

(2) Bomb Blast Analysis

Inspector field observations of standoff distances were consistent with those documented in the summary description. The licensee confirmed that calculations of minimum standoff distances were based on NUREG/CR-6190 or an independent engineering analysis. Five actual measurements were completed. They confirmed that the minimum standoff distances, as documented in the summary description, were adequate.

(3) Procedural Controls

The licensee defined criteria for maintenance, surveillance, and compensating for the VBS in appropriate procedures. The procedures were well written and detailed except as noted in (a) below. Discussions with the Superintendent, Security (who is a certified reactor operator) confirmed that procedures necessary to safely shutdown the units after a bomb blast were reviewed and found to be adequate. A specific procedure for damaged equipment by a bomb blast was not prepared, but the existing abnormal operation and emergency operating procedures were considered adequate to cope with loss of equipment because of a bomb blast.

(a) During review of security procedures, the following weaknesses were noted and will be monitored as an Inspection Followup Item (50-263/97005-05).

- The procedure for Vehicle Barrier System compensatory measures (SIP 05.05) does not require the NRC Region Office to be contacted if compensatory measures for the VBS exceed 30 days as identified in Section 4.2 of Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI) Document 96-01, which the licensee has committed to for compensatory measures.
- The procedure for testing of tamper alarms for the active barrier system did not contain specific pass/fail criteria for such testing (This item was identified by the licensee, closure of the item will be monitored because of the significance of the issue).

c. Conclusion

The licensee's program for land vehicle control measures met regulatory requirements and licensee commitments. The VBS program was consistent with the summary description submitted to the NRC (except as noted in this report) or the security plan; installed components were identified in NUREG/CR-6190 or the licensee's engineering analyses; and appropriate procedures had been developed and implemented. Unresolved items were noted pertaining to a potential vulnerability of the VBS in one location, testing of VBS tamper alarm capability and compensatory measures for active elements of the VBS, and spacing between barriers in one location. Inspection followup items were noted for administrative matters that required action.