

UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION REGION II 101 MARIETTA STREET, N.W., SUITE 2900 ATLANTA, GEORGIA 30323-0199

January 24, 1997

NOTE TO: NRC Document Control Desk Mail Stop 0-5-D-24

FROM: Beverly Michael, Licensing Assistant Burely Michael Operating Licensing and Human Performance Branch, Region II

SUBJECT: OPERATOR LICENSING RETAKE EXAMINATION ADMINISTERED ON DECEMBER 18, 1996, AT NORTH ANNA POWER STATION - DOCKET NOS. 50-338 AND 50-339 (EXAMINATION REPORT 50-338/96-301)

On December 18, 1996, Operator Licensing Examinations were administered at the referenced facility. Attached, you will find the following information for processing through NUDOCS and distribution to the NRC staff, including the NRC PDR:


- Item #1 a) Facility submitted outline and initial exam submittal, designated for distribution under RIDS Code A070.
 - As given operating examination, designated for distribution under RIDS Code A070.
- Item #2 Examination Report already submitted. Written exam N/A.

9702030149 970124 PDR ADDCK 05000338 V PDR ES-301

Individual Walk-through Test Outline - Set #1

Form ES-301-2

Facility: North Anna Examiner's Name (print):		Week of Examination: Jan. 29, 199
System / JPM	Safety Function	Planned Follow-up Questions: K/A/G // Importance // Description
1. Control Rod Drive - Retrieve a dropped rod	I-001 SIM	a. 003AA2.03 (3.6/3.8) Effects of dropped rod on major plant parameters.
(R476)		b. 001K4.03 (3.5/3.8) Given a set of conditions, determine effect on rod control.
2. Chemical and Volume Control - Place excess letdown in service (R333) re-write for unit-2	II-004 MCR	a. GEN-2.1.25 (2.8/3.1) Given a set of plant conditions, use graphs to determine blended flow.
		b. GEN-2.1.32 (3.4/3.8) Describe the reasons for the procedure precautions.
3. Emergency Core Cooling - Transfer the Safety Injection System from hot-leg to cold-	III-006 SIM	a. 011EK3.13 (3.8/4.2) Describe the reasons for swapping from hot-leg back to cold-leg injection.
leg injection (R736) ALT. PATH / ESF / NEW		b. 006A2.13 (3.9/4.2) Actions required following a spurious SI
4. Residual Heat Removal - IV-005 Restore RHR Cooling ALT. SIM		a. GEN-2.1.20 (4.3/4.2) Given a set of conditions, determine required actions.
PATH / SHUTDOWN / NEW (LOSS OF CC TO RHR HXs, R514)		b. 005A2.04 (2.9/2.9) Affect of loss of instrument air on RCS temperature.



5. Reactor Coolant Pump - Start a reactor coolant pump	IV-003 SIM	a. GEN-2.1.32 (3.2/3.3) Given a set of conditions, determine RCP start limitations.
(SEAL DELTA-P IS LOST, R164)		b. 003K5.06 (2.2/2.6) Given a set of plant conditions, determine the effect on calorimetric.
6. Containment Spray - Align containment spray systems	V-028 SIM	a. 028K5.01 (3.4/3.9): Given a set of plant conditions, determine hazards.
(R216)		b. GEN-2.1.28 (3.2/.3.3) Purpose of sample line heat tracing.
7. Pressurizer Pressure Control - Place NDT protection in service during a	III-010 SIM	 a. 010A4.03 (4.0/3.8) Given a set of conditions describe response of PRZR PORV block valve.
natural circulation cooldown (R577) SHUTDOWN		b. 010A1.09 (3.4/3.7) Given a set of conditions, determine tail pipe temperature.
8. Emergency Diesel Generating - Unload and	VI-064 IN-PLANT	a. 064A3.06 (3.3/3.4) Given a set of conditions, determine control of EDG.
shutdown an EDG in the control room emergency mode (N466) AP ACTION		b. 064K4.06 (2.8/3.2) Describe when speed droop is in effect.
9. Auxiliary Feedwater - Collapse steam voids in a	IV-061 IN-PLANT	a. 061A2.06 (2.7/3.0) Affect of check-valve back-leakage.
steam-bound AFW pump (N935)		 b. 061K4.02 (4.5/4.6) Given a set of conditions, apply interlocks to control of AFW pump.
10. Component Cooling Water System - Drain the CC system to a LW test tank	VIII-008 IN-PLANT	a. 008K4.01 (3.1/3.3) Given a set of plant conditions, determine response of CC pumps.
(N230) RCA		b. 008A1.01 (2.8/2.9) Affects on CC flow from shifting common loads.

Examiner:

Chief Examiner:

NORTH ANNA POWER STATION

ADMINISTRATIVE WALK-THROUGH

SET 1

Facilit	nation Level (Circle y: North Anna ner's Name (print):	One): RO / SRO Week of Examination: Dec. 16, 1996
1	Administrative Topic/Subject Description	Describe method of evaluation: 1. ONE Administrative JPM, OR 2. TWO Administrative Questions
A.1	Status Control	JPM - Enter a component into abnormal status.
A.1	Shift Turnover	Given a set of conditions, determine turnover requirements.
		Given a set of conditions, determine qualification of relief.
A.2	Maintenance	JPM - Given a set of plant conditions, prioritize methods of plant cooling.
A.3	Radiation Work Practices	JPM - Review a Radiation Work Permit and obtain a DAD. NOTE: This JPM will be incorporated into the "RCA" task, N230 (JPM # 10).
A.4	Emergency	Given a set of conditions, determine required actions.
	Facilities	List those facilities with protection from radiation/airborne.

Examiner: _____ Chief Examiner: _____

ABNORMAL STATUS JPM

REACTOR OPERATOR/SENIOR REACTOR OPERATOR LICENSE CLASS

Administrative Job Performance Measure

INITIAL CONDITIONS

It has been determined during the unit 1 turbine building watchstander's rounds, that the main steam to aux. steam PCV, 1-AS-PCV-105, drifts open with its M/A station in automatic.

The instrument department has identified the problem, but repair parts will not arrive on sight until January 15th, 1997.

Until it can be repaired, the US has directed that the M/A station be placed in manual with zero demand.

The US has directed that this action be documented in abnormal status.

INITIATING CUE

You are to enter the above into abnormal status.





REACTOR OPERATOR/SENIOR REACTOR OPERATOR LICENSE CLASS

Administrative Job Performance Measure

Candidate	Evaluator	
Evaluation Date		
Performance Evaluation	Satisfactory	Unsatisfactory

TASK

Enter a component into Abnormal Status

NOTE TO THE TRAINER AND THE EVALUATOR

Unless a specific evaluator's cue is provided, you should provide a cue indicating that the component or parameter is in the condition specified by the procedure.

INITIAL CONDITIONS

It has been determined during the unit 1 turbine building watchstander's rounds, that the main steam to aux. steam PCV, 1-AS-PCV-105, drifts open with its M/A station in automatic.

The instrument department has identified the problem, but repair parts will not arrive on sight until January 15th, 1997.

Until it can be repaired, the US has directed that the M/A station be placed in manual with zero demand.

The US has directed that this action be documented in abnormal status.

INITIATING CUE

You are to enter the above into abnormal status.

STANDARDS

Self-checking practices were used throughout task performance

Verbal communication related to any of the following modes was conducted in accordance with VPAP-1407

- Emergency communication
- Face-to-face communication
- Giving and ackn. wledging orders
- Phonetic alphabet
- Telephone communication systems

TOOLS AND EQUIPMENT

Simulator Ops Network Computer

EVALUATION METHOD

Demonstrate

PERFORMANCE STEPS

1.	Select VPPEQS fro	om menu.		
	SAT []	UNSAT []	NOTE	
2.	Enter badge numbe	r and password.		
	SAT []	UNSAT []	NOTE	17 - 10 - 10 - 10 - 10 - 10 - 10 - 10 -
3.	Select "B. Find by	Type".		
	SAT []	UNSAT []	NOTE	
4.	Select "C. Abnorm	al Status".		
	SAT []	UNSAT []	NOTE	
5.	Select "A. Unit 1 a	and Common".		
9	SAT []	UNSAT []	NOTE	

6. Press "Insert".

. Enter equ	ipment mark	number 1-AS-PCV	-105 and required information.
SA	AT[] 1	UNSAT []	NOTE

>>>> END OF EVALUATION <<<<<

SHIFT TURNOVER QUESTIONS (RO)

TOPIC: Shift Turnover

QUESTION #1

QUESTION	ANSWER	S/U
 Given the following conditions: You are the unit-2 OATC. The SS has just informed you that you must report to "Fitness For Duty" for a random test. 	If a Control Room Operator with unit duty expects to be away from the assigned station for situations other than meal and restroom breaks, then a complete, formal relief shall be performed.	
Describe the turnover requirements.	REF. Vision Objective: 13598, OPAP-0005 section 6.2.3	

QUESTION #2

QUESTION	ANSWER	S/U
In the above situation, could Mike Burnette relieve you?	No, the individual does not hold an active license. Determined by referencing Virginia Power Personnel Qualification System (VPPQS) data base.	
	REF. Vision Objective: 13597, OPAP-0005 sections 5.1.5 & 6.1.14	



CORE COOLING ASSESSMENT JPM















































REACTOR OPERATOR/SENIOR REACTOR OPERATOR LICENSE CLASS

Administrative Job Performance Measure

INITIAL CONDITIONS

- Unit 1 has been shutdown for 155 hours.
- RCS temperature is 123°F.
- RCS is depressurized to atmospheric.
- "A" RCS loop stops are closed.
- "B" and "C" loop stops are open but de-energized.
- Both PRZR PORVs are blocked open.
- One PRZR safety valve is removed.
- PRZR level is 20%.
- One train of SI (HHSI and LHSI) is operable with both hot and cold leg injection paths.
- The RSWT is at normal operating level.
- The main condenser is open for maintenance.
- All SG levels are at 33%.
- The AFW system is tagged out for maintenance.
- All other systems are operable and in the expected state for this mode of operation.

INITIATING CUE

You are to determine the Alternate Core Cooling Assessment IAW 1-GOP-13.0, 1-GOP-13.1 for normal surveillance. You are not to determine time to boiling.

REACTOR OPERATOR/SENIOR REACTOR OPERATOR LICENSE CLASS

Administrative Job Performance Measure

Candidate	Evaluator	
Evaluation Date		
Performance Evaluation	Satisfactory	Unsatisfactory

TASK Determine the Alternate Core Cooling Method(s).

NOTE TO THE TRAINER AND THE EVALUATOR

Unless a specific evaluator's cue is provided, you should provide a cue indicating that the component or parameter is in the condition specified by the procedure.

INITIAL CONDITIONS

- Unit 1 has been shutdown for 155 hours.
- RCS temperature is 123°F.
- RCS is depressurized to atmospheric.
- "A" RCS loop stops are closed.
- "B" and "C" loop stops are open but de-energized.
- Both PRZR PORVs are blocked open.
- One PRZR safety valve is removed.
- PRZR level is 20%.
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- The RSWT is at normal operating level.
- The main condenser is open for maintenance.
- All SG levels are at 33%.
- The AFW system is tagged out for maintenance.
- All other systems are operable and in the expected state for this mode of operation.

INITIATING CUE

You are to determine the Alternate Core Cooling Assessment IAW 1-GOP-13.0, 1-GOP-13.1 for normal surveillance. You are not to determine time to boiling.

STANDARDS

Task was performed as directed by the procedure referenced in the task statement within parentheses (one of the <u>underlined</u> procedures if several are cited)

Self-checking practices were used throughout task performance

Verbal communication related to any of the following modes was conducted in accordance with VPAP-1407

- Emergency communication
- Face-to-face communication
- Giving and acknowledging orders
- Phonetic alphabet
- Telephone communication systems

TOOLS AND EQUIPMENT

None

EVALUATION METHOD

Verbal-visual

PERFORMANCE STEPS

1. Enter reason for assessment

STANDARD

Records "surveillance".

SAT[] UNSAT[]

NOTE

2. Verify Natural Circulation available.

STANDARD

Determines that Nat. Circ. is not available due to AFW and main condenser are tagged out.

Verify Reflux Boiling available.

STANDARD

3.

Determines that Reflux Boiling is not available due to AFW and main condenser are tagged out.

SAT [] UNSAT [] NOTE

4. Verify Forced Feed and Spill available.

<u>STANDARD</u>

Determines that:

a. 1 PRZR safety valve is removed, 1 LHSI pump is available, time after shutdown is 1 hour, and RWST level is 50%. AND/OR

b. 2 PRZR PORVs are blocked open, 1 LHSI pump is available, time after shutdown is 26 hours, and RWST level is 50%.

CRITICAL STANDARD

Denotes Forced Feed and Spill as Priority 1.

5.

SAT[] UNSAT[]

NOTE _____

Verify Gravity Feed and Spill available.

STANDARD

Determines that:

1 PRZR safety valve is removed, time after shutdown is 58 hours, 1 train of SI operable, RWST level is approx. 82%.


CRITICAL STANDARD

Denotes Gravity Feed and Spill as Priority 2.

SAT [] UNSAT [] NOTE _____

>>>> END OF EVALUATION <<<<<







REACTOR OPERATOR/SENIOR REACTOR OPERATOR LICENSE CLASS

Administrative Job Performance Measure

INITIAL CONDITIONS

You have been assigned a task in the auxiliary building.

INITIATING CUE

You are to review the applicable RWP and obtain a DAD.





REACTOR OPERATOR/SENIOR REACTOR OPERATOR LICENSE CLASS

Administrative Job Performance Measure

Candidate	Evaluator	
Evaluation Date		
Performance Evaluation	Satisfactory	Unsatisfactory

TASK Review an RWP and obtain a DAD.

NOTE TO THE TRAINER AND THE EVALUATOR

Unless a specific evaluator's cue is provided, you should provide a cue indicating that the component or parameter is in the condition specified by the procedure.

INITIAL CONDITIONS

You have been assigned a task in the auxiliary building.

INITIATING CUE

You are to review the applicable RWP and obtain a DAD.

