SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

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4.8.2.2 The above required 125-volt battery banks and chargers shall be demonstrated OPERABLE in accordance with Specification 4.8.2.1.

## ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS

### 3/4.8.3 ONSITE POWER DISTRIBUTION

#### OPERATING

#### LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

---

3.8.3.1 The following electrical busses shall be energized in the specified manner:

- a. Train A A.C. ESF Busses consisting of:
  - 1) 4160-Volt ESF Bus # E1A, and
  - 2) 480-Volt ESF Busses # E1A1 and E1A2 from respective load center transformers.
- b. Train B A.C. ESF Busses consisting of:
  - 1) 4160-Volt ESF Bus # E1B, and
  - 2) 480-Volt ESF Busses # E1B1 and E1B2 from respective load center transformers.
- c. Train C A.C. ESF Busses consisting of:
  - 1) 4160-Volt ESF Bus # E1C, and
  - 2) 480-Volt ESF Busses # E1C1 and E1C2 from respective load center transformers.
- d. 120-Volt A.C. Vital Distribution Panels DP1201 and DP001 energized from their associated inverters connected to D.C. Bus # E1A11\*,
- e. 120-Volt A.C. Vital Distribution Panel DP1202 energized from its associated inverter connected to D.C. Bus # E1D11\*,
- f. 120-Volt A.C. Vital Distribution Panel DP1203 energized from its associated inverter connected to D.C. Bus # E1B11\*,
- g. 120-Volt A.C. Vital Distribution Panels DP1204 and DP002 energized from their associated inverters connected to D.C. Bus # E1C11\*,
- h. 125-Volt D.C. Bus E1A11 energized from Battery Bank E1A11,
- i. 125-Volt D.C. Bus E1D11 energized from Battery Bank E1D11,
- j. 125-Volt D.C. Bus E1B11 energized from Battery Bank E1B11, and
- k. 125-Volt D.C. Bus E1C11 energized from Battery Bank E1C11.

\*The inverter(s) associated with one channel may be disconnected from its D.C. bus for up to 24 hours as necessary, for the purpose of performing an equalizing charge on its associated battery bank provided: (1) its vital distribution panels are energized, and (2) the vital distribution panels associated with the other battery banks are energized from their associated inverters and connected to their associated D.C. busses.

## ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS

### LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION (Continued)

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4.

ACTION:

- a. With one of the required trains of A.C. ESF busses not fully energized, reenergize the train within 8 hours or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours.
- b. With one A.C. vital distribution panel either not energized from its associated inverter, or with the inverter not connected to its associated D.C. bus: (1) reenergize the A.C. distribution panel within 2 hours or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours; and (2) reenergize the A.C. vital distribution panel from its associated inverter connected to its associated D.C. bus within 24 hours or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours.
- c. With one D.C. bus not energized from its associated battery bank, reenergize the D.C. bus from its associated battery bank within 2 hours or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours.

### SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

4.8.3.1 The specified busses shall be determined energized in the required manner at least once per 7 days by verifying correct breaker alignment and indicated voltage on the busses.

## ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS

### ONSITE POWER DISTRIBUTION

#### SHUTDOWN

#### LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

---

3.8.3.2 As a minimum, the following electrical busses shall be energized in the specified manner:

- a. Train A and Train C of A.C. ESF busses each consisting of one 4160-volt ESF bus and two 480-volt A.C. ESF load centers,
- b. Four 120-volt A.C. vital distribution panels consisting of DP001, DP1201, DP002, and DP1204 energized from their associated inverter connected to its respective D.C. bus, and
- c. Channel I and Channel IV 125-volt D.C. busses energized from their associated battery banks.

APPLICABILITY MODES 5 and 6.

#### ACTION:

With any of the above required electrical busses not energized in the required manner, immediately suspend all operations involving CORE ALTERATIONS, positive reactivity changes, or movement of irradiated fuel, initiate corrective action to energize the required electrical busses in the specified manner as soon as possible, and within 8 hours, depressurize and vent the RCS through at least a 2.0 square inch vent.

#### SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

---

4.8.3.2 The specified busses shall be determined energized in the required manner at least once per 7 days by verifying correct breaker alignment and indicated voltage on the busses.

## ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS

### 3/4.8.4 ELECTRICAL EQUIPMENT PROTECTIVE DEVICES

#### CONTAINMENT PENETRATION CONDUCTOR OVERCURRENT PROTECTIVE DEVICES

##### LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.8.4.1 For each containment penetration provided with a penetration conductor overcurrent protective device(s), each device shall be OPERABLE.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4.

##### ACTION:

With one or more of the containment penetration conductor overcurrent protective device(s) inoperable:

- a. Restore the protective device(s) to OPERABLE status or deenergize the circuit(s) by tripping the associated backup circuit breaker or racking out or removing the inoperable circuit breaker within 72 hours, declare the affected system or component inoperable, and verify the backup circuit breaker to be tripped or the inoperable circuit breaker racked out or removed at least once per 7 days thereafter; or
- b. Be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours.

##### SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

4.8.4.1 Protective devices required to be OPERABLE as containment penetration conductor overcurrent protective devices shall be demonstrated OPERABLE:

- a. At least once per 18 months:
  - 1) By verifying that the medium voltage 13.8 kV circuit breakers are OPERABLE by selecting, on a rotating basis, at least 10% of the circuit breakers, and performing the following:
    - a) A CHANNEL CALIBRATION of the associated protective relays,
    - b) An integrated system functional test which includes simulated automatic actuation of the system and verifying that each relay and associated circuit breakers and control circuits function as designed, and



## ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS

### SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (Continued)

- c) For each circuit breaker found inoperable during these functional tests, an additional representative sample of at least 10% of all the circuit breakers of the inoperable type shall also be functionally tested until no more failures are found or all circuit breakers of that type have been functionally tested.
- 2) By selecting and functionally testing a representative sample of at least 10% of each type of lower voltage circuit breakers. Circuit breakers selected for functional testing shall be selected on a rotating basis. Testing of these circuit breakers shall consist of injecting a current with a value equal to 300% of the pickup of the long-time delay trip element and 150% of the pickup of the short-time delay trip element, and verifying that the circuit breaker operates within the time delay band width for that current specified by the manufacturer. The instantaneous element shall be tested by injecting a current equal to  $\pm 20\%$  of the pickup value of the element and verifying that the circuit breaker trips instantaneously with no intentional time delay. Molded case circuit breaker testing shall also follow this procedure except that generally no more than two trip elements, time delay and instantaneous, will be involved. The instantaneous element for molded case circuit breakers shall be tested by injecting a current for a frame size of 250 amps or less with tolerances of +40%, -25% and a frame size of 400 amps or greater of  $\pm 25\%$  and verifying that the circuit breaker trips instantaneously with no apparent time delay. Circuit breakers found inoperable during functional testing shall be restored to OPERABLE status prior to resuming operation. For each circuit breaker found inoperable during these functional tests, an additional representative sample of at least 10% of all the circuit breakers of the inoperable type shall also be functionally tested until no more failures are found or all circuit breakers of that type have been functionally tested; and
- b. At least once per 60 months by subjecting each circuit breaker to an inspection and preventive maintenance in accordance with procedures prepared in conjunction with its manufacturer's recommendations.

### 3/4.9 REFUELING OPERATIONS

#### 3/4.9.1 BORON CONCENTRATION

##### LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.9.1 The boron concentration of all filled portions of the Reactor Coolant System and the refueling canal shall be maintained uniform and sufficient to ensure that the more restrictive of the following reactivity conditions is met; either:

- a. A  $K_{eff}$  of 0.95 or less, or
- b. A boron concentration of greater than or equal to 2500 ppm.

APPLICABILITY: MODE 6.\*

##### ACTION:

With the requirements of the above specification not satisfied, immediately suspend all operations involving CORE ALTERATIONS or positive reactivity changes and initiate and continue boration at greater than or equal to 30 gpm of a solution containing greater than or equal to 7000 ppm boron or its equivalent until  $K_{eff}$  is reduced to less than or equal to 0.95 or the boron concentration is restored to greater than or equal to 2500 ppm, whichever is the more restrictive.

##### SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

4.9.1.1 The more restrictive of the above two reactivity conditions shall be determined prior to:

- a. Removing or unbolting the reactor vessel head, and
- b. Withdrawal of any full-length control rod in excess of 3 feet from its fully inserted position within the reactor vessel.

4.9.1.2 The boron concentration of the Reactor Coolant System and the refueling canal shall be determined by chemical analysis at least once per 72 hours.

4.9.1.3 Valves FCV-110B, FCV-111B, CV0201A, and CV0221 shall be verified closed and secured in position by mechanical stops or by removal of air or electrical power at least once per 31 days.

---

\*The reactor shall be maintained in MODE 6 whenever fuel is in the reactor vessel with the vessel head closure bolts less than fully tensioned or with the head removed.

## REFUELING OPERATIONS

### 3/4.9.2 INSTRUMENTATION

#### LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.9.2 As a minimum, two Source Range Neutron Flux Monitors shall be OPERABLE, each with continuous visual indication in the control room and one with audible indication in the containment and control room.

APPLICABILITY: MODE 6.

#### ACTION:

- a. With one of the above required monitors inoperable or not operating, immediately suspend all operations involving CORE ALTERATIONS or positive reactivity changes.
- b. With both of the above required monitors inoperable or not operating, determine the boron concentration of the Reactor Coolant System at least once per 12 hours.

#### SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

4.9.2 Each Source Range Neutron Flux Monitor shall be demonstrated OPERABLE by performance of:

- a. A CHANNEL CHECK at least once per 12 hours,
- b. An ANALOG CHANNEL OPERATIONAL TEST within 8 hours prior to the initial start of CORE ALTERATIONS, and
- c. An ANALOG CHANNEL OPERATIONAL TEST at least once per 7 days.

REFUELING OPERATIONS

3/4.9.3 DECAF TIME

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

---

3.9.3 The reactor shall be subcritical for at least 42 hours.

APPLICABILITY: During movement of irradiated fuel in the reactor vessel.

ACTION:

With the reactor subcritical for less than 42 hours, suspend all operations involving movement of irradiated fuel in the reactor vessel.

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

---

4.9.3 The reactor shall be determined to have been subcritical for at least 42 hours by verification of the date and time of subcriticality prior to movement of irradiated fuel in the reactor vessel.

## REFUELING OPERATIONS

### 3/4.9.4 CONTAINMENT BUILDING PENETRATIONS

#### LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.9.4 The containment building penetrations shall be in the following status:

- a. The equipment door closed and held in place by a minimum of four bolts,
- b. A minimum of one door in each airlock is closed, and
- c. Each penetration providing direct access from the containment atmosphere to the outside atmosphere shall be either:
  - 1) Closed by an isolation valve, blind flange, or manual valve, or
  - 2) Be capable of being closed by an OPERABLE automatic containment purge and exhaust isolation valve.

APPLICABILITY: During CORE ALTERATIONS or movement of irradiated fuel within the containment.

#### ACTION:

With the requirements of the above specification not satisfied, immediately suspend all operations involving CORE ALTERATIONS or movement of irradiated fuel in the containment building.

#### SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

4.9.4 Each of the above required containment building penetrations shall be determined to be either in its closed/isolated condition or capable of being closed by an OPERABLE automatic containment purge and exhaust isolation valve within 100 hours prior to the start of and at least once per 7 days during CORE ALTERATIONS or movement of irradiated fuel in the containment building by:

- a. Verifying the penetrations are in their closed/isolated condition, or
- b. Testing the containment purge and exhaust isolation valves per the applicable portions of Specification 4.6.3.2.

REFUELING OPERATIONS

3/4.9.5 COMMUNICATIONS

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

---

3.9.5 Direct communications shall be maintained between the control room and personnel at the refueling station.

APPLICABILITY: During CORE ALTERATIONS.

ACTION:

When direct communications between the control room and personnel at the refueling station cannot be maintained, suspend all CORE ALTERATIONS.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

---

4.9.5 Direct communications between the control room and personnel at the refueling station shall be demonstrated within 1 hour prior to the start of and at least once per 12 hours during CORE ALTERATIONS.

## REFUELING OPERATIONS

### 3/4.9.6 REFUELING MACHINE

#### LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

---

3.9.6 The refueling machine and auxiliary hoist shall be used for movement of thimble plugs, drive rods or fuel assemblies and shall be OPERABLE with:

- a. The refueling machine used for movement of fuel assemblies having:
  - 1) A minimum capacity of 3300 pounds, and
  - 2) An automatic overload cutoff less than or equal to 3250 pounds.
- b. The auxiliary hoist used for latching and unlatching drive rods and for thimble plug handling operations having:
  - 1) A minimum capacity of 760 pounds, and
  - 2) A 1,000-pound load indicator which shall be used to monitor lifting loads for these operations.

APPLICABILITY: During movement of thimble plugs, drive rods or fuel assemblies within the reactor vessel.

#### ACTION:

With the requirements for the refueling machine and/or hoist OPERABILITY not satisfied, suspend use of any inoperable refueling machine and/or auxiliary hoist from operations involving the movement of thimble plugs, drive rods and fuel assemblies within the reactor vessel.

#### SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

---

4.9.6.1 Each refueling machine used for movement of fuel assemblies within the reactor vessel shall be demonstrated OPERABLE within 100 hours prior to the start of such operations by performing a load test of at least 3300 pounds and demonstrating an automatic load cutoff when the refueling machine load exceeds the setpoints of Specification 3.9.6a.2).

4.9.6.2 Each auxiliary hoist and associated load indicator used for movement of drive rods within the reactor vessel shall be demonstrated OPERABLE within 100 hours prior to the start of such operations by performing a load test of at least 760 pounds.

REFUELING OPERATIONS

3/4.9.7 CRANE TRAVEL - FUEL HANDLING BUILDING

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

---

3.9.7 Loads in excess of 2,500 pounds shall be prohibited from travel over fuel assemblies in the spent fuel pool except when carried by the single-failure-proof 15-ton hoist of the FHB crane.

APPLICABILITY: With fuel assemblies in the spent fuel pool.

ACTION:

- a. With the requirements of the above specification not satisfied, place the crane load in a safe condition.
- b. The provisions of Specification 3.0.3 are not applicable.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

---

4.9.7 Loads shall be verified less than or equal to 2,500 pounds prior to movement over fuel assemblies in the spent fuel pool unless they are carried by the single-failure-proof 15-ton hoist of the FHB crane.



## REFUELING OPERATIONS

### 3/4.9.8 RESIDUAL HEAT REMOVAL AND COOLANT CIRCULATION

#### HIGH WATER LEVEL

#### LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

---

3.9.8.1 At least one residual heat removal (RHR) loop shall be OPERABLE and in operation.\*

APPLICABILITY: MODF 6, when the water level above the top of the reactor vessel flange is greater than or equal to 23 feet.

#### ACTION:

With no RHR loop OPERABLE and in operation, suspend all operations involving an increase in the reactor decay heat load or a reduction in boron concentration of the Reactor Coolant System and immediately initiate corrective action to return the required RHR loop to OPERABLE and operating status as soon as possible. Close all containment penetrations providing direct access from the containment atmosphere to the outside atmosphere within 4 hours.

#### SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

---

4.9.8.1 At least one RHR loop shall be verified in operation and circulating reactor coolant at a flow rate of greater than or equal to 3000 gpm at least once per 12 hours.

---

\*The RHR loop may be removed from operation for up to 1 hour per 8-hour period during the performance of CORE ALTERATIONS in the vicinity of the reactor vessel hot legs.

## REFUELING OPERATIONS

### LOW WATER LEVEL

#### LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

---

3 9.8.2 Two independent residual heat removal (RHR) loops shall be OPERABLE, and at least one RHR loop shall be in operation.\*

APPLICABILITY: MODE 6, when the water level above the top of the reactor vessel flange is less than 23 feet.

#### ACTION:

- a. With less than the required RHR loops OPERABLE, immediately initiate corrective action to return the required RHR loops to OPERABLE status, or to establish greater than or equal to 23 feet of water above the reactor vessel flange, as soon as possible.
- b. With no RHR loop in operation, suspend all operations involving a reduction in boron concentration of the Reactor Coolant System and immediately initiate corrective action to return the required RHR loop to operation. Close all containment penetrations providing direct access from the containment atmosphere to the outside atmosphere within 4 hours.

#### SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

---

4.9.8.2 At least one RHR loop shall be verified in operation and circulating reactor coolant at a flow rate of greater than or equal to 3000 gpm at least once per 12 hours.

---

\*Prior to initial criticality, the RHR loop may be removed from operation for up to 1 hour per 8-hour period during the performance of CORE ALTERATIONS in the vicinity of the reactor vessel hot legs.

## REFUELING OPERATIONS

### 3/4.9.9 CONTAINMENT VENTILATION ISOLATION SYSTEM

#### LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

---

3.9.9 The Containment Ventilation Isolation System shall be OPERABLE.

APPLICABILITY: During CORE ALTERATIONS or movement of irradiated fuel within the containment.

#### ACTION:

- a. With the Containment Ventilation Isolation System inoperable, close each of the purge and exhaust penetrations providing direct access from the containment atmosphere to the outside atmosphere.
- b. The provisions of Specification 3.0.3 are not applicable.

#### SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

---

4.9.9 The Containment Ventilation Isolation System shall be demonstrated OPERABLE within 100 hours prior to the start of and at least once per 7 days during CORE ALTERATIONS by verifying that containment ventilation isolation occurs on manual initiation and on a High Radiation test signal from each of the RCB purge radiation monitoring instrumentation channels.

## REFUELING OPERATIONS

### 3/4.9.10 WATER LEVEL - REFUELING CAVITY

#### LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

---

3.9.10 At least 23 feet of water shall be maintained over the top of the reactor vessel flange.

APPLICABILITY: During movement of fuel assemblies or control rods\* within the refueling cavity when either the fuel assemblies being moved or the fuel assemblies seated within the reactor vessel are irradiated while in MODE 6.

#### ACTION:

With the requirements of the above specification not satisfied, suspend all operations involving movement of fuel assemblies or control rods within the reactor vessel.

#### SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

---

4.9.10 The water level shall be determined to be at least its minimum required depth within 2 hours prior to the start of and at least once per 24 hours thereafter during movement of fuel assemblies or control rods.

---

\*Water level requirements are not applicable when control rods are moved in conjunction with the head package during a rapid refueling.

REFUELING OPERATIONS

3/4.9.11 WATER LEVEL - STORAGE POOLS

SPENT FUEL POOL

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

---

3.9.11.1 At least 23 feet of water shall be maintained over the top of irradiated fuel assemblies seated in the storage racks.

APPLICABILITY: Whenever irradiated fuel assemblies are in the spent fuel pool.

ACTION:

- a. With the requirements of the above specification not satisfied, suspend all movement of fuel assemblies and crane operations with loads in the fuel storage areas and restore the water level to within its limit within 4 hours.
- b. The provisions of Specification 3.0.3 are not applicable.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

---

4.9 11.1 The water level in the spent fuel pool shall be determined to be at least its minimum required depth at least once per 7 days when irradiated fuel assemblies are in the spent fuel pool.

## REFUELING OPERATIONS

### IN-CONTAINMENT STORAGE POOL

#### LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

---

3.9.11.2 At least 23 feet of water shall be maintained over the top of irradiated fuel assemblies seated in the storage racks.

APPLICABILITY: Whenever irradiated fuel assemblies are in the in-containment storage pool.

#### ACTION:

- a. With the requirements of the above specification not satisfied, suspend all movement of fuel assemblies and crane operations with loads in the fuel storage areas and restore the water level to within its limit within 4 hours.
- b. The provisions of Specification 3.0.3 are not applicable.

#### SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

---

4.9.11.2 The water level in the in-containment storage pool shall be determined to be at least its minimum required depth at least once per 7 days when irradiated fuel assemblies are in the in-containment storage pool.

## REFUELING OPERATIONS

### 3/4.9.12 FUEL HANDLING BUILDING EXHAUST AIR SYSTEM

#### LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.9.12 The FHB Exhaust Air System comprised of the following components shall be OPERABLE:

- a. Two independent exhaust air filter trains,
- b. Three independent exhaust booster fans,
- c. Three independent main exhaust fans, and
- d. Associated dampers.

APPLICABILITY: Whenever irradiated fuel is in the spent fuel pool.

#### ACTION:

- a. With less than the above FHB Exhaust Air System components OPERABLE but with at least one FHB exhaust air filter train, two FHB exhaust booster fans, two FHB main exhaust fans, and associated dampers OPERABLE, fuel movement within the spent fuel pool or crane operation with loads over the spent fuel pool may proceed provided the OPERABLE FHB Exhaust Air System components are capable of being powered from an OPERABLE emergency power source and are in operation and discharging through at least one train of HEPA filters and charcoal adsorbers.
- b. With no FHB exhaust air filter train, or less than two FHB exhaust booster fans, or less than two FHB main exhaust fans and associated dampers OPERABLE, suspend all operations involving movement of fuel within the spent fuel pool or crane operation with loads over the spent fuel pool until at least one FHB exhaust air filter train, two FHB exhaust booster fans, two main exhaust fans, and associated dampers are restored to OPERABLE status.
- c. The provisions of Specification 3.0.3 are not applicable.

#### SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

4.9.12 The above required FHB Exhaust Air Systems shall be demonstrated OPERABLE:

- a. At least once per 31 days on a STAGGERED TEST BASIS by initiating, from the control room, flow through the HEPA filters and charcoal adsorbers and verifying that the system operates for at least 10 continuous hours with the heaters operating with two of the three exhaust booster fans and two of the three main exhaust fans operating to maintain adequate air flow rate;

## REFUELING OPERATIONS

### SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (Continued)

- b. At least once per 18 months and (1) after any structural maintenance on the HEPA filter or charcoal adsorber housings, or (2) following painting, fire, or chemical release in any ventilation zone communicating with the system by:
- 1) Verifying that the cleanup system satisfies the in-place penetration and bypass leakage testing acceptance criteria of less than 0.05% for HEPA filter banks and 0.10% for charcoal adsorber banks and uses the test procedure guidance in Regulatory Positions C.5.a, C.5.c, and C.5.d of Regulatory Guide 1.52, Revision 2, March 1978, and the system flow rate is 29,000 cfm  $\pm$  10%;
  - 2) Verifying, within 31 days after removal, that a laboratory analysis of a representative carbon sample obtained in accordance with Regulatory Position C.6.b of Regulatory Guide 1.52, Revision 2, March 1978, meets the laboratory testing criteria of Regulatory Position C.6.a of Regulatory Guide 1.52, Revision 2, March 1978, for a methyl iodide penetration of less than 1.0% when tested at a temperature of 30°C and a relative humidity of 70%; and
  - 3) Verifying a system flow rate of 29,000 cfm  $\pm$  10% during system operation with two of the three exhaust booster fans and two of the three main exhaust fans operating when tested in accordance with ANSI N510-1980. All combinations of two exhaust booster fans and two main exhaust fans shall be tested.
- c. After every 720 hours of charcoal adsorber operation by verifying, within 31 days after removal, that a laboratory analysis of a representative carbon sample obtained in accordance with Regulatory Position C.6.b of Regulatory Guide 1.52, Revision 2, March 1978, meets the laboratory testing criteria of Regulatory Position C.6.a of Regulatory Guide 1.52, Revision 2, March 1978, for a methyl iodide penetration of less than 1.0% when tested at a temperature of 30°C and a relative humidity of 70%.
- d. At least once per 18 months by:
- 1) Verifying that the pressure drop across the combined HEPA filters and charcoal adsorber banks is less than 6 inches Water Gauge while operating the system at a flow rate of 29,000 cfm  $\pm$  10%;
  - 2) Verifying that on a High Radiation test signal, the system automatically starts (unless already operating) and directs its exhaust flow through the HEPA filters and charcoal adsorber banks,



## REFUELING OPERATIONS

### SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (Continued)

- 3) Verifying that the system maintains the spent fuel storage pool area at a negative pressure of greater than or equal to 1/8 inch Water Gauge relative to the outside atmosphere during system operation, and
  - 4) Verifying that the heaters dissipate  $50 \pm 5$  kW when tested in accordance with ANSI N510-1980.
- e. After each complete or partial replacement of a HEPA filter bank, by verifying that the HEPA filter bank satisfies the in-place penetration and bypass leakage testing acceptance criteria of less than 0.05% in accordance with ANSI N510-1980 for a DOP test aerosol while operating the system at a flow rate of 29,000 cfm  $\pm$  10%.
- f. After each complete or partial replacement of a charcoal adsorber bank, by verifying that the charcoal adsorber bank satisfies the in-place penetration and bypass leakage testing acceptance criteria of less than 0.10% in accordance with ANSI N510-1980 for a halogenated hydrocarbon refrigerant test gas while operating the system at a flow rate of 29,000 cfm  $\pm$  10%.

### 3/4.10 SPECIAL TEST EXCEPTIONS

#### 3/4.10.1 SHUTDOWN MARGIN

##### LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.10.1 The SHUTDOWN MARGIN requirement of Specification 3.1.1.1 may be suspended for measurement of control rod worth and SHUTDOWN MARGIN provided reactivity equivalent to at least the highest estimated control rod worth is available for trip insertion from OPERABLE control rod(s).

APPLICABILITY: MODE 2.

##### ACTION:

- a. With any full-length control rod not fully inserted and with less than the above reactivity equivalent available for trip insertion, immediately initiate and continue boration at greater than or equal to 30 gpm of a solution containing greater than or equal to 7000 ppm boron or its equivalent until the SHUTDOWN MARGIN required by Specification 3.1.1.1 is restored.
- b. With all full-length control rods fully inserted and the reactor subcritical by less than the above reactivity equivalent, immediately initiate and continue boration at greater than or equal to 30 gpm of a solution containing greater than or equal to 7000 ppm boron or its equivalent until the SHUTDOWN MARGIN required by Specification 3.1.1.1 is restored.

##### SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

4.10.1.1 The position of each full-length control rod either partially or fully withdrawn shall be determined at least once per 2 hours.

4.10.1.2 Each full-length control rod not fully inserted shall be demonstrated capable of full insertion when tripped from at least the 50% withdrawn position within 24 hours prior to reducing the SHUTDOWN MARGIN to less than the limits of Specification 3.1.1.1.

## SPECIAL TEST EXCEPTIONS

### 3/4.10.2 GROUP HEIGHT, INSERTION, AND POWER DISTRIBUTION LIMITS

#### LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.10.2 The group height, insertion, and power distribution limits of Specifications 3.1.3.1, 3.1.3.5, 3.1.3.6, 3.2.1, and 3.2.4 may be suspended during the performance of PHYSICS TESTS provided:

- a. The THERMAL POWER is maintained less than or equal to 85% of RATED THERMAL POWER, and
- b. The limits of Specifications 3.2.2 and 3.2.3 are maintained and determined at the frequencies specified in Specification 4.10.2.2 below.

APPLICABILITY: MODE 1.

#### ACTION:

With any of the limits of Specification 3.2.2 or 3.2.3 being exceeded while the requirements of Specifications 3.1.3.1, 3.1.3.5, 3.1.3.6, 3.2.1, and 3.2.4 are suspended, either:

- a. Reduce THERMAL POWER sufficient to satisfy the ACTION requirements of Specifications 3.2.2 and 3.2.3, or
- b. Be in HOT STANDBY within 6 hours.

#### SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

4.10.2.1 The THERMAL POWER shall be determined to be less than or equal to 85% of RATED THERMAL POWER at least once per hour during PHYSICS TESTS.

4.10.2.2 The requirements of the below listed specifications shall be performed at least once per 12 hours during PHYSICS TESTS:

- a. Specifications 4.2.2.2 and 4.2.2.3, and
- b. Specification 4.2.3.2.

## SPECIAL TEST EXCEPTIONS

### 3/4.10.3 PHYSICS TESTS

#### LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

---

3.10.3 The limitations of Specifications 3.1.1.3, 3.1.1.4, 3.1.3.1, 3.1.3.5, and 3.1.3.6 may be suspended during the performance of PHYSICS TESTS provided:

- a. The THERMAL POWER does not exceed 5% of RATED THERMAL POWER,
- b. The Reactor Trip Setpoints on the OPERABLE Intermediate and Power Range channels are set at less than or equal to 25% of RATED THERMAL POWER, and
- c. The Reactor Coolant System lowest operating loop temperature ( $T_{avg}$ ) is greater than or equal to 551°F.

APPLICABILITY: MODE 2.

#### ACTION:

- a. With the THERMAL POWER greater than 5% of RATED THERMAL POWER, immediately open the Reactor trip breakers.
- b. With a Reactor Coolant System operating loop temperature ( $T_{avg}$ ) less than 551°F, restore  $T_{avg}$  to within its limit within 15 minutes or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 15 minutes.

#### SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

---

4.10.3.1 The THERMAL POWER shall be determined to be less than or equal to 5% of RATED THERMAL POWER at least once per hour during PHYSICS TESTS.

4.10.3.2 Each Intermediate and Power Range channel shall be subjected to an ANALOG CHANNEL OPERATIONAL TEST within 12 hours prior to initiating PHYSICS TESTS.

4.10.3.3 The Reactor Coolant System temperature ( $T_{avg}$ ) shall be determined to be greater than or equal to 551°F at least once per 30 minutes during PHYSICS TESTS.

## SPECIAL TEST EXCEPTIONS

### 3/4.10.4 REACTOR COOLANT LOOPS

#### LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

---

3.10.4 The limitations of Specification 3.4.1.1 may be suspended during the performance of STARTUP and PHYSICS TESTS provided:

- a. The THERMAL POWER does not exceed the P-7 Interlock Setpoint, and
- b. The Reactor Trip Setpoints on the OPERABLE Intermediate and Power Range channels are set less than or equal to 25% of RATED THERMAL POWER.

APPLICABILITY: During operation below the P-7 Interlock Setpoint.

#### ACTION:

With the THERMAL POWER greater than the P-7 Interlock Setpoint, immediately open the Reactor trip breakers.

#### SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

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4.10.4.1 The THERMAL POWER shall be determined to be less than P-7 Interlock Setpoint at least once per hour during STARTUP and PHYSICS TESTS.

