C Form 366 53)	LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)					U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION APPROVED OME NO. 3150-0104 EXPIRES 8/31/06					
					DOCKET NUMBE	1 (2)		PAGE (3)			
Davis-Besse Unit 1					0 5 0 0	101314	16	1 OF 0			
TLE (4)							F.F.				
Fire Protection Deviations,	License Conditi	an 2.0	(4).								
EVENT DATE (5) LER NUMBER (6)	REPORT DAT	E (7) YEAR		PACILITY NA	FACILITIES INV	DOCKET N	MBERI	\$)			
ONTH DAY YEAR YEAR SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	NUMBER MONTH DAY	TEAN			0 151010101 1						
17 019 8 6 8 6 0 3 0	010323	8 8				- Annother the second	101	011			
OPERATING THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED	PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREM	ENTS OF 10	CFR \$ 10	50.73(a)(2)(iv)	of the following)	73.7	(16)				
MODE (0) 5 20.402(b)	20.406(c) 50.36(c)(1)		-	50.73(a)(2)(v)		73.7					
POWER 20.406(a)(1)(9) LEVEL 20.406(a)(1)(8)	50.36(c)(2)			50.73(a)(2)(vii)		X OTH	ER ISpec	Text, NRC For			
20.406(a)(1)(iii)	\$0.73(a)(2)(i)			50.73(a)(2)(viii)		366.4	U				
20.408(a)(1)(iv)	50.73(a)(2)(ii)		H	50.73(a)(2)(vill) 50.73(a)(2)(x)	(8)	Specia	al Re	eport			
20.405(s)(1)(v)	50.73(4)(2)(11)	FOR THIS	LER (12)	BU. / BIBINE / KA		1					
AME					AREA COD	TELEPHON	E NUMB	ER			
						Takes!	91-1	51010			
J. C. Stotz, Associate Nuclea	ar Engineer NE LINE FOR EACH COMPONEN	TEALURE	DESCRIBE	D IN THIS REPO		14141	91-	121010			
	EPORTABLE			COMPONENT	MANUFAC	REPORT					
	TO NPROS	CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	TURER	TO NP	HOS				
					1						
					+		-				
				111							
BUPPLEMEN	TAL REPORT EXPECTED (14)				EXPE	TED	MONTH	DAY Y			
YES I'l yes, complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE!	NO				DATE	(15)	1.1				
On July 9, 1986, as a result between commitments made in conditions in the areas of K This results in a violation in place to address specific development to address the h License. The schedule for i On July 12, 1986, as a resul Kaowool wrap degradation was of Kaowool and amount of wor	License Amendmen aowool wraps, en of the Operating Kaowool wrap de ardware deficien mplementing the t of an inspect eliminated, mon	nt 18 mergen g Lices aficies acies se mod ion pe re def	(July cy lig nse. ncies to ach ificat rforme icienc	26, 1979 shting an Compensa and modi- nieve com- tions has ed to ens- cies were	and ac ad fire d atory mea fication pliance been ac sure that found.	tual pl etection sures h package with th cepted the reaction The fr	lant on. ave ges a be Op by t ecurr ragil	been p are und beratin he NRC ence o te natu			
Increased inspection and even this concern. On December 28, 1987, Toledo Condition 2.c(4). Two addit additional hand-held fire ex on supports to four horizont	Edison complete ional discrepance tinguishers and	ed a contract of the second se	h a mo omplia ere no nstall	ance revi oted invo	lew of Am low of Am lving no actural s	ial wil endment t insta teel fi	1 re 18, 11ir	Licen Licen g proofin			

1

1

1

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION

US NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSIO

APPROVED OMB NO 3150-0104 EXPIRES 8/31 85

FACILITY NAME (1)	DOCKET NUMBER (2)	LER NUMBER 16/ PAGE 13/
		YEAR SEQUENTIAL REVISION
Davis-Besse Unit 1	0 5 0 0 0 3 4	6 816 - 01310 - 011 012 OF 014

TEXT (If more space is required, use additional NRC Form 3664's) (17)

NRC Form 366.4

Description of Occurrence:

Design document reviews beginning July 9, 1986 while the plant was at cold shutdown (Mode 5) resulted in findings of conditions not in agreement with Amendment 18 (7/26/79) to the Operating License. Three areas of deficiency were found regarding Kaowool wraps, emergency lighting and fire detection commitments.

