

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY

Sequoyah Nuclear Plant
Post Office Box 2000
Soddy-Daisy, Tennessee 37379

March 18, 1988

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Document Control Desk
Washington, DC 20555

Gentlemen:

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY - SEQUOYAH NUCLEAR PLANT UNITS 1 AND 2 - DOCKET
NOS. 50-327 AND -328 - FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE DPR-77 AND DPR-79 -
SPECIAL REPORT 88-01 REVISION 1

The enclosed special report is being revised to provide clarification to
the description and analysis of events concerning two doors which were
breached greater than 7 days. This event was previously reported in
accordance with action statement (a) of Limiting Conditions for
Operation 3.7.12, on January 29, 1988.

Very truly yours,

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY


S. J. Smith
Plant Manager

Enclosure
cc (Enclosure):

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SEQUOYAH NUCLEAR PLANT
UNITS 2
SPECIAL REPORT 88-01

This report is being revised to provide clarification to the description and analysis of events.

DESCRIPTION OF EVENT

On January 4, 1988, with unit 2 in mode 5 (0 percent power, 140 psig, 128 degree F), fire breach permits issued on December 28, 1987, for fire door A-71 (permit No. 5689) (to 2A containment spray and residual heat removal (RHR) heat exchanger room, Elevation 690, Auxiliary Building) and for fire door A-72 (permit No. 5390) (to 2B containment spray and RHR heat exchanger room, Elevation 690, Auxiliary Building) exceeded the seven-day limit allowed by Technic Specification Limiting Condition for Operation (LCO) 3.7.12.

Temporary hoses for service air and a 480V power supply for welding equipment were required to be connected to the permanent connections located outside the rooms, in order to modify the lower support structures of the containment spray heat exchangers. The fire breach permits were issued to maintain the fire doors open so that temporary hoses and the power supply for the welding equipment could be taken through the door openings.

CAUSE OF EVENT

The modification to the lower support structures of 2A and 2B containment spray heat exchangers was not completed within the seven-day period due to the extent of the work involved. A management decision was made to maintain the breaches for the duration of the modification activities to permit the timely completion of the modifications. As a result, the fire breaches exceeded the seven-day limit of action statement A of LCO 3.7.12.

ANALYSIS OF EVENT

The above described event is being reported in accordance with the requirements of action statement A of LCO 3.7.12.

A roving fire watch was established to inspect the heat exchanger rooms 2A and 2B on an hourly basis as required by the action statement of LCO 3.7.12. The existing fire detection systems for the heat exchanger rooms were operable and would have actuated in the event of a fire. Therefore, there was no danger to redundant safety related equipment.

CORRECTIVE ACTION

A roving fire watch at a regular interval of one hour was established for both 2A and 2B heat exchanger rooms immediately and maintained until the modification activities were completed, and the fire doors A-71 and A-72 were returned to functional status on January 22, 1988. No further corrective actions are required.