STANDARDS

Task way performed as directed by the procedure referenced in the task statement within parentheses (one of the <u>underlined</u> procedures if several are cited)

Self-checking practices were used throughout task performance

Verbal communication related to any of the following modes was conducted in accordance with VPAP-1407

- Emergency communication
- Face-to-face communication
- Giving and acknowledging orders
- Phonetic alphabet
- Telephone communication systems

TOOLS AND EQUIPMENT

None

EVALUATION METHOD

Perform in-plant

PERFORMANCE STEPS

1. Select applicable RWP on RWP review computer.

SAT [] UNSAT [] NOTE

2. Review RWP.

SAT[]	UNSAT []	NOTE	


3. Obtain DAD from shelf and ensure it reads "PAUSE".




4.	Insert DAD into re	eader.		
	SAT []	UNSAT []	NOTE	
5.	Enter TLD/badge	number.		
	SAT []	UNSAT []	NOTE	
6.	Enter RWP number	er.		
	SAT []	UNSAT []	NOTE	
7.	Scan TLD.			
	SAT []	UNSAT []	NOTE	
8.	Acknowledge revi	ew of RWP.		
	SAT []	UNSAT []	NOTE	
9.	Review personal a	nd RWP informatio	n.	
	SAT []	UNSAT []	NOTE	
10.	Remove DAD from	m reader and ensure	it is reading "0.000 rem".	
	SAT []	UNSAT []	NOTE	

>>>> END OF EVALUATION <<<<<









TOPIC: Emergency Facilities

QUESTION #1

QUESTION	ANSWER	S/U
You are escorting a mechanical chiller tech. rep. in the turbine building when an Alert is declared. What should you do	The "visitor" must be taken to security building for accountability.	
with the tech. rep.?	REF. Emergency Plan, page 6.8	

QUESTION #2

QUESTION	ANSWER	S/U
Which emergency facilities were designed to provide some form of protection from whole body radiation and airborne contamination?	The following emergency facilities were designed to provide some form of protection from whole body radiation and airborne contamination:	
	Main Control Room (MCR), Technical Support Center (TSC), and the Local Emergency Response Facility (LEOF).	
	NOTE: Candidate may mention the Alternate Operation Support Center (OSC), which shares the MCR pressure envelop.	
	REF. Emergency Plan, pages 7.3, 7.4, & 7.5.	

REACTOR OPERATOR/SENIOR REACTOR OPERATOR LICENSE CLASS

Job Performance Measure

R...476

INITIAL CONDITIONS

Unit was at 100% steady-state operation prior to the event

Control bank A control rod P-10 is at 0 steps, as indicated by individual rod position

1-AP-1.2, "Dropped Rod," has been signed off up to the point of determining the maximum withdrawal rate, and it has been determined that no rate applies.

INITIATING CUE

You are requested to complete the "Dropped Rod Retrieval" attachment 2 in 1-AP-1.2.

REACTOR OPERATOR/SENIOR REACTOR OPERATOR LICENSE CLASS

Job Performance Measure

R...476

Candidate	Evaluator	valuator	
Evaluation Date			
Performance Evaluation	Satisfactory	Unsatisfactory	

TASK

Retrieve a dropped rod (1-AP-1.2).

NOTE TO THE TRAINER AND THE EVALUATOR

You must supply key variable information needed for training or evaluating this task

- <u>BEFORE</u> the session, fill in (or check the blank following the correct information in) all <u>BRACKETED</u> blanks [____]
- <u>DURING</u> the session, fill in (or check the blank following the correct information in) all <u>NON-BRACKETED</u> blanks

Unless a specific evaluator's cue is provided, you should provide a cue indicating that the component or parameter is in the condition specified by the procedure.

INITIAL CONDITIONS

Unit was at 100% steady-state operation prior to the event

Control bank A control rod P-10 is at 0 steps, as indicated by individual rod position

1-AP-1.2, "Dropped Rod," has been signed off up to the point of determining the maximum withdrawal rate, and it has been determined that no rate applies.

INITIATING CUE

You are requested to complete the "Dropped Rod Retrieval" attachment 2 in 1-AP-1.2.

STANDARDS

Task was performed as directed by the procedure referenced in the task statement within parentheses (one of the <u>underlined</u> procedures if several are cited)

Self-checking practices were used throughout task performance

Verbal communication related to any of the following modes was conducted in accordance with VPAP-1407

- Emergency communication
- Face-to-face communication
- Giving and acknowledging orders
- Phonetic alphabet
- Telephone communication systems

TOOLS AND EQUIPMENT

Copy of 1-AP-1.2 signed off to the point of completing the "Dropped Rod Retrieval" attachment

PREFERRED EVALUATION METHOD

Simulator

PERFORMANCE STEPS

1. Place the control rod bank selector switch in BANK SELECT.

CRITICAL STANDARDS

Candidate places rod control selector switch in the CONTROL BANK A position

2. Record the affected bank's group step counter reading.

VERBAL-VISUAL CUES

Control bank A group 2 step counter reading is 225.

STANDARD

Candidate records 225 for control bank A group 2 step counter reading.

SAT [] UNSAT [] NOTE

3. Manually reset the group step counter.

CRITICAL STANDARDS

Candidate resets thumbwheels for control bank A group 2 step counters to zero.

SAT [] UNSAT [] NOTE _____

5. Record the affected bank pulse-to-analog converter reading.

STANDARD

Candidate requests an extra operator to obtain the pulse-to-analog converter reading for control bank A.

DEMONSTRATION CUES

Control bank A pulse-to-analog converter reading is 225.

STANDARD

Candidate records 225 for Control bank A pulse-to-analog converter reading.

6. Request an extra operator to reset the pulse-to-analog converter for control bank A.

STANDARD

Candidate requests an extra operator to reset the pulse-to-analog converter for control bank A.

SAT [] UNSAT [] NOTE _____

 Open all lift coil disconnect switches for the affected bank, except the switch for the dropped rod.

CRITICAL STANDARDS

Candidate opens all lift coil disconnect switches for control bank A except for rod P-10.

SAT [] UNSAT [] NOTE _____

8. Independently verify that all lift coil disconnect switches for the affected bank, except the switch for the dropped rod, are open.

DEMONSTRATION CUES

Assume that another operator has performed this step.

SAT [] UNSAT [] NOTE

9. Manually withdraw the affected control rod.

CRITICAL STANDARDS

Candidate commences withdrawaling control rod P-10.

DEMONSTRATION CUES

Reactor Coolant System temperature control will be accomplished by the balance-of-plant operator.

10. Continue to withdraw control rod P-10 to 225 steps.

CRITICAL STANDARDS

Candidate withdrawals control rod P-10 to 225 steps.

STANDARD

Candidate records 225 steps.

SAT [] UNSAT [] NOTE

11. Verify that all rods in the affected bank are at the same height and that no rod bottom light is lit.

STANDARD

Candidate verifies all rods in the affected bank are at the same height and that no rod bottom light is lit.

SAT [] UNSAT [] NOTE

12. Close all lift coil disconnect switches.

CRITICAL STANDARDS

Candidate closes all lift coil disconnect switches for control bank A.

SAT [] UNSAT [] NOTE

13. Reset the ROD CONTROL URGENT FAILURE alarm.

STANDARD

Candidate resets the ROD CONTROL URGENT FAILURE alarm.

14. Step the affected bank control rods in one step, and verify that group 2, and then group-1, are sequencing properly.

DEMONSTRATION CUES

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Assume another operator will complete this procedure.

SAT[] UNSAT[] NOTE _____

>>>> END OF EVALUATION <<<<<

JPM QUESTION SHEET R...476

TOPIC: I-001

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SYSTEM: Rod Control

K/A: 003AA2.03 (3.6/3.8)

QUESTION #1

QUESTION		S/ U
 Explain how each of the following plant parameters change in response to a dropped control rod that does not cause a reactor trip while the unit is at power. Indicated reactor power Actual reactor power Reactor Coolant System ΔT/T_{ave} Pressurizer level and pressure Axial flux difference 	 ANSWER Indicated reactor power will decrease by varying amounts as indicated by the PRNIS due to rod shadowing and the relationship between the dropped rod and detector location. Actual reactor power should remain constant if steam demand does not change unless the corresponding decrease in T_{avg} causes steam pressure to decrease low enough to reduce steam demand. Reactor Coolant System ΔT will remain constant if actual power does not change. If power does decrease (for the reasons noted above), ΔT will correspondingly decrease. T_{avg} will decrease to provide positive reactivity (in response to the negative reactivity inserted by the dropped rod). PRZR level will decrease in response to the reduced T_{avg} due to "shrinkage" of the RCS as well as the decrease in the programmed pressurizer level that corresponds to the reduced T_{avg}. Pressurizer pressure will decrease in response to the reduced T_{avg}. Axial flux will shift upward due to the greater amount of positive reactivity inserted in the top of the core due to the T_{avg} decrease 	
	(greater fractional change in density at the top of the core than at the bottom of the core). REF. Vision Objective #: 11025	

TOPIC: 1-001

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QUESTION #2

QUESTION	ANSWER	S/U
 Given the following conditions: The unit is holding at 30% power for chemistry. Rod control is in manual. Tave is 557°F Tref unit fails to +4°F above Tave. 	$2^{\circ} \text{ mis-match between } 3^{\circ}F \text{ and } 5^{\circ}F$ ial. $32 \text{ SPM/}^{\circ}F + 8 \text{ SPM (min speed)} = 40 \text{ SPM}$	
What would indicated rod speed be if rod control was placed in automatic?	REF. Vision Objective #: 6512, PLS DOCUMENT	

11025 Explain how each of the following plant parameters change in response to a dropped control rod that does not cause a reactor trip while the unit is at power.

Indicated reactor power

Indicated reactor power will decrease by varying amounts as indicated by the PRNIS due to rod shadowing and the relationship between the dropped rod and detector location. A noticeable tilt/imbalance may be indicated due to the proximity of the dropped rod to the detectors.

Actual reactor power

Actual reactor power should remain constant if steam demand does not change unless the corresponding decrease in T_{avg} causes steam pressure to decrease low enough to reduce steam demand. (This should not be the case with minimal SG tube plugging, adequate initial SG pressure and "room" for the governor valves to open in response to the decrease in steam pressure.)

Reactor Coolant System ΔT/T_{ave}

Reactor Coolant System ΔT will remain constant if actual power does not change. If power does decrease (for the reasons noted above), ΔT will correspondingly decrease.

 T_{avg} will decrease to provide positive reactivity (in response to the negative reactivity inserted by the dropped rod) to maintain the reactor critical.

Pressurizer level and pressure

Pressurizer level will decrease in response to the reduced T_{avg} due to "shrinkage" of the RCS as well as the decrease in the programmed pressurizer level that corresponds to the reduced T_{vg} .

Pressurizer pressure will decrease in response to the reduced T_{avg} until the heaters can restore the system to normal operating pressure.

Axial flux difference

Axial flux will shift upward due to the greater amount of positive reactivity inserted in the top of the core due to the T_{avg} decrease (greater fractional change in density at the top of the core than at the bottom of the core).

- 6512 Explain the following concepts associated with the output signal generated by the Rod Control System's automatic temperature control unit.
 - Differential temperature at which rod motion is initiated at minimum speed

1.5 °F

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- Differential temperature range at which rod speed is linearly increased to its maximum value
 3.0 to 5.0 °F
- Differential temperature range known as the "control rod lockup region"

-1.0 to -1.5°F and +1.0 to +1.5°F

• Why the lockup region is provided

A lockup region is included in the program to prevent bistable chattering, when the error signal is near the end of the deadband.

• Differential temperature range known as the "control rod deadband region"

 $3.0 \,^{\circ}\text{F} (-1.5 \text{ to } +1.5 \,^{\circ}\text{F})$

• Why the deadband region is provided

A deadband is provided in the rod control program to prevent continuous stepping of the control rods.

REACTOR OPERATOR/SENIOR REACTOR OPERATOR LICENSE CLASS

Job Performance Measure

R...333

EVITIAL CONDITIONS

Maintenance on the Normal Letdown System is required

Unit 1 is at 100% power

INITIATING CUE

You are requested to shift from normal to excess letdown flowing to the volume control tank.

REACTOR OPERATOR/SENIOR REACTOR OPERATOR LICENSE CLASS

Job Performance Measure

R...333

Candidate	Evaluator	
Evaluation Date		
Performance Evaluation	Satisfactory	Unsatisfactory

TASK

Shift from normal letdown to excess letdown (1-OP-8.5).

NOTE TO THE TRAINER AND THE EVALUATOR

Unless a specific evaluator's cue is provided, you should provide a cue indicating that the component or parameter is in the condition specified by the procedure.

INITIAL CONDITIONS

Maintenance on the Normal Letdown System is required

Unit is in mode 1

INITIATING CUE

You are requested to shift from normal to excess letdown flowing to the volume control tank.

STANDARDS

.

Task was performed as directed by the procedure referenced in the task statement within parentheses (one of the <u>underlined</u> procedures if several are cited)

Self-checking practices were used throughout task performance

Verbal communication related to any of the following modes was conducted in accordance with VPAP-1407

- Emergency communication
- Face-to-face communication
- Giving and acknowledging orders
- Phonetic alphabet
- Telephone communication systems

TOOLS AND EQUIPMENT

None

PREFERRED EVALUATION METHOD

Simulator

PERFORMANCE STEPS

1. Review initial conditions, precautions, and limitations.

STANDARD

Candidate reviews initial conditions, precautions, and limitations.

SAT [] UNSAT [] NOTE

2. Verify that component cooling water is being supplied to the excess letdown heat exchanger.

STANDARD

Candidate observes that annunciator G-E2, "EXC LTDN HX CC OUT LO FLOW" is not lit.

SAT [] UNSAT [] NOTE

3. Close excess letdown pressure control valve 1-CH-HCV-1137.

STANDARD

Candidate closes excess letdown pressure control valve 1-CH-HCV-1137.

SAT [] UNSAT [] NOTE

4. Close the breaker for the loop drain header isolation valves.

CRITICAL STANDARDS

Candidate requests that breaker 1-EP-CB-26B-22 for loop drain header isolation valves 1-CH-HCV-1557A, 1557B, and 1557C be closed.

SAT [] UNSAT [] NOTE

5. Place the selector switch for excess letdown flow divert valve 1-CH-HCV-1389 in VCT.

STANDARD

Candidate verifies selector switch for excess letdown flow divert valve 1-CH-HCV-1389 is in VCT.

SAT [] UNSAT [] NOTE

Close the letdown orifice isolation valves.

CRITICAL STANDARDS

Candidate closes letdown orifice valves 1-CH-HCV-1200A, 1200B, and 1200C.

SAT [] UNSAT [] NOTE _____

 Place normal charging flow control valve 1-CH-FCV-1122 in MANUAL, and close the valve.

CRITICAL STANDARDS

Candidate place normal charging flow control valve 1-CH-FCV-1122 in MANUAL, and closes the valve.

SAT [] UNSAT [] NOTE

8. Open at least one Reactor Coolant System drain valve.

CRITICAL STANDARDS

Candidate opens at least one Reactor Coolant System drain valve (1-CH-HCV-1557A, 1557B, or 1557C).

SAT [] UNSAT [] NOTE

9. Open the excess letdown heat exchanger isolation valve.

CRITICAL STANDARDS

Candidate opens excess letdown heat exchanger isolation valve 1-CH-HCV-1201.

SAT [] UNSAT [] NOTE _____

6.

10. Open the excess letdown pressure control valve.

CRITICAL STANDARDS

.

Candidate opens excess letdown pressure control valve 1-CH-HCV-1137.