Amendment 18 identified that conduit wraps for power and control circuits in the Service Water Pump Room were required. Contrary to this, circuits for service water discharge valves had the Kaowool removed and instructions were given not to reinstall since administrative controls are now used negating the need to wrap the service water discharge valve circuits. Both the Service Water System - system procedure and Appendix R Compliance Assessment Report (Rev. 1) take credit for tagging open one service water discharge valve. Even though these documents technically justify the current plant condition a license amendment should have been requested to allow removal of the Kaowool.

Additionally, during a July 12, 1986 QC inspection of Kaowool wraps in the Component Cooling Water Pump Room (Room 238) and the Service Water Valve Room (Room 53), deficiencies in wrap integrity were found. Engineering had requested a review of these areas since previous periodic inspections indicated an on-going degradation due to various work activities around the Kaowool wraps. 37 of 63 circuits requiring fire wraps inspected were considered unsatisfactory (nonfunctional) due to missing Kaowool, damaged Kaowool or missing bands (retainers). Those circuits are listed as follows:

Missing Kaowool	Damaged Kaowool	Missing Band
37074E	37073A	37073D
37449A		37073E +
37450A		37469C
37450B		37499B
37493D		36004E
		36005D
		36201D
		502010
	and the second sec	
		* On Missing Kaowool List Too
		+ On Damaged Kaowool List Too
000100/014000		+ On Damaged Raowool List ioc
	37074E 37449A 37450A	37074E 37073A 37449A 37073B 37450A 37073E 37450B 37074A 37493D 37074D 37498C 36010C 37591A 37452A 37601B 37498B 37601B 37499C 46088D 37591A * CC5095 37591B *

Other rooms listed in License Amendment 18 that were originally required to have Kaowool wraps are no longer required to as justified by the evaluations provided in the Appendix R

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION				US	APP	CLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION PPROVED OMB NO 3150-0104 XPIRES 8/31 85					
FACILITY NAME (1)	DOCKET NUMBER (2)	LER NUMBER (6)					1	PAGE (3)			
		YEAR		SEQ	UENTIAL	L	REVISION NUMBER				
Davis-Besse Unit 1	0 5 0 0 0 3 4 6	8 6	_	0	30	-	0 1	03	OF	0 6	

TEXT (If more space is required, use additional NRC Form 366A's) (17)

Compliance Assessment Report (CAR) (Rev. 1) and Fire Hazards Analysis Report (FHAR) (Rev. 7). Rather than maintain or repair these areas, a change to the License Amendment will be requested.

Amendment 18 also identified areas where emergency lighting is required. A plant review located one area in Room 241 - passage where no 8-hour emergency battery pack light was installed. An adjoining room (Room 230) open to the passage has an 8-hour battery pack light aimed into the passage. However, a cable tray shields the passage from receiving, adequate coverage. A recent emergency light survey has already identified additional lighting for the passage and is scheduled for installation prior to the 6th refueling outage.

Amendment 18 identified areas where area type fire detection that was required was not present. A plant review identified two areas (Room 233 and 300) where inadequate or no detection was found. Room 233 - Demineralizer Room is inaccessible except for shield plugs from the room above and contains minimal fire loading (400 BTU/square foot) with all circuits routed in conduit. A review of the CAR (Rev. 1) and FHAR (Rev. 7) indicated no detection is needed due to the unique nature of the room and no reasoning is given in documents leading to License Amendment 18 that justify the need. Therefore, a License Amendment is needed to delete this item. Room 300 - Fuel Handling Area has local equipment detection but no area detection. A review of this area indicates there is a need for area detection and this will be incorporated with other area detection upgrades scheduled prior to startup from the sixth refueling outage. Originally, the local detection may have been considered adequate but current reviews can no longer support this condition.