4.10.4.2 Each Intermediate and Power Range channel, and P-7 Interlock shall be subjected to an ANALOG CHANNEL OPERATIONAL TEST within 12 hours prior to initiating STARTUP and PHYSICS TESTS.

## SPECIAL TFST EXCEPTIONS

### 3/4.10.5 POSITION INDICATION SYSTEM - SHUTDOWN

#### LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.10.5 The limitations of Specification 3.1.3.3 may be suspended during the performance of individual full-length shutdown and control rod drop time measurements provided;

- a. Only one shutdown or control bank is withdrawn from the fully inserted position at a time, and
- b. The rod position indicator is OPERABLE during the withdrawal of the rods.\*

APPLICABILITY: MODES 3, 4, and 5 during performance of rod drop time measurements.

#### ACTION:

With the Position Indication Systems inoperable or with more than one bank of rods withdrawn, immediately open the Reactor trip breakers.

#### SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

4.10.5 The above required Position Indication Systems shall be determined to be OPERABLE within 24 hours prior to the start of and at least once per 24 hours thereafter during rod drop time measurements by verifying the Demand Position Indication System and the Digital Rod Position Indication System agree:

- a. Within 12 steps when the rods are stationary, and
- b. Within 24 steps during rod motion.

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\*This requirement is not applicable during the initial calibration of the Digital Rod Position Indication System provided: (1)  $K_{eff}$  is maintained less than or equal to 0.95, and (2) only one shutdown or control rod bank is withdrawn from the fully inserted position at one time.

### 3/4.11 RADIOACTIVE EFFLUENTS

#### 3/4.11.1 LIQUID EFFLUENTS

##### CONCENTRATION

##### LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.11.1.1 The concentration of radioactive material released in liquid effluents to UNRESTRICTED AREAS (see Figure 5.1-4) shall be limited to the concentrations specified in 10 CFR Part 20, Appendix B, Table II, Column 2 for radionuclides other than dissolved or entrained noble gases. For dissolved or entrained noble gases, the concentration shall be limited to  $2 \times 10^{-4}$  microCurie/ml total activity.

APPLICABILITY: At all times.

##### ACTION:

With the concentration of radioactive material released in liquid effluents to UNRESTRICTED AREAS exceeding the above limits, immediately restore the concentration to within the above limits.

##### SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

4.11.1.1.1 Radioactive liquid wastes shall be sampled and analyzed according to the sampling and analysis program specified in Part A of the ODCM.

4.11.1.1.2 The results of the radioactivity analyses shall be used in accordance with the methodology and parameters in the ODCM to assure that the concentrations at the point of release are maintained within the limits of Specification 3.11.1.1.

## RADIOACTIVE EFFLUENTS

### DOSE

#### LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.11.1.2 The dose or dose commitment to a MEMBER OF THE PUBLIC from radioactive materials in liquid effluents released, from each unit, to UNRESTRICTED AREAS (see Figure 5.1-4) shall be limited:

- a. During any calendar quarter to less than or equal to 1.5 mrems to the whole body and to less than or equal to 5 mrems to any organ, and
- b. During any calendar year to less than or equal to 3 mrems to the whole body and to less than or equal to 10 mrems to any organ.

APPLICABILITY: At all times.

#### ACTION:

- a. With the calculated dose from the release of radioactive materials in liquid effluents exceeding any of the above limits, prepare and submit to the Commission within 30 days, pursuant to Specification 6.9.2, a Special Report that identifies the cause(s) for exceeding the limit(s) and defines the corrective actions that have been taken to reduce the releases and the proposed corrective actions to be taken to assure that subsequent releases will be in compliance with the above limits. This Special Report shall also include: (1) the results of radiological analyses of the drinking water source, and (2) the radiological impact on finished drinking water supplies with regard to the requirements of 40 CFR Part 141, Safe Drinking Water Act.\*
- b. The provisions of Specification 3.0.3 are not applicable.

#### SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

4.11.1.2 Cumulative dose contributions from liquid effluents for the current calendar quarter and the current calendar year shall be determined in accordance with the methodology and parameters in the ODCM at least once per 31 days.

\*The requirements of ACTION a.(1) and (2) are applicable only if drinking water supply is taken from the receiving water body within 3 miles of the plant discharge. In the case of river-sited plants, this is 3 miles downstream only.



## RADIOACTIVE EFFLUENTS

### LIQUID WASTE PROCESSING SYSTEM

#### LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.11.1.3 The Liquid Waste Processing System shall be OPERABLE and appropriate portions of the system shall be used to reduce releases of radioactivity when the projected doses due to the liquid effluent, from each unit, to UNRESTRICTED AREAS (see Figure 5.1-4) would exceed 0.06 mrem to the whole body or 0.2 mrem to any organ in a 31-day period.

APPLICABILITY: At all times.

#### ACTION:

- a. With radioactive liquid waste being discharged without treatment and in excess of the above limits and any portion of the Liquid Waste Processing System not in operation, prepare and submit to the Commission within 30 days, pursuant to Specification 6.9.2, a Special Report that includes the following information:
  1. Explanation of why liquid radwaste was being discharged without treatment, identification of any inoperable equipment or subsystems, and the reason for the inoperability,
  2. Action(s) taken to restore the inoperable equipment to OPERABLE status, and
  3. Summary description of action(s) taken to prevent a recurrence.
- b. The provisions of Specifications 3.0.3 are not applicable.

#### SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

4.11.1.3.1 Doses due to liquid releases from each unit to UNRESTRICTED AREAS shall be projected at least once per 31 days in accordance with the methodology and parameters in the ODCM when Liquid Waste Processing Systems are not being fully utilized.

4.11.1.3.2 The installed Liquid Waste Processing System shall be considered OPERABLE by meeting Specifications 3.11.1.1 and 3.11.1.2.

## RADIOACTIVE EFFLUENTS

### LIQUID HOLDUP TANKS\*

#### LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.11.1.4 The quantity of radioactive material contained in each of the following unprotected outdoor tanks shall be limited to less than or equal to 10 Curies, excluding tritium and dissolved or entrained noble gases:

- a. Outside temporary tank

APPLICABILITY: At all times.

#### ACTION:

- a. With the quantity of radioactive material in any of the above listed tanks exceeding the above limit, immediately suspend all additions of radioactive material to the tank, within 48 hours reduce the tank contents to within the limit, and describe the events leading to this condition in the next Semiannual Radioactive Effluent Release Report, pursuant to Specification 6.9.1.4.
- b. The provisions of Specification 3.0.3 are not applicable.

#### SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

4.11.1.4 The quantity of radioactive material contained in each of the above listed tanks shall be determined to be within the above limit by analyzing a representative sample of the tank's contents at least once per 7 days when radioactive materials are being added to the tank.

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\*Tanks included in this specification are those outdoor tanks that are not surrounded by liners, dikes, or walls capable of holding the tank contents and that do not have tank overflows and surrounding area drains connected to the Liquid Waste Processing System.

## RADIOACTIVE EFFLUENTS

### 3/4.11.2 GASEOUS EFFLUENTS

#### DOSE RATE

#### LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

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3.11.2.1 The dose rate due to radioactive materials released in gaseous effluents from the site to areas at and beyond the SITE BOUNDARY (see Figure 5.1-3) shall be limited to the following:

- a. For noble gases: Less than or equal to 500 mrems/yr to the whole body and less than or equal to 3000 mrems/yr to the skin, and
- b. For Iodine-131, for Iodine-133, for tritium, and for all radionuclides in particulate form with half-lives greater than 8 days: Less than or equal to 1500 mrems/yr to any organ.

APPLICABILITY: At all times.

#### ACTION:

With the dose rate(s) exceeding the above limits, immediately restore the release rate to within the above limit(s).

#### SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

---

4.11.2.1.1 The dose rate due to noble gases in gaseous effluents shall be determined to be within the above limits in accordance with the methodology and parameters in the ODCM.

4.11.2.1.2 The dose rate due to Iodine-131, Iodine-133, tritium, and all radionuclides in particulate form with half-lives greater than 8 days in gaseous effluents shall be determined to be within the above limits in accordance with the methodology and parameters in the ODCM by obtaining representative samples and performing analyses in accordance with the sampling and analysis program specified in Part A of the ODCM.

## RADIOACTIVE EFFLUENTS

### DOSE - NOBLE GASES

#### LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

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3.11.2.2 The air dose due to noble gases released in gaseous effluents, from each unit, to areas at and beyond the SITE BOUNDARY (see Figure 5.1-3) shall be limited to the following:

- a. During any calendar quarter: Less than or equal to 5 mrad for gamma radiation and less than or equal to 10 mrad for beta radiation, and
- b. During any calendar year: Less than or equal to 10 mrad for gamma radiation and less than or equal to 20 mrad for beta radiation.

APPLICABILITY: At all times.

#### ACTION

- a. With the calculated air dose from radioactive noble gases in gaseous effluents exceeding any of the above limits, prepare and submit to the Commission within 30 days, pursuant to Specification 6.9.2, a Special Report that identifies the cause(s) for exceeding the limit(s) and defines the corrective actions that have been taken to reduce the releases and the proposed corrective actions to be taken to assure that subsequent releases will be in compliance with the above limits.
- b. The provisions of Specification 3.0.3 are not applicable.

#### SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

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4.11.2.2 Cumulative dose contributions for the current calendar quarter and current calendar year for noble gases shall be determined in accordance with the methodology and parameters in the ODCM at least once per 31 days.

## RADIOACTIVE EFFLUENTS

### DOSE - IODINE-131, IODINE-133, TRITIUM, AND RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL IN PARTICULATE FORM

#### LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.11.2.3 The dose to a MEMBER OF THE PUBLIC from Iodine-131, Iodine-133, tritium, and all radionuclides in particulate form with half-lives greater than 8 days in gaseous effluents released, from each unit, to areas at and beyond the SITE BOUNDARY (see Figure 5.1-3) shall be limited to the following:

- a. During any calendar quarter: Less than or equal to 7.5 mrem to any organ and,
- b. During any calendar year: Less than or equal to 15 mrem to any organ.

APPLICABILITY: At all times.

#### ACTION:

- a. With the calculated dose from the release of Iodine-131, Iodine-133, tritium, and radionuclides in particulate form with half-lives greater than 8 days, in gaseous effluents exceeding any of the above limits, prepare and submit to the Commission within 30 days, pursuant to Specification 6.9.2, a Special Report that identifies the cause(s) for exceeding the limit(s) and defines the corrective actions that have been taken to reduce the releases and the proposed corrective actions to be taken to assure that subsequent releases will be in compliance with the above limits.
- b. The provisions of Specification 3.0.3 are not applicable.

#### SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

4.11.2.3 Cumulative dose contributions for the current calendar quarter and current calendar year for Iodine-131, Iodine-133, tritium and radionuclides in particulate form with half-lives greater than 8 days shall be determined in accordance with the methodology and parameters in the ODCM at least once per 31 days.

## RADIOACTIVE EFFLUENTS

### GASEOUS WASTE PROCESSING SYSTEM

#### LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.11.2.4 The GASEOUS WASTE PROCESSING SYSTEM shall be OPERABLE and appropriate portions of this system shall be used to reduce releases of radioactivity when the projected doses in 31 days due to gaseous effluent releases, from each unit, to areas at and beyond the SITE BOUNDARY (see Figure 5.1-3) would exceed:

- a. 0.2 mrad to air from gamma radiation, or
- b. 0.4 mrad to air from beta radiation, or
- c. 0.3 mrem to any organ of a MEMBER OF THE PUBLIC.

APPLICABILITY: At all times.

#### ACTION:

- a. With radioactive gaseous waste being discharged without treatment and in excess of the above limits, prepare and submit to the Commission within 30 days, pursuant to Specification 6.9.2, a Special Report that includes the following information:
  1. Identification of any inoperable equipment or subsystems, and the reason for the inoperability,
  2. Action(s) taken to restore the inoperable equipment to OPERABLE status, and
  3. Summary description of action(s) taken to prevent a recurrence.
- b. The provisions of Specification 3.0.3 are not applicable.

#### SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

4.11.2.4.1 Doses due to gaseous releases from each unit to areas at and beyond the SITE BOUNDARY shall be projected at least once per 31 days in accordance with the methodology and parameters in the ODCM when the GASEOUS WASTE PROCESSING SYSTEM is not being fully utilized.

4.11.2.4.2 The installed GASEOUS WASTE PROCESSING SYSTEM shall be considered OPERABLE by meeting Specifications 3.11.2.1 and 3.11.2.2 or 3.11.2.3.

RADIOACTIVE EFFLUENTS

EXPLOSIVE GAS MIXTURE

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

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3.11.2.5 The concentration of oxygen in the GASEOUS WASTE PROCESSING SYSTEM inlet shall be limited to less than or equal to 3% by volume.

APPLICABILITY: At all times.

ACTION:

- a. With the concentration of oxygen in the GASEOUS WASTE PROCESSING SYSTEM inlet exceeding the limit, restore the concentration to within the limit within 48 hours.
- b. The provisions of Specification 3.0.3 are not applicable.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

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4.11.2.5 The concentration of oxygen in the GASEOUS WASTE PROCESSING SYSTEM shall be determined to be within the above limits by continuously monitoring the waste gases entering the GASEOUS WASTE PROCESSING SYSTEM with the oxygen monitor required OPERABLE by Table 3.3-13 of Specification 3.3.3.11.

## RADIOACTIVE EFFLUENTS

### GAS STORAGE TANKS

#### LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

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3.11.2.6 The quantity of radioactivity contained in each gas storage tank shall be limited to less than or equal to  $1.0 \times 10^5$  Curies of noble gases (considered as Xe-133 equivalent).

APPLICABILITY: At all times.

#### ACTION:

- a. With the quantity of radioactive material in any gas storage tank exceeding the above limit, immediately suspend all additions of radioactive material to the tank, within 48 hours reduce the tank contents to within the limit, and describe the events leading to this condition in the next Semiannual Radioactive Effluent Release Report, pursuant to Specification 6.9.1.4.
- b. The provisions of Specification 3.0.3 are not applicable.

#### SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

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4.11.2.6 The quantity of radioactive material contained in each gas storage tank shall be determined to be within the above limit at least once per 24 hours when radioactive materials are being added to the tank.



## RADIOACTIVE EFFLUENTS

### 3/4.11.3 SOLID RADIOACTIVE WASTES

#### LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.11.3 Radioactive wastes shall be solidified or dewatered in accordance with the PROCESS CONTROL PROGRAM to meet shipping and transportation requirements during transit, and disposal site requirements when received at the disposal site.

APPLICABILITY: At all times.

#### ACTION:

- a. With SOLIDIFICATION or dewatering not meeting disposal site and shipping and transportation requirements, suspend shipment of the inadequately processed wastes and correct the PROCESS CONTROL PROGRAM, the procedures, and/or the Solid Waste System as necessary to prevent recurrence.
- b. With SOLIDIFICATION or dewatering not performed in accordance with the PROCESS CONTROL PROGRAM, test the improperly processed waste in each container to ensure that it meets burial ground and shipping requirements and take appropriate administrative action to prevent recurrence.
- c. The provisions of Specification 3.0.3 are not applicable.

#### SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

4.11.3 SOLIDIFICATION of at least one representative test specimen from at least every tenth batch of each type of wet radioactive wastes (e.g., filter sludges, spent resins, evaporator bottoms, boric acid solutions, and sodium sulfate solutions) shall be verified in accordance with the PROCESS CONTROL PROGRAM:

- a. If any test specimen fails to verify SOLIDIFICATION, the SOLIDIFICATION of the batch under test shall be suspended until such time as additional test specimens can be obtained, alternative SOLIDIFICATION parameters can be determined in accordance with the PROCESS CONTROL PROGRAM, and a subsequent test verifies SOLIDIFICATION. SOLIDIFICATION of the batch may then be resumed using the alternative SOLIDIFICATION parameters determined by the PROCESS CONTROL PROGRAM;
- b. If the initial test specimen from a batch of waste fails to verify SOLIDIFICATION, the PROCESS CONTROL PROGRAM shall provide for the collection and testing of representative test specimens from each consecutive batch of the same type of wet waste until at least three consecutive initial test specimens demonstrate SOLIDIFICATION. The PROCESS CONTROL PROGRAM shall be modified as required, as provided in Specification 6.13, to assure SOLIDIFICATION of subsequent batches of waste; and

RADIOACTIVE EFFLUENTS

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (Continued)

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- c. With the installed equipment incapable of meeting Specification 3.11.3 or declared inoperable, restore the equipment to OPERABLE status or provide for contract capability to process wastes as necessary to satisfy all applicable transportation and disposal requirements.

## RADIOACTIVE EFFLUENTS

### 3/4.11.4 TOTAL DOSE

#### LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.11.4 The annual (calendar year) dose or dose commitment to any MEMBER OF THE PUBLIC due to releases of radioactivity and to radiation from uranium fuel cycle sources shall be limited to less than or equal to 25 mrems to the whole body or any organ, except the thyroid, which shall be limited to less than or equal to 75 mrems.

APPLICABILITY: At all times.

#### ACTION:

- a. With the calculated doses from the release of radioactive materials in liquid or gaseous effluents exceeding twice the limits of Specification 3.11.1.2a., 3.11.1.2b., 3.11.2.2a., 3.11.2.2b., 3.11.2.3a., or 3.11.2.3b., calculations shall be made including direct radiation contributions from the units and from outside storage tanks to determine whether the above limits of Specification 3.11.4 have been exceeded. If such is the case, prepare and submit to the Commission within 30 days, pursuant to Specification 6.9.2, a Special Report that defines the corrective action to be taken to reduce subsequent releases to prevent recurrence of exceeding the above limits and includes the schedule for achieving conformance with the above limits. This Special Report, as defined in 10 CFR 20.405(c), shall include an analysis that estimates the radiation exposure (dose) to a MEMBER OF THE PUBLIC from uranium fuel cycle sources, including all effluent pathways and direct radiation, for the calendar year that includes the release(s) covered by this report. It shall also describe levels of radiation and concentrations of radioactive material involved, and the cause of the exposure levels or concentrations. If the estimated dose(s) exceeds the above limits, and if the release condition resulting in violation of 40 CFR Part 190 has not already been corrected, the Special Report shall include a request for a variance in accordance with the provisions of 40 CFR Part 190. Submittal of the report is considered a timely request, and a variance is granted until staff action on the request is complete.
- b. The provisions of Specification 3.0.3 are not applicable.

#### SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

4.11.4.1 Cumulative dose contributions from liquid and gaseous effluents shall be determined in accordance with Specifications 4.11.1.2, 4.11.2.2, and 4.11.2.3, and in accordance with the methodology and parameters in the ODCM.

4.11.4.2 Cumulative dose contributions from direct radiation from the units and from radwaste storage tanks shall be determined in accordance with the methodology and parameters in the ODCM. This requirement is applicable only under conditions set forth in ACTION a. of Specification 3.11.4.

## 3/4.12 RADIOLOGICAL ENVIRONMENTAL MONITORING

### 3/4.12.1 MONITORING PROGRAM

#### LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.12.1 The Radiological Environmental Monitoring Program (REMP) shall be conducted as specified in the ODCM.

APPLICABILITY: At all times.

#### ACTION:

- a. With the Radiological Environmental Monitoring Program not being conducted as specified, prepare and submit to the Commission, in the Annual Radiological Environmental Operating Report required by Specification 6.9.1.3, a description of the reasons for not conducting the program as required and the plans for preventing a recurrence.
- b. With the level of radioactivity as the result of plant effluents in an environmental sampling medium at a specified location exceeding the reporting levels of the REMP when averaged over any calendar quarter, prepare and submit to the Commission within 30 days, pursuant to Specification 6.9.2, a Special Report that identifies the cause(s) for exceeding the limit(s) and defines the corrective actions to be taken to reduce radioactive effluents so that the potential annual dose\* to a MEMBER OF THE PUBLIC is less than the calendar year limits of Specifications 3.11.1.2, 3.11.2.2, or 3.11.2.3. When more than one of the radionuclides in the REMP are detected in the sampling medium, this report shall be submitted if:

$$\frac{\text{concentration (1)}}{\text{reporting level (1)}} + \frac{\text{concentration (2)}}{\text{reporting level (2)}} + \dots \geq 1.0$$

When radionuclides other than those listed in the REMP are detected and are the result of plant effluents, this report shall be submitted if the potential annual dose\* to a MEMBER OF THE PUBLIC from all radionuclides is equal to or greater than the calendar year limits of Specification 3.11.1.2, 3.11.2.2, or 3.11.2.3. This report is not required if the measured level of radioactivity was not the result of plant effluents; however, in such an event, the condition shall be reported and described in the Annual Radiological Environmental Operating Report required by Specification 6.9.1.3.

\*The methodology and parameters used to estimate the potential annual dose to a MEMBER OF THE PUBLIC shall be indicated in this report.

## RADIOLOGICAL ENVIRONMENTAL MONITORING

### LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

#### ACTION (Continued)

- c. With milk or fresh leafy vegetable samples unavailable from one or more of the sample locations required by the REMP, identify specific locations for obtaining replacement samples and add them within 30 days to the Radiological Environmental Monitoring Program given in the ODCM. The specific locations from which samples were unavailable may then be deleted from the monitoring program. Pursuant to Specification 6.14, submit in the next Semiannual Radioactive Effluent Release Report documentation for a change in the ODCM including a revised figure(s) and table for the ODCM reflecting the new location(s) with supporting information identifying the cause of the unavailability of samples and justifying the selection of the new location(s) for obtaining samples.
- d. The provisions of Specification 3.0.3 are not applicable.

### SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

4.12.1 The radiological environmental monitoring samples shall be collected pursuant to the REMP from the specific locations given in the table and figure(s) in the ODCM, and shall be analyzed pursuant to the requirements of and the detection capabilities required by the REMP.

## RADIOLOGICAL ENVIRONMENTAL MONITORING

### 3/4.12.2 LAND USE CENSUS

#### LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.12.2 A Land Use Census shall be conducted and shall identify within a distance of 8 km (5 miles) the location in each of the 16 meteorological sectors of the nearest milk animal, the nearest residence, and the nearest garden\* of greater than 50 m<sup>2</sup> (500 ft<sup>2</sup>) producing broad leaf vegetation.

APPLICABILITY: At all times.

#### ACTION:

- a. With a Land Use Census identifying a location(s) that yields a calculated dose or dose commitment greater than the values currently being calculated in Specification 4.11.2.3, pursuant to Specification 6.9.1.4, identify the new location(s) in the next Semiannual Radioactive Effluent Release Report.
- b. With a Land Use Census identifying a location(s) that yields a calculated dose or dose commitment (via the same exposure pathway) 20% greater than at a location from which samples are currently being obtained in accordance with Specification 3.12.1, add the new location(s) within 30 days to the Radiological Environmental Monitoring Program given in the ODCM. The sampling location(s), excluding the control station location, having the lowest calculated dose or dose commitment(s), via the same exposure pathway, may be deleted from this monitoring program after October 31 of the year in which this Land Use Census was conducted. Pursuant to Specification 6.14, submit in the next Semiannual Radioactive Effluent Release Report documentation for a change in the ODCM including a revised figure(s) and table(s) for the ODCM reflecting the new location(s) with information supporting the change in sampling locations.
- c. The provisions of Specification 3.0.3 are not applicable.

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\*Broad leaf vegetation sampling of at least three different kinds of vegetation may be performed at the SITE BOUNDARY in each of two different direction sectors with the highest predicted L/Qs in lieu of the garden census. Specifications for broad leaf vegetation sampling in the REMP shall be followed, including analysis of control samples.

## RADIOLOGICAL ENVIRONMENTAL MONITORING

### SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

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4.12.2 The Land Use Census shall be conducted at least once per 12 months using that information that will provide the best results, such as by a door-to-door survey, aerial survey, or by consulting local agriculture authorities, as described in the ODCM. The results of the Land Use Census shall be included in the Annual Radiological Environmental Operating Report pursuant to Specification 6.9.1.3.

RADIOLOGICAL ENVIRONMENTAL MONITORING

3/4.12.3 INTERLABORATORY COMPARISON PROGRAM

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

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3.12.3 Analyses shall be performed on all radioactive materials, supplied as part of an Interlaboratory Comparison Program that has been approved by the Commission, that correspond to samples required by the REMP.

APPLICABILITY: At all times.

ACTION:

- a. With analyses not being performed as required above, report the corrective actions taken to prevent a recurrence to the Commission in the Annual Radiological Environmental Operating Report pursuant to Specification 6.9.1.3.
- b. The provisions of Specification 3.0.3 are not applicable.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

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4.12.3 The Interlaboratory Comparison Program shall be described in the ODCM. A summary of the results obtained as part of the above required Interlaboratory Comparison Program shall be included in the Annual Radiological Environmental Operating Report pursuant to Specification 6.9.1.3.



BASES FOR  
SECTIONS 3.0 AND 4.0  
LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION  
AND  
SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

NOTE

The BASES contained in succeeding pages summarize the reasons for the Specifications in Sections 3.0 and 4.0, but in accordance with 10 CFR 50.36 are not part of these Technical Specifications.

## 3/4 LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION AND SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

### 3.4.0 APPLICABILITY

#### BASES

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Specification 3.0.1 through 3.0.4 establish the general requirements applicable to Limiting Conditions for Operation. These requirements are based on the requirements for Limiting Conditions for Operation stated in the Code of Federal Regulations, 10 CFR 50.36(c)(2):

"Limiting conditions for operation are the lowest functional capability or performance levels of equipment required for safe operation of the facility. When a limiting condition for operation of a nuclear reactor is not met, the licensee shall shut down the reactor or follow any remedial action permitted by the technical specification until the condition can be met."

Specification 3.0.1 establishes the Applicability statement within each individual specification as the requirement for when (i.e., in which OPERATIONAL MODES or other specified conditions) conformance to the Limiting Conditions for Operation is required for safe operation of the facility. The ACTION requirements establish those remedial measures that must be taken within specified time limits when the requirements of a Limiting Condition for Operation are not met.

There are two basic types of ACTION requirements. The first specifies the remedial measures that permit continued operation of the facility which is not further restricted by the time limits of the ACTION requirements. In this case, conformance to the ACTION requirements provides an acceptable level of safety for unlimited continued operation as long as the ACTION requirements continue to be met. The second type of ACTION requirement specifies a time limit in which conformance to the conditions of the Limiting Condition for Operation must be met. This time limit is the allowable outage time to restore an inoperable system or component to OPERABLE status or for restoring parameters within specified limits. If these actions are not completed within the allowable outage time limits, a shutdown is required to place the facility in a MODE or condition in which the specification no longer applies. It is not intended that the shutdown ACTION requirements be used as an operational convenience which permits (routine) voluntary removal of a system(s) or component(s) from service in lieu of other alternatives that would not result in redundant systems or components being inoperable.

The specified time limits of the ACTION requirements are applicable from the point in time it is identified that a Limiting Condition for Operation is not met. The time limits of the ACTION requirements are also applicable when a system or component is removed from service for surveillance testing or investigation of operational problems. Individual specifications may include a specified time limit for the completion of a Surveillance Requirement when equipment is removed from service. In this case, the allowable outage time

### 3.4.0 APPLICABILITY

#### BASES (Continued)

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limits of the ACTION requirements are applicable when this limit expires if the surveillance has not been completed. When a shutdown is required to comply with ACTION requirements, the plant may have entered a MODE in which a new specification becomes applicable. In this case, the time limits of the ACTION requirements would apply from the point in time that the new specification becomes applicable if the requirements of the Limiting Condition for Operation are not met.

Specification 3.0.2 establishes that noncompliance with a specification exists when the requirements of the Limiting Condition for Operation are not met and the associated ACTION requirements have not been implemented within the specified time interval. The purpose of this specification is to clarify that (1) implementation of the ACTION requirements within the specified time interval constitutes compliance with a specification and (2) completion of the remedial measures of the ACTION requirements is not required when compliance with a Limiting Condition for Operation is restored within the time interval specified in the associated ACTION requirements.

Specification 3.0.3 establishes the shutdown ACTION requirements that must be implemented when a Limiting Condition for Operation is not met and the condition is not specifically addressed by the associated ACTION requirements. The purpose of this specification is to delineate the time limits for placing the unit in a safe shutdown MODE when plant operation cannot be maintained within the limits for safe operation defined by the Limiting Conditions for Operation and its ACTION requirements. It is not intended to be used as an operational convenience which permits (routine) voluntary removal of redundant systems or components from service in lieu of other alternatives that would not result in redundant systems or components being inoperable. One hour is allowed to prepare for an orderly shutdown before initiating a change in plant operation. This time permits the operator to coordinate the reduction in electrical generation with the load dispatcher to ensure the stability and availability of the electrical grid. The time limits specified to reach lower MODES of operation permit the shutdown to proceed in a controlled and orderly manner that is well within the specified maximum cooldown rate and within the cooldown capabilities of the facility assuming only the minimum required equipment is OPERABLE. This reduces thermal stresses on components of the primary coolant system and the potential for a plant upset that could challenge safety systems under conditions for which this specification applies.

If remedial measures permitting limited continued operation of the facility under the provisions of the ACTION requirements are completed, the shutdown may be terminated. The time limits of the ACTION requirements are applicable from the point in time there was a failure to meet a Limiting Condition for Operation. Therefore, the shutdown may be terminated if the ACTION requirements have been met or the time limits of the ACTION requirements have not expired, thus providing an allowance for the completion of the required actions.

### 3.4.0 APPLICABILITY

#### BASES (Continued)

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The time limits of Specification 3.0.3 allow 37 hours for the plant to be in the COLD SHUTDOWN MODE when a shutdown is required during the POWER MODE of operation. If the plant is in a lower MODE of operation when a shutdown is required, the time limit for reaching the next lower MODE of operation applies. However, if a lower MODE of operation is reached in less time than allowed, the total allowable time to reach COLD SHUTDOWN, or other applicable MODE, is not reduced. For example, if HOT STANDBY is reached in 2 hours, the time allowed to reach HOT SHUTDOWN is the next 11 hours because the total time to reach HOT SHUTDOWN is not reduced from the allowable limit of 13 hours. Therefore, if remedial measures are completed that would permit a return to POWER operation, a penalty is not incurred by having to reach a lower MODE of operation in less than the total time allowed.