SAT [] UNSAT [] NOTE _____

11. Maintain the pressurizer level stable.

SAT [] UNSAT [] NOTE _____

>>>> END OF EVALUATION <<<<<

JPM QUESTION SHEET R...333

TOPIC: II-004

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SYSTEM: Chemical and Volume Control K/A: GEN-2.1.25 (2.8/3.1)

QUESTION #1

QUESTION	ANSWER	S/U
Given the following plant conditions:	Use 1-SC-2.1 to determine that boric acid flow should be 4 gpm to achieve a blended flow of 500 ppm.	
 RCS boron concentration is 500 ppm. Desired PG flow rate wi.1 be 100 gpm. BAS^T concentration is 12,950 ppm Determine the potentiometer settings to achieve a blended flow equal to that of RCS boron concentration. 	(Note: the following equation can <u>ONLY</u> be used if the range of indication starts at ZERO) Potentiometer Setting = $\left(\frac{Desired \ Flow \ Rate}{Total \ Rangeof \ Indication}\right)$ 10 $6.66 = \left(\frac{100 \ gpm}{150 \ gpm}\right)$ 10 $2.0 = \left(\frac{4 \ gpm}{20 \ gpm}\right)$ 10 REF. Vision Objective #: 3966, STATION CURVE BOOK	

QUESTION	ANSWER	S/U
 Explain the consequences of the following actions when placing excess letdown in service. Exceeding 130 psig excess letdow pressure 	to the excess letdown heat exchanger relief valve (150 psig setpoint). Excessive pressure in the excess letdown line (when aligned to the	
• Exceeding 75 psig volume control tank pressure	 This would present an unnecessary challenge to the VCT relief valve (75 psig relieves to HLLWT's) if the VCT were to be overfilled since there is no divert capability via LCV-1115A while on excess letdown. REF. Vision Objective #: 245, 11715-FM-95 SERIES 	

3966 Given the desired concentration of a blended makeup, determine the correct potentiometer settings for the boric acid flow controller and primary grade water flow controller.

Determining the potentiometer settings to achieve a given boron concentration.

- 245 Explain the consequences of the following actions when placing excess letdown in service.
 - Exceeding 130 psig excess letdown pressure

This could present an unnecessary challenge to the excess letdown heat exchanger relief valve (150 psig setpoint).

Excessive pressure in the excess letdown line (when aligned to the VCT) exerts a higher than normal back-pressure on the #1 RCP seals.

• Exceeding 75 psig volume control tank pressure

This would present an unnecessary challenge to the VCT reliaf value (75 psig relieves to HLLWT's) if the VCT were to be overfilled since there is no divert capability via LCV-1115A while on excess letdown.

• Rapidly placing excess letdown in service

This would cause undue pressure/temperature stress on the excess letdown heat exchanger and could cause tube leakage.

REACTOR OPERATOR/SENIOR REACTOR OPERATOR LICENSE CLASS

Job Performance Measure

R...736

INITIAL CONDITIONS

1-E-1, "Loss of Reactor or Secondary Coolant," has directed the transition to 1-ES-1.5, "Transfer From Hot Leg Recirculation to Cold Leg Recirculation"

Safety Injection System is in the hot-leg recirculation mode

1-CH-P-1B was lined up to flow through the boron injection tank header for hot-leg recirculation, but has tripped on over-current and cannot be restarted.

1-CH-P-1C was tagged out at the start of the accident for coupling replacement and will not be available for 18 hours.

1-CH-P-1A is flowing through the alternate header for hot-leg recirculation

INITIATING CUE

You are requested to transfer from hot-leg recirculation to cold-leg recirculation in accordance with 1-ES-1.5, "Transfer From Hot Leg Recirculation to Cold Leg Recirculation."

REACTOR OPERATOR/SENIOR REACTOR OPERATOR LICENSE CLASS

Job Performance Measure

R...736

Candidate	Evaluator	Evaluator	
Evaluation Date			
Performance Evaluation	Satisfactory	Unsatisfactory	

TASK

Transfer the Safety Injection System from hot-leg to cold-leg recirculation (1-ES-1.5).

ALTERNATE - PATH TOPIC

1-CH-P-1A is the only available charging pump.

NOTE TO THE TRAINER AND THE EVALUATOR

Unless a specific evaluator's cue is provided, you should provide a cue indicating that the component or parameter is in the condition specified by the procedure.

INITIAL CONDITIONS

1-E-1, "Loss of Reactor or Secondary Coolant," has directed the transition to 1-ES-1.5, "Transfer From Hot Leg Recirculation to Cold Leg Recirculation"

Safety Injection System is in the hot-leg recirculation mode

1-CH-P-1B was lined up to flow through the boron injection tank header for hot-leg recirculation, but has tripped on over-current and cannot be restarted.

1-CH-P-1C was tagged out at the start of the accident for coupling replacement and will not be available for 18 hours.

1-CH-P-1A is flowing through the alternate header for hot-leg recirculation

INITIATING CUE

You are requested to transfer from hot-leg recirculation to cold-leg recirculation in accordance with 1-ES-1.5, "Transfer From Hot Leg Recirculation to Cold Leg Recirculation."

STANDARDS

Task was performed as directed by the procedure referenced in the task statement within parentheses (one of the <u>underlined</u> procedures if several are cited)

Self-checking practices were used throughout task performance

Verbal communication related to any of the following modes was conducted in accordance with VPAP-1407

- Emergency communication
- Face-to-face communication
- Giving and acknowledging orders
- Phonetic alphabet
- Telephone communication systems

TOOLS AND EQUIPMENT

None

PREFERRED EVALUATION METHOD

Simulator

PERFORMANCE STEPS

- 1. Close the following low-head safety injection pump hot-leg injection valves.
 - 1-SI-MOV-1890A
 - 1-SI-MOV-1890B

CRITICAL STANDARDS

Candidate places key switches for 1-SI-MOV-1890A and 1-SI-MOV-1890B in CLOSE.

SAT [] UNSAT [] NOTE

Open the low-head safety injection pump discharge valves.

CRITICAL STANDARDS

Candidate depresses OPEN push-button for 1-SI-MOV-1864A or 1-SI-MOV-1864B.

SAT [] UNSAT [] NOTE _____

3. Open the low-head safety injection pump cold-leg injection valves.

CRITICAL STANDARDS

Candidate places control switch for 1-SI-MOV-1890C or 1890D in OPEN.

SAT [] UNSAT [] NOTE

4. Verify two charging pumps in service.

STANDARD

Candidate determines that only one charging pump is available.

SAT [] UNSAT [] NOTE

5. Establish charging pump recirc for the running pump.

CRITICAL STANDARDS

Candidate places control switch for 1-CH-MOV-1275A in OPEN.

SAT [] UNSAT [] NOTE

2.

Isolate hot-leg injection.

CRITICAL STANDARDS

Candidate depresses CLOSE push-buttons for 1-SI-MOV-1869B and 1869A.

SAT [] UNSAT [] NOTE

7. Establish cold-leg injection flow path.

CRITICAL STANDARDS

Candidate depresses OPEN push-buttons fo. 1-SI-MOV-1867C and/or 1867D, then depresses OPEN push-buttons for 1-SI-MOV-1867A and/or 1867B.

SAT [] UNSAT [] NOTE _____

8. Verify that normal header cold-leg injection flow exists.

STANDARD

Candidate determines that cold-leg injection flow does not exist.

SAT [] UNSAT [] NOTE _____

9. Align 1-CH-P-1A to the normal header.

CRITICAL STANDARDS

Candidate places control switch for 1-CH-MOV-1286A in OPEN.

SAT [] UNSAT [] NOTE

10. Clossarging pump recirc valve for 1-CH-P-1A.

CRITICAL STANDARDS

Candidate places control switch for 1-CH-MOV-1275A in CLOSE .

SAT [] UNSAT [] NOTE

>>>> END OF EVALUATION <<<<<

6.

JPM QUESTION SHEET R...736

TOPIC: III-006

SYSTEM: Emergency Core Cooling K/A: 011EK3.13 (3.8/4.2)

QUESTION #1

QUESTION	ANSWER	S/U
Explain the reason Safety Injection System is transferred from the hot-leg recirculation mode back to the cold-leg recirculation mode in 1-ES-1.5, "Transfer From Hot Leg Recirculation to Cold Leg Recirculation."	Based on the NAPS ECCS design, the SI flow path should be alternated from the hot legs to the cold legs. This change in flow path is needed to address a concern relating to boron precipitation in the reactor vessel core region. If a relatively large pipe break or leakage occurs in the RCS hot leg and SI is injected into the RCS hot legs, then the boron concentration in the reactor core region may increase and approach the precipitation limit. In order to alleviate this situation, the irjection flow path should be changed so the low-head SI pump discharge flows back to the cold legs and the charging pump primary flow path is via the bit with the alternate pump and flow path to the cold leg injection path. REF. Vision Objective #: 13438	

TOPIC: III-006

SYSTEM: Emergency Core Cooling K/A: 006A2.13 (3.9/4.2)

QUESTION #2

QUESTION	ANSWER	S/IJ
Assuming that a spurious safety injection occurs with the unit at full power, explain the potential long-term consequences of failing to reset the recirculation mode signal using the SI RECIRC MODE RESET push-buttons.	Reseting a Safety Injection signal using the main benchboard's reset pushbuttons DOES NOT RESET the safety injection input signal for automatic swapover of the LHSI pump suction to the containment sump.	
	If this signal is not reset, it could result in the LHSI pumps shifting into the Recirc Mode automatically when RWST level decreases below the lo-lo level setpoint, such as during a refueling, and may destroy the LHSI Pumps.	
	To prevent this from occurring, the operator MUST depress the SI RECIRC MODE RESET pushbuttons after the safety injection signal has been reset.	
	This action is required to reset the safety injection input required to actuate this interlock circuit.	
	REF. Vision Objective #: 3432	

SIMULATOR SETUP

TASK

R...736 Transfer the Safety Injection System from hot-leg to cold-leg recirculation (1-ES-1.5).

CHECKLIST

Recall IC #1 (100% power)

Tag out 1-Ch-P-1C - non-rotaional

Enter malfunction MRC0101, time delay = 10, ramp = 60, start = 0, stop = 100

Go to RUN, and perform 1-E-0 to 1-E-1

When the Safety Injection System swaps to cold-leg recirculation, then perform the steps up through establishing redundant cold-leg injection flow paths (1-CH-P-1B flowing the boron injection tank and 1-CH-P-1A flowing the alternate header)

Swap to hot-leg recirculation in accordance with 1-ES-1.4

Enter the following malfunctions: MCH1602, TD = 0 SEC, TRGR = N/A

Place the simulator in FREEZE

Place the keys in SI-MOV-1890A, 1890B, 1869A, and 1869B

13438 Explain why the Safety Injection System is transferred from the hot-leg recirculation mode back to the cold-leg recirculation mode in 1-ES-1.5, "Transfer From Hot Leg Recirculation to Cold Leg Recirculation."

Based on the NAPS ECCS design, the SI flow path should be alternated from the hot legs to the cold legs. This change in flow path is needed to address a concern relating to boron precipitation in the reactor vessel core region. If a relatively large pipe break or leakage occurs in the RCS hot leg and SI is injected into the RCS hot legs, then the boron concentration in the reactor core region may increase and approach the precipitation limit. In order to alleviate this situation, the injection flow path should be changed so the low-head SI pump discharge flows back to the cold legs and the charging pump primary flow path is via the bit with the alternate pump and flow path to the cold leg injection path.

3432 Assuming that a spurious safety injection occurs with the unit at full power, explain the potential long-term consequences of failing to reset the recirculation mode signal using the SI RECIRC MODE RESET push-buttons.

Reseting a Safety Injection signal using the main benchboard's reset pushbuttons DOES NOT RESET the safety injection input signal for automatic swapover of the LHSI pump suction to the containment sump.

If this signal is not reset, it could result in the LHSI pumps shifting into the Recirc Mode automatically when RWST level decreases below the lo-lo level setpoint, such as during a refueling, and may destroy the LHSI Pumps.

To prevent this from occurring, the operator MUST depress the SI RECIRC MODE RESET pushbuttons after the safety injection signal has been reset.

This action is required to reset the safety injection input required to actuate this interlock circuit.

Refueling water storage tank level is currently 81%, and a large break loss of coolant accident is in progress. Calculate how long it will be before manual swapover to cold leg recirculation is required. Assume the following pumps are running at the specified flow rates:

"A" and "B" low head safety injection pumps (2500 gpm each)

"B" and "C" high head safety injection pumps (200 gpm each)

"A" and "B" quench spray pumps (1900 gpm each)

Disregard the volume of the chemical addition tank.

1.00
30 minutes
32 minutes
60 minutes
63 minutes
Vision objective number-3381

1-SC-5.12

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REACTOR OPERATOR/SENIOR REACTOR OPERATOR LIC INSE CLASS

JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE

R...514

INITIAL CONDITIONS

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Unit-1 is in mode 4.

It is day 5 of a 30-day refueling outage

1-RH-P-1B is in service with 2 RHR heat exchangers in service

INITIATING CUE

You are the OATC on watch.

REACTOR OPERATOR/SENIOR REACTOR OPERATOR LICENSE CLASS

JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE

R...514

Operator _____ Evaluator _____

Observer _____ Evaluation Date _____

Performance Evaluation [___] Satisfactory [___] Unsatisfactory

TASK

Restore residual heat removal flow (1-AP-11).

ALTERNATE - PATH TOPIC

Running RHR pump has a sheared shaft.

NOTE TO THE TRAINER AND THE EVALUATOR

Unless a specific evaluator's cue is provided, you should provide a cue indicating that the component or parameter is in the condition specified by the procedure.

INITIAL CONDITIONS

Unit-1 is in mode 4.

It is day 5 of a 30-day refueling outage

1-RH-P-1B is in service with 2 RHR heat exchangers in service

INITIATING CUE

You are the OATC on watch.

STANDARDS

Task was performed as directed by the procedure referenced in the task statement within parentheses (one of the <u>underlined</u> procedures if several are cited)

Self-checking practices were used throughout task performance

Verbal communication related to any of the following modes was conducted in accordance with VPAP-1407

- Emergency communication
- Face-to-face communication
- Giving and acknowledging orders
- Phonetic alphabet
- Telephone communication systems

Residual Heat Removal System flow is restored to normal

TOOLS AND EQUIPMENT

None

EVALUATION METHOD

Simulator

PERFORMANCE STEPS

1. Check if Reactor Coolant System level is decreasing.

STANDARD

Candidate determines that a loss of inventory is not in progress.

SAT [] UNSAT [] NOTE

2. Verify that the Residual Heat Removal System inlet isolation valves are open.

STANDARD

Candidate determines that 1-RH-MOV-1700 and 1701 are open.

SAT [] UNSAT [] NOTE

3. Verify that the Residual Heat Removal System outlet isolation valves are open.

STANDARD

Candidate determines that 1-RH-MOV-1720A and 1720B are open.

SAT [] UNSAT [] NOTE

4. Check that at least one residual heat removal pump is running.

STANDARD

Candidate determines that 1-RH-P-1B has a sheared shaft and is not to be considered as running.

SAT [] UNSAT [] NOTE

5. Manually close 1-RH-FCV-1605 and 1-RH-HCV-1758.

STANDARD

Candidate closes 1-RH-FCV-1605 and 1-RH-HCV-1758.

SAT [] UNSAT [] NOTE

6. Start one RHR pump.

CRITICAL STANDARD

Candidate starts 1-RH-P-1A.

