

PRECURSOR DESCRIPTION AND ANALYSIS

LER No.: 346/85-002
Event Description: Reactor Trip, Loss of Feedwater, and AFW Train Failure
Date of Event: January 15, 1985
Plant: Davis-Besse 1

EVENT DESCRIPTION

Sequence

During zero power physics testing with the reactor in a critical condition, it was discovered that the Integrated Control System (ICS) was not controlling SG 1 level at the desired set point. The MFW valves were placed in manual control to allow adjustments in the ICS low-level limit control. SG 1 level continued to decrease to the low level set point of the Steam and Feedwater Rupture Control System (SFRCS), which initiated a reactor trip and MFW isolation.

AFW initiated; however, the No. 1 AFW pump became unavailable when the pump suction transferred to the SW system 30 s after the SFRCS actuation, and the operator subsequently isolated the SW supply. The transfer had occurred because of the low suction pressure switch actuated isolating the condensate storage tank, which also caused isolation of steam to the No. 1 AFW pump turbine. The No. 2 AFW pump operated properly and maintained proper levels in SG2 throughout the event. The pressure switch is located upstream of the two AFW pumps and downstream of the condensate storage tank strainer.

Corrective Action

See LER, p. 3.

Plant/Event Data

Systems Involved

ICS, SFRCS, AFW, and MFW

Components and Failure Modes Involved:

AFW pump — failed to deliver flow on demand

One ICS function level control in SG 1 — failed on demand

Component Unavailability Duration: NA

Plant Operating Mode: Startup mode (0% power)

Discovery Method: During startup testing

Reactor Age: 7.43 years

Plant Type: PWR

Event Identifier: 346/85-002

Comments:

The reactor had been shut down in a refueling outage for over four months.

MODELING CONSIDERATIONS AND DECISIONS

Initiators Modeled and Initiator Nonrecovery Estimate

Transient	1.0	Nonrecoverable
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Branches Impacted and Branch Nonrecovery Estimate

One AFW train	Base case	
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MFW	Base case	Recovery would require reset of the SFRCS-trip, a nonroutine but possible action under the circumstances of the transient
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Bleed and feed, HPR, and LPR	See calculations	Branch tailoring was done to reflect the bleed-and-feed procedures in effect and the use of LPI as a suction source for HPR
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Plant Models Utilized

PWR plant Class B

Event Identifier: 346/85-002

CONDITIONAL CORE DAMAGE CALCULATIONS

LER Number: 346/85-002
 Event Description: Reactor Trip, LOFW, and AFW Train Failure
 Event Date: 1/15/85
 Plant: Davis-Besse

INITIATING EVENT

NON-RECOVERABLE INITIATING EVENT PROBABILITIES

TRANS	1.000E+00
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SEQUENCE CONDITIONAL PROBABILITY SUMS

End State/Initiator	Probability
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CV

TRANS	5.308E-04
Total	5.308E-04

CD

TRANS	3.036E-04
Total	3.036E-04

ATWS

TRANS	3.000E-05
Total	3.000E-05

DOMINANT SEQUENCES

End State: CV	Conditional Probability: 2.453E-04
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125 TRANS -RT AFW MFW HPI(F/B) -SS.DEPRESS -COND/MFW

End State: CD	Conditional Probability: 1.264E-04
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126 TRANS -RT AFW MFW HPI(F/B) -SS.DEPRESS COND/MFW

End State: ATWS	Conditional Probability: 3.000E-05
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128 TRANS RT

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SEQUENCE CONDITIONAL PROBABILITIES