The same principle applies with regard to the allowable outage time limits of the ACTION requirements, if compliance with the ACTION requirements for one specification results in entry into a MODE or condition of operation for another specification in which the requirements of the Limiting Condition for Operation are not met. If the new specification becomes applicable in less time than specified, the difference may be added to the allowable outage time limits of the second specification. However, the allowable outage time limits of ACTION requirements for a higher MODE of operation may not be used to extend the allowable outage time that is applicable when a Limiting Condition for Operation is not met in a lower MODE of operation.

The shutdown requirements of Specification 3.0.3 do not apply in MODES 5 and 6, because the ACTION requirements of individual specifications define the remedial measures to be taken.

Specification 3.0.4 establishes limitations on MODE changes when a Limiting Condition for Operation is not met. It precludes placing the facility in a higher MODE of operation when the requirements for a Limiting Condition for Operation are not met and continued noncompliance to these conditions would result in a shutdown to comply with the ACTION requirements if a change in MODES were permitted. The purpose of this specification is to ensure that facility operation is not initiated or that higher MODES of operation are not entered when corrective action is being taken to obtain compliance with a specification by restoring equipment to OPERABLE status or parameters to specified limits. Compliance with ACTION requirements that permit continued operation of the facility for an unlimited period of time provides an acceptable level of safety for continued operation without regard to the status of the plant before or after a MODE change. Therefore, in this case, entry into an OPERATIONAL MODE or other specified condition may be made in accordance with the provisions of the ACTION requirements. The provisions of this specification should not, however, be interpreted as endorsing the failure to exercise good practice in restoring systems or components to OPERABLE status before plant startup.

### 3.4.0 APPLICABILITY

#### BASES (Continued)

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When a shutdown is required to comply with ACTION requirements, the provisions of Specification 3.0.4 do not apply because they would delay placing the facility in a lower MODE of operation.

Specifications 4.0.1 through 4.0.5 establish the general requirements applicable to Surveillance Requirements. These requirements are based on the Surveillance Requirements stated in the Code of Federal Regulations, 10 CFR 50.36(c)(3):

"Surveillance requirements are requirements relating to test, calibration, or inspection to ensure that the necessary quality of systems and components is maintained, that facility operation will be within safety limits, and that the limiting conditions of operation will be met."

Specification 4.0.1 establishes the requirement that surveillances must be performed during the OPERATIONAL MODES or other conditions for which the requirements of the Limiting Conditions for Operation apply unless otherwise stated in an individual Surveillance Requirement. The purpose of this specification is to ensure that surveillances are performed to verify the operational status of systems and components and that parameters are within specified limits to ensure safe operation of the facility when the plant is in a MODE or other specified condition for which the associated Limiting Conditions for Operation are applicable. Surveillance Requirements do not have to be performed when the facility is in an OPERATIONAL MODE for which the requirements of the associated Limiting Condition for Operation do not apply unless otherwise specified. The Surveillance Requirements associated with a Special Test Exception are only applicable when the Special Test Exception is used as an allowable exception to the requirements of a specification.

Specification 4.0.2 establishes the conditions under which the specified time interval for Surveillance Requirements may be extended. Item a. permits an allowable extension of the normal surveillance interval to facilitate surveillance scheduling and consideration of plant operating conditions that may not be suitable for conducting the surveillance; e.g., transient conditions or other ongoing surveillance or maintenance activities. Item b. limits the use of the provisions of item a. to ensure that it is not used repeatedly to extend the surveillance interval beyond that specified. The limits of Specification 4.0.2 are based on engineering judgment and the recognition that the most probable result of any particular surveillance being performed is the verification of conformance with the Surveillance Requirements. These provisions are sufficient to ensure that the reliability ensured through surveillance activities is not significantly degraded beyond that obtained from the specified surveillance interval.

Specification 4.0.3 establishes the failure to perform a Surveillance Requirement within the allowed surveillance interval, defined by the provisions of Specification 4.0.2, as a condition that constitutes a failure to meet the OPERABILITY requirements for a Limiting Condition for Operation. Under the

### 3.4.0 APPLICABILITY

#### BASES (Continued)

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provisions of this specification, systems and components are assumed to be OPERABLE when Surveillance Requirements have been satisfactorily performed within the specified time interval. However, nothing in this provision is to be construed as implying that systems or components are OPERABLE when they are found or known to be inoperable although still meeting the Surveillance Requirements. This specification also clarifies that the ACTION requirements are applicable when Surveillance Requirements have not been completed within the allowed surveillance interval and that the time limits of the ACTION requirements apply from the point in time it is identified that a surveillance has not been performed and not at the time that the allowed surveillance interval was exceeded. Completion of the Surveillance Requirement within the allowable outage time limits of the ACTION requirements restores compliance with the requirements of Specification 4.0.3. However, this does not negate the fact that the failure to have performed the surveillance within the allowed surveillance interval, defined by the provisions of Specification 4.0.2, was a violation of the OPERABILITY requirements of a Limiting Condition for Operation that is subject to enforcement action. Further, the failure to perform a surveillance within the provisions of Specification 4.0.2 is a violation of a Technical Specification requirement and is, therefore, a reportable event under the requirements of 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B) because it is a condition prohibited by the plant's Technical Specifications.

If the allowable outage time limits of the ACTION requirements are less than 24 hours or a shutdown is required to comply with ACTION requirements, e.g., Specification 3.0.3, a 24-hour allowance is provided to permit a delay in implementing the ACTION requirements. This provides an adequate time limit to complete Surveillance Requirements that have not been performed. The purpose of this allowance is to permit the completion of a surveillance before a shutdown is required to comply with ACTION requirements or before other remedial measures would be required that may preclude completion of a surveillance. The basis for this allowance includes consideration for plant conditions, adequate planning, availability of personnel, the time required to perform the surveillance, and the safety significance of the delay in completing the required surveillance. This provision also provides a time limit for the completion of Surveillance Requirements that become applicable as a consequence of MODE changes imposed by ACTION requirements and for completing Surveillance Requirements that are applicable when an exception to the requirements of Specification 4.0.4 is allowed. If a surveillance is not completed within the 24-hour allowance, the time limits of the ACTION requirements are applicable at that time. When a surveillance is performed within the 24-hour allowance and the Surveillance Requirements are not met, the time limits of the ACTION requirements are applicable at the time that the surveillance is terminated.

Surveillance Requirements do not have to be performed on inoperable equipment because the ACTION requirements define the remedial measures that apply. However, the Surveillance Requirements have to be met to demonstrate that inoperable equipment has been restored to OPERABLE status.

### 3.4.0 APPLICABILITY

#### BASES (Continued)

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Specification 4.0.4 establishes the requirement that all applicable surveillances must be met before entry into an OPERATIONAL MODE or other condition of operation specified in the Applicability statement. The purpose of this specification is to ensure that system and component OPERABILITY requirements or parameter limits are met before entry into a MODE or condition for which these systems and components ensure safe operation of the facility. This provision applies to changes in OPERATIONAL MODES or other specified conditions associated with plant shutdown as well as startup.

Under the provisions of this specification, the applicable Surveillance Requirements must be performed within the specified surveillance interval to ensure that the Limiting Conditions for Operation are met during initial plant startup or following a plant outage.

When a shutdown is required to comply with ACTION requirements, the provisions of Specification 4.0.4 do not apply because this would delay placing the facility in a lower MODE of operation.

Specification 4.0.5 establishes the requirement that inservice inspection of ASME Code Class 1, 2, and 3 components and inservice testing of ASME Code Class 1, 2, and 3 pumps and valves shall be performed in accordance with a periodically updated version of Section XI of the ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code and Addenda as required by 10 CFR 50.55a. These requirements apply except when relief has been provided in writing by the Commission.

This specification includes a clarification of the frequencies for performing the inservice inspection and testing activities required by Section XI of the ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code and applicable Addenda. This clarification is provided to ensure consistency in surveillance intervals throughout the Technical Specifications and to remove any ambiguities relative to the frequencies for performing the required inservice inspection and testing activities.

Under the terms of this specification, the more restrictive requirements of the Technical Specifications take precedence over the ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code and applicable Addenda. The requirements of Specification 4.0.4 to perform surveillance activities before entry into an OPERATIONAL MODE or other specified condition takes precedence over the ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code provision which allows pumps and valves to be tested up to one week after return to normal operation. The Technical Specification definition of OPERABLE does not allow a grace period before a component, that is not capable of performing its specified function, is declared inoperable and takes precedence over the ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code provision which allows a valve to be incapable of performing its specified function for up to 24 hours before being declared inoperable.



## 3/4.1 REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS

### BASES

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#### 3/4.1.1 BORATION CONTROL

##### 3/4.1.1.1 and 3/4.1.1.2 SHUTDOWN MARGIN

A sufficient SHUTDOWN MARGIN ensures that: (1) the reactor can be made subcritical from all operating conditions, (2) the reactivity transients associated with postulated accident conditions are controllable within acceptable limits, and (3) the reactor will be maintained sufficiently subcritical to preclude inadvertent criticality in the shutdown condition.

SHUTDOWN MARGIN requirements vary throughout core life as a function of fuel depletion, RCS boron concentration, and RCS  $T_{avg}$ . In MODES 1 and 2, the most restrictive condition occurs at EOL, with  $T_{avg}$  at no load operating temperature, and is associated with a postulated steam line break accident and resulting uncontrolled RCS cooldown. In the analysis of this accident, a minimum SHUTDOWN MARGIN of 1.75%  $\Delta k/k$  is required to control the reactivity transient. The 1.75%  $\Delta k/k$  SHUTDOWN MARGIN is the design basis minimum for the 14-foot fuel using Hafnium control rods (Ref. FSAR Table 4.3-3). Accordingly, the SHUTDOWN MARGIN requirement for MODES 1 and 2 is based upon this limiting condition and is consistent with FSAR safety analysis assumptions. In MODES 3, 4, and 5, the most restrictive condition occurs at BOL, when the boron concentration is the greatest. In these modes, the required SHUTDOWN MARGIN is composed of a constant requirement and a variable requirement, which is a function of the RCS boron concentration. The constant SHUTDOWN MARGIN requirement of 1.75%  $\Delta k/k$  is based on an uncontrolled RCS cooldown from a steamline break accident. The variable SHUTDOWN MARGIN requirement is based on the results of a boron dilution accident analysis, where the SHUTDOWN MARGIN is varied as a function of RCS boron concentration, to guarantee a minimum of 15 minutes for operator action after a boron dilution alarm, prior to a loss of all SHUTDOWN MARGIN.

The boron dilution analysis assumed a common RCS volume, and maximum dilution flow rate for MODES 3 and 4, and a different volume and flow rate for MODE 5. The MODE 5 conditions assumed limited mixing in the RCS and cooling with the RHR system only. In MODES 3 and 4 it was assumed that at least one reactor coolant pump was operating. If at least one reactor coolant pump is not operating in MODE 3 or 4, then the SHUTDOWN MARGIN requirements for MODE 5 shall apply.

##### 3/4.1.1.3 MODERATOR TEMPERATURE COEFFICIENT

The limitations on moderator temperature coefficient (MTC) are provided to ensure that the value of this coefficient remains within the limiting condition assumed in the FSAR accident and transient analyses.

The MTC values of this specification are applicable to a specific set of plant conditions; accordingly, verification of MTC values at conditions other than those explicitly stated will require extrapolation to those conditions in order to permit an accurate comparison.

## REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS

### BASES

#### MODERATOR TEMPERATURE COEFFICIENT (Continued)

The most negative MTC, value equivalent to the most positive moderator density coefficient (MDC), was obtained by incrementally correcting the MDC used in the FSAR analyses to nominal operating conditions. These corrections involved subtracting the incremental change in the MDC associated with a core condition of all rods inserted (most positive MDC) to an all rods withdrawn condition and, a conversion for the rate of change of moderator density with temperature at RATED THERMAL POWER conditions. This value of the MDC was then transformed into the limiting MTC value  $-4.0 \times 10^{-4} \Delta k/k/^\circ F$ . The MTC value of  $-3.1 \times 10^{-4} \Delta k/k/^\circ F$  represents a conservative value (with corrections for burnup and soluble boron) at a core condition of 300 ppm equilibrium boron concentration and is obtained by making these corrections to the limiting MTC value of  $-4.0 \times 10^{-4} \Delta k/k/^\circ F$ .

The Surveillance Requirements for measurement of the MTC at the beginning and near the end of the fuel cycle are adequate to confirm that the MTC remains within its limits since this coefficient changes slowly due principally to the reduction in RCS boron concentration associated with fuel burnup.

#### 3/4.1.1.4 MINIMUM TEMPERATURE FOR CRITICALITY

This specification ensures that the reactor will not be made critical with the Reactor Coolant System average temperature less than 561°F. This limitation is required to ensure: (1) the moderator temperature coefficient is within its analyzed temperature range, (2) the trip instrumentation is within its normal operating range, (3) the pressurizer is capable of being in an OPERABLE status with a steam bubble, and (4) the reactor vessel is above its minimum  $RT_{NDT}$  temperature.

#### 3/4.1.2 BORATION SYSTEMS

The Boron Injection System ensures that negative reactivity control is available during each mode of facility operation. The components required to perform this function include: (1) borated water sources, (2) charging pumps, (3) separate flow paths, (4) boric acid transfer pumps, and (5) an emergency power supply from OPERABLE diesel generators.

With the RCS average temperature above 350°F, a minimum of two boron injection flow paths are required to ensure single functional capability in the event an assumed failure renders one of the flow paths inoperable. The boration capability of either flow path is sufficient to provide a SHUTDOWN MARGIN from expected operating conditions of 1.75%  $\Delta k/k$  after xenon decay and cooldown to 200°F. The maximum expected boration capability requirement occurs at EOL from full power equilibrium xenon conditions and requires 27,000 gallons of 7000 ppm borated water from the boric acid storage system or 458,000 gallons of 2500 ppm borated water from the refueling water storage tank (RWST). The RWST volume is an EACS requirement and is more than adequate for the required boration capability.

## REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS

### BASES

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#### BORATION SYSTEMS (Continued)

With the RCS temperature below 350°F, one boron injection flow path/source is acceptable without single failure consideration on the basis of the stable reactivity condition of the reactor and the additional restrictions prohibiting CORE ALTERATIONS and positive reactivity changes in the event the single boron injection flow path/source becomes inoperable.

The limitation for a maximum of one charging pump to be OPERABLE and the Surveillance Requirement to verify all charging pumps except the required OPERABLE pump to be inoperable below 350°F provides assurance that a mass addition pressure transient can be relieved by the operation of a single PORV.

The boration capability required below 200°F is sufficient to provide a variable SHUTDOWN MARGIN based on the results of a boron dilution accident analysis where the SHUTDOWN MARGIN is varied as a function of RCS boron concentration after xenon decay and cooldown from 200°F to 140°F. This condition requires either 2900 gallons of 7000 ppm borated water from the boric acid storage system or 122,000 gallons of 2500 ppm borated water from the RWST for MODE 5 and 33,000 gallons of 2500 ppm borated water from the RWST for MODE 6.

The contained water volume limits include allowance for water not available because of discharge line location and other physical characteristics.

The limits on contained water volume and boron concentration of the RWST also ensure a pH value of between 7.5 and 10.0 for the solution recirculated within containment after a LOCA. This pH band minimizes the evolution of iodine and minimizes the effect of chloride and caustic stress corrosion on mechanical systems and components.

The OPERABILITY of one Boron Injection System during REFUELING ensures that this system is available for reactivity control while in MODE 6.

#### 3/4.1.3 MOVABLE CONTROL ASSEMBLIES

The specifications of this section ensure that: (1) acceptable power distribution limits are maintained, (2) the minimum SHUTDOWN MARGIN is maintained, and (3) the potential effects of rod misalignment on associated accident analyses are limited. OPERABILITY of the control rod position indicators is required to determine control rod positions and thereby ensure compliance with the control rod alignment and insertion limits. Verification that the Digital Rod Position Indicator agrees with the demanded position within  $\pm 12$  steps at 24, 48, 120, and 259 steps withdrawn for the Control Banks and 18, 234, and 259 steps withdrawn for the Shutdown Banks provides assurance that the Digital Rod Position Indicator is operating correctly over the full range of indication. Since the Digital Rod Position Indication System does not indicate the actual shutdown rod position between 18 steps and 234 steps, only points in the indicated ranges are picked for verification of agreement with demanded position.

## REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS

### BASES

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#### MOVABLE CONTROL ASSEMBLIES (Continued)

The ACTION statements which permit limited variations from the basic requirements are accompanied by additional restrictions which ensure that the original design criteria are met. Misalignment of a rod requires measurement of peaking factors and a restriction in THERMAL POWER. These restrictions provide assurance of fuel rod integrity during continued operation. In addition, those safety analyses affected by a misaligned rod are reevaluated to confirm that the results remain valid during future operation.

The maximum rod drop time restriction is consistent with the assumed rod drop time used in the safety analyses. Measurement with  $T_{avg}$  greater than or equal to 561°F and with all reactor coolant pumps operating ensures that the measured drop times will be representative of insertion times experienced during a Reactor trip at operating conditions.

Control rod positions and OPERABILITY of the rod position indicators are required to be verified on a nominal basis of once per 12 hours with more frequent verifications required if an automatic monitoring channel is inoperable. These verification frequencies are adequate for assuring that the applicable LCOs are satisfied.

## 3/4.2 POWER DISTRIBUTION LIMITS

### BASES

The specifications of this section provide assurance of fuel integrity during Condition I (Normal Operation) and II (Incidents of Moderate Frequency) events by: (1) maintaining the minimum DNBR in the core greater than or equal to 1.30 during normal operation and in short-term transients, and (2) limiting the fission gas release, fuel pellet temperature, and cladding mechanical properties to within assumed design criteria. In addition, limiting the peak linear power density during Condition I events provides assurance that the initial conditions assumed for the LOCA analyses are met and the ECCS acceptance criteria limit of 2200°F is not exceeded.

The definitions of certain hot channel and peaking factors as used in these specifications are as follows:

- $F_Q(Z)$  Heat Flux Hot Channel Factor, is defined as the maximum local heat flux on the surface of a fuel rod at core elevation  $Z$  divided by the average fuel rod heat flux, allowing for manufacturing tolerances on fuel pellets and rods;
- $F_{\Delta H}^N$  Nuclear Enthalpy Rise Hot Channel Factor, is defined as the ratio of the integral of linear power along the rod with the highest integrated power to the average rod power; and
- $F_{xy}(Z)$  Radial Peaking Factor, is defined as the ratio of peak power density to average power density in the horizontal plane at core elevation  $Z$ .

### 3/4.2.1 AXIAL FLUX DIFFERENCE

The limits on AXIAL FLUX DIFFERENCE (AFD) assure that the  $F_Q(Z)$  upper bound envelope of 2.50 times the normalized axial peaking factor is not exceeded during either normal operation or in the event of xenon redistribution following power changes.

Target flux difference is determined at equilibrium xenon conditions. The full-length rods may be positioned within the core in accordance with their respective insertion limits and should be inserted near their normal position for steady-state operation at high power levels. The value of the target flux difference obtained under these conditions divided by the fraction of RATED THERMAL POWER is the target flux difference at RATED THERMAL POWER for the associated core burnup conditions. Target flux differences for other THERMAL POWER levels are obtained by multiplying the RATED THERMAL POWER value by the appropriate fractional THERMAL POWER level. The periodic updating of the target flux difference value is necessary to reflect core burnup considerations.

## POWER DISTRIBUTION LIMITS

### BASES

#### AXIAL FLUX DIFFERENCE (Continued)

Although it is intended that the plant will be operated with the AFD within the target band required by Specification 3.2.1 about the target flux difference, during rapid plant THERMAL POWER reductions, control rod motion will cause the AFD to deviate outside of the target band at reduced THERMAL POWER levels. This deviation will not affect the xenon redistribution sufficiently to change the envelope of peaking factors which may be reached on a subsequent return to RATED THERMAL POWER (with the AFD within the target band) provided the time duration of the deviation is limited. Accordingly, a 1-hour penalty deviation limit cumulative during the previous 24 hours is provided for operation outside of the target band but within the limits of Figure 3.2-1 while at THERMAL POWER levels between 50% and 90% of RATED THERMAL POWER. For THERMAL POWER levels between 15% and 50% of RATED THERMAL POWER, deviations of the AFD outside of the target band are less significant. The penalty of 2 hours actual time reflects this reduced significance.

Provisions for monitoring the AFD on an automatic basis are derived from the plant process computer through the AFD Monitor Alarm. The computer determines the 1-minute average of each of the OPERABLE excore detector outputs and provides an alarm message immediately if the AFD for two or more OPERABLE excore channels are outside the target band and the THERMAL POWER is greater than 90% of RATED THERMAL POWER. During operation at THERMAL POWER levels between 50% and 90% and between 15% and 50% RATED THERMAL POWER, the computer outputs an alarm message when the penalty deviation accumulates beyond the limits of 1 hour and 2 hours, respectively.

Figure B 3/4 2-1 shows a typical monthly target band.

#### 3/4.2.2 and 3/4.2.3 HEAT FLUX HOT CHANNEL FACTOR and NUCLEAR ENTHALPY RISE HOT CHANNEL FACTOR

The limits on heat flux hot channel factor and nuclear enthalpy rise hot channel factor ensure that: (1) the design limits on peak local power density and minimum DNBR are not exceeded and (2) in the event of a LOCA the peak fuel clad temperature will not exceed the 2200°F ECCS acceptance criteria limit.

Each of these is measurable but will normally only be determined periodically as specified in Specifications 4.2.2 and 4.2.3. This periodic surveillance is sufficient to ensure that the limits are maintained provided:

- a. Control rods in a single group move together with no individual rod insertion differing by more than  $\pm 12$  steps, indicated, from the group demand position;
- b. Control rod groups are sequenced with overlapping groups as described in Specification 3.1.3.6;




FIGURE B 3/4.2-1  
 TYPICAL INDICATED AXIAL FLUX DIFFERENCE VERSUS THERMAL POWER

## POWER DISTRIBUTION LIMITS

### BASES

#### HEAT FLUX HOT CHANNEL FACTOR and NUCLEAR ENTHALPY RISE HOT CHANNEL FACTOR (Continued)

- c. The control rod insertion limits of Specifications 3.1.3.5 and 3.1.3.6 are maintained; and
- d. The axial power distribution, expressed in terms of AXIAL FLUX DIFFERENCE, is maintained within the limits.

$F_{\Delta H}^N$  will be maintained within its limits provided Conditions a. through d. above are maintained. The combination of the RCS flow requirement (395,000 gpm) and the requirement on  $F_{\Delta H}^N$  guarantees that the DNBR used in the safety analysis will be met. The relaxation of  $F_{\Delta H}^N$  as a function of THERMAL POWER allows changes in the radial power shape for all permissible rod insertion limits.

When  $F_{\Delta H}^N$  is measured, no additional allowances are necessary prior to comparison with the limit. A measurement error of 4% for  $F_{\Delta H}^N$  has been allowed for in the determination of the design DNBR value.

Fuel rod bowing reduces the value of DNS ratio. Credit is available to offset this reduction in the generic margin. The generic margins, totaling 3.3% DNBR completely offset any rod bow penalties. This margin includes the following:

- a. Design limit DNBR of 1.30 vs 1.28,
- b. Grid Spacing ( $K_g$ ) of 0.059 vs 0.066, and
- c. Thermal Diffusion Coefficient (for use in modified spacer factor) of 0.059 vs 0.061.

The applicable values of rod bow penalties are explained in FSAR Section 4.4.2.2.5.



## POWER DISTRIBUTION LIMITS

### BASES

#### HEAT FLUX HOT CHANNEL FACTOR and NUCLEAR ENTHALPY RISE HOT CHANNEL FACTOR (Continued)

When an  $F_Q$  measurement is taken, an allowance for both experimental error and manufacturing tolerance must be made. An allowance of 5% is appropriate for a full-core map taken with the Incore Detector Flux Mapping System, and a 3% allowance is appropriate for manufacturing tolerance.

The Radial Peaking Factor,  $F_{xy}(Z)$ , is measured periodically to provide assurance that the Hot Channel Factor,  $F_Q(Z)$ , remains within its limit. The  $F_{xy}$  limit for RATED THERMAL POWER ( $F_{xy}^{RTPQ}$ ) as provided in the Radial Peaking Factor Limit Report per Specification 6.9.1.6 was determined from expected power control maneuvers over the full range of burnup conditions in the core.

#### 3/4.2.4 QUADRANT POWER TILT RATIO

The QUADRANT POWER TILT RATIO limit assures that the radial power distribution satisfies the design values used in the power capability analysis. Radial power distribution measurements are made during STARTUP testing and periodically during power operation.

The limit of 1.02, at which corrective action is required, provides DNB and linear heat generation rate protection with x-y plane power tilts. A limit of 1.02 was selected to provide an allowance for the uncertainty associated with the indicated power tilt.

The 2-hour time allowance for operation with a tilt condition greater than 1.02 is provided to allow identification and correction of a dropped or misaligned control rod. In the event such action does not correct the tilt, the margin for uncertainty on  $F_Q$  is reinstated by reducing the maximum allowed power by 3% for each percent of tilt in excess of 1.

For purposes of monitoring QUADRANT POWER TILT RATIO when one excore detector is inoperable, the moveable incore detectors are used to confirm that the normalized symmetric power distribution is consistent with the QUADRANT POWER TILT RATIO. The incore detector monitoring is done with a full incore flux map or two sets of four symmetric thimbles. The two sets of four symmetric thimbles is a unique set of eight detector locations. These locations are C-8, E-5, E-11, H-3, H-13, L-5, L-11, N-8.

#### 3/4.2.5 DNB PARAMETERS

The limits on the DNB-related parameters assure that each of the parameters are maintained within the normal steady-state envelope of operation assumed in the transient and accident analyses. The limits are consistent with the

## POWER DISTRIBUTION LIMITS

### BASES

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#### 3/4.2.5 DNB PARAMETERS (Continued)

initial FSAR assumptions and have been analytically demonstrated adequate to maintain a minimum DNBR of 1.30 throughout each analyzed transient. The indicated  $T_{avg}$  value of 598°F and the indicated pressurizer pressure value of 2201 psig are provided assuming that the readings from four channels will be averaged before comparing with the required limit. The flow requirement (395,000 gpm) includes a measurement uncertainty of 3.5%.

The 12-hour periodic surveillance of these parameters through instrument readout is sufficient to ensure that the parameters are restored within their limits following load changes and other expected transient operation.

### 3/4.3 INSTRUMENTATION

#### BASES

#### 3/4.3.1 and 3/4.3.2 REACTOR TRIP SYSTEM and ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURES ACTUATION SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION

The OPERABILITY of the Reactor Trip System and the Engineered Safety Features Actuation System instrumentation and interlocks ensures that: (1) the associated ACTION and/or Reactor trip will be initiated when the parameter monitored by each channel or combination thereof reaches its Setpoint, (2) the specified coincidence logic is maintained, (3) sufficient redundancy is maintained to permit a channel to be out-of-service for testing or maintenance, and (4) sufficient system functional capability is available from diverse parameters.

The OPERABILITY of these systems is required to provide the overall reliability, redundancy, and diversity assumed available in the facility design for the protection and mitigation of accident and transient conditions. The integrated operation of each of these systems is consistent with the assumptions used in the safety analyses. The Surveillance Requirements specified for these systems ensure that the overall system functional capability is maintained comparable to the original design standards. The periodic surveillance tests performed at the minimum frequencies are sufficient to demonstrate this capability. Specified surveillance intervals and surveillance and maintenance outage times have been determined in accordance with WCAP-10271, "Evaluation of Surveillance Frequencies and Out of Service Times for the Reactor Protection Instrumentation System," and supplements to that report. Surveillance intervals and out of service times were determined based on maintaining an appropriate level of reliability of the Reactor Protection System instrumentation.

The Engineered Safety Features Actuation System Instrumentation Trip Setpoints specified in Table 3.3-4 are the nominal values at which the bistables are set for each functional unit. A Setpoint is considered to be adjusted consistent with the nominal value when the "as measured" Setpoint is within the band allowed for calibration accuracy.

To accommodate the instrument drift assumed to occur between operational tests and the accuracy to which Setpoints can be measured and calibrated, Allowable Values for the Setpoints have been specified in Table 3.3-4. Operation with Setpoints less conservative than the Trip Setpoint but within the Allowable Value is acceptable since an allowance has been made in the safety analysis to accommodate this error. An optional provision has been included for determining the OPERABILITY of a channel when its Trip Setpoint is found to exceed the Allowable Value. The methodology of this option utilizes the "as measured" deviation from the specified calibration point for rack and sensor components in conjunction with a statistical combination of the other uncertainties of the instrumentation to measure the process variable and the uncertainties in calibrating the instrumentation. In Equation 2.2-1,  $Z + R + S \leq TA$ , the interactive effects of the errors in the rack and the sensor, and the "as measured" values of the errors are considered. Z, as specified in Table 3.3-4, in percent span, is the statistical summation of errors assumed in the analysis excluding those associated with the sensor and rack drift and the accuracy of their measurement. TA or Total Allowance

## INSTRUMENTATION

### BASES

#### REACTOR TRIP SYSTEM and ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURES ACTUATION SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION (Continued)

is the difference, in percent span, between the trip setpoint and the value used in the analysis for the actuation. R or Rack Error is the "as measured" deviation, in the percent span, for the affected channel from the specified Trip Setpoint. S or Sensor Error is either the "as measured" deviation of the sensor from its calibration point or the value specified in Table 3.3-4, in percent span, from the analysis assumptions. Use of Equation 2.2-1 allows for a sensor drift factor, an increased rack drift factor, and provides a threshold value for REPORTABLE EVENTS.