SAT [] UNSAT [] NOTE

7. Verify RHR system parameters normal.

STANDARD

Candidate determines that RHR system is normal.

SAT [] UNSAT [] NOTE

8. Check service water to CC heat exchangers delta-P normal.

DEMONSTRATION CUES

The auxiliary building watchstander reports that SW to CC heat exchanger delta P is 12 PSID.

STANDARD

Candidate determines that the delta-p is normal.

SAT [] UNSAT [] NOTE _____

9. Check CC flow to RHR heat exchangers normal.

STANDARD

Candidate determines that CC flow to RHR heat exchangers is normal.

SAT [] UNSAT [] NOTE

10. Return to the procedure in effect.

SAT [] UNSAT [] NOTE

>>>> END OF EVALUATION <<<<<

JPM QUESTION SHEET R...514

TOPIC: IV-005

SYSTEM: Residual Heat Removal

K/A: GEN-2.1.20 (4.3/4.2)

QUESTION #1

QUESTION	ANSWER	S/U
 Assume the following conditions existed during the performance of the just completed JPM: Unit 1 is in mode 5. It is day 5 of a 30-day refueling outage. RHR pump amps are observed to be oscillating. RCS level is decreasing rapidly. The operating decreasing rapidly. The operating crew entered 1-AP-11 RCS inventory has been stabilized at +7 inches above centerline. RHR flow has been reduced to equal "design flow" for time after shutdow.n. 	 Since RCS level is +7 inches above centerline, current RHR flow is in the "unacceptable region". The following actions should be taken: 1. Continue RCS makeup. 2. Stop RHR pumps. 3. Go to step 11 REF. 1-AP-11 	

TOPIC: IV-005

SYSTEM: Residual Heat Removal K/A: 005A2.04 (2.9/2.9)

QUESTION #2

QUESTION	ANSWER	S/U
 Given the following conditions: Unit 1 is in mode 5 for a refueling outage. A VCT float has been established. Core off-load has not yet begun. An instrument air leak has developed inside containment. The containment instrument air TV has been closed and outside instrument air pressure is recovering. As containment instrument air decreases to zero, what will happen to RCS temperature and why? 	RCS temperature will decrease as 1-RH-HCV-1758 fails open and 1-RH-FCV- 1605 fails closed. REF. 11715-FM-94	

REACTOR OPERATOR/SENIOR REACTOR OPERATOR LICENSE CLASS

Job Performance Measure

R...164

INITIAL CONDITIONS

Unit startup from mode 4 to 3 is in progress

"A" and "C" RCPs are in service

Conditions have been established for starting the "B" RCP

The reactor coolant filter and a mixed bed ion exchanger are in service

INITIATING CUE

You are requested to start the "B" RCP.

REACTOR OPERATOR/SENIOR REACTOR OPERATOR LICENSE CLASS

Job Performance Measure

R...164

Candidate	Evaluator	
Evaluation Date		
Performance Evaluation	Satisfactory	Unsatisfactory

TASK

Start a reactor coolant pump.

NOTE TO THE TRAINER AND THE EVALUATOR

Unless a specific evaluator's cue is provided, you should provide a cue indicating that the component or parameter is in the condition specified by the procedure.

INITIAL CONDITIONS

Unit startup from mode 4 to 3 is in progress

"A" and "C" RCPs are in service

Conditions have been established for starting the "B" RCP

The reactor coolant filter and a mixed bed ion exchanger are in service

INITIATING CUE

You are requested to start the "B" RCP.

STANDARDS

Task was performed as directed by the procedure referenced in the task statement within parentheses (one of the <u>underlined</u> procedures if several are cited)

Self-checking practices were used throughout task performance

Verbal communication related to any of the following modes was conducted in accordance with VPAP-1407

- Emergency communication
- Face-to-face communication
- Giving and acknowledging orders
- Phonetic alphabet
- Telephone communication systems

Failed channel is placed in TEST within one hour

TOOLS AND EQUIPMENT

None

PREFERRED EVALUATION METHOD

Simulator

PERFORMANCE STEPS

1. Review initial conditions, precautions, and limitations.

STANDARD

Candidate reviews initial conditions, precautions, and limitations.

SAT [] UNSAT [] NOTE

2. Ensure seal return MOVs are open.

STANDARD

Candidate verifies 1-CH-MOV-1380 and 1381 are open.

SAT [] UNSAT [] NOTE

3. Verify "B" #1 seal leak off flow is within acceptable limits.

<u>STANDARD</u>

Candidate verifies acceptable flow IAW attachment 1.

SAT [] UNSAT [] NOTE

4. Verify "B" #1 seal delta-P is greater than 200 PSID.

STANDARD

Candidate verifies delta-P is >200 PSID.

SAT [] UNSAT [] NOTE

5. Start the "B" RCP bearing lift pump.

CRITICAL STANDARDS

Candidate places control switch for 1-RC-P-1B1 in START.

SAT [] UNSAT [] NOTE _____

6. Verify "B" RCP oil pressure start permissive indicating light is on.

STANDARD

Candidate observes that light is lit.

SAT [] UNSAT [] NOTE

7. Verify "B" RCP annunciators are not lit.

STANDARD

Candidate observes that annunciators are not lit.

SAT [] UNSAT [] NOTE _____

Ensure CVCS parameters are within spec.

STANDAFD

Candidate determines that CVCS parameters are within spec.

SAT [] UNSAT [] NOTE _____

9. Ensure CC parameters are within spec.

STANDARD

Candidate determines that CC parameters are within spec.

SAT [] UNSAT [] NOTE _____

10. Ensure RCS pressure is above required value.

STANDARD

Candidate verifies RCS pressure is > 280 PSIG.

SAT [] UNSAT [] NOTE

11. Verify that bearing lift pump has been running at least 2 minutes.

CRITICAL STANDARDS

Pump has been running at least 2 minutes.

SAT [] UNSAT [] NOTE

12. Start the "B" RCP.

CRITICAL STANDARDS

Candidate places the "B" RCP control switch to START, then to AUTO-AFTER-START.

SAT [] UNSAT [] NOTE

8.

13. Verify RCS flow is increasing.

STANDARD

.

Candidate observes RCS flow increasing.

SAT [] UNSAT [] NOTE

NOTE TO EVALUATOR: AT THIS POINT, #1 SEAL DELTA-P WILL BEGIN TO DECREASE.

14. Determine that #1 seal delta-P is decreasing to/is going below 200 PSID.

CRITICAL STANDARDS

Candidate stops "B" RCP.

SAT [] UNSAT [] NOTE

>>>> END OF EVALUATION <<<<<

JPM QUESTION SHEET R....57

TOPIC: VII-015

SYSTEM: Nuclear Instrumentation K/A: GEN-2.1.28 (3.2/3.3)

QUESTION #1

QUESTION	ANSWER	S/U
Given the following conditions:	The next start attempt may be made at 1715.	
 Unit 1 is in mode 3 The "A" RCP tripped at 1500 due 	REF. Vision Objective #: 10499, 1-	
to a faulty relay	OP-5.2	
The relay has been replacedAt 1615, the OATC started the		
"A" RCP, but inadvertently stopped		
 t was reaching full speed Another start was attempted at		2.2
1645, but it too was unsuccessful		
When may the next start attempt be made?		

TOPIC: VII-015 QUESTION #2

QUESTION	ANSWER	S/U
 Given the following conditions: The OATC is performing a computer calorimetric. The OATC inadvertently omits the heat input from the RCPs. 	By not considering the heat added by the RCPs, actual reactor power will less than calculated. $\dot{Q}_{Rx} = \dot{Q}_{S/G} + \dot{Q}_{S/G Blowdown} - \dot{Q}_{RCP's} - \dot{Q}_{Ptr Heaters}$	
Based on the above, what will the relationship be between actual power and calculated power?	REF. Vision Objective #: 7804	

10499 List the following requirements associated with starting a reactor coolant pump.

- Time required for the motor to be idle before any start attempt Allow motor to idle at least 30 minutes before any restart.
- Time required for the motor to be idle between the third and fourth start attempt Allow motor to idle at least 1 hour before fourth attempt.
- Number of start attempts allowed in a two-hour period Attempt only three starts in 2 hours.
- Reason for limiting the number of motor starts within a given time period
 To prevent damage to the stator due to overheating

7804 Explain the following concepts concerning the adjustment of the power-range nuclear instruments.

• Qualifications required of personnel who adjust the power-range instruments

The channel is adjusted by a licensed operator under the direct supervision of a senior reactor operator.

• Parameters used to calculate the secondary plant calorimetric

1 4

$$\dot{Q}_{Rx} = \dot{Q}_{S/G} + \dot{Q}_{S/G} Blowdown - \dot{Q}_{RCP's} - \dot{Q}_{PT} Heaters$$

• Maximum difference between the secondary plant calorimetric and the power-range nuclear instrument reading

Each power range channel at the North Anna Power Station is required to be within two percent of the calorimetric power level.

Virginia Power North Anna Power Station

REACTOR OPERATOR/SENIOR REACTOR OPERATOR LICENSE CLASS

Job Performance Measure

R...216

INITIAL CONDITIONS

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Unit 1 tripped from 100% power due to a main generator fault

While stabilizing the unit in 1-ES-0.1, a large break LOCA occurred

The STA has identified an orange path on Containment

INITIATING CUE

You are requested to respond in accordance with 1-FR-Z.1.

Virginia Power North Anna Power Station

REACTOR OPERATOR/SENIOR REACTOR OPERATOR LICENSE CLASS

Job Performance Measure

R...216

Candidate	Evaluator	
Evaluation Date		
Performance Evaluation	Satisfactory	Unsatisfactory

TASK

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Align the containment spray systems in response to high containment pressure (1-FR-Z.1).

NOTE TO THE TRAINER AND THE EVALUATOR

Unless a specific evaluator's cue is provided, you should provide a cue indicating that the component or parameter is in the condition specified by the procedure.

INITIAL CONDITIONS

Unit 1 tripped from 100% power due to a main generator fault

While stabilizing the unit in 1-ES-0.1, a large break LOCA occurred

The STA has identified an orange path on Containment

INITIATING CUE

You are requested to respond in accordance with 1-FR-Z.1.

STANDARDS

self-checking practices were used throughout task performance

Verbal communication related to any of the following modes was conducted in accordance with VPAP-1407

- Emergency communication
- Face-to-face communication
- Giving and acknowledging orders
- Phonetic alphabet
- Telephone communication systems

TOOLS AND EQUIPMENT

None

PREFERRED EVALUATION METHOD

Simulator

PERFORMANCE STEPS

1. Verify Phase A isolation valves closed.

STANDARD

Candidate observes Phase A trip valves are closed.

SAT [] UNSAT [] NOTE

2. Check if CDA is required.

STANDARD

Candidate determines that containment pressure has exceeded 28 PSIA.

SAT [] UNSAT [] NOTE

Manually actuate CDA.

CRITICAL STANDARDS

Candidate places both of the CDA switches to INITIATE.

SAT [] UNSAT [] NOTE

4. Verify CC pumps tripped.

CRITICAL STANDARDS

Candidate stops 1-CC-P-1A.

SAT [] UNSAT [] NOTE

5. Stop all RCPs.

CRITICAL STANDARDS

Candidate stops all RCPs.

SAT [] UNSAT [] NOTE

6. Verify Phase B isolation valves closed.

CRITICAL STANDARDS

Candidate closes 1-CC-TV-105A, B, C, 1-CC-TV-102A, C, E, 1-CC-TV-101A, 103A, and 1-IA-TV-102A.

STANDARD

Candidate observes all other Phase B isolation valves are closed.

SAT [] UNSAT [] NOTE

7. Verify at least two service water pumps running.

STANDARD

Candidate observes both SW pumps running.

3.

SAT [] UNSAT [] NOTE

8. Verify SW supply to CC HXs closed.

CRITICAL STANDARDS

Candidate closes 1-SW-MOV-108A.

SAT [] UNSAT [] NOTE

9. Verify SW supply to recirc spray HXs open.

CRITICAL STANDARDS

Candidate opens 1-SW-MOV-103A, 101A, 103D, and 101C.

SAT [] UNSAT [] NOTE

10. Verify SW return from recirc spray HXs open.

CRITICAL STANDARDS

Candidate opens 1-SW-MOV-104A, 105A, 104D, and 105C.

SAT [] UNSAT [] NOTE

11. Verify proper operation of the "H" train containment spray systems.

CRITICAL STANDARDS

Candidate opens 1-QS-MOV-101A and 1-RS-MOV-100A. Candidate starts 1-RS-P-1A, 2A, 3A, and 1-QS-P-1A.

SAT [] UNSAT [] NOTE

12. Verify proper operation of the "J" train containment spray systems.

STANDARD

Candidate observes all "J" equipment operating.

SAT [] UNSAT [] NOTE

13. Verify MSTVs and bypass valves closed.

STANDARD

Candidate observes valves are closed.

SAT [] UNSAT [] NOTE _____

14. Check if feed flow should be isolated to any SG.

STANDARD

Candidate determines that SGs are not faulted.

SAT [] UNSAT [] NOTE

15. Check containment hydrogen concentration.

EVALUATOR'S CUE

Assume another operator will complete this procedure.

SAT [] UNSAT [] NOTE

>>>> END OF EVALUATION <<<<<

JPM QUESTION SHEET R...765

TOPIC: V-028

SYSTEM: Hydrogen Analyzer K/A: 028K5.01 (3.4/3.9):

QUESTION #1

QUESTION'	ANSWER	S/U
 Given the following conditions: Unit 1 has suffered a LOCA The crew is cooling down the plant using 1-ES-1.2, "POST-LOCA COOLDOWN AND DEPRESSURIZATION". Containment sump level is 2.5' Containment hydrogen concentration is 17%. They are at the point of isolating accumulators Unknown to the crew, the wiring to 1- SI-MOV-1865B has been damaged. Given the above conditions, what might occur if a spark developed during the energizing of 1-SI-MOV-1865B, and what indications would the control room see? 	Since containment hydrogen concentration is 17%, any spark could cause an explosion, which would cause a spike in containment pressure. REF. Vision Objective #: 5450, 12654, 13008	

TOPIC: V-028

SYSTEM: Hydrogen Analyzer K/A: GEN-2.1.28 (3.2/.3.3)

QUESTION #2

QUESTION	ANSWER	S/U
Why does the procedure require you to place the hydrogen analyzer heat tracing in service?	This maintains sample line temperature at approximately 285°F to prevent condensation and equipment malfunction damage. This heat tracing extends from outside Containment to the inlet to the hydrogen analyzer. REF. Vision Objective #: 5433	

SIMULATOR SETUP

TASK

R. 765 Place a containment hydrogen analyzer in operation (1-OP-63.2).

CHECKLIST

Reca'l IC #1 (100% power)

5450 List the following information associated with hydrogen in containment.

- Minimum hydrogen concentration required for hydrogen to burn if ignited
- Minimum hydrogen concentration required for hydrogen to detonate if ignited

% hydrogen in air by volume	Characteristics
4% to 15%	Hydrogen will burn
15% to 60%	Hydrogen will detonate/explode
60% to 74%	Hydrogen will burn

Hydrogen characteristics in dry air:

12654 Explain why an extreme challenge to the containment barrier exists if containment pressure is greater than the design pressure (1-F-0).

