U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION APPROVED OMB NO. 3150-0104 EXPIRES BOT 85 LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) FACILITY NAME (1) DOCKET NUMBER (2) Oyster Creek, Unit 1 0 15 10 10 10 12 11 1 OF 014 TITLE (4) SIX OUT OF EIGHT ISOLATION CONDENSER PIPE BREAK SENSORS OUT OF SPECIFICATION EVENT DATE (6) OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED (8) LER NUMBER (6) REPORT DATE (7) FACILITY NAMES DOCKET NUMBER(S) SEQUENTIAL DAY YEAR MONTH 0 | 5 | 0 | 0 | 0 8 8 0 | 5 | 0 | 0 | 0 8 5 8 5 0 1 0 3 1 7 THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR \$: (Check one or more of the following) (11) OPERATING 73.71(b) 20.402(b) 20.406(a) 50.73(a)(2)(iv) POWER LEVEL (10) 50.73(a)(2)(v) 73.71(e) 20.406(4)(1)(1) 50 38(a)(1) 50.73(a)(2)(vii) OTHER (Specify in Abstract below and in Text, NRC Form 366A) 20 405(4)(1)(9) 50.38(+)(2) 20.406(+)(1)(80) 50.73(a)(2)(i) 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A) 20.406(a)(1)(iv) 50.73(a)(2)(ii) 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(8) 20.406(a)(1)(v) 50.73(a)(2)(x) 50.73(a)(2)(iii) LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12) NAME TELEPHONE NUMBER AREA CODE John J. Rogers, Licensing Engineer 61019 917111-14181913 COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (13) MANUFAC TO NPROS MANUFAC-REPORTABLE TO NPROS CAUSE SYSTEM COMPONENT CAUSE SYSTEM COMPONENT B PIDII | S | I | 2 | 0 | 4 SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (14) DAY YEAR YES III yes, complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE!

During routine surveillance testing, pipe break sensors IBO5A1, IBO5B1, IBI1A1, IBI1A2, IBI1B1 and IBI1B2 for both isolation condensers steam and condensate lines, tripped at values greater than specified in the technical specifications, Table 3.1.1.

Sensors IBO5A1, IBO5B1, IBI1A2, IBI1B1 and IBI1B2 were reset to trip within desired set point limits. Sensor IBI1A1 had a defective switch actuating cam; the defective cam was replaced and the sensor was set to trip within limits.

The event had no effect upon public health or safety.

ABSTRACT /Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e., approximately fifteen single-space typewritten lines/ (18)

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NAC Form 366A U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION APPROVED OMB NO. 3150-0104 EXPIRES 8/31/85 FACILITY NAME (1) DOCKET NUMBER (2) LER NUMBER (6) YEAR SEQUENTIAL Oyster Creek, Unit 1

TEXT (If more space is required, use additional NRC Form 366A's) (17)

### DATE OF OCCURRENCE

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The event occurred on February 10, 1985 at approximately 0330 hours.

## IDENTIFICATION OF OCCURRENCE

During surveillance testing, isolation condenser pipe break sensors IBO5A1, IBO5B1, IB11A1, IB11A2, IB11B1 and IB11B2 tripped at values greater than specified in the Technical Specification Table 3.1.1, Item H.

The event is considered the reportable as defined in 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(i)(B).

# CONDITIONS PRIOR TO OCCURRENCE

The Mode switch was in the shutdown position with reactor coolant temperature <212°F.

### DESCRIPTION OF OCCURRENCE

While performing the test and calibration of the steam and condensate pipe break sensors in the isolation condenser system, the trip setpoints for six out of the eight sensors were found to be less conservative than permitted by the Technical Specifications. Surveillance testing of sensors yielded the following data:

Switch Designat		Sens			Tech Spec	"As Found"	"As Left"
IB05A1			Cond.	Α	<20 psid	21 psid	15.5 psid
IB05A2	Steam	Pipe,	Cond.	A	≤20 psid	20 psid	15.25 psid
IB05B1	Steam	Pipe,	Cond.	В	<20 psid	21.5 psid	14.5 psid
IB05B2	Steam	Pipe,	Cond.	В	<20 psid	18.4 psid	14.0 psid
IB11A1	Cond.	Pipe,	Cond.	A	<27 in. H <sub>2</sub> 0	*60 in. H <sub>2</sub> 0	**
IB11A2	Cond.	Pipe,	Cond.	Α	<27 in. H <sub>2</sub> 0	30 in H <sub>2</sub> 0	25 in. H <sub>2</sub> 0
181182	Cond.	Pipe,	Cond.	В	<27 in. H <sub>2</sub> 0	32.2 in. H <sub>2</sub> 0	24.5 in. H <sub>2</sub> 0
IB11B2	Cond.	Pipe,	Cond.	В	<27 in. H <sub>2</sub> 0	31.8 in. H <sub>2</sub> 0	24.6 in. H <sub>2</sub> 0
IB11B2							No.