On December 28, 1987, Toledo Edison completed a compliance review of Amendment 18, License Condition 2.c(4). Two additional discrepancies were noted involving not installing additional hand-held fire extinguishers in Rooms 303 and 320 and not installing structural steel fire proofing on supports to four horizontal cable trays penetracing the 3-hour fire barrier at column 9-F on Elevation 603' - 0".

This information is being submitted as a Special Report per the Action Statement "a" of Technical Specification 3.7.10 due to the nonfunctional barrier condition lasting more than 7 days. Additionally, the License Amendment 18 noncompliances are being reported to document resolution since no other reporting requirement could be identified and the subject is related to the Kaowool deficiencies.

Designation of Apparent Cause of Occurrence:

The pertinent Kaoworl deficiencies that still need correction resulted from a management/quality assurance deficiency that allowed unrelated work in an area to degrade Kaowool wraps without appropriate instructions to notify management. Also, procedure AD 1835.00 concerning inspection of Kaowool has not been effective. The fragile nature of

1

1

NRC Form 366A (9-83)	LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION					CLEAR R GULATORY COMMISSION PPROVED OMB NO 3150-0104 XPIRES 8:31.85					
FACILITY NAME (1)	DOCKET NUMBER (2)	LER NUMBER 16					PAGE (3)				
		YEAR		SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISI						
Davis-Besse Unit 1	0 5 0 0 0 3 4 6	8 6	_	030	-01	10	4 OF	06			

TEXT (If more space is required, use additional NRC Form 3664's) (17)

. . . .

Kaowool contributes to this problem and a more durable replacement will enhance maintainability.

In response to a previous NRC Violation Item 50-346/83-16-11, Toledo Edison instituted a Preventative Maintenance Activity 1941 which conducted inspection/repairs of all Kaowool wraps listed on drawing E-899A at the end of each refueling outage. This action has since been determined to be ineffective for maintaining Kaowool in the appropriate configuation due to other activities which may occur during the operational phase of the plant.

License Amendment 18 deficiencies resulted from lack of attention to specific commitments that needed maintaining as the plant conditions and regulations changed. Recent NRC guidance reflects a concern for Fire Protection license commitments and in Generic Letter 86-10 suggests a change to put major fire protection commitments in the Updated Safety Analysis Report and delete the license condition. This will allow updating and tracking of commitments in a more expeditious manner.

Analysis of Occurrence:

The two areas of pertinent fire wrap deficiencies are the Component Cooling Water Pump Room (Fire Area T) and the Service Water Valve Room (Fire Area II). Both areas have fire detection and automatic suppression systems. Also, fire watches were previously in effect due to other barrier deficiencies and will remain in effect until all deficiencies are resolved.

The emergency lighting deficiency is overcome by the portable lighting dedicated for the operators use.

The lack of area detection in Room 300 is compensated for by hourly fire watches and detection on the opposite side of pertinent boundaries. Again, local detection is available and operable but area wide detection is now deemed appropriate.

Although the above conditions were found at cold shutdown the previously instituted compensatory measures/backup systems would be equally effective during power operation.

In letter dated August 21, 1987 (Serial No. 1406), Toledo Edison committed to document the means used to implement the modifications required by license condition 2.C.(4) transmitted in License Amendment 18. During this review of the license condition, Toledo Edison identified two additional discrepancies. The first discrepancy involved not installing additional hand-held fire extinguishers in Rooms 303 and 320. The second discrepancy involved not installing structural steel fire proofing on supports to four cable trays penetrating the 3-hour fire barrier at column 9-F on Elevation 603' - 0". Subsequent engineering analyses were initiated to identify any necessary corrective or compensatory measures.

1

US NUCLEAR REQUUS NUC						
FACILITY NAME (1)	DOCKET NUMBER (2)	LER NUMBER	LER NUMBER (6)			
		YEAR SEQUENT	AL REVISION R NUMBER			
Davis-Besse Unit 1	0 5 0 0 0 3 4 6	816 - 0131	0-011	015 01 016		

The engineering analyses of the hand-held fire extinguishers in Rooms 303 and 320 determined that, in order to satisfy NFPA 10 and the FHAR, the existing hand-held dry chemical extinguisher in Room 303 is adequate and that the hand-held CO2 fire extinguisher in Room 320 should be replaced with a hand-held dry chemical extinguisher. The CO2 extinguisher in Room 320 has been replaced. The discrepancy in the license condition will be resolved as part of the Generic Letter 86-10 process.