The extreme challenge to the containment boundary does not necessarily come from the pressure alone, but rather from the potential additional pressure spike which would accompany a hydrogen ignition inside containment. The total pressure could then potentially exceed the strength of containment. Also, above containment design pressure, leakage may exceed design basis limits.

13008 Explain the following concepts associated with 1-FR-Z.1, "Response to High Containment Pressure."

*

• Why excessive hydrogen concentration in containment is a concern with respect to containment integrity

A hydrogen burn/explosion could cause a pressure spike which may challenge the containments integrity.

- 5433 Explain the following concepts associated with hydrogen analyzer H₂A-HC-101.
 - Why the containment sample line is heat traced

This maintains sample line temperature at approximately 285°F to prevent condensation and equipment malfunction damage. This heat tracing extends from outside Containment to the inlet to the hydrogen analyzer.

• How a low temperature in the heated sample compartment affects detector operability

Inlet gas is heated to 275 to 300 °F by electric heaters. This elevated temperature is necessary for the operation of the analyzer cell within its designed accuracy. If the temperature drops to 250 degree F, an alarm lamp is energized on the local analyzer panel.

Virginia Power North Anna Power Station

REACTOR OPERATOR/SENIOR REACTOR OPERATOR LICENSE CLASS

Job Performance Measure

R...577

INITIAL CONDITIONS

Residual Heat Removal System is in service

Reactor was manually tripped due to a loss of all reactor coolant pump seal cooling

Unit-1 "H" emergency diesel generator is tagged out for maintenance

Shift supervisor desires to maintain "J" bus powered equipment operable

1-ES-0.2A, "Natural Circulation Cooldown with CRDM Fans," has been completed to the point of determining if systems should be aligned for NDT protection

INITIATING CUE

You are requested to align each pressurizer PORV for NDT protection in accordance with step 22 of 1-ES-0.2A.

Virginia Power North Anna Power Station

REACTOR OPERATOR/SENIOR REACTOR OPERATOR LICENSE CLASS

Job Performance Measure

R...577

Candidate	Evaluator	
Evaluation Date		
Performance Evaluation	Satisfactory	Unsatisfactory

TASK

Place NDT protection in service during a natural circulation cooldown (<u>1-ES-0.2A</u>, 1-ES-0.2B).

NOTE TO THE TRAINER AND THE EVALUATOR

Unless a specific evaluator's cue is provided, you should provide a cue indicating that the component or parameter is in the condition specified by the procedure.

INITIAL CONDITIONS

Residual Heat Removal System is in service

Reactor was manually tripped due to a loss of all reactor coolant pump seal cooling

Unit-1 "H" emergency diesel generator is tagged out for maintenance

Shift supervisor desires to maintain "J" bus powered equipment operable

1-ES-0.2A, "Natural Circulation Cooldown with CRDM Fans," has been completed to the point of determining if systems should be aligned for NDT protection

INITIATING CUE

You are requested to align each pressurizer PORV for NDT protection in accordance with step 22 of 1-ES-0.2A.

STANDARDS

Task was performed as directed by the procedure referenced in the task statement within parentheses (one of the <u>underlined</u> procedures if several are cited)

Self-checking practices were used throughout task performance

Verbal communication related to any of the following modes was conducted in accordance with VPAP-1407

- Emergency communication
- Face-to-face communication
- Giving and acknowledging orders
- Phonetic alphabet
- Telephone communication systems

TOOLS AND EQUIPMENT

Pressurizer power-operated relief valve NDT protection keys

Copy of 1-ES-0.2A signed off to the point of determining if systems should be aligned for NDT protection

PREFERRED EVALUATION METHOD

Simulator

PERFORMANCE STEPS

1. Verify that Reactor Coolant System cold-leg temperatures will be less than the required value within one hour.

SAT [] UNSAT [] NOTE

2. Place one low-head safety injection pump in PULL-TO-LOCK.

CRITICAL STANDARDS

Candidate places control switch for 1-SI-P-1A in PULL-TO-LOCK.

SAT [] UNSAT [] NOTE

3. Place all but one charging pump in PULL-TO-LOCK.

CRITICAL STANDARDS

Candidate places control switches for 1-CH-P-1A and 1C in PULL-TO-LOCK.

SAT [] UNSAT [] NOTE

4. Verify that RCS pressure is less than the required value.

STANDARD

Candidate checks RCS pressure.

SAT [] UNSAT [] NOTE _____

5. Close pressurizer power-operated relief block valve 1-RC-MOV-1535.

CRITICAL STANDARDS

Candidate closes pressurizer power-operated relief block valve 1-RC-MOV-1535.

SAT [] UNSAT [] NOTE _____

6. Open pressurizer power-operated relief valve 1-RC-PCV-1456.

CRITICAL STANDARDS

Candidate opens pressurizer power-operated relief valve 1-RC-PCV-1456.

SAT [] UNSAT [] NOTE _____

Close pressurizer power-operated relief valve 1-RC-PCV-1456.

CRITICAL STANDARDS

Candidate closes pressurizer power-operated relief valve 1-RC-PCV-1456.

SAT [] UNSAT [] NOTE

8. Open pressurizer power-operated relief block valve 1-RC-MOV-1535.

CRITICAL STANDARDS

Candidate opens pressurizer power-operated relief block valve 1-RC-MOV-1535.

SAT [] UNSAT [] NOTE _____

9. Close pressurizer power-operated relief block valve 1-RC-MOV-1536.

CRITICAL STANDARDS

Candidate closes pressurizer power-operated relief block valve 1-RC-MOV-1536.

SAT [] UNSAT [] NOTE

10. Open pressurizer power-operated relief valve 1-RC-PCV-1455C.

CRITICAL STANDARDS

Candidate opens pressurizer power-operated relief valve 1-RC-PCV-1455C.

SAT [] UNSAT [] NOTE _____

11. Close pressurizer power-operated relief valve 1-RC-PCV-1455C.

CRITICAL STANDARDS

Candidate closes pressurizer power-operated relief valve 1-RC-PCV-1455C.

SAT [] UNSAT [] NOTE

7.

12. Open pressurizer power-operated relief block valve 1-RC-MOV-1536.

CRITICAL STANDARDS

Candidate opens pressurizer power-operated relief block valve 1-RC-MOV-1536.

SAT [] UNSAT [] NOTE

13. Place the pressurizer power-operated relief valve key switches in AUTO.

CRITICAL STANDARDS

Candidate places PRZR power-operated relief valve 1-RC-PCV-1455C and 1456 NDT protection key switches in AUTO.

SAT [] UNSAT [] NOTE _____

14. Depressurize safety injection accumulators.

VERBAL-VISUAL CUES

Assume that another operator will complete this procedure

SAT [] UNSAT [] NOTE

>>>> END OF EVALUATION <<<<<

JPM QUESTION SHEET R...577

TOPIC: III-010

SYSTEM: Pressurizer Pressure Control K/A: 010A4.03 (4.0/3.8)

QUESTION #1

QUESTION	ANSWER	S/U
 Given the following conditions: Unit is operating at 100% power. 1-RC-PCV-1456 fails open. Actions to close it IAW 1-AP-44 have failed. In an attempt to isolate the open PORV, the operator mistakenly takes the control switch for 1-RC-MOV-1535 to CLOSE. Realizing his error, he immediately takes the switch back to OPEN. 	Once valve travel is initiated by placing the handswitch to the "Open" or "Close" position, the handswitch can be shifted to and maintained in opposite position, but valve travel will continue until either the "full-open" or "full-closed" position is reached. <u>At that time</u> the valve will reverse direction and continue stroking until the valve position matches the handswitch position.	
Describe the valve's response to these action's.	REF. Vision Objective #: 3499	

TOPIC: III-010 SYSTEM: Pressurizer Pressure Control K/A: 010A1.09 (3.4/3.7)

QUESTION #2

17

QUESTION	ANSWER	S/U
Given the following conditions: • The unit is operating at 100%	281°F	
 power when a PRZR safety valve fails partially open. PRZR pressure is 1910 PSIG PRZR vapor temperature is 630°F 	REF. Steam Tables	
 RCS Tave is 550°F PRT pressure is 35 PSIG. 		
What is the PRZR safety valve tail- pipe temperature?		

- 3499 Explain the purpose of the following pressurizer components.
 - Power-operated relief valve block valves

Each PORV has a blocking valve (MOV-1535 and 1536) located upstream of it. The motor-operated valves are normally open, but they are used to isolate a PORV which does not fully reseat after opening or is experiencing leakage. These blocking valves are controlled from the MCR. Once valve travel is initiated by placing the handswitch to the "Open" or "Close" position, the handswitch can be shifted to and maintained in opposite position, but valve travel will continue until either the "full-open" or "full-closed" position is reached. At that time the valve will reverse direction and continue stroking until the valve position matches the handswitch position.

Virginia Power North Anna Power Station

REACTOR OPERATOR/SENIOR REACTOR OPERATOR LICENSE CLASS

Job Performance Measure

N...466

INITIAL CONDITIONS

Control room is uninhabitable

The 1H emergency diesel generator is carrying the 1H emergency bus in the CRE mode

The 1H EDG started on a UV signal

Normal emergency bus power supply is available

Breaker 15F3 is closed

INITIATING CUE

You are requested to unload and shut down an emergency diesel generator in the control room emergency mode.

Virginia Power North Anna Power Station

REACTOR OPERATOR/SENIOR REACTOR OPERATOR LICENSE CLASS

Job Performance Measure

N...466

Candidate _____ Evaluator

Evaluation Date ____

Performance Evaluation Unsatisfactory

_____ Satisfactory

TASK

Unload and shut down an emergency diesel generator in the control room emergency mode (1-OP-6.5).

NOTE TO THE TRAINER AND THE EVALUATOR

Unless a specific evaluator's cue is provided, you should provide a cue indicating that the component or parameter is in the condition specified by the procedure.

INITIAL CONDITIONS

Control room is uninhabitable

The 1H emergency diesel generator is carrying the 1H emergency bus in the CRE mode

The 1H EDG started on a UV signal

Normal emergency bus power supply is available

Breaker 15F3 is closed

INITIATING CUE

You are requested to unload and shut down an emergency diesel generator in the control room emergency mode.

STANDARDS

Task was performed as directed by the procedure referenced in the task statement within parentheses (one of the <u>underlined</u> procedures if several are cited)

Self-checking practices were used throughout task performance

Verbal communication related to any of the following modes was conducted in accordance with VPAP-1407

- Emergency communication
- Face-to-face communication
- Giving and acknowledging orders
- Phonetic alphabet
- Telephone communication systems

TOOLS AND EQUIPMENT

Administrative key

Sync key

1H and 2H diesel swap-over remote panel isolation switch key (#67)

PREFERRED EVALUATION METHOD

Verbal-visual

PERFORMANCE STEPS

Verify that the emergency but normal feeder breaker, 15H11, is open.

STANDARD

Candidate verifies that the emergency bus normal feeder breaker, 15H11, is open.

VERBAL-VISUAL CUES

The green indicating light for 15H11 is lit.

SAT [] UNSAT [] NOTE

2. Ensure that breaker, 15F3, is closed.

STANDARD

Candidate determines that 15F3, is closed from intial conditions.

SAT [] UNSAT [] NOTE

3. Turn on the 15H11 synch switch.

CRITICAL STANDARDS

Candidate turns on synch switch.

SAT [] UNSAT [] NOTE

4. Turn the droop/isochronous switch to droop.

CRITICAL STANDARDS

Candidate places the droop/isochronous switch in DROOP. SAT [] UNSAT [] NOTE 5. Adjust 1H EDG voltage, as required.

STANDARD

Candidate adjusts 1H EDG voltage (incoming) to 1 to 2 volts higher than "C" RSST (running).

VERBAL-VISUAL CUES

1H EDG voltage (incoming) is 120, "C" RSST (running) is 118.

SAT [] UNSAT [] NOTE

6. Adjust 1H EDG speed, as required.

CRITICAL STANDARDS

Candidate adjusts 1H EDG speed until synch scope is moving very slowly (1 rotation in 20 seconds or longer) in the fast direction.

SAT [] UNSAT [] NOTE

7. Verify that no diesel normal shutdown alarms are locked in.

STANDARD

Candidate verifies that no diesel normal shutdown alarms are locked in.

VERBAL-VISUAL CUES

No diesel normal shutdown alarms are locked in.

SAT [] UNSAT [] NOTE

8. Close the emergency bus normal power supply, 15H11.

CRITICAL STANDARDS

Candidate closes 15H11 when synch scope reaches 1-minute to 12 o'clock.

VERBAL-VISUAL CUES

The red indicating light for 15H11 is lit.

SAT [] UNSAT [] NOTE

9. Adjust power factor and turn off the 15H11 synch switch.

STANDARD

Candidate adjusts power factor to 0 KVAR and turns off 15H11 synch switch.

VERBAL-VISUAL CUES

Vars are at 0.

SAT [] UNSAT [] NOTE

10. Adjust the speed and voltage, as required, to unload the diesel.

CRITICAL STANDARDS

Candidate adjusts load to below 100KW over a 2-3 minute period.

VERBAL-VISUAL CUES

Diesel load is 100 KW.

SAT [] UNSAT [] NOTE

11. Open 15H2.

CRITICAL STANDARDS

Candidate opens 15H2.

VERBAL-VISUAL CUES

The green indicating light for 15H2 is lit

SAT [] UNSAT [] NOTE

12. Turn the droop/isochronous switch to droop.

STANDARD

Candidate verifies the droop/isochronous switch is in DROOP.

SAT [] UNSAT [] NOTE

13. Adjust 1H EDG speed to 900 RPM.

STANDARD

Candidate adjusts 1H EDG speed to 900 RPM.

VERBAL-VISUAL CUES

Diesel speed is 900 RPM.

SAT [] UNSAT [] NOTE

14. Turn the droop/isochronous switch to off.

CRITICAL STANDARDS

Candidate places the droop/isochronous switch in OFF. SAT [] UNSAT [] NOTE 15. Turn the 15H2 synch switch to on.

STANDARD

Candidate places the 15H2 synch switch to on. SAT [] UNSAT [] NOTE

16. Adjust 1H EDG voltage.

STANDARD

Candidate adjusts 1H EDG voltage (incoming) to 119-120 volts.

VERBAL-VISUAL CUES

1H EDG voltage (incoming) is 120 volts.

SAT [] UNSAT [] NOTE

17. Turn the 15H2 synch switch to off.

STANDARD

Candidate places the 15H2 synch switch to off.

SAT [] UNSAT [] NOTE

18. Cool down the diesel.

STANDARD

Candidate allows the EDG to run for 5 minutes un-loaded.

VERBAL-VISUAL CUES

Assume 5 minutes has ellapsed.