<sup>\*</sup>Test input pressure limited to sixty inches. With 60 inches applied, switch had still not tripped.

<sup>\*\*</sup> Due to malfunction of the sensor, technicians were not able to reset the switch within the required "As Left" tolerances. The switch actuating cam for this sensor was subsequently replaced.

US NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION NRC Form 366A LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION APPROVED OMB NO. 3150-0104 EXPIRES 8/31/85 DOCKET NUMBER (2) FACILITY NAME (1) LER NUMBER (6) PAGE (3) SEQUENTIAL Oyster Creek, Unit 1 0 |5 |0 |0 |0 | 2 | 1 | 9 8 | 5 01015-01101305 014

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#### APPARENT CAUSE OF OCCURRENCE

The cause of occurrence is attributed to instrument drift for sensors IBO5Al. IBO5B1, IB11A2, IB11B1, and IB11B2. Sensor IB11A1 was found with a defective switch actuating cam.

#### ANALYSIS OF OCCURRENCE

The isolation condenser pipe break sensors are designed to provide protection in the event of a steam or a condensate line break. Four pipe break sensors are installed in the piping of each emergency condenser; two sensors are for the detection of high flow in the steam line, and two are for the detection of high flow in the condensate line. Should one of these sensors detect a high flow condition lasting as long as 35 seconds, the isolation valves to that condenser are given a close signal.

#### SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE

Any one out of the four pipe break sensors (two in the condensate line, and two in the steam line) installed in each isolation condenser system, will, upon detecting a high flow, send a signal to isolate that Isolation Condenser System. A review of "As Found" sensor switch settings indicates that in the event of a pipe break, the steam line break sensor IBO5A2 (in Isolation Condenser System A), and steam line break sensor IBO5B2 (in Isolation Condenser System B), which were operating within the technical specification limits, would have actuated to isolate the affected Isolation Condenser System in the required manner.

Based on the above, the safety significance of this occurrence is considered minimal.

## CORRECTIVE ACTION

Sensors IBO5A1, IBO5B1, IB11A2, IB11B1, and IB11B2 were reset to trip within the limits required by Technical Specifications. (Note the "As Left" values in the description of occurrence.) The switch actuating cam for sensor IBITAL was replaced and the sensor was set to trip within the limits required by Technical Specifications. An inspection was performed on a sample of other sensors for any degradation. The Switch Actuating cams and mechanisms were found in satisfactory condition in these sensors.

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U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

As part of an integrated Reactor System upgrade, four digital RPS sensors will be replaced with newer design switches during Refueling Outage 12R, currently scheduled to commence in the fourth quarter of 1988. The performance of the new switches will be monitored during operating cycle 12. If the results of this monitoring are favorable, the remaining sensors identified for upgrade will be installed during refueling outage 13R.

The need for any modifications or replacements to IBO5 switches will be included in the RPS upgrade and tracked as part of the Integrated Living Schedule.

#### SIMILAR EVENTS

81-070	Isolation	Condenser	Pipe	Break	Sensor	
81-050	Isolation	Condenser	Pipe	Break	Sensor	
80-050	Isolation	Condenser	Pipe	Break	Sensor	
79-016	Isolation	Condenser	Delta	a P Ser	nsor	
77-027	Isolation	Condenser	Pipe	Break	Sensor	Drift

# EQUIPMENT DATA

Manufacturer - ITT Barton.


Model No. 288A indicating pressure switch.

Range: Steam line break sensors (IB05's): 0-50 psid.

Condensate line break sensors (IB11's): 0-60 inches H<sub>2</sub>0.

(0882A)

TEXT IN more space is required, use additional NRC Form 3664's) (17)



**GPU Nuclear Corporation** 

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Forked River, New Jersey 08731-0388
609 971-4000
Writer's Direct Dial Number

March 17, 1988

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Document Control Desk Washington, DC 20555

Dear Sir:

Subject: Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station

Docket No. 50-219

Licensee Event Report Revision

This letter forwards one (1) copy of Licensee Event Report (LER) No. 85-005, Revision 1. Vertical lines in the right side margin indicate those sections of the LER that have been revised.

Very truly yours.

Peter B. Fiedler Vice President and Director Oyster Creek

PBF:JR:dmd (#0882A) Encs.

cc: Mr. William T. Russell, Administrator Region I U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 631 Park Avenue King of Prussia, PA 19406

NRC Resident Inspectors Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station Forked River, NJ 08731

Mr. Alex Dromerick U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 7920 Norfolk Avenue, Phillips Bldg. Bethesda, MD 20014 Mail Stop No. 316

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