LICENSEE EVENT REPORT

	CONTROL BLOCK: (PLEASE PRINT OR TYPE ALL REQUIRED INFORMATION)
0 1 7 B	M I PA I 1 2 0 0 - 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
O 1	SOURCE L 6 0 5 0 0 0 2 5 5 7 0 8 2 8 7 8 0 9 1 1 7 8 9 DOCKET NUMBER 68 69 EVENT DATE 74 75 REPORT DATE 80
0 2	During cooldown of the reactor at the beginning of a maintenance outage,
0 3	the containment building was ventilated through the purge supply and
0 4	exhaust valves. Because three of the valves were in an inoperable status
0 5	and the reactor was not in cold shutdown, the containment integrity
0 6	requirements of TS 3.6.1 were not met. Upon discovery, the valves
0 7	were restored to a locked closed condition. Event had no effect on
0 8 7 8	public health or safety.
0 9 8	SYSTEM CAUSE CAUSE SUBCODE SUB
	LERIRO EVENT YEAR REPORTING OCCURRENCE REPORT THE NUMBER 21 22 23 24 26 27 28 29 30
1101	ACTION FUTURE ON PLANT SHUTDOWN HOURS 22 ATTACHMENT SUBMITTED FORMSUB. PRIME COMPONENT MANUFACTURER SUBMITTED FORMSUB. PRIME COMPONENT SUBMITTED FORMSUB. PRIME COMPONEN
	resulted in their being opened without the realization that containment
1 2	integrity requirements would not be met. The valves have since been
1 3	properly tagged.
1 4	
7 B F S	
	LEASED C7 RELEASE N/A LOCATION OF RELEASE 36
1 7	PERSONNEL EXPOSURES NUMBER 11 2 38 DESCRIPTION 39
1 8	NUMBER DESCRIPTION 41
1 9	OSS OF OR DAMAGE TO FACILITY 43 PORT OF OR DAMAGE TO FACILITY 43
2 0 15	PUBLICITY DESCRIPTION 45 7809190177 NRC USE ONLY

Attachment to Licensee Event Report 78-030 Consumers Power Company Palisades Nuclear Plant Docket 50-255

Description of Occurrence:

On August 28, 1978, the plant was taken off-line in order to permit repairs to CRDM seals and to PCP seals. During PCS cooldown, the containment building was ventilated through the purge supply and exhaust valves. Because of leakage problems in a 3-way selector valve in the air supply system to the T-rings for CVs 1805, 1806 and 1807, these selector valves were bypassed in April 1978. As a result of this bypass, the T-rings for these valves required manual operation in order to be either pressurized or depressurized. This in turn meant that the valves were inoperable from an automatic closing/sealing point of view. Because the PCS was at 305°F when the purge valves were opened, the containment integrity requirements of Technical Specification 3.6.1 were not met.

Proximate Cause:

The decision to open the purge valves was prompted by the necessity to ventilate the containment building prior to opening the equipment hatch. The purging requirement was discussed at length during a plant staff meeting on August 28; however, at that time none of the staff members present recognized that opening CVs 1805, 1806 and 1807 would render those valves inoperable and thereby lead to a violation of containment integrity requirements. Prior to opening the valves, it was found that the valves had previously been tagged closed. The reason that they had been tagged was to prevent unnecessary usage of the valves in order to minimize the probability of valve failure (these valves have exhibited a high failure rate over the past several years). This tagging, which was performed prior to bypassing the T-ring 3-way valves, was not tied to containment integrity requirements. As a result, tagging clearance was requested and received and the valves were opened.

Probable Consequences:

All of the containment purge valves would have closed upon receipt of either a manual or automatic closing signal. However, no sealing air would have been supplied to the T-rings of CVs 1805, 1806 and 1807. As a result, a path for leakage through the purge exhaust valves (CVs 1806 and 1805) would have existed until air could have been manually restored to their T-rings. At the time of the occurrence, PCS temperature was 305°F. The corresponding saturation pressure for this temperature is approximately 57 psig. As a result, the energy stored in the PCS was relatively low as compared to that at normal operating temperature and pressure. Consequently, if a loss of coolant accident had occurred at the same time the valves were inoperable, the peak pressure inside containment would have been considerably lower than 55 psig and the corresponding leakage out of containment would, in all probability, have been of a small magnitude. Because of the lowered PCS temperature, it is felt that public health or safety was not threatened.

Attachment to Licensee Event Report 78-030 Consumers Power Company Palisades Nuclear Plant Docket 50-255

Root Cause:

This occurrence could have been prevented by proper tagging of the valves (i.e., tags with statements that valve opening would result in a breach of containment integrity). When the 3-way valves were bypassed, the Plant Review Committee dictated that the valves should be tagged. Apparently, the individual who was to perform the tagging saw that the valves had previously been tagged (see details in "Proximate Cause" above) and concluded that no additional tagging was needed. As discussed above (Proximate Cause) the tagging which was already on the valves was insufficient to assure containment integrity. The lesson learned, therefore, is that when an item needs to be tagged for reasons different from existing tags, new tags must be issued.

Corrective Action:

The valves were closed and the T-rings pressurized. The valve tagging was modified to reflect the containment integrity requirements. This occurrence, and the lessons learned, will be discussed with appropriate supervisory personnel. When materials are available, the valves will be repaired in order to restore them to a fully operable status.