NRC Form 366
(9-83)

U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
APPROVED OMB NO. 3150-0104
EXPIRES: 8/31/88

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

FACILITY NAME (1)	DOCKET NUMBER (2)	PAGE (3)
Wolf Creek Generating Station	0 5 0 0 0 4 8 2	1 OF 0 3

TITLE (4)

Technical Specification Violation - Failure To Establish Continuous Firewatch

EVENT DATE (5)			LER NUMBER (6)			REPORT DATE (7)			OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED (8)	
MONTH	DAY	YEAR	YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	FACILITY NAMES	DOCKET NUMBER(S)
0 2	1 4	8 6	8 6	— 0 1 0	— 0 0	0 3	1 2	8 6		0 5 0 0 0
										0 5 0 0 0

OPERATING MODE (9)	POWER LEVEL (10)	THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR §: (Check one or more of the following) (11)					
1	0 9 8	20.402(b)	20.405(c)	50.73(a)(2)(iv)	73.71(b)		
		20.405(a)(1)(i)	50.36(c)(1)	50.73(a)(2)(v)	73.71(c)		
		20.405(a)(1)(ii)	50.36(c)(2)	50.73(a)(2)(vii)	OTHER (Specify in Abstract below and in Text, NRC Form 366A)		
		20.405(a)(1)(iii)	X 50.73(a)(2)(i)	50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A)			
		20.405(a)(1)(iv)	50.73(a)(2)(ii)	50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B)			
		20.405(a)(1)(v)	50.73(a)(2)(iii)	50.73(a)(2)(x)			

LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12)

NAME	TELEPHONE NUMBER
Merlin G. Williams - Superintendent of Regulatory, Quality and Administrative Services	AREA CODE 3 1 6 — 3 6 4 1 - 8 8 1 3 1 1

COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (13)

CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NPRDS		CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NPRDS	

SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (14)		EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE (15)	MONTH	DAY	YEAR
YES (If yes, complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE)	X NO				

ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e., approximately fifteen single-space typewritten lines) (16)

On February 14, 1986, a violation of Technical Specification 3.7.10.2 occurred when an hourly rather than a continuous fire watch was established for an inoperable spray/sprinkler system. Technical Specification 3.7.10.2 requires, in part, that a continuous fire watch be established for areas associated with an inoperable spray/sprinkler system in which redundant systems or components could be damaged.

From approximately 1630 CST until 1800 CST, on February 14, 1986, a fire protection deluge valve control panel was inoperable. An hourly fire watch was established in accordance per Technical Specification 3.3.3.8, which is applicable to fire detection instrumentation. During this time period, the unit operated in Mode 1, Power Operation, at 98 percent reactor power.

Subsequently it was determined that Technical Specification 3.7.10.2 was applicable because the automatic actuation of the associated spray/sprinkler system had been inoperable during this time period, and that a continuous fire watch of the affected area had been required. The cause of this event was a cognitive personnel error by a licensed operator who failed to recognize all consequences of the inoperable panel.

There was no damage to plant equipment or release of radioactivity as a result of this event, and at no time did conditions develop that posed a threat to the health or safety of the public.

A previous similar occurrence is discussed in Licensee Event Report 85-010-01.

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FACILITY NAME (1)	DOCKET NUMBER (2)	LER NUMBER (6)			PAGE (3)
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TEXT (If more space is required, use additional NRC Form 366A's) (17)

On February 14, 1986, a violation of Technical Specification 3.7.10.2 occurred when an hourly rather than a continuous fire watch patrol was established for an inoperable spray/sprinkler system [KP]. Technical Specification 3.7.10.2 requires, in part, that with a required spray/sprinkler system inoperable, a continuous fire watch be established for those areas in which redundant systems or components could be damaged.

At approximately 1630 CST on February 14, 1986, it was discovered that Fire Protection Deluge Valve Control Panel KC257 [KP-PL] had no power. The panel was declared inoperable, and an hourly fire watch patrol was established for the area protected by panel KC257 in accordance with the requirements of Technical Specification 3.3.3.8., which is applicable to fire detection instrumentation [IC-DET].

Subsequent troubleshooting determined that the malfunction was the result of blown control power fuses. The fuses were replaced, and the panel was restored to operable status at 1800 CST on February 14. During this time period, the unit operated in Mode 1, Power Operation, at approximately 98 percent reactor power.

During a subsequent review of the Impairment Control Permit utilized to initiate the hourly fire watch patrol, it was determined that the inoperability of panel KC257 rendered the automatic actuation of the spray/sprinkler system for the 2000' elevation cable trays in the Auxiliary Building [NF] inoperable. Therefore, Technical Specification 3.7.10.2 was applicable to this situation, and a continuous fire watch patrol should have been established.

Panel KC257 is the actuation panel for the 2000' level Auxiliary Building Cable Tray Pre-Action System Deluge Valve [KP-V]. It converts an alarm from the fire detection instrumentation (covered by Technical Specification 3.3.3.8) for that area into an actuation signal for the deluge valve KC-XV165. Per Technical Specification 3.7.10.2, since this area contains redundant systems or components which could be damaged, a continuous fire watch must be established within one hour if the associated spray/sprinkler system is inoperable.

The cause of this event (misinterpretation of the applicable Technical Specification) was a cognitive personnel error by a utility licensed operator. The individual has been counseled regarding this error, and the information in this report will be incorporated into Required Reading for licensed personnel to emphasize the importance of determining all consequences of inoperable equipment.

The fire detection instrumentation for this area remained operable throughout this event, thus assuring prompt Control Room notification should a fire in this area be detected. There was no damage to plant equipment or release of radioactivity as a result of this event, and at no time did conditions develop that may have posed a threat to the health or safety of the public.

NRC Form 366A
(9-83)

U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION

APPROVED OMB NO. 3150-0104
EXPIRES: 8/31/85

FACILITY NAME (1)	DOCKET NUMBER (2)	LER NUMBER (6)			PAGE (3)
		YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER	
Wolf Creek Generating Station	0 5 0 0 0 4 8 2	8 6	— 0 1 0	— 0 0	0 3 OF 0 3

TEXT (If more space is required, use additional NRC Form 366A's) (17)

A previous similar occurrence of failure to establish a continuous fire watch for an inoperable spray/sprinkler system is discussed in Licensee Event Report 85-010-01.

KANSAS GAS AND ELECTRIC COMPANY
THE ELECTRIC COMPANY

GLENN L. KOESTER
VICE PRESIDENT - NUCLEAR

March 12, 1986

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Document Control Desk
Washington, D.C. 20555

Mr. E.H. Johnson, Director
Division of Reactor Safety and Projects
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Region IV
611 Ryan Plaza Drive, Suite 1000
Arlington, Texas 76011

KMLNRC 86-044
Re: Docket No. STN 50-482
Subj: License Event Report 86-010-00

Gentlemen:

The attached Licensee Event Report is submitted pursuant to 10 CFR 50.73 (a) (2) (i) concerning a Technical Specification violation.

Yours very truly,

Glenn L Koester

Glenn L. Koester
Vice President - Nuclear

GLK:see

Enclosure

xc: PO'Connor (2), w/a
JCummins, w/a

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