SAT [] UNSAT [] NOTE

19. Ensure 15H2 is in auto-after-trip.

STANDARD

Candidate ensures 15H2 is in auto-after-trip. VERBAL-VISUAL CUES

15H2 has a green "flag".

SAT [] UNSAT [] NOTE

20. Shutdown the diesel.

CRITICAL STANDARDS

Candidate pushes both ENGINE STOP push buttons.

VERBAL-VISUAL CUES

The diesel is coasting to a stop.

SAT (] UNSAT [] NOTE

21. Check if 1H EDG door was blocked open.

CRITICAL STANDARDS

Candidate checks status of door.

VERBAL-VISUAL CUES

The door was as you found it.

SAT [] UNSAT [] NOTE

22. Verify the control room is habitable.

VERBAL-VISUAL CUES

Assume another operator will complete this procedure.

SAT [] UNSAT [] NOTE

>>>> END OF EVALUATION <<<<<

JPM QUESTION SHEET

N...466

TOPIC: VI-064 SYSTEM: Emergency Diesel GeneraltorA3.06 (3.3/3.4)

QUESTION #1

QUESTION	ANSWER	s/u
With the emergency diesel generator CRE switch in EMERGENCY, how can the diesel be started and	Can be started using the blue start pushbutton on CRE panel.	
stopped?	Can be stopped using either:	
	2/2 emergency stop PB's on CRE panel.	
	or	1.1.3
	2/2 emergency stop PB's on MCR diesel panel.	
	REF. Vision Objective #: 6299, 11715-ESK-11C	

TOPIC: VI-064 SYSTEM: Emergency Diesel Generalton (2.8/3.2)

QUESTION #2

QUESTION	ANSWER	s/U
Concerning the emergency diesel generators, when is speed droop in service?	Speed droop is automatically in service whenever:	
	the EDG is supplying power to the 4 Kv emergency bus in parallel with another power source,	
	or	
	the EDG output breaker is synchronized (i.e. synch key or) to close onto an emergency bus that is already powered by another power source,	
	or	
	another power source breaker is synchronized (i.e. synch key on) to close onto an emergency bus that is already powered by the EDG.	
	REF. VISION CBJ. 6305, 11715-ESK-11C	

- 6299 Identify the push-buttons that will start and stop a diesel generator when each of the following switch alignments exist.
 - Mode selector switch in AUTO REMOTE

2/2 emergency stop PB's on CRE panel 2/2 emergency stop PB's on MCR diesel panel

Mode selector switch in MAN REMOTE

Start pushbutton on diesel panel in the MCR (Auto prelube occurs prior to EDG start) 2/2 emergency stop PB's on CRE panel 2/2 emergency stop PB's on MCR diesel panel

Mode selector switch in MAN LOCAL

Start pushbutton on EDG skid gageboard All automatic starts are blocked 2/2 emergency stop PB's on CRE panel 2/2 emergency stop PB's on MCR diesel panel

CRE switch in EMERG

Blue start pushbutton on CRE panel (All odd # CRE contacts close with CRE switch in emergency) 2/2 emergency stop PB's on CRE panel 2/2 emergency stop PB's on MCR diesel panel

- 6305 Explain the following concepts concerning speed droop on the diesel generators.
 - Purpose

Speed droop stabilizes the load sharing between the generator and a larger (infinite) power source, such as the Virginia Power grid.

Differences between the two types of speed droop provided

Speed droop is used during parallel operations. Without the droop characteristics (referred to as isochronous operation), the generator does not have a load sharing characteristic.

When speed droop is automatically in service

circuits have droop characteristics inserted whenever:

- 1. the EDG is supplying power to the 4 Kv emergency bus in parallel with another power source, or
- the EDG output breaker is synchronized to close onto an emergency bus that is already powered by another power source, or
- another power source breaker is synchronized to close onto an emergency bus that is already powered by the EDG.
- How the diesel generator would respond to load changes with speed droop in service while carrying the emergency bus alone (non-parallel operation)

With speed droop control present and the EDG as the sole power supplier to a load, as the generator load increases, the speed set of the mechanical governor is lowered, causing the engine to operate at lower steadystate speeds.

 How the diesel generator would respond to load changes with speed droop <u>out of</u> service while carrying the emergency bus with another source (parallel operation)

Without the droop characteristics (referred to as isochronous operation), the generator does not have a load sharing characteristic.

If the flat isochronous EDG characteristic were used, the EDG would pick up no load, all the load, or the load would shift between the two in an unstable manner.

REACTOR OPERATOR/SENIOR REACTOR OPERATOR LICENSE CLASS

Job Performance Measure

N...935

INITIAL CONDITIONS

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Auxiliary feedwater pump, 1-FW-P-3A, discharge piping upstream of the discharge check valve is hot to the touch

1-FW-P-3A has been tagged out electrically

INITIATING CUE

You are requested to collapse steam voids in 1-FW-P-3A in accordance with 1-OP-31.09. You are <u>not</u> required to clear tags or perform periodic testing.

REACTOR OPERATOR/SENIOR REACTOR OPERATOR LICENSE CLASS

Job Performance Measure

N...935

Candidate	Evaluator	Evaluator	
Evaluation Date			
Performance Evaluation	Satisfactory	Unsatisfactory	

TASK

Collapse steam voids in a steam-bound auxiliary feedwater pump (1-OP-31.09).

NOTE TO THE TRAINER AND THE EVALUATOR

Unless a specific evaluator's cue is provided, you should provide a cue indicating that the component or parameter is in the condition specified by the procedure.

INITIAL CONDITIONS

Auxiliary feedwater pump, 1-FW-P-3A discharge piping upstream of the discharge check valve is hot to the touch

1-FW-P-3A has been tagged out electrically

INITIATING CUE

You are requested to collapse steam voids in 1-FW-P-3A in accordance with 1-OP-31.09. You are <u>not</u> required to clear tags or perform periodic testing.

STANDARDS

Task was performed as directed by the procedure referenced in the task statement within parentheses (one of the <u>underlined</u> procedures if several are cited)

Self-checking practices were used throughout task performance

Verbal communication related to any of the following modes was conducted in accordance with VPAP-1407

- Emergency communication
- Face-to-face communication
- Giving and acknowledging orders
- Phonetic alphabet
- Telephone communication systems

Tagging was performed in accordance with approved practices

TOOLS AND EQUIPMENT

Administrative key - CANDIDATE MUST SIMULATE OBTAINING ADMIN. KEY PRIOR TO "UN-LOCKING" ANY ADMIN. LOCK.

Pipe wrench - CANDIDATE MUST SIMULATE OBTAINING PIPE WRENCH PRIOR TO "REMOVING" ANY PIPE CAP.

PREFERRED EVALUATION METHOD

Verbal-visual

PERFORMANCE STEPS

1. Tag out the pump's prime mover.

STANDARD

Candidate notes initial conditions stated that 1-FW-P-3A breaker has been danger-tagged.

SAT [] UNSAT [] NOTE

Isolate the pump's suction and discharge paths.

CRITICAL STANDARDS

Candidate unlocks and closes 1-FW-172 and 160.

STANDARD

Candidate checks 1-FW-166 and 162 closed.

SAT [] UNSAT [] NOTE

3. Vent the pump.

CRITICAL STANDARDS

Candidate removes pipe caps from casing vents, and 1-FW-252 and 532 are cracked open.

VERBAL-VISUAL CUES

Assume that several minutes have passed and that 1-FW-PI-156B reads 0 PSIG.

SAT [] UNSAT [] NOTE

Throttle open the pump's suction from the emergency condensate storage tank in order 4. to cool the pump's casing.

CRITICAL STANDARDS

Candidate cracks open 1-FW-160.

VERBAL-VISUAL CUES

Assume that several minutes have passed and the pump casing is now cool

SAT [] UNSAT [] NOTE

2.

5. When the pump's casing has been cooled, return the pump to its normal alignment.

CRITICAL STANDARDS

Candidate closes 1-FW-252 and 532.

Candidate opens 1-FW-160 and 172.

STANDARD

.

Candidate checks 1-FW-166 and 162 closed.

SAT [] UNSAT [] NOTE _____

6. Clear the tag-out on the pump's prime mover.

VERBAL-VISUAL CUES

Assume that another operator will complete this procedure

SAT [] UNSAT [] NOTE

>>>> END OF EVALUATION <<<<<

JPM QUESTION SHEET N...935

TOPIC: IV-061

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SYSTEM: Aux. Feed K/A: 061A2.06 (2.7/3.0)

QUESTION #1

QUESTION	ANSWER	S/U
What are the adverse effects of having a steam-bound AFW pump?	If an AFW pump becomes steam bound, the possibility exists that upon starting NPSH will not be available, and the pump will not deliver flow to the steam generator. REF. Vision Objective #: 5977	

TOPIC: IV-061

SYSTEM: Aux. Feed

K/A: 061K4.02 (4.5/4.6)

QUESTION #2

QUESTION	ANSWER	S/U	
Describe the operator actions required for manually stopping a motor-driven auxiliary feedwater pump from the auxiliary shutdown panel following an automatic start. Assume control has already been	If a safety injection signal is present, regardless of which signal actually started the pump, then SI must be reset before the pump can be manually stopped.		
transfered to the auxiliary shutdown panel.	If no SI signal is present, then the pump can be manually stopped without clearing the AUTO-START signals, however if the control switch is returned to AUTO, the pump will re-start.		
	REF. Vision Objective #:10173, 11715-ESK-5AA/5AB		

- 5977 Explain the following concepts associated with steam binding of the auxiliary feedwater pumps.
 - Probable cause

The most probable cause of steam binding of an auxiliary feedwater pump is back-leakage through its associated discharge check valves.

• Possible consequences if a pump becomes steam-bound

If an AFW pump becomes steam bound, the possibility exists that upon starting NPSH will not be available, and the pump will not deliver flow to the steam generator.

• Methods used to detect when a pump may be steam-bound

The AFW pumps are monitored for possible steam binding by the safeguards operator. Indication of steam binding is a pump casing that is hot to the touch.

10173 List the operator actions required for manually stopping a motor-driven auxiliary feedwater pump from the auxiliary shutdown panel following an automatic start.

If a safety injection signal is present, regardless of which signal actually started the pump, then SI must be reset before the pump can be manually stopped. {If the control room is inaccessible, the pump's control switch could be placed in PULL-TO-LOCK, then the breaker tripped open <u>locally</u> at the breaker cabinet. The breaker will not automatically re-close with the switch in PTL.}

If no SI signal is present, then the pump can be manually stopped without clearing the AUTO-START signals, however if the control switch is returned to AUTO, the pump will re-start.

REACTOR OPERATOR/SENIOR REACTOR OPERATOR LICENSE CLASS

JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE

N...230

INITIAL CONDITIONS

Component cooling surge tank level is 70%.

INITIATING CUE

You are requested to drain 10% from the component cooling water surge tank to both 1-LW-TK-5A and 1-LW-TK-5B IAW 0-OP-51.3

REACTOR OPERATOR/SENIOR REACTOR OPERATOR LICENSE CLASS

JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE

N...230

Operator Eva	aluator
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Observer _____ Evaluation Date _____

Performance Evaluation [__] Satisfactory [__] Unsatisfactory

TASK

Drain the Component Cooling Water System to a liquid waste test tank on the auxiliary building watchtation (0-OP-51.3).

TASK COMPLETION TIMES

Approximate = 10 minutes Actual = minutes

LICENSED OPERATOR REQUALIFICATION PROGRAM

JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE

N...230

TASK

Drain the Component Cooling Water System to a liquid waste test tank on the auxiliary building watchtat on (0-OP-51.3).

NOTE TO THE TRAINER AND THE EVALUATOR

Unless a specific evaluator's cue is provided, you should provide a cue indicating that the component or parameter is in the condition specified by the procedure.

INITIAL CONDITIONS

Component cooling surge tank level is 70%.

INITIATING CUE

You are requested to drain 10% from the component cooling water surge tank to 1-LW-TK-5A and 1-LW-TK-5B IAW 0-OP-51.3

STANDARDS

Task was performed as directed by the procedure referenced in the task statement within parentheses (one of the <u>underlined</u> procedures if several are cited)

Self-checking practices were used throughout task performance

Verbal communication related to any of the following modes was conducted in accordance with VPAP-1407

- Emergency communication
- Face-to-face communication
- Giving and acknowledging orders
- Phonetic alphabet
- Telephone communication systems

TOOLS AND EQUIPMENT

None

EVALUATION METHOD

Verbal-visual

PERFORMANCE STEPS

1. Verify that the liquid waste test tank pumps are isolated.

STANDARD

Candidate verifies the following valves closed: 1-LW-76, 1-LW-87, 1-LW-1003

SAT [] UNSAT [] NOTE

2. Align the desired test tank(s).

CRITICAL STANDARDS

Candidate opens 1-LW-86, 1-LW-75, 1-LW-74 and 1-LW-1002.

SAT [] UNSAT [] NOTE

3. Request the control room operator to monitor component cooling surge tank level.

STANDARD

Candidate informs OATC that he will be draining the CC head tank.

SAT [] UNSAT [] NOTE

4. Begin draining the surge tank to the test tank(s).

CRITICAL STANDARDS

Candidate throttles open 1-CC-1012.

SAT [] UNSAT [] NOTE

5. When notified by the control room operator that the desired surge tank level is reached, secure the draining.

VERBAL-VISUAL CUES

χ.

The control room reports that CC surge tank level is 60%.

CRITICAL STANDARDS

Candidate closes 1-CC-1012.

SAT [] UNSAT [] NOTE

6. Secure the test tank(s) alignment.

STANDARD

Candidate closes 1-LW-86, 1-LW-75, 1-LW-74 and 1-LW-1002.

SAT [] UNSAT [] NOTE

>>>> END OF EVALUATION <<<<<

JPM QUESTION SHEET N...230

TOPIC: VIII-008

SYSTEM: Component Cooling K/A: 008K4.01 (3.1/3.3)

QUESTION #1

QUESTION	ANSWER	S/U
1-CC-P-1A is running, normal feeder to 1J bus trips open, 1J EDG starts and powers up the bus. What is the status of CC pumps?	Both CC pumps will be running. REF. Vision Objective #: 3656, 11715-ESK- 005P/Q	

TOPIC: VIII-008

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SYSTEM: Component Cooling K/A: 008A1.01 (2.8/2.9)

QUESTION #2

QUESTION	ANSWER	S/U
Explain how shifting the Component Cooling Water System common loads supply from one unit to the other will affect each unit's reactor coolant pump component cooling water flows.	Since the component cooling water system is normally operated cross-connected between units, shifting common loads has no effect on the system.	
	If the CC system is being operated with the units split, then one unit or the other will supply common CC loads. When the Component Cooling Water System common loads supply is shifted from one unit to the other, the affect on each unit's reactor coolant pump component cooling water flows will be as follows: RCP CC flows will be lowered on the unit supplying common loads because the unit supply header pressure will continue to drop after the recirculation valve (PCV-110) has fully closed. REF. Vision Objective #: 3686,	

3656 List the following information associated with the component cooling water pumps.

- Power supply to each pump
 - The component cooling water pumps are powered from the 4160 volt stub-busses:
- Interlocks associated with manually starting a pump

To manually start CC pump 1-CC-P-1A, the following conditions must exist:

No ground or phase overcurrent condition exists

Normal voltage on the supply bus for at least 20 seconds

No CDA signal present

Interlocks associated with automatically starting a pump

A CC pump will automatically start, provided all of the following conditions exist:

Selected control switch in AUTO as appropriate (local or remote),

No CDA signal

No ground or phase overcurrent condition

Either:

Auto-trip signal on opposite pump or undervoltage condition on the opposite bus, assuming no UV/DV signal on supply bus for at least 20 seconds

Following a UV/DV on supply bus: power restored for at least 15 seconds, but no more than 20 seconds.