The existing detection in Rooms 303 and 320 and the existing fire hose stations in surrounding areas provide adequate assurance that a fire in these areas would be promptly detected and extinguished.

The engineering analyses also determined that the cable tray supports at column line 9-F on Elevation 603'- O" require 3-hour fire proofing consistent with the Toledo Edison and NRC correspondence regarding Rev. 2 of the FHAR. By restart from the current fifth refueling outage, these cable tray supports will be protected with a durable 3-hour fire proofing material. In the interim, hourly fire patrols are located in the area as a compensatory measure.

The Turbine Building area containing the cable tray supports (Fire Area II) has a combustible loading significantly below a 3-hour duration. The specific area containing the cable tray supports is a walkway and, as such, significant transient combustibles would not have been placed near the cable tray supports. Also, the area near these cable tray supports is heavily traveled such that early detection of a fire and quick response by the on-site Fire Brigade would have been possible.

Therefore, the failure to install the additional fire extinguishers and to install the fire proofing on the cable tray supports had no actual or potential safety significance.

Corrective Action:

1

1

1

1

1

1

Pertinent Kaowool wrap deficiencies were repaired under MWO 1-86-2595-00. To prevent recurrence a new procedure (PT 5116.17, Fire Protection System Wrap Perodic Test) was developed to inspect the wraps. Finally, replacement of Kaowool with a more durable material is scheduled prior startup from the 6th Refueling Outage (FCR 85-0266).

The hand-held CO2 fire extinguisher in Room 320 has been replaced with a hand-held dry chemical extinguisher. By restart from the current Fifth Refueling Outage, the cable tray supports at column line 9-F on Elevation 603' - 0" will be protected with durable 3-hour fire proofing material.

As part of the Generic Letter 86-10 process, a license amendment will be requested to delete License Condition 2.C.(4) so that certain Kaowool fire wraps, fire detection in Room 233 and additional hand-held extinguishers in Rooms 303 and 320 will no longer be required.

LICENSEE EV	LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION					U & NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSIO APPROVED OME NO 3150-0104 EXPIRES 8:31.85					
FACILITY NAME (1)	DOCKET NUMBER (2)	1	LE	R NUMBER 161		PAC	SE (3)				
	옷 다 가는 말을 수 없다. 가 가는 것	YEAR		SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER		T				
Davis-Besse Unit 1	0 5 0 0 0 3 4 6	816	_	0 3 0	- 011	016	OFO				

TEXT III more space is required, use additional NRC Form 3664's) (17)

The remaining License Amendment 18 deficiencies are addressed in the interim by compensatory measures. Actual plant modifications for the cable tray support fire proofing will be implemented during the current fifth refueling outage with the remaining modifications for fire detection to be completed by restart from the sixth refueling outage. The emergency lighting modification has been completed.

Failure Data:

1

In 1986 the following Licensee Event Reports have been issued on fire protection items: 86-0005 (boot seals), 86-0010 (fire dampers), 86-0017 (inadequate fire barrier), 86-0018 (breaching a fire barrier), 86-0025 (fire detection), and 86-0027 (fire doors).

REPORT NO: NP-45-86-04

PCAQ NO(s): 86-0144 & 87-0561

.



EDISON PLAZA 300 MADISON AVENUE TOLEDO, OHIO 43652-0001

Log No: KA88-0265 NP-45-86-04 Revision 1

March 23, 1988

1. 1. 1

Docket No. 50-346 License No. NPF-3

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Document Control Desk Washington, D. C. 20555

Gentlemen:

Enclosed is Revision 1 to Special Report 86-030. The revisions to the report are indicated by a "1" in the left margin of each page.

Please destroy or mark superseded your previous copy of this report and replace with the attached revision.

Yours truly,

Hon

Louis F. Storz Plant Manager Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station

LFS/ed

Enclosure

cc: Mr. A. Bert Davis Regional Administrator, USNRC Region III

> Mr. Paul Byron DB-1 NRC Resident Inspector