The methodology to derive the Trip Setpoints is based upon combining all of the uncertainties in the channels. Inherent to the determination of the Trip Setpoints are the magnitudes of these channel uncertainties. Sensor and rack instrumentation utilized in these channels are expected to be capable of operating within the allowances of these uncertainty magnitudes. Rack drift in excess of the Allowable Value exhibits the behavior that the rack has not met its allowance. Being that there is a small statistical chance that this will happen, an infrequent excessive drift is expected. Rack or sensor drift, in excess of the allowance that is more than occasional, may be indicative of more serious problems and should warrant further investigation.

The measurement of response time at the specified frequencies provides assurance that the Reactor trip and the Engineered Safety Features actuation associated with each channel is completed within the time limit assumed in the safety analyses. No credit was taken in the analyses for those channels with response times indicated as not applicable. Response time may be demonstrated by any series of sequential, overlapping, or total channel test measurements provided that such tests demonstrate the total channel response time as defined. Sensor response time verification may be demonstrated by either: (1) in place, onsite, or offsite test measurements, or (2) utilizing replacement sensors with certified response times.

The Engineered Safety Features Actuation System senses selected plant parameters and determines whether or not predetermined limits are being exceeded. If they are, the signals are combined into logic matrices sensitive to combinations indicative of various accidents, events, and transients. Once the required logic combination is completed, the system sends actuation signals to those Engineered Safety Features components whose aggregate function best serves the requirements of the condition. As an example, the following actions may be initiated by the Engineered Safety Features Actuation System to mitigate the consequences of a steam line break or loss-of-coolant accident: (1) Safety Injection pumps start, (2) Reactor trip, (3) feedwater isolation, (4) startup of the standby diesel generators, (5) containment spray pumps start and automatic valves position, (6) containment isolation, (7) steam line isolation, (8) Turbine trip, (9) auxiliary feedwater pumps start and automatic valves position, (10) reactor containment fan coolers start, (11) essential cooling water pumps start and automatic valves position, (12) Control Room Ventilation Systems start, and (13) component cooling water pumps start and automatic valves position.

## INSTRUMENTATION

### BASES

#### REACTOR TRIP SYSTEM and ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURES ACTUATION SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION (Continued)

The Engineered Safety Features Actuation System interlocks perform the following functions:

- P-4 Reactor tripped - Actuates Turbine trip via P-16, closes main feedwater valves on  $T_{avg}$  below Setpoint, prevents the opening of the main feedwater valves which were closed by a Safety Injection or High Steam Generator Water Level or Excessive Cooldown Protection signal, allows Safety Injection block so that components can be reset or tripped, and actuates P-15.  
Reactor not tripped - prevents manual block of Safety Injection.
- P-11 On increasing pressurizer pressure, P-11 automatically reinstates Safety Injection actuation on low pressurizer pressure or excessive cooldown signals, reinstates steamline isolation on excessive cooldown signals, and opens the accumulator discharge isolation valves. On decreasing pressure, P-11 allows the manual block of Safety Injection actuation on low pressurizer pressure or excessive cooldown signals, allows the manual block of steamline isolation on excessive cooldown signals, and enables steam line isolation on high negative steam line pressure rate.
- P-12 On increasing reactor coolant loop temperature, P-12 automatically provides an arming signal to the Steam Dump System. On decreasing reactor coolant loop temperature, P-12 automatically removes the arming signal from the Steam Dump System.
- P-14 On increasing steam generator water level, P-14 automatically trips the turbine and the main feedwater pumps, and closes all feedwater isolation valves and feedwater control valves.
- P-15 When the reactor is tripped (P-4) or when below the power range neutron flux setpoint, P-15 is present and allows Safety Injection actuation and main steamline isolation on Low-Low  $T_{cold}$  and allows feedwater isolation and turbine trip from Low Compensated  $T_{cold}$  or high feedwater flow.

### 3/4.3.3 MONITORING INSTRUMENTATION

#### 3/4.3.3.1 RADIATION MONITORING FOR PLANT OPERATIONS

The OPERABILITY of the radiation monitoring instrumentation for plant operations ensures that: (1) the associated action will be initiated when the radiation level monitored by each channel or combination thereof reaches its Setpoint, (2) the specified coincidence logic is maintained, and (3) sufficient redundancy is maintained to permit a channel to be out of service for testing or maintenance. The radiation monitors for plant operations sense radiation levels in selected plant systems and locations and determine whether or not predetermined limits are being exceeded. If they are, the signals are combined into logic matrices sensitive to combinations indicative of various accidents and abnormal conditions. Once the required logic combination is completed, the system sends actuation signals to initiate alarms or automatic isolation action and actuation of Emergency Exhaust or Ventilation Systems.

## INSTRUMENTATION

### BASES

#### 3/4.3.3.2 MOVABLE INCORE DETECTORS

The OPERABILITY of the movable incore detectors with the specified minimum complement of equipment ensures that the measurements obtained from use of this system accurately represent the spatial neutron flux distribution of the core. The OPERABILITY of this system is demonstrated by irradiating each detector used and determining the acceptability of its voltage curve.

For the purpose of measuring  $F_Q(Z)$  or  $F_{\Delta H}^N$  a full incore flux map is used. Quarter-core flux maps, as defined in WCAP-8648, June 1976, may be used in recalibration of the Excore Neutron Flux Detection System, and full incore flux maps or symmetric incore thimbles may be used for monitoring the QUADRANT POWER TILT RATIO when one Power Range channel is inoperable.

#### 3/4.3.3.3 SEISMIC INSTRUMENTATION

The OPERABILITY of the seismic instrumentation ensures that sufficient capability is available to promptly determine the magnitude of a seismic event and evaluate the response of those features important to safety. This capability is required to permit comparison of the measured response to that used in the design basis for the facility to determine if plant shutdown is required pursuant to Appendix A of 10 CFR Part 100. The instrumentation is consistent with the recommendations of Regulatory Guide 1.12, "Instrumentation for Earthquakes," April 1974.

#### 3/4.3.3.4 METEOROLOGICAL INSTRUMENTATION

The OPERABILITY of the meteorological instrumentation ensures that sufficient meteorological data are available for estimating potential radiation doses to the public as a result of routine or accidental release of radioactive materials to the atmosphere. This capability is required to evaluate the need for initiating protective measures to protect the health and safety of the public and is consistent with the recommendations of Regulatory Guide 1.23, "Onsite Meteorological Programs," February 1972.

#### 3/4.3.3.5 REMOTE SHUTDOWN SYSTEM

The OPERABILITY of the Remote Shutdown System ensures that sufficient capability is available to permit safe shutdown of the facility from locations outside of the control room. This capability is required in the event control room habitability is lost and is consistent with General Design Criterion 19 of 10 CFR Part 50.

## INSTRUMENTATION

### BASES

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#### REMOTE SHUTDOWN SYSTEM (Continued)

The OPERABILITY of the Remote Shutdown System ensures that a fire will not preclude achieving safe shutdown. The Remote Shutdown System instrumentation, control, and power circuits and transfer switches necessary to eliminate effects of the fire and allow operation of instrumentation, control and power circuits required to achieve and maintain a safe shutdown condition are independent of areas where a fire could damage systems normally used to shut down the reactor. This capability is consistent with General Design Criterion 3 and Appendix R to 10 CFR Part 50.

#### 3/4.3.3.6 ACCIDENT MONITORING INSTRUMENTATION

The OPERABILITY of the accident monitoring instrumentation ensures that sufficient information is available on selected plant parameters to monitor and assess these variables following an accident. This capability is consistent with the recommendations of Regulatory Guide 1.97, Revision 2, "Instrumentation for Light-Water-Cooled Nuclear Power Plants to Assess Plant Conditions During and Following an Accident," December 1980 and NUREG-0737, "Clarification of TMI Action Plan Requirements," November 1980. The instrumentation listed in Table 3.3-10 corresponds to the Category 1 instrumentation for which selection, design, qualification and display criteria are described in Regulatory Guide 1.97, Revision 2.

#### 3/4.3.3.7 CHEMICAL DETECTION SYSTEMS

The OPERABILITY of the Chemical Detection Systems ensures that sufficient capability is available to promptly detect and initiate protective action in the event of an accidental chemical release. This capability is required to protect control room personnel and is consistent with the recommendations of Regulatory Guide 1.78, "Assumptions for Evaluating the Habitability of a Nuclear Power Plant Control Room During a Postulated Hazardous Chemical Release," June 1974.

#### 3/4.3.3.8 (Not Used)

## INSTRUMENTATION

### BASES

#### 3/4.3.3.9 (Not Used)

#### 3/4.3.3.10 RADIOACTIVE LIQUID EFFLUENT MONITORING INSTRUMENTATION

The radioactive liquid effluent instrumentation is provided to monitor and control, as applicable, the releases of radioactive materials in liquid effluents during actual or potential releases of liquid effluents. The Alarm/Trip Setpoints for these instruments shall be calculated and adjusted in accordance with the methodology and parameters in the ODCM to ensure that the alarm/trip will occur prior to exceeding the limits of 10 CFR Part 20. The OPERABILITY and use of this instrumentation is consistent with the requirements of General Design Criteria 60, 63, and 64 of Appendix A to 10 CFR Part 50.

#### 3/4.3.3.11 RADIOACTIVE GASEOUS EFFLUENT MONITORING INSTRUMENTATION

The radioactive gaseous effluent instrumentation is provided to monitor and control, as applicable, the releases of radioactive materials in gaseous effluents during actual or potential releases of gaseous effluents. The Alarm/Trip Setpoints for these instruments shall be calculated and adjusted in accordance with the methodology and parameters in the ODCM to ensure that the alarm/trip will occur prior to exceeding the limits of 10 CFR Part 20. This instrumentation also includes provisions for monitoring (and controlling) the concentrations of potentially explosive gas mixtures in the GASEOUS WASTE PROCESSING SYSTEM. The OPERABILITY and use of this instrumentation is consistent with the requirements of General Design Criteria 60, 63, and 64 of Appendix A to 10 CFR Part 50. The sensitivity of any noble gas activity monitors used to show compliance with the gaseous effluent release requirements of Specification 3.11.2.2 shall be such that concentrations as low as  $1 \times 10^{-6}$   $\mu\text{Ci/cc}$  are measurable.

#### 3/4.3.4 TURBINE OVERSPEED PROTECTION

This specification is provided to ensure that the turbine overspeed protection instrumentation and the turbine speed control valves are OPERABLE and will protect the turbine from excessive overspeed. Protection from turbine excessive overspeed is required since excessive overspeed of the turbine could generate potentially damaging missiles which could impact and damage safety-related components, equipment, or structures.



### 3/4.4 REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM

#### BASES

#### 3/4.4.1 REACTOR COOLANT LOOPS AND COOLANT CIRCULATION

The plant is designed to operate with all reactor coolant loops in operation and maintain DNBR above 1.30 during all normal operations and anticipated transients. In MODES 1 and 2 with one reactor coolant loop not in operation this specification requires that the plant be in at least HOT STANDBY within 6 hours.

In MODE 3, two reactor coolant loops provide sufficient heat removal capability for removing core decay heat even in the event of a bank withdrawal accident; however, a single reactor coolant loop provides sufficient heat removal capacity if a bank withdrawal accident can be prevented, i.e., by opening the Reactor Trip System breakers. Single failure considerations require that two loops be OPERABLE at all times.

In MODE 4, and in MODE 5 with reactor coolant loops filled, a single reactor coolant loop or RHR loop provides sufficient heat removal capability for removing decay heat; but single failure considerations require that at least two loops (either RHR or RCS) be OPERABLE.

In MODE 5 with reactor coolant loops not filled, a single RHR loop provides sufficient heat removal capability for removing decay heat; but single failure considerations, and the unavailability of the steam generators as a heat removing component, require that at least two RHR loops be OPERABLE.

The boron dilution analysis assumed a common RCS volume, and maximum dilution flow rate for MODES 3 and 4, and a different volume and flow rate for MODE 5. The MODE 5 conditions assumed limited mixing in the RCS and cooling with the RHR system only. In MODES 3 and 4, it was assumed that at least one reactor coolant pump was operating. If at least one reactor coolant pump is not operating in MODE 3 or 4, then the maximum possible dilution flow rate must be limited to the value assumed for MODE 5.

The operation of one reactor coolant pump (RCP) or one RHR pump provides adequate flow to ensure mixing, prevent stratification and produce gradual reactivity changes during boron concentration reductions in the Reactor Coolant System. The reactivity change rate associated with boron reduction will, therefore, be within the capability of operator recognition and control.

The restrictions on starting an RCP with one or more RCS cold legs less than or equal to 350°F are provided to prevent RCS pressure transients, caused by energy additions from the Secondary Coolant System, which could exceed the limits of Appendix G to 10 CFR Part 50. The RCS will be protected against overpressure transients and will not exceed the limits of Appendix G by restricting starting of the RCPs to when the secondary water temperature of each steam generator is less than 50°F above each of the RCS cold leg temperatures.

#### 3/4.4.2 SAFETY VALVES

The pressurizer Code safety valves operate to prevent the RCS from being pressurized above its Safety Limit of 2735 psig. Each safety valve is designed to relieve 504,950 lbs per hour of saturated steam at the valve setpoint of 2500 psia. The relief capacity of a single safety valve is adequate to relieve any overpressure condition which could occur during shutdown. In the event that no safety valves are OPERABLE, an operating RHR loop, connected to the

## REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM

### BASES

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#### SAFETY VALVES (Continued)

RCS, provides overpressure relief capability and will prevent RCS overpressurization. In addition, the Overpressure Protection System provides a diverse means of protection against RCS overpressurization at low temperatures.

During operation, all pressurizer Code safety valves must be OPERABLE to prevent the RCS from being pressurized above its Safety Limit of 2735 psig. The combined relief capacity of all of these valves is greater than the maximum surge rate resulting from a complete loss-of-load assuming no Reactor trip until the first Reactor Trip System Trip Setpoint is reached (i.e., no credit is taken for a direct Reactor trip on the turbine trip resulting from loss-of-load) and also assuming no operation of the power-operated relief valves or steam dump valves.

Demonstration of the safety valves' lift settings will occur only during shutdown and will be performed in accordance with the provisions of Section XI of the ASME Boiler and Pressure Code.

#### 3/4.4.3 PRESSURIZER

The 12-hour periodic surveillance is sufficient to ensure that the parameter is restored to within its limit following expected transient operation. The maximum water volume also ensures that a steam bubble is formed and thus the RCS is not a hydraulically solid system. The requirement that a minimum number of pressurizer heaters be OPERABLE enhances the capability of the plant to control Reactor Coolant System pressure and establish natural circulation.

#### 3/4.4.4 RELIEF VALVES

The power-operated relief valves (PORVs) and steam bubble function to relieve RCS pressure during all design transients up to and including the design step load decrease with steam dump. Operation of the PORVs minimizes the undesirable opening of the spring-loaded pressurizer Code safety valves. Each PORV has a remotely operated block valve to provide a positive shutoff capability should a relief valve become inoperable.

#### 3/4.4.5 STEAM GENERATORS

The Surveillance Requirements for inspection of the steam generator tubes ensure that the structural integrity of this portion of the RCS will be maintained. The program for inservice inspection of steam generator tubes is based on a modification of Regulatory Guide 1.83, Revision 1. Inservice inspection of steam generator tubing is essential in order to maintain surveillance of the conditions of the tubes in the event that there is evidence of mechanical damage or progressive degradation due to design, manufacturing errors, or inservice conditions that lead to corrosion. Inservice inspection of steam generator tubing also provides a means of characterizing the nature and cause of any tube degradation so that corrective measures can be taken.

## REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM

### BASES

#### STEAM GENERATORS (Continued)

The plant is expected to be operated in a manner such that the secondary coolant will be maintained within those chemistry limits found to result in negligible corrosion of the steam generator tubes. If the secondary coolant chemistry is not maintained within these limits, localized corrosion may likely result in stress corrosion cracking. The extent of cracking during plant operation would be limited by the limitation of steam generator tube leakage between the Reactor Coolant System and the Secondary Coolant System (primary-to-secondary leakage = 500 gallons per day per steam generator). Cracks having a primary-to-secondary leakage less than this limit during operation will have an adequate margin of safety to withstand the loads imposed during normal operation and by postulated accidents. Operating plants have demonstrated that primary-to-secondary leakage of 500 gallons per day per steam generator can readily be detected by radiation monitors of steam generator blowdown. Leakage in excess of this limit will require plant shutdown and an unscheduled inspection, during which the leaking tubes will be located and plugged.

Wastage-type defects are unlikely with proper chemistry treatment of the secondary coolant. However, even if a defect should develop in service, it will be found during scheduled inservice steam generator tube examinations. Plugging will be required for all tubes with imperfections exceeding the plugging limit of 40% of the tube nominal wall thickness. Steam generator tube inspections of operating plants have demonstrated the capability to reliably detect degradation that has penetrated 20% of the original tube wall thickness.

Whenever the results of any steam generator tubing inservice inspection fall into Category C-3, these results will be promptly reported to the Commission in a Special Report pursuant to Specification 6.9.2 within 30 days and prior to resumption of plant operation. Such cases will be considered by the Commission on a case-by-case basis and may result in a requirement for analysis, laboratory examinations, tests, additional eddy-current inspection, and revision of the Technical Specifications, if necessary.

#### 3/4.4.6 REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM LEAKAGE

##### 3/4.4.6.1 LEAKAGE DETECTION SYSTEMS

The RCS Leakage Detection Systems required by this specification are provided to monitor and detect leakage from the reactor coolant pressure boundary. These Detection Systems are consistent with the recommendations of Regulatory Guide 1.45, "Reactor Coolant Pressure Boundary Leakage Detection Systems," May 1973.

##### 3/4.4.6.2 OPERATIONAL LEAKAGE

PRESSURE BOUNDARY LEAKAGE of any magnitude is unacceptable since it may be indicative of an impending gross failure of the pressure boundary. Therefore,

## REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM

### BASIS

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#### OPERATIONAL LEAKAGE (Continued)

the presence of any PRESSURE BOUNDARY LEAKAGE requires the unit to be promptly placed in COLD SHUTDOWN.

Industry experience has shown that while a limited amount of leakage is expected from the RCS, the unidentified portion of this leakage can be reduced to a threshold value of less than 1 gpm. This threshold value is sufficiently low to ensure early detection of additional leakage.

The total steam generator tube leakage limit of 1 gpm for all steam generators not isolated from the RCS ensures that the dosage contribution from the tube leakage will be limited to a small fraction of 10 CFR Part 100 dose guideline values in the event of either a steam generator tube rupture or steam line break. The 1 gpm limit is consistent with the assumptions used in the analysis of these accidents. The 500 gpd leakage limit per steam generator ensures that steam generator tube integrity is maintained in the event of a main steam line rupture or under LOCA conditions.

The 10 gpm IDENTIFIED LEAKAGE limitation provides allowance for a limited amount of leakage from known sources whose presence will not interfere with the detection of UNIDENTIFIED LEAKAGE by the Leakage Detection Systems.

The specified allowed leakage from any RCS pressure isolation valve is sufficiently low to ensure early detection of possible in-series check valve failure. It is apparent that when pressure isolation is provided by two in-series check valves and when failure of one valve in the pair can go undetected for a substantial length of time, verification of valve integrity is required. Since these valves are important in preventing overpressurization and rupture of the ECCS low pressure piping which could result in a LOCA that bypasses containment, these valves should be tested periodically to ensure low probability of gross failure.

The Surveillance Requirements for RCS pressure isolation valves provide added assurance of valve integrity thereby reducing the probability of gross valve failure and consequent intersystem LOCA. Leakage from the RCS pressure isolation valve is IDENTIFIED LEAKAGE and will be considered as a portion of the allowed limit.

#### 3/4.4.7 CHEMISTRY

The limitations on Reactor Coolant System chemistry ensure that corrosion of the Reactor Coolant System is minimized and reduces the potential for Reactor Coolant System leakage or failure due to stress corrosion. Maintaining

## REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM

### BASES

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#### CHEMISTRY (Continued)

the chemistry within the Steady-State Limits provides adequate corrosion protection to ensure the structural integrity of the Reactor Coolant System over the life of the plant. The associated effects of exceeding the oxygen, chloride, and fluoride limits are time and temperature dependent. Corrosion studies show that operation may be continued with contaminant concentration levels in excess of the Steady-State Limits, up to the Transient Limits, for the specified limited time intervals without having a significant effect on the structural integrity of the Reactor Coolant System. The time interval permitting continued operation within the restrictions of the Transient Limits provides time for taking corrective actions to restore the contaminant concentrations to within the Steady-State Limits.

The Surveillance Requirements provide adequate assurance that concentrations in excess of the limits will be detected in sufficient time to take corrective action.

#### 3/4.4.8 SPECIFIC ACTIVITY

The limitations on the specific activity of the reactor coolant ensure that the resulting 2-hour doses at the SITE BOUNDARY will not exceed an appropriately small fraction of 10 CFR Part 100 dose guideline values following a steam generator tube rupture accident in conjunction with an assumed steady-state reactor-to-secondary steam generator leakage rate of 1 gpm. The values for the limits on specific activity represent limits based upon a parametric evaluation by the NRC of typical site locations. These values are conservative in that specific site parameters of the STPEGS site, such as SITE BOUNDARY location and meteorological conditions, were not considered in this evaluation.

The ACTION statement permitting POWER OPERATION to continue for limited time periods with the reactor coolant's specific activity greater than 1 microCurie/gram DOSE EQUIVALENT I-131, but within the allowable limit shown on Figure 3.4-1, accommodates possible iodine spiking phenomenon which may occur following changes in THERMAL POWER.

The sample analysis for determining the gross specific activity and  $\bar{E}$  can exclude the radioiodines because of the low reactor coolant limit of 1 microCurie/gram DOSE EQUIVALENT I-131, and because, if the limit is exceeded, the radioiodine level is to be determined every 4 hours. If the gross specific activity level and radioiodine level in the reactor coolant were at their limits, the radioiodine contribution would be approximately 1%. In a release of reactor coolant with a typical mixture of radioactivity, the actual radioiodine contribution would probably be about 20%. The exclusion of radio-nuclides with half-lives less than 15 minutes from these determinations has

## REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM

### BASES

#### SPECIFIC ACTIVITY (Continued)

been made for several reasons. The first consideration is the difficulty to identify short-lived radionuclides in a sample that requires a significant time to collect, transport, and analyze. The second consideration is the predictable delay time between the postulated release of radioactivity from the reactor coolant to its release to the environment and transport to the SITE BOUNDARY, which is related to at least 30 minutes decay time. The choice of 15 minutes for the half-life cutoff was made because of the nuclear characteristics of the typical reactor coolant radioactivity. The radionuclides in the typical reactor coolant have half-lives of less than 4 minutes or half-lives of greater than 14 minutes, which allows a distinction between the radionuclides above and below a half-life of 15 minutes. For these reasons the radionuclides that are excluded from consideration are expected to decay to very low levels before they could be transported from the reactor coolant to the SITE BOUNDARY under any accident condition.

Based upon the above considerations for excluding certain radionuclides from the sample analysis, the allowable time of 2 hours between sample taking and completing the initial analysis is based upon a typical time necessary to perform the sampling, transport the sample, and perform the analysis of about 90 minutes. After 90 minutes, the gross count should be made in a reproducible geometry of sample and counter having reproducible beta or gamma self-shielding properties. The counter should be reset to a reproducible efficiency versus energy. It is not necessary to identify specific nuclides. The radiochemical determination of nuclides should be based on multiple counting of the sample within typical counting basis following sampling of less than 1 hour, about 2 hours, about 1 day, about 1 week, and about 1 month.

Reducing  $T_{avg}$  to less than 500°F prevents the release of activity should a steam generator tube rupture since the saturation pressure of the reactor coolant is below the lift pressure of the atmospheric steam relief valves. The Surveillance Requirements provide adequate assurance that excessive specific activity levels in the reactor coolant will be detected in sufficient time to take corrective action. A reduction in frequency of isotopic analyses following power changes may be permissible if justified by the data obtained.

#### 3/4.4.9 PRESSURE/TEMPERATURE LIMITS

The temperature and pressure changes during heatup and cooldown are limited to be consistent with the requirements given in the ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, Section III, Appendix G:

1. The reactor coolant temperature and pressure and system heatup and cooldown rates (with the exception of the pressurizer) shall be limited in accordance with Figures 3.4-2 and 3.4-3 for the service period specified thereon:

## REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM

### BASES

#### PRESSURE TEMPERATURE LIMITS (Continued)

- a. Allowable combinations of pressure and temperature for specific temperature change rates are below and to the right of the limit lines shown. Limit lines for cooldown rates between those presented may be obtained by interpolation; and
  - b. Figures 3.4-2 and 3.4-3 define limits to assure prevention of non-ductile failure only. For normal operation, other inherent plant characteristics, e.g., pump heat addition and pressurizer heater capacity, may limit the heatup and cooldown rates that can be achieved over certain pressure-temperature ranges.
2. These limit lines shall be calculated periodically using methods provided below,
  3. The secondary side of the steam generator must not be pressurized above 200 psig if the temperature of the steam generator is below 70°F,
  4. The pressurizer heatup and cooldown rates shall not exceed 100°F/h and 200°F/h, respectively. The spray shall not be used if the temperature difference between the pressurizer and the spray fluid is greater than 621°F, and
  5. System preservice hydrotests and inservice leak and hydrotests shall be performed at pressures in accordance with the requirements of ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, Section XI.

The fracture toughness properties of the ferritic materials in the reactor vessel are determined in accordance with the NRC Standard Review Plan, ASTM E185-73, and in accordance with additional reactor vessel requirements. These properties are then evaluated in accordance with Appendix G of the 1976 Summer Addenda to Section III of the ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code and the calculation methods described in WCAP-7924-A, "Basis for Heatup and Cooldown Limit Curves," April 1975.

Heatup and cooldown limit curves are calculated using the most limiting value of the nil-ductility reference temperature,  $RT_{NDT}$ , at the end of 32 effective full power years (EFPY) of service life. The 32 EFPY service life period is chosen such that the limiting  $RT_{NDT}$  at the 1/4T location in the core region is greater than the  $RT_{NDT}$  of the limiting unirradiated material. The selection of such a limiting  $RT_{NDT}$  assures that all components in the Reactor Coolant System will be operated conservatively in accordance with applicable Code requirements.

The reactor vessel materials have been tested to determine their initial  $RT_{NDT}$ ; the results of these tests are shown in Table B 3/4.4-1. Reactor operation and resultant fast neutron (E greater than 1 MeV) irradiation can cause

## REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM

### BASES

#### PRESSURE/TEMPERATURE LIMITS (Continued)

an increase in the  $RT_{NDT}$ . Therefore, an adjusted reference temperature, based upon the fluence, copper content, and phosphorus content of the material in question, can be predicted using Figure B 3/4.4-1 and the value of  $\Delta RT_{NDT}$  computed by Regulatory Guide 1.99, Revision 1, "Effects of Residual Elements on Predicted Radiation Damage to Reactor Vessel Materials." The heatup and cooldown limit curves of Figures 3.4-2 and 3.4-3 include predicted adjustments for this shift in  $RT_{NDT}$  at the end of 32 EFPY as well as adjustments for possible errors in the pressure and temperature sensing instruments.

Values of  $\Delta RT_{NDT}$  determined in this manner may be used until the results from the material surveillance program, evaluated according to ASTM E185, are available. Capsules will be removed in accordance with the requirements of ASTM E185-73 and 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix H. The surveillance specimen withdrawal schedule is shown in Table 4.4-5. The lead factor represents the relationship between the fast neutron flux density at the location of the capsule and the inner wall of the reactor vessel. Therefore, the results obtained from the surveillance specimens can be used to predict future radiation damage to the reactor vessel material by using the lead factor and the withdrawal time of the capsule. The heatup and cooldown curves must be recalculated when the  $\Delta RT_{NDT}$  determined from the surveillance capsule exceeds the calculated  $\Delta RT_{NDT}$  for the equivalent capsule radiation exposure.

Allowable pressure-temperature relationships for various heatup and cooldown rates are calculated using methods derived from Appendix G in Section III of the ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code as required by Appendix G to 10 CFR Part 50, and these methods are discussed in detail in WCAP-7924-A.

The general method for calculating heatup and cooldown limit curves is based upon the principles of the linear elastic fracture mechanics (LEFM) technology. In the calculation procedures a semielliptical surface defect with a depth of one-quarter of the wall thickness,  $T$ , and a length of  $3/2T$  is assumed to exist at the inside of the vessel wall as well as at the outside of the vessel wall. The dimensions of this postulated crack, referred to in Appendix G of ASME Section III as the reference flaw, amply exceed the current capabilities of in-service inspection techniques. Therefore, the reactor operation limit curves developed for this reference crack are conservative and provide sufficient safety margins for protection against nonductile failure. To assure that the radiation embrittlement effects are accounted for in the calculation of the limit curves, the most limiting value of the nil-ductility reference temperature,  $RT_{NDT}$ , is used and this includes the radiation-induced shift,  $\Delta RT_{NDT}$ , corresponding to the end of the period for which heatup and cooldown curves are generated.