Interlocks associated with automatically tripping a pump

The following conditions will automatically trip a CC pump:

Undervoltage condition on the supply bus

CDA signal

Ground or phase overcurrent condition

3686 Explain how shifting the Component Cooling Water System common loads supply from one unit to the other will affect each unit's reactor coolant pump component cooling water flows.

Since the component cooling water system is normally operated cross-connected between units, shifting common loads has no effect on the system. If the CC system is being operated with the units split, then one unit or the other will supply common CC loads. When the Component Cooling Water System common loads supply is shifted from one unit to the other will affect each unit's reactor coolant pump component cooling water flows as follows: RCP CC flows will be lowered on the unit supplying common loads because the unit supply header pressure will continue to drop after the recirculation valve (PCV-110) has fully closed.

ES-301

Scenario Events

Form ES-301-3

Simulation Facility: North Anna Examiners: <u>Paul Steiner</u>			Applicants: <u>R. Pickerius</u> : RD
	Conditions: 100% powe	er.	
mainten cooling	The quipment is ance (expe	s unavailable: 1 cted to take 18 n out (expected to	gin with both units at 100 % power. The following -FW-P-3B is tagged out for scheduled lube oil nore hours), 1-FW-P-1B is tagged out for bearing take 4 more days). Shift orders are to maintain
Event No.	Malf. No.	Event Type*	Event Description
140.	summer can a raise of the second		
		C:ALL	Failure of single train SI.
0.a.		C:ALL C:RO	Failure of single train SI. Running HHSI pump trips, standby doesn't auto start.
			Running HHSI pump trips, standby doesn't auto
0.a. 0.b		C:RO	Running HHSI pump trips, standby doesn't auto start.
0.a. 0.b 1.0 2.0		C:RO I:SRO/RO	Running HHSI pump trips, standby doesn't auto start. Continuous Uncontrolled Rod Motion
0.a. 0.b 1.0		C:RO I:SRO/RO I:SRO/RO	Running HHSI pump trips, standby doesn't auto start. Continuous Uncontrolled Rod Motion PRZR level transmitter fails low.

Chief Examiner:

Paul Steiner Gaultemen

AO70 AS-Given Operations Exam North-Anna-Retake

VIRGINIA POWER

NORTH ANNA POWER STATION

INITIAL LICENSE CLASS

NRC SIMULATOR EXAMINATION SCENARIO I-1

PICKERING AS RO

SCENARIO 1

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NRC SIMULATOR EXAMINATION SCENARIO

EVENT

4

DESCRIPTION

- 1. Continuous Uncontrolled Rod Motion
- 2. PRZR Level Failure
- 3. Letdown Leak
- 4. Ramp Unit Off-Line
- 5. SBLOCA

SCENARIO DURATION

60 Minutes

SCENARIO SUMMARY

The scenario will begin with both units at 100 % power. Unit 1 is at 8000 MWD/MTU, Cb = 784 PPM. Aux. steam is being supplied from unit 1's second point extraction steam. The following unit 1 equipment is unavailable: 1-FW-P-3B is tagged out for scheduled lube oil maintenance (expected to take 18 more hours), 1-FW-P-1B is tagged out for bearing cooling line clean out (expected to take 4 more days). Shift orders are to maintain current plant conditions.

The first event will be a failure in the automatic rod control circuitry, resulting in the control rods stepping in at 72 steps per minute. The crew will be expected to respond IAW 1-AP-1.1, "CONTINUOUS UNCONTROLLED ROD MOTION". The RO will place rod control in manual and verify rod motion stopped. The RO will restore Tave and PRZR pressure as required. After the US has requested assistance from the instrument department, and the plant has been stabilized, the next event will occur.

The selected PRZR level channel will fail low resulting in a loss of letdown and the opening of the charging flow control valve. The RO will be expected to respond IAW 1-AP-3, "LOSS OF VITAL INSTRUMENTATION" and take manual control of PRZR level. After the crew has restored letdown and places the failed channel in trip, the next event will occur.

As a result of the loss and restoration of letdown, an un-isolable leak will develop in the letdown system. The crew will be expected to respond IAW 1-AP-5, "UNIT 1 RADIATION MONITORING SYSTEM" and 1-AP-16, "INCREASING PRIMARY PLANT LEAKAGE". An RCS flow balance will indicate an approx. 15 GPM leak that will not be isolated when letdown is secured. The US will direct the crew to commence ramping the unit off-line IAW TS 3.4.6.2. After the unit has been ramped a sufficient amount, the last event will occur.

The leak in the letdown system will increase, resulting in a small break (<2") LOCA. The crew will be expected to respond IAW 1-E-0, "REACTOR TRIP OR SAFETY INJECTION". A single train SI will occur, with the "B" HHSI pump tripping and the standby pump not start automatically. The RO must manually start the "A" HHSI pump. The crew will proceed through 1-E-0 and transition out to 1-E-1, "LOSS OF REACTOR OR SECONDARY COOLANT". The scenario may be terminated after the crew has checked QS pump status, or as directed by the lead examiner.

EVENT 1: Continuous Uncontrolled Rod Motion

TIME

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	1.	RO identifies control rods stepping inward.
	2.	RO determines that rod movement is not called for.
	3.	RO places control rod bank selector switch in manual IAW 1-AP-1.1, "CONTINUOUS UNCONTROLLED ROD MOTION."
	4.	RO verifies rod motion stopped.
	5.	RO checks RCS Tave within 1.5°F of Tref.
	6.	Crew maintains stable plant conditions.
	7.	US notifies instrument department of problem.
NOTE:	STE	PS 8 THRU 13 REQUIRED IF Tave/Tref WERE NOT WITHIN 1.5°F.
	8.	RO checks Tave less than Tref.
	9.	RO verifies Tave greater than 541°F. RO restores Tave as directed by US.
	10.	RO checks PRZR pressure stable or trending to 2235 PSIG. RO energizes heaters as required. Crew reduces turbine load if required.
	11.	RO checks PRZR level stable. RO takes manual control of 1-CH-FCV-1122.

COMMENTS:

EVENT 1:	Continuous Uncontrolled Rod Motion		
TIME			
	 RO verifies insertion limits not exceeded. RO restores rods above insertion limit as directed by the US. 		
	13. RO restores Tave to program as directed by the US.		
NOTE:	AFTER THE CREW HAS STABILIZED THE PLANT, THE NEXT EVENT WILL OCCUR.		
COMMENT	S:		

EVENT 2: PRZR Level Failure

TIME

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1.	RO identifies various PRZR level alarms
2.	RO identifies PRZR level channel III failing.
3.	US directs crew to perform actions of 1-AP-3, "LOSS OF VITAL INSTRUMENTATION".
4.	RO and BOP verify redundant instrument channel indication normal.
5.	BOP verifies SG level parameters normal.
6.	RO verifies PRZR level indications normal. (NO) RO performs RNO step and places 1-CH-FCV-1122 in manual and controls PRZR level.
7.	BOP verifies turbine 1st stage pressure indication normal.
8.	RO verifies systems affected by PRZR level channels normal. (NO) RO performs RNO step and selects operable channel RO restores charging and letdown as directed by the US. RO resets PRZR heaters.
9.	Crew verifies remaining vital instrumentation normal.
10.	US refers to TS 3.3.1.1 for operability.
11.	115 notifies instrument dept. of failure.
12.	Crew determines that channel should be placed in trip IAW 1-MOP-55.72, "PRESSURIZER LEVEL INSTRUMENTATION".
COMMENTS:	

SCENARIO 1

EVENT 3: Letdown Leak Inside Containment

TIME

	1.	Crew identifies annunciator K-D2, "RAD MONITOR SYSTEM HI RAD LEVEL".
-	2.	Crew identifies 1-RMS-RM-160, containment gaseous, in alarm.
	3.	US directs BOP to perform actions of 1-AP-5, "UNIT 1 RADIATION MONITORING SYSTEM".
	4.	US directs RO to perform actions of 1-AP-16, "INCREASING PRIMARY PLANT LEAKAGE".
	5.	RO verifies PRZR level and RCS subcooling under his control.
	6.	RO verifies 1-CH-LCV-1115A not diverted.
	7.	Crew identifies containment sump pumping rate has increased.
	8.	RO performs RCS flow balance and identifies approx. 24 GPM leak.
-	9.	US refers to TS 3.4.6.2 for operability.
NOTE:		OMOC WILL DIRECT A UNIT SHUTDOWN WHEN INFORMED OF LEAK.
-	10.	US directs crew to ramp unit off-line IAW TS.
COMMENTS	S:	

EVENT 4: Ramp Unit Off-Line

TIME

1. US briefs crew on ramp. RO calculates amount of reactivity change due to ramp. 2. RO commences lowering Tave using boration/control rods. 3. BOP commences lowering main turbine load. 4. Verifies load rate at .3%/min. (may select higher rate until off limiter). Lowers reference setter. Pushes GO button. BOP directs turbine building watchstander to place LP Heater Drain 5. Pumps on recirc and shutdown when power is approx. 94%. COMMENTS:

EVENT	5:	SBLOCA

TIME

	1.	RO identifies rapidly decreasing pressurizer level and pressure.
	2.	RO informs the US of RCS conditions.
	3.	US directs crew to manually trip the reactor and perform actions of 1-E-0.
	4.	Crew trips reactor.
	5.	BOP trips turbine.
	6.	RO verifies AC emergency busses energized.
-	7.	Crew checks if safety injection has actuated.
	8.	Crew checks if safety injection is required. (YES)
	9.	US directs crew to manually initiate SI.
1	0.	RO and BOP initiate SI.
1	1.	RO verifies both emergency diesels running. (NO) BOP starts 1J EDG as directed by the US.
1	2.	Crew verifies SI pumps running. (NO) RO performs RNO step and starts 1-CH-P-1A. BOP performs RNO step and starts 1-SI-P-1B.
1	3.	BOP verifies main feedwater isolation.
COMMENTS:		

SCENARIO 1

Revision 0

EVENT 5: SBLOCA

TIME

 14.	BOP verifies AFW Pumps are running.
 15.	Crew verifies Phase "A" isolation.
 16.	BOP verifies service water pumps running. BOP starts 1-SW-P-1B.
 17.	Crew checks if MS line should be isolated.
 18.	Crew checks if CDA is required. (NO)
 19.	Crew checks if QS is required. (NO)
 20.	BOP verifies SI flow indicated.
 21.	BOP ensures MSR vents aligned to main condenser.
 22.	BOP adjusts gland steam as required.
 23.	BOP verifies AFW flow.
 24.	US directs unit 2 to initiate 0-AP-47, "UNIT OPERATION WITH OTHER UNIT EMERGENCY".
 25.	RO checks RCS average temperature.
 26.	RO checks RCP trip and charging pump recirc criteria.

COMMENTS:

EVENT 5: SBLOCA

TIME

 27.	US notifies STA, initiates EPIPs.
 28.	RO checks PRZR PORVs, spray valves, and safety valves closed.
 29.	Crew checks SGs not faulted.
 30.	Crew checks SGs not ruptured.
 31.	Crew checks RCS intact. (NO)
 32.	US directs crew to transition to 1-E-1.
 33.	STA commences monitoring CSFs.
 34.	RO checks RCP trip and charging pump recirc criteria.
 35.	BOP checks SGs not faulted.
 36.	BOP checks intact SG levels.
 37.	Crew checks secondary radiation levels.
38.	RO checks PRZR PORVs.
39.	Crew checks if SI can be terminated.

COMMENTS:

EVENT 5:	SBLOCA
TIME	
	40. RO/BOP resets CDA.
	41. BOP checks QS pump status.
NOTE:	The scenario may be terminated after the crew has checked QS pump status, or as directed by the lead examiner.
COMMENT	S:

SIMULATOR OPERATOR'S COMPUTER PROGRAM

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SIMULATOR OPERATOR'S COMPUTER PROGRAM SCENARIO II-1

Initial conditions

1. Recall IC # (100% Power)

2. Ensure Tave, Tref, PDTT level, and VCT level are selected on trend recorders.

3. ENSURE PRZR LEVEL CONTROL IS SELECTED TO THE "461/460 " POSITION.

PRELOAD THE FOLLOWING PRIOR TO START OF SCENARIO:

- 1. MSI0702, TD = 0 (FAILURE OF "J" TRAIN SI)
- 2. TAGOUT 1-FW-P-3B
- 3. TAGOUT 1-FW-P-1B
- 4. MCH1602, TD = O SEC, TRGR = SI1 ("B" HHSI PUMP TRIP ON SI)

EVENT

MALFUNCTION/OVERRIDE/COMMUNICATIONS

1. Continuous Uncontrolled Rod Motion MALFUNCTION: MRD07 TD = 15 SEC TRGR = N/A

2. PRZR Level Failure

MALFUNCTION: MRC0803 TD = 30 SEC RAMP = 5START = 50STOP = 0

3. Letdown Leak Inside Containment

MALFUNCTION: MRC04 TD = 30 SEC RAMP = 60START = 0STOP = 3.5

NOTE: THE OMOC WILL DIRECT A UNIT SHUTDOWN WHEN INFORMED OF RCS LEAK.

SCENARIO 1

EVENT

MALFUNCTION/OVERRIDE/COMMUNICATIONS

4. Ramp Unit Off-Line

PROVIDE FEEDBACK AS REQUIRED

5. SBLOCA

UPDATE MALFUNCTION: MRC04 TD = 0 RAMP = 30 START = 3.5STOP = 75

	-	: North Anna Steiner	Applicants:	Scenario No.: 2 R. Picker, ug BOP
Initial Co				
35	% power			
the "B" st P-1B. Ur equipment expected t	ation serv nit 2 is at t is unava to be RTS to be RTS	vice bus, this in t 100 % power wi ilable: 1-FW-P-3 in 18 hours, 1-1	-1B2 which did not trip and urn caused a reactor trip due ith no limiting actions. The B is tagged for scheduled lu FW-P-1B is tagged for break hift orders are to start a seco wer.	e to the loss of 1-RC- following unit 1 be oil maintenance, ker repair and is
pump and Event	Malf.	Event Type*	Eve	
pump and	T	T	Eve Descrij	
pump and Event No.	Malf.	T		ption
pump and Event No.	Malf.	Event Type*	Descrij	ption ne trip.
pump and Event No. 0.a	Malf.	Event Type*	Descrip Failure of automatic turbi	ption ne trip.
pump and Event No. 0.a 1.0	Malf.	Event Type* C:BOP N:SRO/BOP	Descrip Failure of automatic turbit Start second main feedwar	ption ne trip. ter pump.
pump and Event No. 0.a 1.0 2.0	Malf.	Event Type* C:BOP N:SRO/BOP I:SRO/BOP	Descrip Failure of automatic turbit Start second main feedwar "C" SG level fails low.	ption ne trip. ter pump. s.