	Sequence	End State	Seq. Prob	Non-Recov**
119	TRANS -RT AFW MFW -HPI(F/B) -HPR/-HPI PORV.OPEN -SS.DEPRESS -COND/MFW	CV	5.366E-05	5.578E-02
120	TRANS -RT AFW MFW -HPI(F/B) -HPR/-HPI PORV.OPEN -SS.DEPRESS COND/MFW	CD	2.764E-05	2.874E-02
122	TRANS -RT AFW MFW -HPI(F/B) HPR/-HPI -SS.DEPRESS -COND/MFW	CV	2.292E-04	3.577E-03
123	TRANS -RT AFW MFW -HPI(F/B) HPR/-HPI -SS.DEPRESS COND/MFW	CD	1.181E-04	1.843E-03
124	TRANS -RT AFW MFW -HPI(F/B) HPR/-HPI SS.DEPRESS	CD	1.297E-05	5.420E-03
125	TRANS -RT AFW MFW HPI(F/B) -SS.DEPRESS -COND/MFW	CV	2.453E-04 *	3.746E-03
126	TRANS -RT AFW MFW HPI(F/B) -SS.DEPRESS COND/MFW	CD	1.264E-04 *	1.930E-03
127	TRANS -RT AFW MFW HPI(F/B) SS.DEPRESS	CD	1.388E-05	5.676E-03
128	TRANS RT	ATWS	3.000E-05 *	1.200E-01

* dominant sequence for end state

** non-recovery credit for edited case

Note:

Conditional probability values are differential values which reflect the added risk due to observed failures. Parenthetical values indicate a reduction in risk compared to a similar period without the existing failures.

MODEL: b:pwrbtree.cmp

DATA: b:davispro.cmp

No Recovery Limit

BRANCH FREQUENCIES/PROBABILITIES

Branch	System	Non-Recov	Opr Fail
TRANS	1.030E-03	1.000E+00	
LOOP	2.280E-05	3.400E-01	
LOCA	4.170E-06	3.400E-01	
RT	2.500E-04	1.200E-01	
RT/LOOP	0.000E+00	1.000E+00	
EMERG.POWER	2.850E-03	5.100E-01	
AFW	5.000E-03 > 1.000E-01	2.700E-01	
Branch Model: 1.OF.2			
Train 1 Cond Prob:	5.000E-02 > Failed		
Train 2 Cond Prob:	1.000E-01		
AFW/EMERG.POWER	5.000E-03	2.700E-01	
MFW	2.000E-01 > 1.000E+00	3.400E-01	
Branch Model: 1.OF.1			
Train 1 Cond Prob:	2.000E-01 > Failed		
PORV.DR.SRV.CHALL	8.000E-02	1.000E+00	
PORV.DR.SRV.RESEAT	1.000E-02	5.000E-02	

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PORV.OR.SRV.RESEAT/EMERG.POWER	1.000E-02	5.000E-02	
SS.RELEAS.TERM	1.500E-02	3.400E-01	
SS.RELEAS.TERM/-MFW	1.500E-02	3.400E-01	
HPI	1.000E-03	5.200E-01	
HPI(F/B)	1.000E-03 > 4.000E-03	5.200E-01	4.000E-02
Branch Model: 1.OF.2+opr			
Train 1 Cond Prob:	1.000E-02 > 4.000E-02		
Train 2 Cond Prob:	1.000E-01		
HPR/-HPI	3.000E-03 > 1.000E-03	5.600E-01 > 1.000E+00	4.000E-02
Branch Model: 1.OF.2+opr			
Train 1 Cond Prob:	3.000E-02 > 1.000E-02		
Train 2 Cond Prob:	1.000E-01		
PORV.OPEN	1.000E-02	1.000E+00	
SS.DEPRESS	3.600E-02	1.000E+00	
COND/MFW	1.000E+00	3.400E-01	
LPI/HPI	1.000E-03	3.400E-01	
LPR/-HPI.HPR	6.700E-01 > 1.000E+00	1.000E+00	
Branch Model: 1.OF.1			
Train 1 Cond Prob:	6.700E-01 > 1.000E+00		
LPR/HPI	1.000E-03	1.000E+00	

*** forced

Austin
08-13-1986
05:58:26

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