The ASME approach for calculating the allowable limit curves for various heatup and cooldown rates specifies that the total stress intensity factor,  $K_I$ , for the combined thermal and pressure stresses at any time during heatup or cooldown cannot be greater than the reference stress intensity factor,  $K_{IR}$ , for the metal temperature at that time.  $K_{IR}$  is obtained from the reference



TABLE B 3/4.4-1

## REACTOR VESSEL TOUGHNESS

SOUTH TEXAS - UNIT 1

B 3/4 4-9

Component	Code	Grade	Cu (%)	P (%)	T <sub>NDT</sub> (°F)	50 ft-lb 35 mil Temp. (°F)	RT <sub>NDT</sub> (°F)	Average Upper Self Energy	
								Normal to Principal Working Direction (ft-lb)	Principal Working Direction (ft-lb)
Closure head dome	R1616-1	A533B CL 1	0.07	0.018	-30	80	20	116	-
Closure head torus	R1615-1	A533B CL 1	0.04	0.010	-30	<30	-30	152	-
Closure head torus	R1615-2	A533B CL 1	0.11	0.012	-30	<30	-30	196	-
Closure head torus	R1615-3	A533B CL 1	0.07	0.011	-40	<20	-40	132	-
Closure head torus	R1615-4	A533B CL 1	0.13	0.018	-30	<50	-10	133	-
Closure head flange	R1602-1	A508 CL 2	0.05	0.007	0	<60	0	109	-
Vessel flange	R1601-1	A508 CL 2	0.02	0.017	-10	<50	-10	160.5	-
Inlet nozzle	R1613-1	A508 CL 2	-	0.009	-10	<50	-10	140	-
Inlet nozzle	R1613-2	A508 CL 2	-	0.013	0	<60	0	130.5	-
Inlet nozzle	R1613-3	A508 CL 2	0.09	0.009	-20	<40	-20	175	-
Inlet nozzle	R1613-4	A508 CL 2	-	0.006	20	<80	20	128	-
Outlet nozzle	R1614-1	A508 CL 2	-	0.006	10	<70	10	106	-
Outlet nozzle	R1614-2	A508 CL 2	-	0.006	0	<60	0	114	-
Outlet nozzle	R1614-3	A508 CL 2	-	0.009	-30	<30	-30	129	-
Outlet nozzle	R1614-4	A508 CL 2	-	0.006	10	<70	10	118	-
Nozzle shell	R1607-1	A533B CL 1	0.08	0.012	0	110	50	89	-
Nozzle shell	R1607-2	A533B CL 1	0.08	0.012	-20	110	50	85	-
Nozzle shell	R1607-3	A533B CL 1	0.07	0.010	-50	90	30	82	-
Inter. shell	R1606-1	A533B CL 1	0.04	0.009	-40	70	10	109.5	130
Inter. shell	R1606-2	A533B CL 1	0.04	0.008	-20	60	0	94	119
Inter. shell	R1606-3	A533B CL 1	0.05	0.007	-20	70	10	105.5	132
Lower shell	R1622-1	A533B CL 1	0.05	0.006	-30	30	-30	111	143
Lower shell	R1622-2	A533B CL 1	0.07	0.006	-30	30	-30	122	149
Lower shell	R1622-3	A533B CL 1	0.05	0.007	-30	30	-30	127	148
Bottom head torus	R1617-1	A533B CL 1	0.14	0.012	-50	<10	-50	143	-
Bottom head torus	R1618-1	A533B CL 1	0.08	0.015	-50	<10	-50	128	-
Inter. and lower shell vert. welds	G1.70	SAW	0.03	0.004	-50	<10	-50	*158	-
Inter. and lower shell girth weld	E3.13	SAW	0.03	0.007	-70	<10	-70	*100	-

\*Normal to principal welding direction




FIGURE B 3/4.4-1  
 FAST NEUTRON FLUENCE (E>1MeV) AS A FUNCTION OF FULL POWER SERVICE LIFE

## REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM

### BASES

#### PRESSURE/TEMPERATURE LIMITS (Continued)

fracture toughness curve, defined in Appendix G to the ASME Code. The  $K_{IR}$  curve is given by the equation:

$$K_{IR} = 26.78 + 1.223 \exp [0.0145(T - RT_{NDT} + 160)] \quad (1)$$

Where:  $K_{IR}$  is the reference stress intensity factor as a function of the metal temperature  $T$  and the metal nil-ductility reference temperature  $RT_{NDT}$ . Thus, the governing equation for the heatup-cooldown analysis is defined in Appendix G of the ASME Code as follows:

$$C K_{IM} + K_{It} \leq K_{IR} \quad (2)$$

Where:  $K_{IM}$  = the stress intensity factor caused by membrane (pressure) stress,

$K_{It}$  = the stress intensity factor caused by the thermal gradients,

$K_{IR}$  = constant provided by the Code as a function of temperature relative to the  $RT_{NDT}$  of the material,

$C = 2.0$  for level A and B service limits, and

$C = 1.5$  for inservice hydrostatic and leak test operations.

At any time during the heatup or cooldown transient,  $K_{IR}$  is determined by the metal temperature at the tip of the postulated flaw, the appropriate value for  $RT_{NDT}$ , and the reference fracture toughness curve. The thermal stresses resulting from temperature gradients through the vessel wall are calculated and then the corresponding thermal stress intensity factor,  $K_{IT}$ , for the reference flaw is computed. From Equation (2) the pressure stress intensity factors are obtained and, from these, the allowable pressures are calculated.

#### COOLDOWN

For the calculation of the allowable pressure versus coolant temperature during cooldown, the Code reference flaw is assumed to exist at the inside of the vessel wall. During cooldown, the controlling location of the flaw is always at the inside of the wall because the thermal gradients produce tensile stresses at the inside, which increase with increasing cooldown rates. Allowable pressure-temperature relations are generated for both steady-state and finite cooldown rate situations. From these relations, composite limit curves are constructed for each cooldown rate of interest.

The use of the composite curve in the cooldown analysis is necessary because control of the cooldown procedure is based on measurement of reactor coolant temperature, whereas the limiting pressure is actually dependent on the material temperature at the tip of the assumed flaw. During cooldown, the

## REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM

### BASES

#### PRESSURE/TEMPERATURE LIMITS (Continued)

1/4T vessel location is at a higher temperature than the fluid adjacent to the vessel ID. This condition, of course, is not true for the steady-state situation. It follows that at any given reactor coolant temperature, the  $\Delta T$  developed during cooldown results in a higher value of  $K_{IR}$  at the 1/4T location for finite cooldown rates than for steady-state operation. Furthermore, if conditions exist such that the increase in  $K_{IR}$  exceeds  $K_{It}$ , the calculated allowable pressure during cooldown will be greater than the steady-state value.

The above procedures are needed because there is no direct control on temperature at the 1/4T location; therefore, allowable pressures may unknowingly be violated if the rate of cooling is decreased at various intervals along a cooldown ramp. The use of the composite curve eliminates this problem and assures conservative operation of the system for the entire cooldown period.

#### HEATUP

Three separate calculations are required to determine the limit curves for finite heatup rates. As is done in the cooldown analysis, allowable pressure-temperature relationships are developed for steady-state conditions as well as finite heatup rate conditions assuming the presence of a 1/4T defect at the inside of the vessel wall. The thermal gradients during heatup produce compressive stresses at the inside of the wall that alleviate the tensile stresses produced by internal pressure. The metal temperature at the crack tip lags the coolant temperature; therefore, the  $K_{IR}$  for the 1/4T crack during heatup is lower than the  $K_{IR}$  for the 1/4T crack during steady-state conditions at the same coolant temperature. During heatup, especially at the end of the transient, conditions may exist such that the effects of compressive thermal stresses and different  $K_{IR}$ 's for steady-state and finite heatup rates do not offset each other and the pressure-temperature curve based on steady-state conditions no longer represents a lower bound of all similar curves for finite heatup rates when the 1/4T flaw is considered. Therefore, both cases have to be analyzed in order to assure that at any coolant temperature the lower value of the allowable pressure calculated for steady-state and finite heatup rates is obtained.

The second portion of the heatup analysis concerns the calculation of pressure-temperature limitations for the case in which a 1/4T deep outside surface flaw is assumed. Unlike the situation at the vessel inside surface, the thermal gradients established at the outside surface during heatup produce stresses which are tensile in nature and thus tend to reinforce any pressure stresses present. These stresses, of course, are dependent on both the rate of heatup and the coolant temperature along the heatup ramp. Furthermore, since the thermal stresses at the outside are tensile and

## REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM

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#### PRESSURE/TEMPERATURE LIMITS (Continued)

increase with increasing heatup rate, a lower bound curve cannot be defined. Rather, each heatup rate of interest must be analyzed on an individual basis.

Following the generation of pressure-temperature curves for both the steady-state and finite heatup rate situations, the final limit curves are produced as follows. A composite curve is constructed based on a point-by-point comparison of the steady-state and finite heatup rate data. At any given temperature, the allowable pressure is taken to be the lesser of the three values taken from the curves under consideration.

The use of the composite curve is necessary to set conservative heatup limitations because it is possible for conditions to exist such that over the course of the heatup ramp the controlling condition switches from the inside to the outside and the pressure limit must at all times be based on analysis of the most critical criterion.

Finally, the composite curves for the heatup rate data and the cooldown rate data are adjusted for possible errors in the pressure and temperature sensing instruments by the values indicated on the respective curves.

Although the pressurizer operates in temperature ranges above those for which there is reason for concern of nonductile failure, operating limits are provided to assure compatibility of operation with the fatigue analysis performed in accordance with the ASME Code requirements.

#### LOW TEMPERATURE OVERPRESSURE PROTECTION

The OPERABILITY of two PORVs or an RCS vent opening of at least 2.0 square inches ensures that the RCS will be protected from pressure transients which could exceed the limits of Appendix G to 10 CFR Part 50 when one or more of the RCS cold legs are less than or equal to 350°F. Either PORV has adequate relieving capability to protect the RCS from overpressurization when the transient is limited to either: (1) the start of an idle RCP with the secondary water temperature of the steam generator less than or equal to 50°F above the RCS cold leg temperatures, or (2) the maximum credible mass injection flow rate due to the startup of a single HHSI pump plus 100 gpm net charging flow, while the RCS is in a water solid condition and the RCS temperature is between 350°F and 200°F.

For RCS temperatures less than 200°F, the maximum overpressure event consists of operating a centrifugal charging pump with complete termination of letdown and a failure of the charging flow control valve to the full flow condition.

The Maximum Allowed PORV Setpoint for the Cold Overpressure Mitigation System (COMS) is derived by analysis which models the performance of the COMS assuming various mass input and heat input transients. Operation with a PORV Setpoint less than or equal to the maximum Setpoint ensures that Appendix G criteria will not be violated with consideration for a maximum pressure

## REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM

### BASES

#### LOW TEMPERATURE OVERPRESSURE PROTECTION (Continued)

overshoot beyond the PORV Setpoint which can occur as a result of time delays in signal processing and valve opening, instrument uncertainties, and single failure. To ensure that mass and heat input transients more severe than those assumed cannot occur, Technical Specifications require lockout of all high head safety injection pumps while in MODE 5 and MODE 6 with the reactor vessel head on. All but one high head safety injection pump are required to be locked out in MODE 4. Technical Specifications also require lockout of all but one charging pump while in MODES 4, 5, and 6 with the reactor vessel head installed and disallow start of an RCP if secondary temperature is more than 50°F above primary temperature.

The Maximum Allowed PORV Setpoint for the COMS will be updated based on the results of examinations of reactor vessel material irradiation surveillance specimens performed as required by 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix H, and in accordance with the schedule in Table 4.4-5.

#### 3/4.4.10 STRUCTURAL INTEGRITY

The inservice inspection and testing programs for ASME Code Class 1, 2, and 3 components ensure that the structural integrity and operational readiness of these components will be maintained at an acceptable level throughout the life of the plant. These programs are in accordance with Section XI of the ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code and applicable Addenda as required by 10 CFR 50.55a(g) except where specific written relief has been granted by the Commission pursuant to 10 CFR 50.55a(g)(6)(i).

Components of the Reactor Coolant System were designed to provide access to permit inservice inspections in accordance with Section XI of the ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, 1974 Edition and Addenda through Winter 1975.

#### 3/4.4.11 REACTOR VESSEL HEAD VENTS

Reactor vessel head vents are provided to exhaust noncondensable gases and/or steam from the Reactor Coolant System that could inhibit natural circulation core cooling. The OPERABILITY of at least two reactor vessel head vent paths ensures that the capability exists to perform this function.

The valve redundancy of the reactor vessel head vent paths serves to minimize the probability of inadvertent or irreversible actuation while ensuring that a single failure of a vent valve, power supply, or control system does not prevent isolation of the vent path.

The function, capabilities, and testing requirements of the reactor vessel head vents are consistent with the requirements of Item II.B.1 of NUREG-0737, "Clarification of TMI Action Plan Requirements," November 1980.

### 3/4.5 EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEMS

#### BASES

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#### 3/4.5.1 ACCUMULATORS

The OPERABILITY of each Reactor Coolant System (RCS) accumulator ensures that a sufficient volume of borated water will be immediately forced into the reactor core through three cold legs in the event the RCS pressure falls below the pressure of the accumulators. This initial surge of water into the core provides the initial cooling mechanism during large RCS pipe ruptures.

The limits on accumulator volume represent a spread about an average value used in the safety analysis and have been demonstrated by sensitivity studies to vary the peak clad temperature by less than 20°F. The limit on accumulator pressure ensures that the assumptions used for accumulator injection in the safety analysis are met.

The accumulator power operated isolation valves are considered to be "operating bypasses" in the context of IEEE Std. 279-1971, which requires that bypasses of a protective function be removed automatically whenever permissive conditions are not met. In addition, as these accumulator isolation valves fail to meet single failure criteria, removal of power to the valves is required.

The limits for operation with an accumulator inoperable for any reason except an isolation valve closed minimizes the time exposure of the plant to a LOCA event occurring concurrent with failure of an additional accumulator which may result in unacceptable peak cladding temperatures. If a closed isolation valve cannot be opened within one hour, the full capability of one accumulator is not available and prompt action is required to place the reactor in a mode where this capability is not required.

#### 3/4.5.2 and 3/4.5.3 ECCS SUBSYSTEMS

The OPERABILITY of three independent ECCS subsystems ensures that sufficient emergency core cooling capability will be available in the event of a LOCA assuming the loss of one subsystem through any single failure consideration. Each subsystem operating in conjunction with the accumulators is capable of supplying sufficient core cooling to limit the peak cladding temperatures within acceptable limits for all postulated break sizes ranging from the double ended break of the largest RCS cold leg pipe downward. One ECCS is assumed to discharge completely through the postulated break in the RCS loop. Thus, three trains are required to satisfy the single failure criterion. Note that the centrifugal charging pumps are not part of ECCS and that the RHR pumps are not used in the injection phase of the ECCS. Each ECCS subsystem and the RHR pumps and heat exchangers provide long-term core cooling capability in the recirculation mode during the accident recovery period.

When the RCS temperature is below 350°F, the ECCS requirements are balanced between the limitations imposed by the low temperature overpressure protection and the requirements necessary to mitigate the consequences of a LOCA below 350°F. At these temperatures, single failure considerations are not required because of the stable reactivity condition of the reactor and the limited core cooling requirements. Only a single Low Head Safety Injection pump is required to mitigate the effects of a large-break LOCA in this mode. However, two are

## EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEMS

### BASES

#### ECCS SUBSYSTEMS (Continued)

provided to accommodate the possibility that the break occurs in a loop containing one of the Low Head pumps. Low Head Safety Injection pumps are not required inoperable below 350°F because their shutoff head is too low to impact the low temperature overpressure protection limits.

Below 200°F (MODE 5) no ECCS pumps are required, so the High Head Safety Injection pumps are locked out to prevent cold overpressure.

The Surveillance Requirements provided to ensure OPERABILITY of each component ensure that, at a minimum, the assumptions used in the safety analyses are met and that subsystem OPERABILITY is maintained. Surveillance Requirements for flow testing provide assurance that proper ECCS flows will be maintained in the event of a LOCA.

#### 3/4.5.4 (Not used)

#### 3/4.5.5 REFUELING WATER STORAGE TANK

The OPERABILITY of the refueling water storage tank (RWST) as part of the ECCS ensures that a sufficient supply of borated water is available for injection by the ECCS in the event of a LOCA or a steamline break. The limits on RWST minimum volume and boron concentration ensure that: (1) sufficient water is available within containment to permit recirculation cooling flow to the core, (2) the reactor will remain subcritical in the cold condition (68°F to 212°F) following a small break LOCA assuming complete mixing of the RWST, RCS, Spray Additive Tank, Containment Spray System and ECCS water volumes with all control rods inserted except the most reactive control rod assembly (ARI-1), (3) the reactor will remain subcritical in cold condition following a large break LOCA (break flow area > 3.0 ft<sup>2</sup>) assuming complete mixing of the RWST, RCS, Spray Additive Tank, Containment Spray System and ECCS water volumes and other sources of water that may eventually reside in the sump post-LOCA with all control rods assumed to be out (ARO), and (4) long term subcriticality following a steamline break assuming ARI-1 and preclude fuel failure.

The maximum allowable value for the RWST boron concentration forms the basis for determining the time (post-LOCA) at which operator action is required to switch over the ECCS to hot leg recirculation in order to avoid precipitation of the soluble boron.

The contained water volume limit includes an allowance for water not usable because of tank discharge line location or other physical characteristics.

The limits on contained water volume and boron concentration of the RWST also ensure a pH value of between 7.5 and 10.0 for the solution recirculated within containment after a LOCA. This pH band minimizes the evolution of iodine and minimizes the effect of chloride and caustic stress corrosion on mechanical systems and components.



## EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEMS

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#### 3/4.5.6 RESIDUAL HEAT REMOVAL (RHR) SYSTEM

The OPERABILITY of the RHR system ensures adequate heat removal capabilities for Long-Term Core Cooling in the event of a small-break loss-of-coolant accident (LOCA), an isolatable LOCA, or a secondary break in MODES 1, 2, and 3. The limits on the OPERABILITY of the RHR system ensure that at least one RHR loop is available for cooling including single active failure criteria.

The surveillances ensure that RHR system isolation valves close upon an overpressure protection system signal.

## 3/4.6 CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS

### BASES

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#### 3/4.6.1 PRIMARY CONTAINMENT

##### 3/4.6.1.1 CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY

Primary CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY ensures that the release of radioactive materials from the containment atmosphere will be restricted to those leakage paths and associated leak rates assumed in the safety analyses. This restriction, in conjunction with the leakage rate limitation, will limit the SITE BOUNDARY radiation doses to within the dose guideline values of 10 CFR Part 100 during accident conditions.

##### 3/4.6.1.2 CONTAINMENT LEAKAGE

The limitations on containment leakage rates ensure that the total containment leakage volume will not exceed the value assumed in the safety analyses at the peak accident pressure,  $P_a$ . As an added conservatism, the measured overall integrated leakage rate is further limited to less than or equal to  $0.75 L_a$  during performance of the periodic test to account for possible degradation of the containment leakage barriers between leakage tests.

The surveillance testing for measuring leakage rates is consistent with the requirements of Appendix J of 10 CFR Part 50.

##### 3/4.6.1.3 CONTAINMENT AIR LOCKS

The limitations on closure and leak rate for the containment air locks are required to meet the restrictions on CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY and containment leak rate. Surveillance testing of the air lock seals provides assurance that the overall air lock leakage will not become excessive due to seal damage during the intervals between air lock leakage tests.

##### 3/4.6.1.4 INTERNAL PRESSURE

The limitations on containment internal pressure ensure that: (1) the containment structure is prevented from exceeding its design negative pressure differential with respect to the outside atmosphere of 3.5 psig, and (2) the containment peak pressure does not exceed the design pressure of 56.5 psig during LOCA or steam line break conditions.

The maximum peak pressure expected to be obtained from a LOCA or steam line break event is 37.5 psig. The limit of 0.3 psig for initial positive containment pressure will limit the total pressure to 37.5 psig, which is less than design pressure and is consistent with the safety analyses.

## CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS

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#### 3/4.6.1.5 AIR TEMPERATURE

The limitations on containment average air temperature ensure that the overall containment average air temperature does not exceed the initial temperature condition assumed in the safety analysis for a LOCA or steam line break accident. Measurements shall be made by fixed instruments, prior to determining the average air temperature.

#### 3/4.6.1.6 CONTAINMENT STRUCTURAL INTEGRITY

This limitation ensures that the structural integrity of the containment will be maintained comparable to the original design standards for the life of the facility. Structural integrity is required to ensure that the containment will withstand the maximum pressure of 37.5 psig in the event of a LOCA or steam line break accident. The measurement of containment tendon lift-off force, the tensile tests of the tendon wires, the visual examination of tendons, anchorages and exposed interior and exterior surfaces of the containment, and the Type A leakage test are sufficient to demonstrate this capability.

The Surveillance Requirements for demonstrating the containment's structural integrity are in compliance with the recommendations of Regulatory Guide 1.35, "Inservice Inspection of UngROUTed Tendons in Prestressed Concrete Containment Structures," and proposed Regulatory Guide 1.35.1, "Determining Prestressing Forces for Inspection of Prestressed Concrete Containments," April 1979.

The required Special Reports from any engineering evaluation of containment abnormalities shall include a description of the tendon condition, the condition of the concrete (especially at tendon anchorages), the inspection procedures, the tolerances on cracking, the results of the engineering evaluation, and the corrective actions taken.

#### 3/4.6.1.7 CONTAINMENT VENTILATION SYSTEM

The 48-inch containment purge supply and exhaust isolation valves are required to be sealed closed during plant operations since these valves have not been demonstrated capable of closing during a LOCA or steam line break accident. Maintaining these valves sealed closed during plant operation ensures that excessive quantities of radioactive materials will not be released via the Containment Purge System. To provide assurance that these containment valves cannot be inadvertently opened, the valves are sealed closed in accordance with Standard Review Plan 6.2.4 which includes mechanical devices to seal or lock the valve closed, or prevents power from being supplied to the valve operator.

The use of the containment purge lines is restricted to the 18-inch purge supply and exhaust isolation valves since, unlike the 48-inch valves, the 18-inch valves are capable of closing during a LOCA or steam line break accident. There-

## CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS

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#### CONTAINMENT VENTILATION SYSTEM (Continued)

fore, the SITE BOUNDARY dose guideline of 10 CFR Part 100 would not be exceeded in the event of an accident during containment PURGING operation.

Leakage integrity tests with a maximum allowable leakage rate for containment purge supply and exhaust supply valves will provide early indication of resilient material seal degradation and will allow opportunity for repair before gross leakage failures could develop. The 0.60 L leakage limit of Specification 3.6.1.2b shall not be exceeded when the leakage rates determined by the leakage integrity tests of these valves are added to the previously determined total for all valves and penetrations subject to Type B and C tests.

#### 3/4.6.2 DEPRESSURIZATION AND COOLING SYSTEMS

##### 3/4.6.2.1 CONTAINMENT SPRAY SYSTEM

The OPERABILITY of the Containment Spray System ensures that containment depressurization and cooling capability will be available in the event of a LOCA or steam line break. The pressure reduction and resultant lower containment leakage rate are consistent with the assumptions used in the safety analyses.

The Containment Spray System and the Containment Cooling System both provide post-accident cooling of the containment atmosphere. However, the Containment Spray System also provides a mechanism for removing iodine from the containment atmosphere and therefore the time requirements for restoring an inoperable Spray System to OPERABLE status have been maintained consistent with that assigned other inoperable ESF equipment.

##### 3/4.6.2.2 SPRAY ADDITIVE SYSTEM

The OPERABILITY of the Spray Additive System ensures that sufficient NaOH is added to the containment spray and containment sump in the event of a LOCA. The limits on NaOH volume and concentration ensure a pH value of between 7.5 and 10.0 for the solution recirculated within containment after a LOCA. This pH band minimizes the evolution of iodine and minimizes the effect of chloride and caustic stress corrosion on mechanical systems and components. The contained solution volume limit includes an allowance for solution not usable because of tank discharge line location or other physical characteristics. These assumptions are consistent with the iodine removal efficiency assumed in the safety analyses.

## CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS

### BASES

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#### 3/4.6.2.3 CONTAINMENT COOLING SYSTEM

The OPERABILITY of the Containment Cooling System ensures that: (1) the containment air temperature will be maintained within limits during normal operation, and (2) adequate heat removal capacity is available when operated in conjunction with the Containment Spray Systems during post-LOCA conditions.

STPEGS has three groups of Reactor Containment Fan Coolers with two fans in each group (total of six fans). Five fans are adequate to satisfy the safety requirements including single failure.

#### 3/4.6.3 CONTAINMENT ISOLATION VALVES

The OPERABILITY of the containment isolation valves ensures that the containment atmosphere will be isolated from the outside environment in the event of a release of radioactive material to the containment atmosphere or pressurization of the containment and is consistent with the requirements of General Design Criteria 54 through 57 of Appendix A to 10 CFR Part 50. Containment isolation within the time limits specified for those isolation valves designed to close automatically ensures that the release of radioactive material to the environment will be consistent with the assumptions used in the analyses for a LOCA.

#### 3/4.6.4 COMBUSTIBLE GAS CONTROL

The OPERABILITY of the equipment and systems required for the detection and control of hydrogen gas ensures that this equipment will be available to maintain the hydrogen concentration within containment below its flammable limit during post-LOCA conditions. Either recombiner unit is capable of controlling the expected hydrogen generation associated with: (1) zirconium-water reactions, (2) radiolytic decomposition of water, and (3) corrosion of metals within containment. These Hydrogen Control Systems are consistent with the recommendations of Regulatory Guide 1.7, "Control of Combustible Gas Concentrations in Containment Following a LOCA," Revision 2, November 1978.

### 3/4.7 PLANT SYSTEMS

#### BASES

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#### 3/4.7.1 TURBINE CYCLE

##### 3/4.7.1.1 SAFETY VALVES

The OPERABILITY of the main steam line Code safety valves ensures that the Secondary System pressure will be limited to within 110% (1413.5 psig) of its design pressure of 1285 psig during the most severe anticipated system operational transient. The maximum relieving capacity is associated with a Turbine trip from 100% RATED THERMAL POWER coincident with an assumed loss of condenser heat sink (i.e., no steam bypass to the condenser).

The specified valve lift settings and relieving capacities are in accordance with the requirements of Section III of the ASME Boiler and Pressure Code, 1971 Edition. The total relieving capacity for all valves on all of the steam lines is  $20.65 \times 10^6$  lbs/h which is 122% of the total secondary steam flow of  $16.94 \times 10^6$  lbs/h at 100% RATED THERMAL POWER. A minimum of two OPERABLE safety valves per steam generator ensures that sufficient relieving capacity is available for the allowable THERMAL POWER restriction in Table 3.7-1.

STARTUP and/or POWER OPERATION is allowable with safety valves inoperable within the limitations of the ACTION requirements on the basis of the reduction in Secondary Coolant System steam flow and THERMAL POWER required by the reduced Reactor trip settings of the Power Range Neutron Flux channels. The Reactor Trip Setpoint reductions are derived on the following bases:

$$SP = \frac{(X) - (Y)(V)}{X} \times (109)$$

Where:

POWER, SP = Reduced Reactor Trip Setpoint in percent of RATED THERMAL

V = Maximum number of inoperable safety valves per steam line,

109 = Power Range Neutron Flux-High Trip Setpoint for four loop operation,

X = Total relieving capacity of all safety valves per steam line in lbs/hour, and

Y = Maximum relieving capacity of any one safety valve in lbs/hour

## PLANT SYSTEMS

### BASES

#### 3/4.7.1.2 AUXILIARY FEEDWATER SYSTEM

The OPERABILITY of the Auxiliary Feedwater System ensures that the Reactor Coolant System can be cooled down to less than 350°F from normal operating conditions in the event of a total loss-of-offsite power.

Each auxiliary feedwater pump is capable of delivering a total feedwater flow of 540 gpm at a pressure of 1324 psig to the entrance of the steam generators. This capacity is sufficient to ensure that adequate feedwater flow is available to remove decay heat and reduce the Reactor Coolant System temperature to less than 350°F when the Residual Heat Removal System may be placed into operation. The AFW pumps are tested using the test line back to the AFST and the AFW isolation valves closed to prevent injection of cold water into the steam generators. The STPEGS isolation valves are active valves required to open on an AFW actuation signal. Specification 4.7.1.2.1 requires these valves to be verified in the correct position.

#### 3/4.7.1.3 AUXILIARY FEEDWATER STORAGE TANK (AFST)

The OPERABILITY of the auxiliary feedwater storage tank with the minimum water volume ensures that sufficient water is available to maintain the RCS at HOT STANDBY conditions for 4 hours with steam discharge to the atmosphere concurrent with total loss-of-offsite power followed by a cooldown to 350°F at 25°F per hour. The contained water volume limit includes an allowance for water not usable because of tank discharge line location or other physical characteristics.

#### 3/4.7.1.4 SPECIFIC ACTIVITY

The limitations on Secondary Coolant System specific activity ensure that the resultant offsite radiation dose will be limited to a small fraction of 10 CFR Part 100 dose guideline values in the event of a steam line rupture. This dose also includes the effects of a coincident 1 gpm primary-to-secondary tube leak in the steam generator of the affected steam line. These values are consistent with the assumptions used in the safety analyses.

#### 3/4.7.1.5 MAIN STEAM LINE ISOLATION VALVES

The OPERABILITY of the main steam line isolation valves ensures that no more than one steam generator will blow down in the event of a steam line rupture. This restriction is required to: (1) minimize the positive reactivity effects of the Reactor Coolant System cooldown associated with the blowdown, and (2) limit the pressure rise within containment in the event the steam line rupture occurs within containment. The OPERABILITY of the main steam isolation valves within the closure times of the Surveillance Requirements are consistent with the assumptions used in the safety analyses.

## PLANT SYSTEMS

### BASES

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#### 3/4.7.1.6 ATMOSPHERIC STEAM RELIEF VALVES

The atmospheric steam relief valves are required for decay heat removal and safe cooldown in accordance with Branch Technical Position RSB 5-1. In the safety analyses, operation of the atmospheric steam relief valves is assumed in accident analyses for mitigation of small break LOCA, feedwater line break, loss of normal feedwater and loss-of-offsite power.

#### 3/4.7.2 STEAM GENERATOR PRESSURE/TEMPERATURE LIMITATION

The limitation on steam generator pressure and temperature ensures that the pressure-induced stresses in the steam generators do not exceed the maximum allowable fracture toughness stress limits. The limitations of 70°F and 200 psig are based on a steam generator RT<sub>NDT</sub> of 10°F and are sufficient to prevent brittle fracture.

#### 3/4.7.3 COMPONENT COOLING WATER SYSTEM

The OPERABILITY of the Component Cooling Water System ensures that sufficient cooling capacity is available for continued operation of safety-related equipment during normal and accident conditions. The redundant cooling capacity of this system, assuming a single failure, is consistent with the assumptions used in the safety analyses.

