



UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555

MAR 17 1988

50-293

Mr. David L. Quaid
21 Summer Street
P.O. Box 1617
Duxbury, Massachusetts 02331-1617

Dear Mr. Quaid:

This letter is provided in response to your January 28, 1988 letter to Chairman Zech of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) expressing your concerns regarding emergency preparedness plans for the Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station. Specifically, you challenged the adequacy of evacuation routes for the Duxbury and Plymouth areas and the availability of shelters for the barrier beaches. You also expressed your concern that the NRC has demonstrated a lack of concern for public safety and would allow the Pilgrim plant to resume operation in an unsafe condition.

As you may know, the NRC and the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) are the two Federal agencies assigned to evaluate emergency preparedness at and around nuclear power plants. The NRC is responsible (1) for assessing the adequacy of onsite emergency plans developed by the utility and (2) for making overall safety judgments regarding the operation of nuclear plants. FEMA is responsible (1) for assessing the adequacy of offsite emergency planning and advising NRC of its findings and (2) for assisting State and local governments in the preparation of emergency response plans.

In September 1986, because of information received from local officials, the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, and other interested parties, FEMA began a self-initiated review of its previous finding of adequacy regarding offsite emergency planning for the Pilgrim plant. On August 6, 1987, FEMA gave NRC a report on its findings. The report listed six specific areas of concern in the Massachusetts emergency plans for the Pilgrim 10-mile emergency planning zone (EPZ). These areas of concern included the lack of adequate information concerning protective measures for the beach population. FEMA requested the following additional information from the Commonwealth: (1) an updated geographical description of the beaches and their capacity; (2) a detailed analysis of the beach population, including the number of permanent and temporary residents and the number of day visitors, together with their geographical dispersion; (3) an updated estimate of the length of time it would take to evacuate the beach population; and (4) a list of suitable buildings available for sheltering the beach population at each beach, including the capacities of these buildings and their distances from the beaches.

Since the FEMA report was issued, the Commonwealth and local governments within the 10-mile EPZ, with the assistance of the Pilgrim licensee, the Boston Edison Company, have undertaken extensive efforts to improve the offsite emergency response programs. In addition to the upgrading of Emergency Operation Centers which you mention, these efforts include the revision of the local town plans

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as well as the Massachusetts Civil Defense Agency Area II plan and the Commonwealth's State-wide plan, the development of revised procedures; and the development and implementation of training programs for officials and emergency personnel. We understand that the revised emergency plans for Duxbury and Plymouth will include specific protective measures for the beach population. A draft plan for Plymouth has been forwarded by the Commonwealth to FEMA for informal technical review. We expect that the plan for Duxbury will be forwarded to FEMA as well.

As to your concern regarding the safe resumption of operations at the Pilgrim plant, Federal regulations for the design, construction, and operation of nuclear power reactors have been established to protect the public health and safety. Their objective is to ensure that the probability is very small that a serious nuclear power plant accident would occur that would result in the release of radioactive materials in amounts that would present a threat to public health and safety. To meet this objective, the NRC relies on a "defense-in-depth" concept. Briefly stated, this concept (1) requires high quality in the design, construction, and operation of nuclear plants to reduce the likelihood of malfunctions in the first instance; (2) recognizes that equipment can fail and operators can make mistakes and, therefore, requires safety systems to reduce the chances that malfunctions will lead to accidents that release fission products from the fuel; (3) recognizes that, in spite of these precautions, serious fuel damage accidents can happen and, therefore, requires containment structures and other safety features to prevent the release of fission products off the site; (4) further, for the unlikely event of an offsite fission product release, requires the added feature of emergency planning to ensure that there will be reasonable assurance that protective actions can be taken to protect the population around nuclear power plants. While there is no absolute guarantee of safety, our objective is to ensure that the risk to the public health and safety from the consequences of nuclear power plant operation is extremely low.

Let me assure you that NRC will not permit the Pilgrim plant to resume operation until we determine that Pilgrim can be operated safely and that the health and safety of the public can be protected. The determination whether to restart the Pilgrim plant will involve consideration of each of the emergency planning issues identified by FEMA. The quality of offsite emergency preparedness at the Pilgrim plant will depend heavily on how well the Commonwealth of Massachusetts is able to correct the deficiencies noted in the FEMA report.

Sincerely,

Original signed by
Thomas E. Murley

Thomas E. Murley, Director
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

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As to your concern regarding the safe resumption of operations at the Pilgrim plant, Federal regulations for the design, construction, and operation of nuclear power reactors have been established to protect the public health and safety. Their objective is to ensure that the probability is very small that a serious nuclear power plant accident would occur that would result in the release of radioactive materials in amounts that would present a threat to public health and safety. To meet this objective, the NRC relies on a "defense-in-depth" concept. Briefly stated, this concept (1) requires high quality in the design, construction, and operation of nuclear plants to reduce the likelihood of malfunctions in the first instance; (2) recognizes that equipment can fail and operators can make mistakes and, therefore, requires safety systems to reduce the chances that malfunctions will lead to accidents that release fission products from the fuel; (3) recognizes that, in spite of these precautions, serious fuel damage accidents can happen and, therefore, requires containment structures and other safety features to prevent the release of fission products off the site; (4) further, for the unlikely event of an offsite fission product release, requires the added feature of emergency planning to ensure that there will be reasonable assurance that protective actions can be taken to protect the population around nuclear power plants. While there is no absolute guarantee of safety, our objective is to ensure that the risk to the public health and safety from the consequences of nuclear power plant operation is extremely low.

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In addition, the NRC has taken the position that the added feature of emergency planning provides that there will be reasonable assurance that protective actions can be taken to protect the population around nuclear power plants even in the unlikely event of an offsite fission product release. While there is no absolute guarantee of safety, our objective is to ensure that the risk to the public health and safety from the consequences of nuclear power plant operation is extremely low.

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NRC has imposed its offsite emergency planning requirements to add even more conservatism to this defense-in-depth safety philosophy. The added feature of emergency planning provides that, even in the unlikely event of an offsite fission product release, there is reasonable assurance that protective actions can be taken to protect the population around nuclear power plants. While there is no absolute guarantee of safety, our objective is to ensure that the risk to the public health and safety from the consequences of nuclear power plant operation is low.

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DUXBURY, MA

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TO:

CHAIRMAN ZECH

FOR SIGNATURE OF:

** GREEN **

SECY NO: 88-76

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ROUTING:

1 TR ONLY
RUSSELL

DATE: 02/05/88

ASSIGNED TO: NRR

CONTACT: MURLEY

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FOR APPROPRIATE ACTION

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DUE TO NRR DIRECTOR'S OFFICE
BY _____