VIRGINIA POWER

NORTH ANNA POWER STATION

INITIAL LICENSE CLASS

NRC SIMULATOR EXAMINATION SCENARIO I-2

PICKERING AS BOP

NRC SIMULATOR EXAMINATION SCENARIO

EVENT

DESCRIPTION

- 1. Start Second Main Feedwater Pump
- 2. Ramp Unit To 90% Power
- 3. "C" Steam Generator Level Transmitter Fails Low
- 4. Loss Of 1H Emergency Bus
- 5. Loss Of Heat Sink

SCENARIO DURATION

60 Minutes

SCENARIO SUMMARY

The scenario will begin with unit 1 at 35 % power, 8000 MWD/MTU, Cb = 1070 PPM, following a forced outage to repair a steam leak in an extraction steam line. Unit 2 is at 100% power, supplying aux. steam from its second point extraction. The following unit 1 equipment is unavailable: 1-FW-P-3B is tagged out for scheduled lube oil maintenance (expected to take 18 more hours), 1-FW-P-1B is tagged out for breaker repair and is expected to be RTS in 16 hours. Shift orders are to start a second main feedwater pump and ramp the unit to 90% power.

The first event will be the starting of a second main feedwater pump by the BOP. After the pump has been started, the next event will occur.

The "C" SG level channel III will fail high requiring the BOP to respond IAW 1-AP-3 and take manual control of "C" SG level. After the crew has placed the failed channel in trip, the next event will occur.

A loss of the 1H emergency bus will occur, with the 1H emergency diesel will failing to start, leaving the bus de-energized. In addition, the BOP will identify that the "B" component cooling water pump did not auto start and manually start it. After the RO completes the diagnostic portion of 1-AP-10, and reports to the US, the last event will occur.

A second "C" SG level channel will fail high, resulting in a loss of all main feedwater pumps on P-14 (HI-HI SG LEVEL). The automatic turbine trip will not occur and the terry turbine AFW pump will trip on over-speed upon starting. This, along with 1-FW-P-3B being tagged out for maintenance and the loss of the 1H emergency bus, will result in the total loss of feedwater to the SGs. The crew will be expected to respond IAW 1-E-0, "REACTOR TRIP OR SAFETY INJECTION", where the turbine will trip manually. Eventually, the crew will transition to 1-FR-H.1, "RESPONSE TO LOSS OF SECONDARY HEAT SINK." The scenario may be terminated anytime after condensate flow is established to at least 1 SG or as directed by the lead examiner. EVENT 1: Start a Second Main Feedwater Pump

TIME

1. BOP revie , initial conditions, precautions, and limitations. 2. BOP request the turbine building operator to verify the support conditions for the "C" feedwater pump. 3. BOP verifies that the FW PP 1C LUBE OIL LO PRESS annunciator (1E-H7) is not lit. BOP places the control switch for the standby condensate pump in 4. PULL-TO-LOCK. BOP opens feedwater pump recirculation valve 1-FW-FCV-150A, 150B, 5. or 150C. BOP notes the control switches for the standby feedwater pump are 6. already in PULL-TO-LOCK for its tagout. BOP places the control switch for the "C1" feedwater pump motor in 7. PULL-TO-LOCK. BOP closes feedwater pump discharge motor-operated valve 8. 1-FW-MOV-150C. 9. B. P places the control switch for the "C2" feedwater pump motor in START. BOP verifies that the feedwater pump motor current lowers to a normal 10. value.

COMMENTS:

SCENARIO 2

Revision 0

EVENT 1: Start a Second Main Feedwater Pump

TIME

BOP places the control switch for the "C1" feedwater pump motor in 11. START. BOP verifies that the feedwater pump motor current lowers to a normal 12. value. BOP opens feedwater pump 13. discharge motor-operated valve 1-FW-MOV-150C. BOP requests that the turbine building operator to place the control switch 14. for the auxiliary lube oil pump in AUTO. BOP places the control switches for the "C" feedwater pump motors in 15. AUTO-AFTER-STOP. BOP verifies that feedwater pump discharge motor-operated valve 16. 1-FW-MOV-150C is open. BOP places the feedwater pump recirculation valve that was previously 17. opened in AUTO. BOP places the control switch for the standby condensate pump in 18. AUTO-AFTER-STOP.

EVENT 2: "C" Steam Generator Level Transmitter Fails Low

TIME

	1.	BOP identifies annunciator F-F2, "SG1B LEVEL ERROR".
***	2.	BOP identifies "C" SG level channel III failing.
	3.	US directs crew to perform actions of 1-AP-3, "LOSS OF VITAL INSTRUMENTATION".
	4.	RO and BOP verify redundant instrument channel indication normal.
	5.	BOP verifies SG level parameters normal. (NO) BOP performs RNO step and places "C" MFRV control in manual.
	6.	RO verifies PRZR level indications normal.
	7.	BOP verifies turbine 1st stage pressure indication normal.
	8.	RO verifies systems affected by PRZR level channels normal.
	9.	Crew verifies remaining vital instrumentation normal.
	10.	US refers to TS 3.3.1.1 for operability.
	11.	Crew places channel in trip IAW 1-MOP-55.76, "STEAM GENERATOR LEVEL INSTRUMENTATION".
NOTE:		ER THE CREW HAS PLACED THE CHANNEL IN TRIP, THE NEXT NT WILL OCCUR.

COMMENTS:

SCENARIO 2

EVENT 3: Loss of 1H Emergency Bus.

NOTE:	PRE-BRIEF UNIT SRO THAT YOU WANT THE BOP TO REMAIN ON
	THE BOARD FOR THIS EVENT.

TIME	
-	1

- 1. Crew recognizes loss of 1H Bus.
- 2. US directs crew to enter 0-AP-10.
 - RO commences 0-AP-10 diagnostic.
 - Crew recognizes that 1H diesel did not re-energize the bus.
 - 5. BOP identifies 1-CC-P-1B did not auto start. BOP starts 1-CC-P-1
 - 6. US evaluates T.S. 3.7.3.2, 3.8.1.1 and 3.8.2.1 for equipment lost.
 - _ 7. US directs electrical department to investigate loss of 1H emergency bus and 1H EDG.
- NOTE: AFTER THE RO/BOP BRIEFS US ON EXTENT OF POWER LOSS, THE NEXT EVENT WILL OCCUR.

EVENT 4: Loss Of Heat Sink

TIME

1.	BOP identifies failure of "C" SG level channel II.
2.	BOP identifies loss of all main feedwater pumps.
3.	BOP identifies that turbine did not automatically trip.
4.	US directs crew to manually trip the reactor and turbine and perform actions of 1-E-0.
5.	Crew trips reactor.
6.	BOP trips turbine.
7.	RO verifies AC emergency busses energized.
	Crew checks if safety injection has actuated. (NO)
9.	Crew checks if safety injection is required. (NO)
10.	US directs crew to transition to 1-ES-0.1, "REACTOR TRIP RESPONSE."
11.	Crew identifies red-path on heat sink.
12.	US directs entry into 1-FR-H.1, "RESPONSE TO LOSS OF SECONDARY HEAT SINK."

EVENT 4: Loss Of Heat Sink.

TIME

x

13.	Crew checks if secondary heat sink is required. (YES)
14.	BOP attempts to establish AFW flow to at least one SG.
15.	RO stops reactor coolant pumps.
16.	Crew attempts to establish feed flow to at least one SG.
17.	BOP verifies at least one condensate pump running.
18.	BOP establishes line-up for feed flow from the condensate system. BOP opens at least one main feedwater pump discharge MOV. BOP opens at least one main feedwater reg. bypass valve.
19.	Crew depressurizes RCS.
20.	RO maintains RCS pressure less than 1950 PSIG.
21.	RO blocks low PZR pressure SI.
22.	US verifies condensate feed path aligned.
23.	Crew injects BIT.
24.	Crew depressurizes all SGs to between 610 and 120 PSIG.
25.	RO blocks high steam flow SI.
COMMENTS	

COMMENTS:

SCENARIO 2

EVENT 4: Loss of Heat Sink.

TIME

BOP verifies condensate flow to at least SG.
 BOP verifies wide range SG level(s) increasing.
 RO verifies core exit TCs decreasing.

NOTE: THE SCENARIO MAY BE TERMINATED ANYTIME AFTER ESTABLISHING CONDENSATE FLOW TO AT LEAST 1 SG OR AS DIRECTED BY THE LEAD EXAMINER.

SIMULATOR OPERATOR'S COMPUTER PROGRAM

4

SIMULATOR OPERATOR'S COMPUTER PROGRAM SCENARIO 2

Initial conditions

- 1. Recall IC # (30% Power)
- 2. Ensure Tave, Tref, PDTT level, and VCT level are selected on trend recorders.

PRELOAD THE FOLLOWING PRIOR TO START OF SCENARIO:

- 1. TAGOUT 1-FW-P-3B
- 2. TAGOUT 1-FW-P-1B
- 3. SWITCH OVER-RIDE: EG1H_AUTO_REMOTE, TD = 0, OVRD = OFF, TRGR = N/A
- 4. 15H2 NOT close: SIMLOCH: ED15H2 LO = T
- 5. SIMLOCH: MTU03, FAILURE OF AUTO TURBINE TRIP.
- ON SIMLOCH: CCP1_AUTO_DEFEAT(2) = T (BLOCK AUTO-START OF 1-CC-P-1B)

EVENT MALFUNCTION/OVERRIDE/COMMUNICATIONS

1. Start Second Main Feedwater Pump

PROVIDE FEEDBACK AS REQUIRED

2. "C" Steam Generator Level Transmitter Fails Low

MALFUNCTION: MFW01 TD = 15 SEC RAMP = 45 SEC START = 50 STOP = 0 POS = Y TRGR = N/A

EVENT

MALFUNCTION/OVERRIDE/COMMUNICATIONS

3. Loss Of 1H Emergency Bus

MALFUNCTION: MEL0301 TD = 30 SEC TRGR = N/A -or-<u>SIMLOCH</u> EL15H11_OC = T

4. Loss Of All Feedwater

MALFUNCTION: MFW01 RAMP = 60 SEC START = 50 STOP = 0 POS = Y TRGR = N/A ES-301

Individual Walk-through Test Outline - Set #1

Form ES-301-2

Examination Level (Circle One): (RO) / SRO(I) / SRO(U) Facility: North Anna Examiner's Name (print): Paul Sterior			
System / JPM	Safety Function	Planned Follow-up Questions: K/A/G // Importance // Description	
1. Control Rod Drive - Retrieve a dropped rod	I-001 SIM	a. 003AA2.03 (3.6/3.8) Effects of dropped rod on major plant parameters.	
(R476)		b. C01K4.03 (3.5/3.8) Given a set of conditions, determine effect on rod control.	
2. Chemical and Volume Control - Place excess letdown in service (R333)	II-004 SIM	a. GEN-2.1.25 (2.8/3.1) Given a set of plant conditions, use graphs to determine blended flow.	
		b. GFN-2.1.32 (3.4/3.8) Describe the reasons for the procedure precautions.	
3. Emergency Core Cooling - Transfer the Safety Injection System from hot-leg to cold-	III-006 SIM	a. 011EK3.13 (3.8/4.2) Describe the reasons for swapping from hot-leg back to cold-leg injection.	
leg recirculation (R736) ALT. PATH / ESF / NEW		b. 006A2.13 (3.9/4.2) Actions required following a spurious SI	
4. Residual Heat Removal - Restore RHR Cooling ALT. PATH / SHUTDOWN /	PV=005 I SIM	a. GEN-2.1.20 (4.3/4.2) Given a set of conditions, determine required actions.	
NEW (SHEARED SHAFT, R514)		b. 005A2.04 (2.9/2.9) Affect of loss of instrument air on RCS temperature.	

5. Reactor Coolant Pump - Start a reactor coolant pump	IV-003 SIM	a. GEN-2.1.32 (3.2/3.3) Given a set of conditions, determine RCP start limitations.
(SEAL DELTA-P IS LOST, R164)		b. 003K5.06 (2.2/2.6) Given a set of plant conditions, determine the effect on calorimetric.
6. Containment Spray - Align containment spray systems	VL028 SIM	a. 028K5.01 (3.4/3.9): Given a set of plant conditions, determine hazards.
(R216)		b. GEN-2.1.28 (3.2/.3.3) Purpose of sample line heat tracing.
7. Pressurizer Pressure Control - Place NDT protection in service during a	III-010 SIM	a. 010A4.03 (4.0/3.8) Given a set of conditions describe response of PRZR PORV block valve.
natural circulation cooldown (R577) SHUTDOWN		b. 010A1.09 (3.4/3.7) Given a set of conditions, determine tail pipe temperature.
8. Emergency Diesel Generating - Unload and shutdown an EDG in the	VII VI- 064 IN-PLANT	a. 064A3.06 (3.3/3.4) Given a set of conditions, determine control of EDG.
control room emergency mode (N466) AP ACTION		b. 064K4.06 (2.8/3.2) Describe when speed droop is in effect.
9. Auxiliary Feedwater - Collapse steam voids in a	∑ H¥2061 IN-PLANT	a. 061A2.06 (2.7/3.0) Affect of check-valve back-leakage.
steam-bound AFW pump (N935)		b. 061K4.02 (4.5/4.6) Given a set of conditions, apply interlocks to control of AFW pump.
10. Component Cooling Water System - Drain the CC system to a LW test tank	₩HI-008 IN-PLANT XI	a. 008K4.01 (3.1/3.3) Given a set of plant conditions, determine response of CC pumps.
(N230) RCA		b. 008A1.01 (2.8/2.9) Affects on CC flow from shifting common loads.

Facility Author: KERNA LINK KAUM Mil Chief Examiner: Paul Steine Gaal Ma

Facilit	nation Level (Circle y: North Anna ner's Name (print):	One): (RO) SRO Week of Examination: Dec. 16, 1996 Paul Stanio
7	Administrative Fopic/Subject Description	Describe method of evaluation: 1. ONE Administrative JPM, OR 2. TWO Administrative Questions
A.1	Status Control	JPM - Enter a component into abnormal status.
A.1	Shift Turnover	Given a set of conditions, determine turnover requirements.
	fan i ser	Given a set of conditions, determine qualification of relief.
A.2	Maintenance	JPM - Given a set of plant conditions, prioritize methods of plant cooling.
A.3	Radiation Work Practices	JPM - Review a Radiation Work Permit and obtain a DAD. NOTE: This JPM will be incorporated into the "RCA" task, N230 (JPM # 10).
A.4	Emergency	Given a set of conditions, determine required actions.
	Facilities	List those facilities with protection from radiation/airborne.

Facility Author: Chief Examiner:

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