#### 3/4.7.4 ESSENTIAL COOLING WATER SYSTEM

The OPERABILITY of the Essential Cooling Water System ensures that sufficient cooling capacity is available for continued operation of safety-related equipment during normal and accident conditions. The redundant cooling capacity of this system, assuming a single failure, is consistent with the assumptions used in the safety analyses.

#### 3/4.7.5 ULTIMATE HEAT SINK

The limitations on the ultimate heat sink level and temperature ensure that sufficient cooling capacity is available either: (1) provide normal cooldown of the facility or (2) mitigate the effects of accident conditions within acceptable limits.

The limitations on minimum water level and maximum temperature are based on providing a 30-day cooling water supply to safety-related equipment without exceeding its design basis temperature and is consistent with the recommendations of Regulatory Guide 1.27, "Ultimate Heat Sink for Nuclear Plants," March 1974.

#### 3/4.7.6 (Not used)



## PLANT SYSTEMS

### BASES

#### 3/4.7.7 CONTROL ROOM MAKEUP AND CLEANUP FILTRATION SYSTEM

The OPERABILITY of the Control Room Makeup and Cleanup Filtration System ensures that: (1) the ambient air temperature does not exceed the allowable temperature for continuous-duty rating for the equipment and instrumentation cooled by this system, and (2) the control room will remain habitable for operations personnel during and following all credible accident conditions. Operation of the system with the heaters operating for at least 10 continuous hours in a 31-day period is sufficient to reduce the buildup of moisture on the adsorbers and HEPA filters. The OPERABILITY of this system in conjunction with control room design provisions is based on limiting the radiation exposure to personnel occupying the control room to 5 rems or less whole body, or its equivalent. This limitation is consistent with the requirements of General Design Criterion 19 of Appendix A, 10 CFR Part 50. ANSI N510-1980 will be used as a procedural guide for surveillance testing.

#### 3/4.7.8 FUEL HANDLING BUILDING EXHAUST AIR SYSTEM

The OPERABILITY of the Fuel Handling Building Exhaust Air System ensures that radioactive materials leaking from the ECCS equipment within the FHB following a LOCA are filtered prior to reaching the environment. Operation of the system with the heaters operating for at least 10 continuous hours in a 31-day period is sufficient to reduce the buildup of moisture on the adsorbers and HEPA filters. The operation of this system and the resultant effect on offsite dosage calculations was assumed in the safety analyses. ANSI N510-1980 will be used as a procedural guide for surveillance testing.

#### 3/4.7.9 SNUBBERS

All snubbers are required OPERABLE to ensure that the structural integrity of the Reactor Coolant System and all other safety-related systems is maintained during and following a seismic or other event initiating dynamic loads.

Snubbers are classified and grouped by design and manufacturer but not by size. For example, mechanical snubbers utilizing the same design features of the 2-kip, 10-kip and 100-kip capacity manufactured by Company "A" are of the same type. The same design mechanical snubbers manufactured by Company "B" for the purposes of this Technical Specification would be of a different type, as would hydraulic snubbers from either manufacturer.

A list of individual snubbers with detailed information of snubber location and size and of system affected shall be available at the plant in accordance with Section 50.71(c) of 10 CFR Part 50. The accessibility of each snubber shall be determined and approved by the Plant Operations Review Committee. The determination shall be based upon the existing radiation levels and the expected time to perform a visual inspection in each snubber location as well as other factors associated with accessibility during plant operations (e.g., temperature, atmosphere, location, etc.), and the recommendations of Regulatory Guides 8.8 and 8.10. The addition or deletion of any hydraulic or mechanical snubber shall be made in accordance with Section 50.59 of 10 CFR Part 50.

## PLANT SYSTEMS

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#### SNUBBERS (Continued)

The visual inspection frequency is based upon maintaining a constant level of snubber protection to each safety-related system during an earthquake or severe transient. Therefore, the required inspection interval varies inversely with the observed snubber failures on a given system and is determined by the number of inoperable snubbers found during an inspection of each system. In order to establish the inspection frequency for each type of snubber on a safety-related system, it was assumed that the frequency of snubber failures and initiating events is constant with time and that the failure of any snubber on that system could cause the system to be unprotected and to result in failure during an assumed initiating event. Inspections performed before that interval has elapsed may be used as a new reference point to determine the next inspection. However, the results of such early inspections performed before the original required time interval has elapsed (nominal time less 25%) may not be used to lengthen the required inspection interval. Any inspection whose results require a shorter inspection interval will override the previous schedule.

The acceptance criteria are to be used in the visual inspection to determine OPERABILITY of the snubbers. For example, if a fluid port of a hydraulic snubber is found to be uncovered, the snubber shall be declared inoperable and shall not be determined OPERABLE via functional testing.

To provide assurance of snubber functional reliability, one of three functional testing methods is used with the stated acceptance criteria:

1. Functionally test 10% of a type of snubber with an additional 10% tested for each functional testing failure, or
2. Functionally test a sample size and determine sample acceptance or rejection using Figure 4.7-1, or
3. Functionally test a representative sample size and determine sample acceptance or rejection using the stated equation.

Figure 4.7-1 was developed using "Wald's Sequential Probability Ratio Plan" as described in "Quality Control and Industrial Statistics" by Acheson J. Duncan.

Permanent or other exemptions from the surveillance program for individual snubbers may be granted by the Commission if a justifiable basis for exemption is presented and, if applicable, snubber life destructive testing was performed to qualify the snubbers for the applicable design conditions at either the completion of their fabrication or at a subsequent date. Snubbers so exempted shall be listed in the list of individual snubbers indicating the extent of the exemptions.

The service life of a snubber is established via manufacturer input and information through consideration of the snubber service conditions and

## PLANT SYSTEMS

### BASES

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#### SNUBBERS (Continued)

associated installation and maintenance records (newly installed snubbers, seal replaced, spring replaced, in high radiation area, in high temperature area, etc.). The requirement to monitor the snubber service life is included to ensure that the snubbers periodically undergo a performance evaluation in view of their age and operating conditions. These records will provide statistical bases for future consideration of snubber service life.

#### 3/4.7.10 SEALED SOURCE CONTAMINATION

The limitations on removable contamination for sources requiring leak testing, including alpha emitters, is based on 10 CFR 70.39(a)(3) limits for plutonium. This limitation will ensure that leakage from Byproduct, Source, and Special Nuclear Material sources will not exceed allowable intake values.

Sealed sources are classified into three groups according to their use, with Surveillance Requirements commensurate with the probability of damage to a source in that group. Those sources which are frequently handled are required to be tested more often than those which are not. Sealed sources which are continuously enclosed within a shielded mechanism (i.e., sealed sources within radiation monitoring or boron measuring devices) are considered to be stored and need not be tested unless they are removed from the shielded mechanism.

#### 3/4.7.11 (Not Used)

#### 3/4.7.12 (Not Used)

#### 3/4.7.13 AREA TEMPERATURE MONITORING

The area temperature limitations ensure that safety-related equipment will not be subjected to temperatures in excess of their environmental qualification temperatures. Exposure to excessive temperatures may degrade equipment and can cause a loss of its OPERABILITY. The temperature limits include an allowance for instrument error of  $\pm 3^{\circ}\text{F}$  maximum.

#### 3/4.7.14 ESSENTIAL CHILLED WATER SYSTEM

The OPERABILITY of the Essential Chilled Water System ensures that sufficient cooling capacity is available for continued operation of safety-related equipment during normal and accident conditions. The redundant cooling capacity of this system, assuming a single failure, is consistent with the assumptions used in the safety analyses.

## 3/4.8 ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS

### BASES

#### 3/4.8.1, 3/4.8.2, and 3/4.8.3 A.C. SOURCES, D.C. SOURCES, and ONSITE POWER DISTRIBUTION

The OPERABILITY of the A.C. and D.C. power sources and associated distribution systems during operation ensures that sufficient power will be available to supply the safety-related equipment required for: (1) the safe shutdown of the facility, and (2) the mitigation and control of accident conditions within the facility. The minimum specified independent and redundant A.C. and D.C. power sources and distribution systems satisfy the requirements of General Design Criterion 17 of Appendix A to 10 CFR Part 50.

The ACTION requirements specified for the levels of degradation of the power sources provide restriction upon continued facility operation commensurate with the level of degradation. The OPERABILITY of the power sources are consistent with the initial condition assumptions of the safety analyses and are based upon maintaining at least two redundant sets of onsite A.C. and D.C. power sources and associated distribution systems OPERABLE during accident conditions coincident with an assumed loss-of-offsite power and single failure of the other onsite A.C. source. The A.C. and D.C. source allowable out-of-service times are based on Regulatory Guide 1.93, "Availability of Electrical Power Sources," December 1974. When one standby diesel generator is inoperable, there is an additional ACTION requirement to verify that all required systems, subsystems, trains, components and devices, that depend on the remaining OPERABLE standby diesel generators as a source of emergency power, are also OPERABLE, and that the steam-driven auxiliary feedwater pump is OPERABLE. This requirement is intended to provide assurance that a loss-of-offsite power event will not result in a complete loss of safety function of critical systems during the period one of the standby diesel generators is inoperable. The term, verify, as used in this context means to administratively check by examining logs or other information to determine if certain components are out-of-service for maintenance or other reasons. It does not mean to perform the Surveillance Requirements needed to demonstrate the OPERABILITY of the component.

The OPERABILITY of the minimum specified A.C. and D.C. power sources and associated distribution systems during shutdown and refueling ensures that: (1) the facility can be maintained in the shutdown or refueling condition for extended time periods, and (2) sufficient instrumentation and control capability is available for monitoring and maintaining the unit status.

The Surveillance Requirements for demonstrating the OPERABILITY of the diesel generators are in accordance with the recommendations of Regulatory Guides 1.9, "Selection of Diesel Generator Set Capacity for Standby Power Supplies," Revision 2, December 1979; 1.108, "Periodic Testing of Diesel Generator Units Used as Onsite Electric Power Systems at Nuclear Power Plants," Revision 1, August 1977; and ASTM D975-81, ASTM D1552-79, ASTM D2622-82, ASTM D4294-83, and ASTM D2276-78. The standby diesel generators auxiliary systems are designed to circulate warm oil and water through the diesel while the diesel is not running, to preclude cold ambient starts. For the purposes of surveillance testing, ambient conditions are considered to be the hot pre-lube condition.

## ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS

### BASES

#### A.C. SOURCES, D.C. SOURCES, and ONSITE POWER DISTRIBUTION (Continued)

The Surveillance Requirements for demonstrating the OPERABILITY of the station batteries are based on the recommendations of Regulatory Guide 1.129, "Maintenance Testing and Replacement of Large Lead Storage Batteries for Nuclear Power Plants," February 1978, and IEEE Std 450-1980, "IEEE Recommended Practice for Maintenance, Testing, and Replacement of Large Lead Storage Batteries for Generating Stations and Substations."

Verifying average electrolyte temperature above the minimum for which the battery was sized, total battery terminal voltage on float charge, connection resistance values, and the performance of battery service and discharge tests ensures the effectiveness of the charging system, the ability to handle high discharge rates, and compares the battery capacity at that time with the rated capacity.

Table 4.8-2 specifies the normal limits for each designated pilot cell and each connected cell for electrolyte level, float voltage, and specific gravity. The limits for the designated pilot cells float voltage and specific gravity, greater than 2.13 volts and 0.015 below the manufacturer's full charge specific gravity or a battery charger current that had stabilize at a low value, are characteristic of a charged cell with adequate capacity. The normal limits for each connected cell for float voltage and specific gravity, greater than 2.13 volts and not more than 0.020 below the manufacturer's full charge specific gravity with an average specific gravity of all the connected cells not more than 0.010 below the manufacturer's full charge specific gravity, ensures the OPERABILITY and capability of the battery.

Operation with a battery cell's parameter outside the normal limit but within the allowable value specified in Table 4.8-2 is permitted for up to 7 days. During this 7-day period: (1) the allowable values for electrolyte level ensures no physical damage to the plates with an adequate electron transfer capability; (2) the allowable value for the average specific gravity of all the cells, not more than 0.020 below the manufacturer's recommended full charge specific gravity, ensures that the decrease in rating will be less than the safety margin provided in sizing; (3) the allowable value for an individual cell's specific gravity, ensures that an individual cell's specific gravity will not be more than 0.040 below the manufacturer's full charge specific gravity and that the overall capability of the battery will be maintained within an acceptable limit; and (4) the allowable value for an individual cell's float voltage, greater than 2.07 volts, ensures the battery's capability to perform its design function.

## ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS

### BASES

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#### 3/4.8.4 ELECTRICAL EQUIPMENT PROTECTIVE DEVICES

Containment electrical penetrations and penetration conductors are protected by either deenergizing circuits not required during reactor operation or by demonstrating the OPERABILITY of primary and backup overcurrent protection circuit breakers during periodic surveillance.

The Surveillance Requirements applicable to lower voltage circuit breakers provide assurance of breaker reliability by testing a representative sample of at least 10% of each manufacturer's brand of circuit breaker. Each manufacturer's molded case and metal case circuit breakers are grouped into representative samples which are then tested on a rotating basis to ensure that all breakers are tested. If a wide variety exists within any manufacturer's brand of circuit breakers it is necessary to divide that manufacturer's breakers into groups and treat each group as a separate type of breaker for surveillance purposes.

The molded case circuit breakers will be tested in accordance with NEMA Standard Publication No. AB-2-1980. For a frame size of 250 amperes or less, the field tolerance of the high and low setting of the injected current will be within + 40%, -25% of the setpoint (pickup) value. For a frame size of 400 amperes or greater, the field tolerance will be  $\pm 25\%$  of the setpoint (pickup) value. The circuit breakers should not be affected when tested within their tolerance.

## 3/4.9 REFUELING OPERATIONS

### BASES

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#### 3/4.9.1 BORON CONCENTRATION

The limitations on reactivity conditions during REFUELING ensure that: (1) the reactor will remain subcritical during CORE ALTERATIONS, and (2) a uniform boron concentration is maintained for reactivity control in the water volume having direct access to the reactor vessel. These limitations are consistent with the initial conditions assumed for the boron dilution incident in the safety analyses. The value of 0.95 or less for  $K_{eff}$  includes a 1%  $\Delta k/k$  conservative allowance for uncertainties. Similarly, the boron concentration value of 2500 ppm or greater includes a conservative uncertainty allowance of 50 ppm boron. The locking closed of the required valves during refueling operations precludes the possibility of uncontrolled boron dilution of the filled portion of the RCS. This action prevents flow to the RCS of unborated water by closing flow paths from sources of unborated water.

#### 3/4.9.2 INSTRUMENTATION

The OPERABILITY of the Source Range Neutron Flux Monitors ensures that redundant monitoring capability is available to detect changes in the reactivity condition of the core.

#### 3/4.9.3 DECAY TIME

The minimum requirement for reactor subcriticality prior to movement of irradiated fuel assemblies in the reactor vessel ensures that sufficient time has elapsed to allow the radioactive decay of the short-lived fission products. This decay time is consistent with the assumptions used in the safety analyses for the rapid refueling design.

#### 3/4.9.4 CONTAINMENT BUILDING PENETRATIONS

The requirements on containment building penetration closure and OPERABILITY ensure that a release of radioactive material within containment will be restricted from leakage to the environment. The OPERABILITY and closure restrictions are sufficient to restrict radioactive material release from a fuel element rupture based upon the lack of containment pressurization potential while in the REFUELING MODE.

#### 3/4.9.5 COMMUNICATIONS

The requirement for communications capability ensures that refueling station personnel can be promptly informed of significant changes in the facility status or core reactivity conditions during CORE ALTERATIONS.

## REFUELING OPERATIONS

### BASES

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#### 3/4.9.6 REFUELING MACHINE

The OPERABILITY requirements for the refueling machine and auxiliary hoist ensure that: (1) the refueling machine and auxiliary hoist will be used for movement of drive rods and fuel assemblies, (2) the refueling machine has sufficient load capacity to lift a drive rod or fuel assembly, and (3) the core internals and reactor vessel are protected from excessive lifting force in the event they are inadvertently engaged during lifting operations.

#### 3/4.9.7 CRANE TRAVEL - FUEL HANDLING BUILDING

The restriction on movement of loads in excess of the nominal weight of a fuel and control rod assembly and associated handling tool over other fuel assemblies in the storage pool, unless handled by the single-failure-proof main hoist of the FHB 15-ton crane, ensures that in the event this load is dropped: (1) the activity release will be limited to that contained in a single fuel assembly, and (2) any possible distortion of fuel in the storage racks will not result in a critical array. This assumption is consistent with the activity release assumed in the safety analyses.

#### 3/4.9.8 RESIDUAL HEAT REMOVAL AND COOLANT CIRCULATION

The requirement that at least one residual heat removal (RHR) loop be in operation ensures that: (1) sufficient cooling capacity is available to remove decay heat and maintain the water in the reactor vessel below 140°F as required during the REFUELING MODE, and (2) sufficient coolant circulation is maintained through the core to minimize the effect of a boron dilution incident and prevent boron stratification.

The requirement to have two RHR loops OPERABLE when there is less than 23 feet of water above the reactor vessel flange ensures that a single failure of the operating RHR loop will not result in a complete loss of residual heat removal capability. With the reactor vessel head removed and at least 23 feet of water above the reactor pressure vessel flange, a large heat sink is available for core cooling. Thus, in the event of a failure of the operating RHR loop, adequate time is provided to initiate emergency procedures to cool the core.

#### 3/4.9.9 CONTAINMENT VENTILATION ISOLATION SYSTEM

The OPERABILITY of this system ensures that the containment purge and exhaust penetrations will be automatically isolated upon detection of high radiation levels in the purge exhaust. The OPERABILITY of this system is required to restrict the release of radioactive material from the containment atmosphere to the environment.



## REFUELING OPERATIONS

### BASES

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#### 3/4.9.10 and 3/4.9.11 WATER LEVEL - REFUELING CAVITY and STORAGE POOLS

The restrictions on minimum water level ensure that sufficient water depth is available to remove 99% of the assumed 10% iodine gas activity released from the rupture of an irradiated fuel assembly. The minimum water depth is consistent with the assumptions of the safety analysis.

#### 3/4.9.12 FUEL HANDLING BUILDING EXHAUST AIR SYSTEM

The limitations on the Fuel Handling Building Exhaust Air System ensure that all radioactive material released from an irradiated fuel assembly will be filtered through the HEPA filters and charcoal adsorber prior to discharge to the atmosphere. Operation of the system with the heaters operating for at least 10 continuous hours in a 31-day period is sufficient to reduce the build-up of moisture on the adsorbers and HEPA filters. The OPERABILITY of this system and the resulting iodine removal capacity are consistent with the assumptions of the safety analyses. ANSI N510-1980 will be used as a procedural guide for surveillance testing.

## 3/4.10 SPECIAL TEST EXCEPTIONS

### BASES

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#### 3/4.10.1 SHUTDOWN MARGIN

This special test exception provides that a minimum amount of control rod worth is immediately available for reactivity control when tests are performed for control rod worth measurement. This special test exception is required to permit the periodic verification of the actual versus predicted core reactivity condition occurring as a result of fuel burnup or fuel cycling operations.

#### 3/4.10.2 GROUP HEIGHT, INSERTION, AND POWER DISTRIBUTION LIMITS

This special test exception permits individual control rods to be positioned outside of their normal group heights and insertion limits during the performance of such PHYSICS TESTS as those required to: (1) measure control rod worth, and (2) determine the reactor stability index and damping factor under xenon oscillation conditions.

#### 3/4.10.3 PHYSICS TESTS

This special test exception permits PHYSICS TESTS to be performed at less than or equal to 5% of RATED THERMAL POWER with the RCS  $T_{avg}$  slightly lower than normally allowed so that the fundamental nuclear characteristics of the core and related instrumentation can be verified. In order for various characteristics to be accurately measured, it is at times necessary to operate outside the normal restrictions of these Technical Specifications. For instance, to measure the moderator temperature coefficient at BOL, it is necessary to position the various control rods at heights which may not normally be allowed by Specification 3.1.3.6 which in turn may cause the RCS  $T_{avg}$  to fall slightly below the minimum temperature of Specification 3.1.1.4.

#### 3/4.10.4 REACTOR COOLANT LOOPS

This special test exception permits reactor criticality under no flow conditions and is required to perform certain STARTUP and PHYSICS TESTS while at low THERMAL POWER levels.

#### 3/4.10.5 POSITION INDICATION SYSTEM - SHUTDOWN

This special test exception permits the Position Indication Systems to be inoperable during rod drop time measurements. The exception is required since the data necessary to determine the rod drop time are derived from the induced voltage in the position indicator coils as the rod is dropped. This induced voltage is small compared to the normal voltage and, therefore, cannot be observed if the Position Indication Systems remain OPERABLE.

## 3/4.11 RADIOACTIVE EFFLUENTS

### BASES

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#### 3/4.11.1 LIQUID EFFLUENTS

##### 3/4.11.1.1 CONCENTRATION

This specification is provided to ensure that the concentration of radioactive materials released in liquid waste effluents to UNRESTRICTED AREAS will be less than the concentration levels specified in 10 CFR Part 20, Appendix B, Table II, Column 2. This limitation provides additional assurance that the levels of radioactive materials in bodies of water in UNRESTRICTED AREAS will result in exposures within: (1) the Section II.A design objectives of Appendix I, 10 CFR Part 50, to a MEMBER OF THE PUBLIC, and (2) the limits of 10 CFR Part 20.106(e) to the population. The concentration limit for dissolved or entrained noble gases is based upon the assumption that Xe-135 is the controlling radioisotope and its MPC in air (submersion) was converted to an equivalent concentration in water using the methods described in International Commission on Radiological Protection (ICRP) Publication 2.

This specification applies to the release of radioactive materials in liquid effluents from all units at the site.

The required detection capabilities for radioactive materials in liquid waste samples are tabulated in terms of the lower limits of detection (LLDs). Detailed discussion of the LLD, and other detection limits can be found in HASL Procedures Manual, HASL-300 (revised annually), Currie, L. A., "Limits for Qualitative Detection and Quantitative Determination - Application to Radiochemistry," *Anal. Chem.* 40, 586-93 (1968), and Hartwell, J. K., "Detection Limits for Radioanalytical Counting Techniques," Atlantic Richfield Hanford Company Report ARH-SA-215 (June 1975).

##### 3/4.11.1.2 DOSE

This specification is provided to implement the requirements of Sections II.A, III.A and IV.A of Appendix I, 10 CFR Part 50. The Limiting Condition for Operation implements the guides set forth in Section II.A of Appendix I. The ACTION statements provide the required operating flexibility and at the same time implement the guides set forth in Section IV.A of Appendix I to assure that the releases of radioactive material in liquid effluents to UNRESTRICTED AREAS will be kept "as low as is reasonably achievable." The dose calculation methodology and parameters in the ODCM implement the requirements in Section III.A of Appendix I that conformance with the guides of Appendix I be shown by calculational procedures based on models and data, such that the actual exposure of a MEMBER OF THE PUBLIC through appropriate pathways is unlikely to be substantially underestimated. The equations specified in the ODCM for calculating the doses due to the actual release rates of radioactive materials in liquid effluents are consistent with the methodology provided in Regulatory Guide 1.109, "Calculation of Annual Doses to Man from Routine Releases of Reactor Effluents for the Purpose of Evaluating Compliance with 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix I" Revision 1, October 1977 and Regulatory Guide 1.113, "Estimating Aquatic Dispersion of Effluents from Accidental and Routine Reactor Releases for the Purpose of Implementing Appendix I," April 1977.

## RADIOACTIVE EFFLUENTS

### BASES

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#### DOSE (Continued)

This specification applies to the release of radioactive materials in liquid effluents from each unit at the site.

#### 3/4.11.1.3 LIQUID WASTE PROCESSING SYSTEM

The OPERABILITY of the Liquid Waste Processing System ensures that this system will be available for use whenever liquid effluents require treatment prior to release to the environment. The requirement that the appropriate portions of this system be used when specified provides assurance that the releases of radioactive materials in liquid effluents will be kept "as low as is reasonably achievable". This specification implements the requirements of 10 CFR 50.36a, General Design Criterion 60 of Appendix A to 10 CFR Part 50 and the design objective given in Section II.D of Appendix I to 10 CFR Part 50. The specified limits governing the use of appropriate portions of the Liquid Waste Processing System were specified as a suitable fraction of the dose design objectives set forth in Section II.A of Appendix I, 10 CFR Part 50, for liquid effluents.

This specification applies to the release of radioactive materials in liquid effluents from each unit at the site.

#### 3/4.11.1.4 LIQUID HOLDUP TANKS

The tanks listed in this specification include all those outdoor radwaste tanks that are not surrounded by liners, dikes, or walls capable of holding the tank contents and that do not have tank overflows and surrounding area drains connected to the Liquid Waste Processing System.

Restricting the quantity of radioactive material contained in the specified tanks provides assurance that in the event of an uncontrolled release of the tanks' contents, the resulting concentrations would be less than the limits of 10 CFR Part 20, Appendix B, Table II, Column 2, at the nearest potable water supply and the nearest surface water supply in an UNRESTRICTED AREA.

#### 3/4.11.2 GASEOUS EFFLUENTS

##### 3/4.11.2.1 DOSE RATE

This specification is provided to ensure that the dose at any time at and beyond the SITE BOUNDARY from gaseous effluents from all units on the site will be within the annual dose limits of 10 CFR Part 20 to UNRESTRICTED AREAS. The annual dose limits are the doses associated with the concentrations of 10 CFR Part 20, Appendix B, Table II, Column 1. These limits provide reasonable assurance that radioactive material discharged in gaseous effluents will not result in the exposure of a MEMBER OF THE PUBLIC in an UNRESTRICTED AREA, either within or outside the SITE BOUNDARY, to annual average concentrations exceeding the limits specified in Appendix B, Table II of 10 CFR Part 20 (10 CFR Part 20.106(b)). For MEMBERS OF THE PUBLIC who may at times be within

## RADIOACTIVE EFFLUENTS

### BASES

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#### DOSE RATE (Continued)

the SITE BOUNDARY, the occupancy of that MEMBER OF THE PUBLIC will usually be sufficiently low to compensate for any increase in the atmospheric diffusion factor above that for the SITE BOUNDARY. Examples of calculations for such MEMBERS OF THE PUBLIC, with the appropriate occupancy factors, shall be given in the ODCM. The specified release rate limits restrict, at all times, the corresponding gamma and beta dose rates above background to a MEMBER OF THE PUBLIC at or beyond the SITE BOUNDARY to less than or equal to 500 mrems/year to the whole body or to less than or equal to 3000 mrems/year to the skin. These release rate limits also restrict, at all times the corresponding thyroid dose rate above background to a child via the inhalation pathway to less than or equal to 1500 mrems/year.

This specification applies to the release of radioactive materials in gaseous effluents from all units at the site.

The required detection capabilities for radioactive materials in gaseous waste samples are tabulated in terms of the lower limits of detection (LLDs). Detailed discussion of the LLD, and other detection limits can be found in HASL Procedures Manual, HASL-300 (revised annually), Currie, L. A., "Limits for Qualitative Detection and Quantitative Determination - Application to Radiochemistry," Anal. Chem. 40, 586-93 (1968), and Hartwell, J.K., "Detection Limits for Radioanalytical Counting Techniques," Atlantic Richfield Hanford Company Report ARH-SA-215 (June 1975).

#### 3/4.11.2.2 DOSE - NOBLE GASES

This specification is provided to implement the requirements of Sections II.B, III.A and IV.A of Appendix I, 10 CFR Part 50. The Limiting Condition for Operation implements the guides set forth in Section II.B of Appendix I. The ACTION statements provide the required operating flexibility and at the same time implement the guides set forth in Section IV.A of Appendix I to assure that the releases of radioactive material in gaseous effluents to UNRESTRICTED AREAS will be kept "as low as is reasonably achievable." The Surveillance Requirements implement the requirements in Section III.A of Appendix I that conformance with the guides of Appendix I be shown by calculational procedures based on models and data such that the actual exposure of a MEMBER OF THE PUBLIC through appropriate pathways is unlikely to be substantially underestimated. The dose calculation methodology and parameters established in the ODCM for calculating the doses due to the actual release rates of radioactive materials in liquid effluents are consistent with the methodology provided in Regulatory Guide 1.109, "Calculation of Annual Doses to Man from Routine Releases of Reactor Effluents for the Purpose of Evaluating Compliance with 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix I" Revision 1, October 1977 and Regulatory Guide 1.111, "Methods for Estimating Atmospheric Transport and Dispersion of Gaseous Effluents in Routine Releases from Light-Water Cooled Reactors," Revision 1," July 1977. The ODCM equations provided for determining the air doses at and beyond the SITE BOUNDARY are based upon the historical average atmospheric conditions.

## RADIOACTIVE EFFLUENTS

### BASES

This specification applies to the release of radioactive materials in gaseous effluents from each unit at the site.

#### 3/4.11.2.3 DOSE - IODINE-131, IODINE-133, TRITIUM, AND RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL IN PARTICULATE FORM

This specification is provided to implement the requirements of Sections II.C, III.A and IV.A of Appendix I, 10 CFR Part 50. The Limiting Conditions for Operation are the guides set forth in Section II.C of Appendix I. The ACTION statements provide the required operating flexibility and at the same time implement the guides set forth in Section IV.A of Appendix I to assure that the releases of radioactive materials in gaseous effluents to UNRESTRICTED AREAS will be kept "as low as is reasonably achievable." The ODCM calculational methods specified in the Surveillance Requirements implement the requirements in Section III.A of Appendix I that conformance with the guides of Appendix I be shown by calculational procedures based on models and data, such that the actual exposure of a MEMBER OF THE PUBLIC through appropriate pathways is unlikely to be substantially underestimated. The ODCM calculational methodology and parameters for calculating the doses due to the actual release rates of the subject materials are consistent with the methodology provided in Regulatory Guide 1.109, "Calculation of Annual Doses to Man from Routine Releases of Reactor Effluents for the Purpose of Evaluating Compliance with 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix I," Revision 1, October 1977 and Regulatory Guide 1.111, "Methods for Estimating Atmospheric Transport and Dispersion of Gaseous Effluents in Routine Releases from Light-Water-Cooled Reactors," Revision 1, July 1977. These equations also provide for determining the actual doses based upon the historical average atmospheric conditions. The release rate specifications for Iodine-131, Iodine-133, tritium, and radionuclides in particulate form with half-lives greater than 8 days are dependent upon the existing radionuclide pathways to man, in the areas at and beyond the SITE BOUNDARY. The pathways that were examined in the development of these calculations were: (1) individual inhalation of airborne radionuclides, (2) deposition of radionuclides onto green leafy vegetation with subsequent consumption by man, (3) deposition onto grassy areas where milk animals and meat producing animals graze with consumption of the milk and meat by man, and (4) deposition on the ground with subsequent exposure to man.

This specification applies to the release of radioactive materials in gaseous effluents from each unit at the site.

#### 3/4.11.2.4 GASEOUS WASTE PROCESSING SYSTEM

The OPERABILITY of the GASEOUS WASTE PROCESSING SYSTEM ensures that the systems will be available for use whenever gaseous effluents require treatment prior to release to the environment. The requirement that the appropriate portions of these systems be used, when specified, provides reasonable assurance that the releases of radioactive materials in gaseous effluents will be kept "as low as is reasonably achievable". This specification implements the requirements of 10 CFR 50.36a, General Design Criterion 60 of Appendix A to 10 CFR Part 50 and the design objectives given in Section II.D of Appendix I to 10 CFR Part 50. The specified limits governing the use of appropriate portions

## RADIOACTIVE EFFLUENTS

### BASES

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#### GASEOUS WASTE PROCESSING SYSTEM (Continued)

of the system were specified as a suitable fraction of the dose design objectives set forth in Section II.B and II.C of Appendix I, 10 CFR Part 50, for gaseous effluents.

This specification applies to the release of radioactive materials in gaseous effluents from each unit at the site.

#### 3/4.11.2.5 EXPLOSIVE GAS MIXTURE

This specification is provided to ensure that the concentration of potentially explosive gas mixtures contained in the GASEOUS WASTE PROCESSING SYSTEM is maintained below the flammability limit of oxygen. The concentration of oxygen in the inlet header to the GASEOUS WASTE PROCESSING SYSTEM is continuously monitored and a high level alarm isolates the GASEOUS WASTE PROCESSING SYSTEM. Provision is made to manually purge the system with nitrogen and/or isolate the source of oxygen. Maintaining the concentration of oxygen below its flammability limit (4% by volume) provides assurance that the releases of radioactive materials will be controlled in conformance with the requirements of General Design Criterion 60 of Appendix A to 10 CFR Part 50. Because of analyzer variabilities, a safety margin of 1% by volume is applied. Therefore, the limiting condition for operation is maintaining oxygen concentration below 3% by volume.

#### 3/4.11.2.6 GAS STORAGE TANKS

The tanks included in this specification are those tanks for which the quantity of radioactivity contained is not limited directly or indirectly by another Technical Specification. Restricting the quantity of radioactivity contained in each gas storage tank provides assurance that in the event of an uncontrolled release of the tank's contents, the resulting whole body exposure to a MEMBER OF THE PUBLIC at the nearest SITE BOUNDARY will not exceed 0.5 rem. This is consistent with Standard Review Plan 11.3, Branch Technical Position ETSB 11-5, "Postulated Radioactive Releases Due to a Waste Gas System Leak or Failure," in NUREG-0800, July 1981. Since only the gamma body dose factor (DFB<sub>γ</sub>) is used in the analysis, the Xe-133 equivalent is determined from the DFB<sub>γ</sub> value for Xe-133 as compared to the composite DFB<sub>γ</sub> for the actual mixture in the tank.

## RADIOACTIVE EFFLUENTS

### BASES

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#### 3/4.11.3 SOLID RADIOACTIVE WASTES

This specification implements the requirements of 10 CFR 50.36a and General Design Criterion 60 of Appendix A to 10 CFR Part 50. The process parameters included in establishing the PROCESS CONTROL PROGRAM may include, but are not limited to, waste type, waste pH, waste/liquid/SOLIDIFICATION agent/catalyst ratios, waste oil content, waste principal chemical constituents, and mixing and curing times.

#### 3/4.11.4 TOTAL DOSE

This specification is provided to meet the dose limitations of 40 CFR Part 190 that have been incorporated into 10 CFR Part 20 by 46 FR 18525. The specification requires the preparation and submittal of a Special Report whenever the calculated doses due to releases of radioactivity and to radiation from uranium fuel cycle sources exceed 25 mrems to the whole body or any organ, except the thyroid, which shall be limited to less than or equal to 75 mrems. For sites containing up to four reactors, it is highly unlikely that the resultant dose to a MEMBER OF THE PUBLIC will exceed the dose limits of 40 CFR Part 190 if the individual reactors remain within twice the dose design objectives of Appendix I, and if direct radiation doses from the reactor units and outside storage tanks are kept small. The Special Report will describe a course of action that should result in the limitation of the annual dose to a MEMBER OF THE PUBLIC to within the 40 CFR Part 190 limits. For the purposes of the Special Report, it may be assumed that the dose commitment to the MEMBER OF THE PUBLIC from other uranium fuel cycle sources is negligible, with the exception that dose contributions from other nuclear fuel cycle facilities at the same site or within a radius of 8 km must be considered. If the dose to any MEMBER OF THE PUBLIC is estimated to exceed the requirements of 40 CFR Part 190, the Special Report with a request for a variance (provided the release conditions resulting in violation of 40 CFR Part 190 have not already been corrected), in accordance with the provisions of 40 CFR 190.11 and 10 CFR 20.405c, is considered to be a timely request and fulfills the requirements of 40 CFR Part 190 until NRC staff action is completed. The variance only relates to the limits of 40 CFR Part 190, and does not apply in any way to the other requirements for dose limitation of 10 CFR Part 20, as addressed in Specifications 3.11.1.1 and 3.11.2.1. An individual is not considered a MEMBER OF THE PUBLIC during any period in which he/she is engaged in carrying out any operation that is part of the nuclear fuel cycle.



## 3/4.12 RADIOLOGICAL ENVIRONMENTAL MONITORING

### BASES

#### 3/4.12.1 MONITORING PROGRAM

The Radiological Environmental Monitoring Program required by this specification provides representative measurements of radiation and of radioactive materials in those exposure pathways and for those radionuclides that lead to the highest potential radiation exposure of MEMBERS OF THE PUBLIC resulting from the plant operation. This monitoring program implements Section IV.B.2 of Appendix I to 10 CFR Part 50 and thereby supplements the Radiological Effluent Monitoring Program by verifying that the measurable concentrations of radioactive materials and levels of radiation are not higher than expected on the basis of the effluent measurements and the modeling of the environmental exposure pathways. Guidance for this monitoring program is provided by the Radiological Assessment Branch Technical Position on Environmental Monitoring. The initially specified monitoring program will be effective for at least the first 3 years of commercial operation. Following this period, program changes may be initiated based on operational experience.

The required detection capabilities for environmental sample analyses are tabulated in terms of the lower limits of detection (LLDs). The LLDs required by the ODCM are considered optimum for routine environmental measurements in industrial laboratories. It should be recognized that the LLD is defined as an a priori (before the fact) limit representing the capability of a measurement system and not as an a posteriori (after the fact) limit for a particular measurement.

Detailed discussion of the LLD, and other detection limits, can be found in HASL Procedures Manual, HASL-300 (revised annually), Currie, L.A., "Limits for Qualitative Detection and Quantitative Determination - Application to Radiochemistry," Anal. Chem. 40, 586-93 (1968), and Hartwell, J. K., "Detection Limits for Radioanalytical Counting Techniques" Atlantic Richfield Hanford Company Report ARH-SA-215 (June 1975).

#### 3/4.12.2 LAND USE CENSUS

This specification is provided to ensure that changes in the use of areas at and beyond the SITE BOUNDARY are identified and that modifications to the Radiological Environmental Monitoring Program given in the ODCM are made if required by the results of this census. The best information from the door-to-door survey, from aerial survey or from consulting with local agricultural authorities shall be used. This census satisfies the requirements of Section IV.B.3 of Appendix I to 10 CFR Part 50. Restricting the census to gardens of greater than 50 m<sup>2</sup> provides assurance that significant exposure pathways via leafy vegetables will be identified and monitored since a garden of this size is the minimum required to produce the quantity (26 kg/year) of leafy vegetables assumed in Regulatory Guide 1.109 for consumption by a child. To determine this minimum garden size, the following assumptions were made: (1) 20% of the garden was used for growing broad leaf vegetation (i.e., similar to lettuce and cabbage), and (2) a vegetation yield of 2 kg/m<sup>2</sup>.

RADIOLOGICAL ENVIRONMENTAL MONITORING

BASES

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3/4.12.3 INTERLABORATORY COMPARISON PROGRAM

The requirement for participation in an approved Interlaboratory Comparison Program is provided to ensure that independent checks on the precision and accuracy of the measurements of radioactive materials in environmental sample matrices are performed as part of the quality assurance program for environmental monitoring in order to demonstrate that the results are valid for the purposes of Section IV.B.2 of Appendix I to 10 CFR Part 50.

SECTION 5.0  
DESIGN FEATURES

## 5.0 DESIGN FEATURES

### 5.1 SITE

#### EXCLUSION AREA

5.1.1 The Exclusion Area shall be as shown in Figure 5.1-1.

#### LOW POPULATION ZONE

5.1.2 The Low Population Zone shall be as shown in Figure 5.1-2.

#### MAP DEFINING UNRESTRICTED AREAS AND SITE BOUNDARY FOR RADIOACTIVE GASEOUS AND LIQUID EFFLUENTS

5.1.3 Information regarding radioactive gaseous and liquid effluents, which will allow identification of structures and release points as well as definition of UNRESTRICTED AREAS within the SITE BOUNDARY that are accessible to MEMBERS OF THE PUBLIC, shall be as shown in Figures 5.1-3 and 5.1-4.

The definition of UNRESTRICTED AREA used in implementing these Technical Specifications has been expanded over that in 10 CFR 20.3(a)(17). The UNRESTRICTED AREA boundary may coincide with the Exclusion (fenced) Area boundary, as defined in 10 CFR 100.3(a), but the UNRESTRICTED AREA does not include areas over water bodies. The concept of UNRESTRICTED AREAS, established at or beyond the SITE BOUNDARY, is utilized in the Limiting Conditions for Operation to keep levels of radioactive materials in liquid and gaseous effluents as low as is reasonably achievable, pursuant to 10 CFR 50.36a.

### 5.2 CONTAINMENT

#### CONFIGURATION

5.2.1 The reactor containment building is a steel-lined, reinforced concrete building of cylindrical shape, with a dome roof and having the following design features:

- a. Nominal inside diameter = 150 feet.
- b. Nominal inside height = 241.25 feet.
- c. Minimum thickness of concrete walls = 4 feet.
- d. Minimum thickness of concrete roof = 3 feet.
- e. Minimum thickness of concrete floor mat = 18 feet.
- f. Nominal thickness of steel liner = 3/8 inches.
- g. Net free volume =  $3.56 \times 10^6$  cubic feet.

#### DESIGN PRESSURE AND TEMPERATURE

5.2.2 The reactor containment building is designed and shall be maintained for a maximum internal pressure of 56.5 psig and a temperature of 286°F.




FIGURE 5.1-1  
EXCLUSION AREA




FIGURE 5.1-2  
LOW POPULATION ZONE






FIGURE 5.1-4

RESTRICTED AREA AND SITE BOUNDARY FOR RADIOACTIVE LIQUID EFFLUENTS



## DESIGN FEATURES

### 5.3 REACTOR CORE

#### FUEL ASSEMBLIES

5.3.1 The core shall contain 193 fuel assemblies with each fuel assembly containing 264 fuel rods clad with Zircaloy-4. Each fuel rod shall have a nominal active fuel length of 168 inches. The initial core loading shall have a maximum enrichment of 3.5 weight percent U-235. Reload fuel shall be similar in physical design to the initial core loading and shall have a maximum enrichment of 3.5 weight percent U-235.

#### CONTROL ROD ASSEMBLIES

5.3.2 The core shall contain 57 full-length control rod assemblies. The full-length control rod assemblies shall contain a nominal 158.9 inches of absorber material. The absorber material shall be hafnium. All control rods shall be clad with stainless steel tubing.

### 5.4 REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM

#### DESIGN PRESSURE AND TEMPERATURE

5.4.1 The Reactor Coolant System is designed and shall be maintained:

- a. In accordance with the Code requirements specified in Section 5.2 of the FSAR, with allowance for normal degradation pursuant to the applicable Surveillance Requirements,
- b. For a pressure of 2485 psig, and
- c. For a temperature of 650°F, except for the pressurizer which is 680°F.

#### VOLUME

5.4.2 The total water and steam volume of the Reactor Coolant System is 13,814 ± 100 cubic feet at a nominal  $T_{avg}$  of 561°F.

### 5.5 METEOROLOGICAL TOWER LOCATION

5.5.1 The meteorological towers shall be located as shown on Figure 5.1-1.

### 5.6 FUEL STORAGE

#### CRITICALITY

5.6.1.1 The spent fuel storage racks are designed and shall be maintained with:

- a. A  $k_{eff}$  equivalent to less than or equal to 0.95 when flooded with unborated water, which includes a conservative allowance of

## DESIGN FEATURES

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3.6%  $\Delta k/k$  for uncertainties as described in Section 4.3 of the FSAR, and

- b. A nominal 14 inch center-to-center distance between fuel assemblies placed in the storage racks.

5.6.1.2 The  $k_{eff}$  for new fuel for the first core loading stored dry in the spent fuel storage racks shall not exceed 0.98 when aqueous foam moderation is assumed.

### DRAINAGE

5.6.2 The spent fuel storage pool is designed and shall be maintained to prevent inadvertent draining of the pool below elevation 62 feet-6 inches.

### CAPACITY

5.6.3 The spent fuel storage pool is designed and shall be maintained with a storage capacity limited to no more than 196 fuel assemblies.

### 5.7 COMPONENT CYCLIC OR TRANSIENT LIMIT

5.7.1 The components identified in Table 5.7-1 are designed and shall be maintained within the cyclic or transient limits of Table 5.7-1.

TABLE 5.7-1

COMPONENT CYCLIC OR TRANSIENT LIMITS

<u>COMPONENT</u>	<u>CYCLIC OR TRANSIENT LIMIT</u>	<u>DESIGN CYCLE OR TRANSIENT</u>
Reactor Coolant System	200 heatup cycles at $\leq 100^\circ\text{F}/\text{h}$ and 200 cooldown cycles at $\leq 100^\circ\text{F}/\text{h}$ .	Heatup cycle - $T_{\text{avg}}$ from $\leq 200^\circ\text{F}$ to $> 550^\circ\text{F}$ . Cooldown cycle - $T_{\text{avg}}$ from $> 550^\circ\text{F}$ to $\leq 200^\circ\text{F}$ .
	200 pressurizer cooldown cycles at $\leq 200^\circ\text{F}/\text{h}$ .	Pressurizer cooldown cycle temperatures from $\geq 650^\circ\text{F}$ to $\leq 200^\circ\text{F}$ .
	80 loss of load cycles, without immediate Turbine or Reactor trip.	$> 15\%$ of RATED THERMAL POWER to $0\%$ of RATED THERMAL POWER.
	40 cycles of loss-of-offsite A.C. electrical power.	Loss-of-offsite A.C. electrical ESF Electrical System.
	80 cycles of loss of flow in one reactor coolant loop.	Loss of only one reactor coolant pump.
	400 Reactor trip cycles.	$100\%$ to $0\%$ of RATED THERMAL POWER.
	10 auxiliary spray actuation cycles.	Spray water temperature differential: $> 621^\circ\text{F}$ .
	200 leak tests.	Pressurized to $\geq 2485$ psig.
	10 hydrostatic pressure tests.	Pressurized to $\geq 3110$ psig.
	Secondary Coolant System	1 steam line break.
10 hydrostatic pressure tests.		Pressurized to $\geq 1600$ psig.

SECTION 6.0  
ADMINISTRATIVE CONTROLS

## ADMINISTRATIVE CONTROLS

### 6.1 RESPONSIBILITY

6.1.1 The Plant Manager shall be responsible for overall unit operation and shall delegate in writing the succession to this responsibility during his absence.

6.1.2 The Shift Supervisor (or during his absence from the control room, a designated individual) shall be responsible for the control room command function. A management directive to this effect, signed by the Group Vice President, Nuclear shall be reissued to all station personnel on an annual basis.

### 6.2 ORGANIZATION

#### OFFSITE

6.2.1 The offsite organization for unit management and technical support shall be as shown in Figure 6.2-1.

#### UNIT STAFF

6.2.2 The unit organization shall be as shown in Figure 6.2-2 and:

- a. Each on-duty shift shall be composed of at least the minimum shift crew composition shown in Table 6.2-1;
- b. At least one licensed Operator shall be in the control room when fuel is in the reactor. In addition, while the unit is in MODE 1, 2, 3, or 4, at least one licensed Senior Operator shall be in the control room;
- c. A Health Physics Technician\* shall be on site when fuel is in the reactor;
- d. All CORE ALTERATIONS shall be observed and directly supervised by either a licensed Senior Operator or licensed Senior Operator Limited to Fuel Handling who has no other concurrent responsibilities during this operation;
- e. A site Fire Brigade of at least five members\* shall be maintained on site at all times. The Fire Brigade shall not include the Shift Supervisor and the two other members of the minimum shift crew necessary for safe shutdown of the unit and any personnel required for other essential functions during a fire emergency; and
- f. Administrative procedures shall be developed and implemented to limit the working hours of unit staff who perform safety-related functions (e.g., licensed Senior Operators, licensed Operators, health physicists, auxiliary operators, and key maintenance personnel).

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\*The Health Physics Technician and Fire Brigade composition may be less than the minimum requirements for a period of time not to exceed 2 hours, in order to accommodate unexpected absence, provided immediate action is taken to fill the required positions.

## ADMINISTRATIVE CONTROLS

### UNIT STAFF (Continued)

Adequate shift coverage shall be maintained without routine heavy use of overtime. The objective shall be to have operating personnel work a nominal 40-hour week while the unit is operating. However, in the event that unforeseen problems require substantial amounts of overtime to be used, or during extended periods of shutdown for re-fueling, major maintenance, or major plant modification, on a temporary basis the following guidelines shall be followed (except for shift technical advisor personnel):

1. An individual should not be permitted to work more than 16 hours straight, excluding shift turnover time.
2. An individual should not be permitted to work more than 16 hours in any 24-hour period, nor more than 24 hours in any 48-hour period, nor more than 72 hours in any 7-day period, all excluding shift turnover time.
3. A break of at least 8 hours should be allowed between work periods, including shift turnover time.
4. Except during extended shutdown periods, the use of overtime should be considered on an individual basis and not for the entire staff on a shift.

Any deviation from the above guidelines shall be authorized by the Plant Manager or his deputy, or higher levels of management, in accordance with established procedures and with documentation of the basis for granting the deviation. Controls shall be included in the procedures such that individual overtime shall be reviewed monthly by the Plant Manager or his designee to assure that excessive hours have not been assigned. Routine deviation from the above guidelines is not authorized.




FIGURE 6.2-1  
OFFSITE ORGANIZATION




FIGURE 6.2-2  
UNIT ORGANIZATION



TABLE 6.2-1  
MINIMUM SHIFT CREW COMPOSITION  
SINGLE UNIT FACILITY

POSITION	NUMBER OF INDIVIDUALS REQUIRED TO FILL POSITION	
	MODE 1, 2, 3, or 4	MODE 5 or 6
SS	1	1
SRO	1	None
RO	2	1
AO	2	1
STA	1*	None

- SS - Shift Supervisor with a Senior Operator license on Unit 1
- SRO - Individual with a Senior Operator license on Unit 1
- RO - Individual with an Operator license on Unit 1
- AO - Auxiliary Operator
- STA - Shift Technical Advisor

The shift crew composition may be one less than the minimum requirements of Table 6.2-1 for a period of time not to exceed 2 hours in order to accommodate unexpected absence of on-duty shift crew members provided immediate action is taken to restore the shift crew composition to within the minimum requirements of Table 6.2-1. This provision does not permit any shift crew position to be unmanned upon shift change due to an oncoming shift crewman being late or absent.

During any absence of the Shift Supervisor from the control room while the unit is in MODE 1, 2, 3, or 4, an individual (other than the Shift Technical Advisor) with a valid Senior Operator license shall be designated to assume the control room command function. During any absence of the Shift Supervisor from the control room while the unit is in MODE 5 or 6, an individual with a valid Senior Operator license or Operator license shall be designated to assume the control room command function.

\*The STA position shall be manned in MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4 unless the Shift Supervisor or the individual with a Senior Operator license meets the qualifications for the STA as required by the NRC.

## ADMINISTRATIVE CONTROLS

### 6.2.3 INDEPENDENT SAFETY ENGINEERING GROUP (ISEG)

#### FUNCTION

6.2.3.1 The ISEG shall function to examine unit operating characteristics, NRC issuances, industry advisories, Licensee Event Reports, and other sources of unit design and operating experience information, including units of similar design, which may indicate areas for improving unit safety. The ISEG shall make detailed recommendations for revised procedures, equipment modifications, maintenance activities, operations activities, or other means of improving unit safety to the Manager, Nuclear Safety Review Board.

#### COMPOSITION

6.2.3.2 The ISEG shall be composed of at least five, dedicated, full-time engineers located on site. Each shall have a bachelor's degree in engineering or related science and at least 2 years professional level experience in his field, at least 1 year of which experience shall be in the nuclear field.

#### RESPONSIBILITIES

6.2.3.3 The ISEG shall be responsible for maintaining surveillance of unit activities to provide independent verification\* that these activities are performed correctly and that human errors are reduced as much as practical.

#### RECORDS

6.2.3.4 Records of activities performed by the ISEG shall be prepared, maintained, and forwarded each calendar month to the Manager, Nuclear Safety Review Board.

### 6.2.4 SHIFT TECHNICAL ADVISOR

6.2.4.1 The Shift Technical Advisor shall provide advisory technical support to the Shift Supervisor in the areas of thermal hydraulics, reactor engineering, and plant analysis with regard to the safe operation of the unit. The Shift Technical Advisor shall have a bachelor's degree or equivalent in a scientific or engineering discipline and shall have received specific training in the response and analysis of the unit for transients and accidents, and in unit design and layout, including the capabilities of instrumentation and controls in the control room.

### 6.3 (Not Used)

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\*Not responsible for sign-off function.

## ADMINISTRATIVE CONTROLS

### 6.4 TRAINING

6.4.1 A retraining and replacement training program for the unit staff shall be maintained under the direction of the Training Manager and shall meet or exceed the requirements and recommendations of Section 5.5 of ANSI N18.1-1971 and Appendix A of 10 CFR Part 55 and the supplemental requirements specified in Sections A and C of Enclosure 1 of the March 28, 1980 NRC letter to all licensees, and shall include familiarization with relevant industry operational experience.

### 6.5 REVIEW AND AUDIT

#### 6.5.1 PLANT OPERATIONS REVIEW COMMITTEE(PORC)

##### FUNCTION

6.5.1.1 The PORC shall function to advise the Plant Manager on all matters related to nuclear safety.

##### COMPOSITION

6.5.1.2 The PORC shall be composed of the:

Member:	Plant Superintendent
Member:	Technical Services Manager
Member:	Plant Operations Manager
Member:	Plant Engineering Manager
Member:	Maintenance Manager
Member:	Quality Engineering Manager

The PORC Chairman shall be appointed in writing from among these members by the Plant Manager, except for the Quality Engineering Manager.

##### ALTERNATES

6.5.1.3 All alternate members shall be appointed in writing by the Plant Manager to serve on a temporary basis; however, no more than two alternates shall participate as voting members in PORC activities at any one time.

##### MEETING FREQUENCY

6.5.1.4 The PORC shall meet at least once per calendar month and as convened by the PORC Chairman or his designated alternate.

##### QUORUM

6.5.1.5 The quorum of the PORC necessary for the performance of the PORC responsibility and authority provisions of these Technical Specifications shall consist of the Chairman or his designated alternate, and three other members including alternates.

## ADMINISTRATIVE CONTROLS

### RESPONSIBILITIES

6.5.1.6 The PORC shall be responsible for:

- a. Review of all safety-related station administrative procedures and changes thereto.
- b. Review of safety evaluations for (1) procedures, (2) changes to procedures, structures, components, or systems, and (3) tests or experiments completed under the provision of 10 CFR 50.59 to verify that such actions did not constitute an unreviewed safety question.
- c. Review of proposed (1) procedures, (2) changes to procedures, structures, components, or systems, and (3) tests or experiments which may involve an unreviewed safety question as defined in 10 CFR 50.59.
- d. Review of all programs required by Specification 6.8 and changes thereto.
- e. Review of proposed changes to the Technical Specifications or the Operating License.
- f. Review of all REPORTABLE EVENTS.
- g. Review of reports of significant operating abnormalities or deviations from normal and expected performance of plant equipment or systems that affect nuclear safety.
- h. Review of reports of unanticipated deficiencies in the design or operation of structures, systems, or components that affect nuclear safety.
- i. Review of the Security Plan and implementing procedures and changes thereto.
- j. Review of the Emergency Plan and implementing procedures and changes thereto.
- k. Review of the PROCESS CONTROL PROGRAM and implementing procedures and changes thereto.
- l. Review of the OFFSITE DOSE CALCULATION MANUAL and implementing procedures and changes thereto.
- m. Performance of special reviews, investigations, or analyses and reports thereon as requested by the Plant Manager or the Nuclear Safety Review Board (NSRB).
- n. Review of any accidental, unplanned, or uncontrolled radioactive release including the preparation of reports covering evaluation, recommendations, and disposition of the corrective action to prevent recurrence and the forwarding of these reports to the Plant Manager and to the NSRB.
- o. Reports of violations of codes, regulations, orders, Technical Specifications, or Operating License requirements having nuclear safety significance or reports of abnormal degradation of systems designed to contain radioactive material.
- p. Review of the Fire Protection Program, quality-related implementing procedures and changes thereto.

## ADMINISTRATIVE CONTROLS

### RESPONSIBILITIES (Continued)

6.5.1.7 The PORC shall:

- a. Recommend in writing to the Plant Manager approval or disapproval of items considered under Specification 6.5.1.6a. through e. prior to their implementation, and items considered under Specification 6.5.1.6i. through l.
- b. Render determinations in writing with regard to whether or not each item considered under Specification 6.5.1.6a. through e. and o. constitutes an unreviewed safety question; and
- c. Provide written notification within 24 hours to the Group Vice President-Nuclear and the Nuclear Safety Review Board of disagreement between the PORC and the Plant Manager; however, the Plant Manager shall have responsibility for resolution of such disagreements pursuant to Specification 6.1.1.

### RECORDS

6.5.1.8 The PORC shall maintain written minutes of each PORC meeting that, at a minimum, document the results of all PORC activities performed under the responsibility provisions of these Technical Specifications. Copies shall be provided to the Group Vice President-Nuclear and the Nuclear Safety Review Board.

## 6.5.2 NUCLEAR SAFETY REVIEW BOARD (NSRB)

### FUNCTION

6.5.2.1 The NSRB shall function to provide independent review and audit of designated activities in the areas of:

- a. Nuclear power plant operations,
- b. Nuclear engineering,
- c. Chemistry and radiochemistry,
- d. Metallurgy,
- e. Instrumentation and control,
- f. Radiological safety,
- g. Mechanical and electrical engineering,
- h. Civil engineering,
- i. Training,
- j. Nuclear assurance,
- k. Nuclear licensing,
- l. Plant security, and
- m. Environmental impact.

The NSRB shall report to and advise the Group Vice President-Nuclear on those areas of responsibility specified in Specifications 6.5.2.7 and 6.5.2.8.

## ADMINISTRATIVE CONTROLS

### COMPOSITION

6.5.2.2 The NSRB shall be composed of the following, and other members appointed in writing by the Group Vice President, Nuclear

Chairman	General Manager, NSRB
Member:	General Manager, South Texas Project Management
Member:	Vice President, Nuclear Plant Operations
Member:	General Manager, Nuclear Assurance
Member:	General Manager, South Texas Project Operations Support

### ALTERNATES

6.5.2.3 All alternate members shall be appointed in writing by the Group Vice President-Nuclear to serve on a temporary basis; however, no more than two alternates shall participate as voting members in NSRB activities at any one time.

### CONSULTANTS

6.5.2.4 Consultants shall be utilized as determined by the NSRB Chairman to provide expert advice to the NSRB.

### MEETING FREQUENCY

6.5.2.5 The NSRB shall meet at least once per calendar quarter during the initial year of unit operation following fuel loading and at least once per 6 months thereafter.

### QUORUM

6.5.2.6 The quorum of the NSRB necessary for the performance of the NSRB review and audit functions of these Technical Specifications shall consist of the Chairman or his designated alternate and at least four NSRB members including alternates. No more than a minority of the quorum shall have line responsibility for operation of the unit.

### REVIEW

6.5.2.7 The NSRB shall be responsible for the review of:

- a. The safety evaluations for: (1) changes to procedures, equipment, or systems; and (2) tests or experiments completed under the provision of 10 CFR 50.59, to verify that such actions did not constitute an unreviewed safety question;
- b. Proposed changes to procedures, equipment, or systems which involve an unreviewed safety question as defined in 10 CFR 50.59;

## ADMINISTRATIVE CONTROLS

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### REVIEW (Continued)

- c. Proposed tests or experiments which involve an unreviewed safety question as defined in 10 CFR 50.59;
- d. Proposed changes to Technical Specifications or this Operating License;
- e. Violations of Codes, regulations, orders, Technical Specifications, license requirements, or of internal procedures or instructions having nuclear safety significance;
- f. Significant operating abnormalities or deviations from normal and expected performance of unit equipment that affect nuclear safety;
- g. All REPORTABLE EVENTS;
- h. All recognized indications of an unanticipated deficiency in some aspect of design or operation of structures, systems, or components that could affect nuclear safety; and
- i. Reports and meeting minutes of the PORC.

### AUDITS

6.5.2.8 Audits of unit activities shall be performed under the cognizance of the NSRB. These audits shall encompass:

- a. The conformance of unit operation to provisions contained within the Technical Specifications and applicable license conditions at least once per 12 months;
- b. The performance, training, and qualifications of the entire unit staff at least once per 12 months;
- c. The results of actions taken to correct deficiencies occurring in unit equipment, structures, systems, or method of operation that affect nuclear safety, at least once per 6 months;
- d. The performance of activities required by the Operational Quality Assurance Program to meet the criteria of Appendix B, 10 CFR Part 50, at least once per 24 months;
- e. The fire protection programmatic controls including the implementing procedures at least once per 24 months by qualified licensee QA personnel;
- f. The fire protection equipment and program implementation at least once per 12 months utilizing either a qualified offsite licensee fire protection engineer or an outside independent fire protection consultant. An outside independent fire protection consultant shall be used at least every third year;

## ADMINISTRATIVE CONTROLS

### AUDITS (Continued)

- g. The Radiological Environmental Monitoring Program and the results thereof at least once per 12 months;
- h. The OFFSITE DOSE CALCULATION MANUAL and implementing procedures at least once per 24 months;
- i. The PROCESS CONTROL PROGRAM and implementing procedures for processing and packaging of radioactive wastes at least once per 24 months;
- i. The performance of activities required by the Quality Assurance Program for effluent and environmental monitoring at least once per 12 months; and
- k. Any other area of unit operation considered appropriate by the NSRB or the Group Vice President-Nuclear.

### RECORDS

6.5.2.9 Records of NSRB activities shall be prepared, approved, and distributed as indicated below:

- a. Minutes of each NSRB meeting shall be prepared, approved, and forwarded to the Group Vice President-Nuclear within 14 days following each meeting;
- b. Reports of reviews encompassed by Specification 6.5.2.7 shall be prepared, approved, and forwarded to the Group Vice President-Nuclear within 14 days following completion of the review; and
- c. Audit reports encompassed by Specification 6.5.2.8 shall be forwarded to the Group Vice President-Nuclear and to the management positions responsible for the areas audited within 30 days after completion of the audit by the auditing organization.

### 6.5.3 TECHNICAL REVIEW AND CONTROL

#### ACTIVITIES

6.5.3.1 Activities that affect nuclear safety shall be conducted as follows:

- a. Procedures required by Specification 6.8, and other procedures that affect nuclear safety, and changes thereto, shall be prepared, reviewed, and approved. Each such procedure, or change thereto, shall be reviewed by an individual/group other than the individual/group who prepared the procedure, or change thereto, but who may be from the same organization as the individual/group who prepared the procedure, or change thereto. Procedures other than station administrative procedures shall be approved as delineated in writing by the Plant Manager. The Plant Manager shall approve station administrative procedures, security plan implementing procedures, and emergency plan implementing procedures. Temporary changes to procedures, which clearly do not change the intent of the approved procedures, shall be approved prior to implementation by two members of the plant staff,



## ADMINISTRATIVE CONTROLS

### ACTIVITIES (Continued)

at least one of whom holds a Senior Reactor Operator's License. Changes to procedures that may involve a change to the intent of the original procedure shall be approved by the individual authorized to approve the procedure prior to implementation of the change.

- b. Proposed changes or modifications to safety-related structures, systems, and components shall be reviewed as designated by the Plant Manager. Each such modification shall be reviewed by an individual/group other than the individual/group who designed the modification, but who may be from the same organization as the individual/group who designed the modification. Proposed modifications to safety-related structures, systems, and components shall be approved by the Plant Manager prior to implementation.
- c. Proposed tests and experiments that affect nuclear safety and that are not addressed in the Final Safety Analysis Report shall be prepared, reviewed, and approved prior to implementation. Each such test or experiment shall be reviewed by an individual/group other than the individual/group who prepared the test or experiment but who may be from the same organization as the individual/group who prepared the test or experiment. Proposed tests and experiments shall be approved by the Plant Manager.
- d. Individuals responsible for reviews performed in accordance with Specification 6.5.3.1 (a) through (c) shall be members of the plant management staff previously designated by the Plant Manager. Each review shall include a determination of whether or not additional, cross-disciplinary review is necessary. If deemed necessary, such review shall be performed by qualified personnel of the appropriate discipline.
- e. Each review will include a determination of whether or not an unreviewed safety question is involved. Pursuant to 10 CFR 50.59, NRC approval of items involving an unreviewed safety question will be obtained prior to Plant Manager approval for implementation.

6.5.3.2 Records of the above activities shall be provided to the Plant Manager, PORC, and/or the NSRB as necessary for required reviews.

### 6.6 REPORTABLE EVENT ACTION

6.6.1 The following actions shall be taken for REPORTABLE EVENTS:

- a. The Commission shall be notified and a report submitted pursuant to the requirements of Section 50.73 to 10 CFR Part 50, and
- b. Each REPORTABLE EVENT shall be reviewed by the PORC, and the results of this review shall be submitted to the NSRB and the Group Vice President-Nuclear.

### 6.7 SAFETY LIMIT VIOLATION

6.7.1 The following actions shall be taken in the event a Safety Limit is violated:

## ADMINISTRATIVE CONTROLS

### SAFETY LIMIT VIOLATION (Continued)

- a. The NRC Operations Center shall be notified by telephone as soon as possible and in all cases within 1 hour. The Group Vice President-Nuclear and the NSRB shall be notified within 24 hours;
- b. A Safety Limit Violation Report shall be prepared. The report shall be reviewed by the PORC. This report shall describe: (1) applicable circumstances preceding the violation, (2) effects of the violation upon facility components, systems, or structures, and (3) corrective action taken to prevent recurrence;
- c. The Safety Limit Violation Report shall be submitted to the Commission, the NSRB, and the Group Vice President-Nuclear within 14 days of the violation; and
- d. Operation of the unit shall not be resumed until authorized by the Commission.

### 6.8 PROCEDURES AND PROGRAMS

6.8.1 Written procedures shall be established, implemented, and maintained covering the activities referenced below:

- a. The applicable procedures recommended in Appendix A of Regulatory Guide 1.33, Revision 2, February 1978;
- b. The emergency operating procedures required to implement the requirements of NUREG-0737 and Supplement 1 to NUREG-0737 as stated in Generic Letter No. 82-33;
- c. Security Plan implementation;
- d. Emergency Plan implementation;
- e. PROCESS CONTROL PROGRAM implementation;
- f. OFFSITE DOSE CALCULATION MANUAL implementation;
- g. Quality Assurance Program for effluent and environmental monitoring; and
- h. Fire Protection Program implementation.

6.8.2 Each procedure of Specification 6.8.1, and changes thereto, shall be reviewed and approved prior to implementation and reviewed periodically as set forth in Specification 6.5.3.

6.8.3 The following programs shall be established, implemented, and maintained:

- a. Primary Coolant Sources Outside Containment

A program to reduce leakage from those portions of systems outside containment that could contain highly radioactive fluids during a serious transient or accident to as low as practical levels. The systems include the containment spray, Safety Injection, containment hydrogen monitoring, post-accident sampling and primary sampling. The program shall include the following:

## ADMINISTRATIVE CONTROLS

### PROCEDURES AND PROGRAMS (Continued)

- 1) Preventive maintenance and periodic visual inspection requirements, and
- 2) Integrated leak test requirements for each system at refueling cycle intervals or less.

#### b. In-Plant Radiation Monitoring

A program which will ensure the capability to accurately determine the airborne iodine concentration in vital areas under accident conditions. This program shall include the following:

- 1) Training of personnel,
- 2) Procedures for monitoring, and
- 3) Provisions for maintenance of sampling and analysis equipment.

#### c. Secondary Water Chemistry

A program for monitoring of secondary water chemistry to inhibit steam generator tube degradation. This program shall include:

- 1) Identification of a sampling schedule for the critical variables and control points for these variables,
- 2) Identification of the procedures used to measure the values of the critical variables,
- 3) Identification of process sampling points, which shall include monitoring the discharge of the condensate pumps for evidence of condenser in-leakage,
- 4) Procedures for the recording and management of data,
- 5) Procedures defining corrective actions for all off-control point chemistry conditions, and
- 6) A procedure identifying: (a) the authority responsible for the interpretation of the data, and (b) the sequence and timing of administrative events required to initiate corrective action.

#### d. Post-Accident Sampling

A program which will ensure the capability to obtain and analyze reactor coolant, radioactive iodines and particulates in plant gaseous effluents, and containment atmosphere samples under accident conditions. The program shall include the following:

- 1) Training of personnel,
- 2) Procedures for sampling and analysis, and
- 3) Provisions for maintenance of sampling and analysis equipment.

## ADMINISTRATIVE CONTROLS

### PROCEDURES AND PROGRAMS (Continued)

#### e. Accident Monitoring Instrumentation

A program which will ensure the capability to monitor plant variables and systems operating status during and following an accident. This program shall include those instruments provided to indicate system operating status and furnish information regarding the release of radioactive materials (Category 2 and 3 instrumentation as defined in Regulatory Guide 1.97, Revision 2) and provide the following:

- 1) Preventive maintenance and periodic surveillance of instrumentation,
- 2) Pre-planned operating procedures and backup instrumentation to be used if one or more monitoring instruments become inoperable, and
- 3) Administrative procedures for returning inoperable instruments to OPERABLE status as soon as practicable.

### 6.9 REPORTING REQUIREMENTS

#### ROUTINE REPORTS

6.9.1 In addition to the applicable reporting requirements of Title 10, Code of Federal Regulations, the following reports shall be submitted to the Regional Administrator of the Regional Office of the NRC unless otherwise noted.

#### STARTUP REPORT

6.9.1.1 A summary report of plant startup and power escalation testing shall be submitted following: (1) receipt of an Operating License, (2) amendment to the license involving a planned increase in power level, (3) installation of fuel that has a different design or has been manufactured by a different fuel supplier, and (4) modifications that may have significantly altered the nuclear, thermal, or hydraulic performance of the unit.

The Startup Report shall address each of the tests identified in the Final Safety Analysis Report and shall include a description of the measured values of the operating conditions or characteristics obtained during the test program and a comparison of these values with design predictions and specifications. Any corrective actions that were required to obtain satisfactory operation shall also be described. Any additional specific details required in license conditions based on other commitments shall be included in this report.

Startup Reports shall be submitted within: (1) 90 days following completion of the Startup Test Program, (2) 90 days following resumption or commencement of commercial power operation, or (3) 9 months following initial criticality, whichever is earliest. If the Startup Report does not cover all three events (i.e., initial criticality, completion of Startup Test Program, and resumption or commencement of commercial operation), supplementary reports shall be submitted at least every 3 months until all three events have been completed.

## ADMINISTRATIVE CONTROLS

### ANNUAL REPORTS\*

6.9.1.2 Annual Reports covering the activities of the unit as described below for the previous calendar year shall be submitted prior to March 1 of each year. The initial report shall be submitted prior to March 1 of the year following initial criticality.

Reports required on an annual basis shall include:

- a. A tabulation on an annual basis of the number of station, utility, and other personnel (including contractors) receiving exposures greater than 100 mrem/yr and their associated man-rem exposure according to work and job functions\*\* (e.g., reactor operations and surveillance, inservice inspection, routine maintenance, special maintenance [describe maintenance], waste processing, and refueling). The dose assignments to various duty functions may be estimated based on pocket dosimeter, thermoluminescent dosimeter (TLD), or film badge measurements. Small exposures totalling less than 20% of the individual total dose need not be accounted for. In the aggregate, at least 80% of the total whole-body dose received from external sources should be assigned to specific major work functions; and
- b. The results of specific activity analyses in which the primary coolant exceeded the limits of Specification 3.4.8. The following information shall be included: (1) Reactor power history starting 48 hours prior to the first sample in which the limit was exceeded (in graphic and tabular format); (2) Results of the last isotopic analysis for radioiodine performed prior to exceeding the limit, results of analysis while limit was exceeded and results of one analysis after the radioiodine activity was reduced to less than limit. Each result should include date and time of sampling and the radioiodine concentrations; (3) Clean-up flow history starting 48 hours prior to the first sample in which the limit was exceeded; (4) Graph of the I-131 concentration ( $\mu\text{Ci/gm}$ ) and one other radioiodine isotope concentration ( $\mu\text{Ci/gm}$ ) as a function of time for the duration of the specific activity above the steady-state level; and (5) The time duration when the specific activity of the primary coolant exceeded the radioiodine limit.

### ANNUAL RADIOLOGICAL ENVIRONMENTAL OPERATING REPORT\*

6.9.1.3 Routine Annual Radiological Environmental Operating Reports covering the operation of the unit during the previous calendar year shall be submitted prior to May 1 of each year. The initial report shall be submitted prior to May 1 of the year following initial criticality.

The Annual Radiological Environmental Operating Reports shall include summaries, interpretations, and an analysis of trends of the results of the radiological environmental surveillance activities for the report period,

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\*A single submittal may be made for a multiple unit station. The submittal should contain those sections that are common to all units at the station.

\*\*This tabulation supplements the requirements of §20.407 of 10 CFR Part 20.

## ADMINISTRATIVE CONTROLS

### ANNUAL RADIOLOGICAL ENVIRONMENTAL OPERATING REPORT (Continued)

including a comparison with preoperational studies, with operational controls, as appropriate, and with previous environmental surveillance reports, and an assessment of the observed impacts of the plant operation on the environment. The reports shall also include the results of the Land Use Census required by Specification 3.12.2.

The Annual Radiological Environmental Operating Reports shall include the results of analysis of all radiological environmental samples and of all environmental radiation measurements taken during the period pursuant to the locations specified in the table and figures in the Offsite Dose Calculation Manual, as well as summarized and tabulated results of these analyses and measurements in the format of the table in the Radiological Assessment Branch Technical Position, Revision 1, November 1979. In the event that some individual results are not available for inclusion with the report, the report shall be submitted noting and explaining the reasons for the missing results. The missing data shall be submitted as soon as possible in a supplementary report.

The reports shall also include the following: a summary description of the Radiological Environmental Monitoring Program; at least two legible maps\* covering all sampling locations keyed to a table giving distances and directions from the centerline of one reactor; the results of licensee participation in the Interlaboratory Comparison Program and the corrective action taken if the specified program is not being performed as required by Specification 3.12.3; reason for not conducting the Radiological Environmental Monitoring Program as required by specification 3.12.1, and discussion of all deviations from the sampling schedule; discussion of environmental sample measurements that exceed the reporting levels but are not the result of plant effluents, pursuant to ACTION b. of Specification 3.12.1; and discussion of all analyses in which the LLD required was not achievable.

### SEMIANNUAL RADIOACTIVE EFFLUENT RELEASE REPORT\*\*

6.9.1.4 Routine Semiannual Radioactive Effluent Release Reports covering the operation of the unit during the previous 6 months of operation shall be submitted within 60 days after January 1 and July 1 of each year. The period of the first report shall begin with the date of initial criticality.

The Semiannual Radioactive Effluent Release Reports shall include a summary of the quantities of radioactive liquid and gaseous effluents and solid waste released from the unit as outlined in Regulatory Guide 1.21, "Measuring, Evaluating, and Reporting Radioactivity in Solid Wastes and Releases of Radioactive Materials in Liquid and Gaseous Effluents from Light-Water-Cooled Nuclear Power Plants," Revision 1, June 1974, with data summarized on a quarterly basis following the format of Appendix B thereof. For solid wastes, the format for Table 3

\*This tabulation supplements the requirements of §20.407 of 10 CFR Part 20.

\*\*A single submittal may be made for a multiple unit station. The submittal should combine those sections that are common to all units at the station; however, for units with separate radwaste systems, the submittal shall specify the releases of radioactive material from each unit.

## ADMINISTRATIVE CONTROLS

### SEMIANNUAL RADIOACTIVE EFFLUENT RELEASE REPORT (Continued)

in Appendix B shall be supplemented with three additional categories: class of solid wastes (as defined by 10 CFR Part 61), type of container (e.g., LSA, Type A, Type B, Large Quantity) and SOLIDIFICATION agent or absorbent (e.g., cement, urea formaldehyde).

The Semiannual Radioactive Effluent Release Report to be submitted within 60 days after January 1 of each year shall include an annual summary of hourly meteorological data collected over the previous year. This annual summary may be either in the form of an hour-by-hour listing on magnetic tape of wind speed, wind direction, atmospheric stability, and precipitation (if measured), or in the form of joint frequency distributions of wind speed, wind direction, and atmospheric stability.\* This same report shall include an assessment of the radiation doses due to the radioactive liquid and gaseous effluents released from the unit or station during the previous calendar year. This same report shall also include an assessment of the radiation doses from radioactive liquid and gaseous effluents to MEMBERS OF THE PUBLIC due to their activities inside the SITE BOUNDARY (Figures 5.1-3 and 5.1-4) during the report period. All assumptions used in making these assessments, i.e., specific activity, exposure time, and location, shall be included in these reports. The meteorological conditions concurrent with the time of release of radioactive materials in gaseous effluents, as determined by sampling frequency and measurement, shall be used for determining the gaseous pathway doses. The assessment of radiation doses shall be performed in accordance with the methodology and parameters in the OFFSITE DOSE CALCULATION MANUAL (ODCM).

The Semiannual Radioactive Effluent Release Report to be submitted within 60 days after January 1 of each year shall also include an assessment of radiation doses to the likely most exposed MEMBER OF THE PUBLIC from reactor releases and other nearby uranium fuel cycle sources, including doses from primary effluent pathways and direct radiation, for the previous calendar year to show conformance with 40 CFR Part 190, "Environmental Radiation Protection Standards for Nuclear Power Operation." Acceptable methods for calculating the dose contribution from liquid and gaseous effluents are given in Regulatory Guide 1.109, Rev. 1, October 1977.

The Semiannual Radioactive Effluent Release Reports shall include a list and description of unplanned releases from the site to UNRESTRICTED AREAS of radioactive materials in gaseous and liquid effluents made during the reporting period.

The Semiannual Radioactive Effluent Release Reports shall include any changes made during the reporting period to the PROCESS CONTROL PROGRAM and the ODCM, pursuant to Specifications 6.13 and 6.14, respectively, as well as any major change to Liquid, Gaseous, or Solid Radwaste Treatment Systems pursuant to Specification 6.15. It shall also include a listing of new locations for dose calculations and/or environmental monitoring identified by the Land Use Census pursuant to Specification 3.12.2.

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\*In lieu of submission with the Semiannual Radioactive Effluent Release Report, the licensee has the option of retaining this summary of required meteorological data on site in a file that shall be provided to the NRC upon request.

## ADMINISTRATIVE CONTROLS

### SEMIANNUAL RADIOACTIVE EFFLUENT RELEASE REPORT (Continued)

The Semiannual Radioactive Effluent Release Reports shall also include the following: an explanation as to why the inoperability of liquid or gaseous effluent monitoring instrumentation was not corrected within the time specified in Specification 3.3.3.10 or 3.3.3.11, respectively; and description of the events leading to liquid holdup tanks or gas storage tanks exceeding the limits of Specification 3.11.1.4 or 3.11.2.6, respectively.

### MONTHLY OPERATING REPORTS

6.9.1.5 Routine reports of operating statistics and shutdown experience, including documentation of all challenges to the PORVs or safety valves, shall be submitted on a monthly basis to the Director, Office of Resource Management, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, D.C. 20555, with a copy to the Regional Administrator of the Regional Office of the NRC, no later than the 15th of each month following the calendar month covered by the report.

### RADIAL PEAKING FACTOR LIMIT REPORT

6.9.1.6 The  $F_{xy}$  limits for RATED THERMAL POWER ( $F_{xy}^{RTP}$ ) shall be established for at least each reload core and shall be maintained available in the Control Room. The limits shall be established and implemented on a time scale consistent with normal procedural changes.

The analytical methods used to generate the  $F_{xy}$  limits shall be those previously approved by the NRC.\* If changes to these methods are deemed necessary, they will be evaluated in accordance with 10 CFR 50.59 and submitted to the NRC for review and approval prior to their use if the changes are determined to involve an unreviewed safety question or if such a change would require amendment of previously submitted documentation.

A report containing the  $F_{xy}$  limits for all core planes containing Bank "D" control rods and all unrodded core planes and the plot of predicted ( $F_{q, P_{Rel}}^T$ ) vs Axial Core Height with the limit envelope shall be provided to the NRC Document Control desk with copies to the Regional Administrator and the Resident Inspector within 30 days of their implementation.

### SPECIAL REPORTS

6.9.2 Special reports shall be submitted to the Regional Administrator of the Regional Office of the NRC within the time period specified for each report.

\*WCAP-8385, "Power Distribution Control and Load Follow Procedures"; WCAP-9272.A, "Westinghouse Reload Safety Evaluation Methodology."



## ADMINISTRATIVE CONTROLS

### 6.10 RECORD RETENTION

6.10.1 In addition to the applicable record retention requirements of Title 10, Code of Federal Regulations, the following records shall be retained for at least the minimum period indicated.

6.10.2 The following records shall be retained for at least 5 years:

- a. Records and logs of unit operation covering time interval at each power level;
- b. Records and logs of principal maintenance activities, inspections, repair, and replacement of principal items of equipment related to nuclear safety;
- c. ALL REPORTABLE EVENTS;
- d. Records of surveillance activities, inspections, and calibrations required by these Technical Specifications;
- e. Records of changes made to the procedures required by Specification 6.8.1;
- f. Records of radioactive shipments;
- g. Records of sealed source and fission detector leak tests and results; and
- h. Records of annual physical inventory of all sealed source material of record.

6.10.3 The following records shall be retained for the duration of the unit Operating License:

- a. Records and drawing changes reflecting unit design modifications made to systems and equipment described in the Final Safety Analysis Report;
- b. Records of new and irradiated fuel inventory, fuel transfers, and assembly burnup histories;
- c. Records of radiation exposure for all individuals entering radiation control areas;
- d. Records of gaseous and liquid radioactive material released to the environs;
- e. Records of transient or operational cycles for those unit components identified in Table 5.7-1;
- f. Records of reactor tests and experiments;
- g. Records of training and qualification for current members of the unit staff;
- h. Records of inservice inspections performed pursuant to these Technical Specifications;
- i. Records of quality assurance activities required by the Operational Quality Assurance Plan;

## ADMINISTRATIVE CONTROLS

### RECORD RETENTION (Continued)

- j. Records of reviews performed for changes made to procedures or equipment or reviews of tests and experiments pursuant to 10 CFR 50.59;
- k. Records of meetings of the PORC and the NSRB;
- l. Records of the service lives of all hydraulic and mechanical snubbers required by Specification 3.7.9 including the date at which the service life commences and associated installation and maintenance records;
- m. Records of secondary water sampling and water quality; and
- n. Records of analyses required by the Radiological Environmental Monitoring Program that would permit evaluation of the accuracy of the analysis at a later date. This should include procedures effective at specified times and QA records showing that these procedures were followed.

### 6.11 RADIATION PROTECTION PROGRAM

6.11.1 Procedures for personnel radiation protection shall be prepared consistent with the requirements of 10 CFR Part 20 and shall be approved, maintained, and adhered to for all operations involving personnel radiation exposure.

### 6.12 HIGH RADIATION AREA

6.12.1 Pursuant to paragraph 20.203(c)(5) of 10 CFR Part 20, in lieu of the "control device" or "alarm signal" required by paragraph 20.203(c), each high radiation area, as defined in 10 CFR Part 20, in which the intensity of radiation is equal to or less than 1000 mR/h at 45 cm (18 in.) from the radiation source or from any surface which the radiation penetrates shall be barricaded and conspicuously posted as a high radiation area and entrance thereto shall be controlled by requiring issuance of a Radiation Work Permit (RWP). Individuals qualified in radiation protection procedures (e.g., Health Physics Technician) or personnel continuously escorted by such individuals may be exempt from the RWP issuance requirement during the performance of their assigned duties in high radiation areas with exposure rates equal to or less than 1000 mR/h, provided they are otherwise following plant radiation protection procedures for entry into such high radiation areas. Any individual or group of individuals permitted to enter such areas shall be provided with or accompanied by one or more of the following:

- a. A radiation monitoring device which continuously indicates the radiation dose rate in the area; or
- b. A radiation monitoring device which continuously integrates the radiation dose rate in the area and alarms when a preset integrated dose is received. Entry into such areas with this monitoring device may be made after the dose rate levels in the area have been established and personnel have been made knowledgeable of them; or
- c. An individual qualified in radiation protection procedures with a radiation dose rate monitoring device, who is responsible for providing positive control over the activities within the area and shall perform periodic radiation surveillance at the frequency specified by the Health and Safety Services Manager in the RWP.

## ADMINISTRATIVE CONTROLS

### HIGH RADIATION AREA (Continued)

6.12.2 In addition to the requirements of Specification 6.12.1, areas accessible to personnel with radiation levels greater than 1000 mR/h at 45 cm (18 in.) from the radiation source or from any surface which the radiation penetrates shall be provided with locked doors to prevent unauthorized entry, and the keys shall be maintained under the administrative control of the Shift Supervisor on duty and/or health physics supervision. Doors shall remain locked except during periods of access by personnel under an approved RWP which shall specify the dose rate levels in the immediate work areas and the maximum allowable stay time for individuals in that area. In lieu of the stay time specification of the RWP, direct or remote (such as closed circuit TV cameras) continuous surveillance may be made by personnel qualified in radiation protection procedures to provide positive exposure control over the activities being performed within the area.

For individual high radiation areas accessible to personnel with radiation levels of greater than 1000 mR/h that are located within large areas, such as PWR containment, where no enclosure exists for purposes of locking, and where no enclosure can be reasonably constructed around the individual area, that individual area shall be barricaded, conspicuously posted, and a flashing light shall be activated as a warning device.

### 6.13 PROCESS CONTROL PROGRAM (PCP)

6.13.1 The PCP shall be approved by the Commission prior to implementation.

6.13.2 Licensee-initiated changes to the PCP:

- a. Shall be submitted to the Commission in the Semiannual Radioactive Effluent Release Report for the period in which the change(s) was made. This submittal shall contain:
  - 1) Sufficiently detailed information to totally support the rationale for the change without benefit of additional or supplemental information;
  - 2) A determination that the change did not reduce the overall conformance of the solidified waste product to existing criteria for solid wastes; and
  - 3) Documentation of the fact that the change has been reviewed and found acceptable by the PORC.
- b. Shall become effective upon review and acceptance by the PORC.

### 6.14 OFFSITE DOSE CALCULATION MANUAL (ODCM)

6.14.1 The ODCM shall be approved by the Commission prior to implementation.

6.14.2 Licensee-initiated changes to the ODCM:

- a. Changes to Part A shall be submitted to and approved by the NRC staff prior to implementation.
- b. Changes to Part B shall be submitted to the Commission in the Semiannual Radioactive Effluent Release Report for the period in which the change(s) was made effective. This submittal shall contain:

## ADMINISTRATIVE CONTROLS

### OFFSITE DOSE CALCULATION MANUAL (ODCM) (Continued)

- 1) Sufficiently detailed information to totally support the rationale for the change without benefit of additional or supplemental information. Information submitted should consist of a package of those pages of the ODCM to be changed with each page numbered, dated and containing the revision number, together with appropriate analyses or evaluations justifying the change(s);
  - 2) A determination that the change will not reduce the accuracy or reliability of dose calculations or Setpoint determinations; and
  - 3) Documentation of the fact that the change has been reviewed and found acceptable by the PORC.
- b. Changes to Part B shall become effective upon review and acceptance by the PORC.

### 6.15 MAJOR CHANGES TO LIQUID, GASEOUS, AND SOLID RADWASTE TREATMENT SYSTEMS\*

#### 6.15.1 Licensee-initiated major changes to the Radwaste Treatment Systems (liquid, gaseous, and solid):

- a. Shall be reported to the Commission in the Semiannual Radioactive Effluent Release Report for the period in which the evaluation was reviewed by the PORC. The discussion of each change shall contain:
  - 1) A summary of the evaluation that led to the determination that the change could be made in accordance with 10 CFR 50.59;
  - 2) Sufficient detailed information to totally support the reason for the change without benefit of additional or supplemental information;
  - 3) A detailed description of the equipment, components, and processes involved and the interfaces with other plant systems;
  - 4) An evaluation of the change, which shows the predicted releases of radioactive materials in liquid and gaseous effluents and/or quantity of solid waste that differ from those previously predicted in the License application and amendments thereto;
  - 5) An evaluation of the change which shows the expected maximum exposures to a MEMBER OF THE PUBLIC in the UNRESTRICTED AREA and to the general population that differ from those previously estimated in the License application and amendments thereto;
  - 6) A comparison of the predicted releases of radioactive materials, in liquid and gaseous effluents and in solid waste, to the actual releases for the period prior to when the change is to be made;

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\*Licensees may choose to submit the information called for in this Specification as part of the annual FSAR update.

ADMINISTRATIVE CONTROLS

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MAJOR CHANGES TO LIQUID, GASEOUS, AND SOLID RADWASTE TREATMENT SYSTEMS (Continued)

- 7) An estimate of the exposure to plant operating personnel as a result of the change; and
  - 8) Documentation of the fact that the change was reviewed and found acceptable by the PORC.
- b. Shall become effective upon review and acceptance by the PORC.

NRC FORM 335 (2-84) NRCM 1102 3201, 3202	U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION	1 REPORT NUMBER (Assigned by TDC add Vol. No. if any)
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<p>The South Texas Project, Unit No. 1, Technical Specifications were prepared by the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission to set forth the limits, operating conditions, and other requirements applicable to a nuclear reactor facility as set forth in Section 50.36 of 10 CFR 50 for the protection of the health and safety of the public.</p>		
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