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LER 86-03

### Description of Event

On 1/27/86 and 1/28/86 two main steam relief values (removed from service during the 1985/86 pipe replacement outage) were tested as required by Technical Specification Section 4.6.D.2. This section requires that at least  $\frac{1}{2}$  of all relief values be tested every refueling outage (or replaced with a tested value) and that all four values be checked (or replaced) every two refueling outages. Both relief values actuated above the setpoint pressures delineated by Technical Specification section 2.2.8 and the 1% variation allowed by Tech. Spec. Bases 3.6/4.6-D and ASME section III division 1 subsection NB7524.3.

Valve S/N (Serial Number) 204 had a setpoint of 1090 psig and actuated at 1105 psig (a deviation of 1.4%) and valve S/N 205 had a setpoint of 1080 psig and actuated at 1109 psig (a deviation of 2.7%). In addition, valve S/N 205 exceeded its FSAR section 4.4.5 design delay time of 0.4 seconds. The as-found design delay time for valve S/N 205 was 0.8 seconds.

The other two relief values were tested during the 1984 refueling outage and met all of the required testing criteria.

#### Cause of Event

This event was due to pilot stage leakage caused by steam cuts on the pilot disc and pilot seat. The exact root cause of the steam cutting is not known. However, the suspected root cause is a slight misalignment of the pilot valve disc or foreign material on the seating surface. This is supported by the fact that valve S/N 205 exceeded its design delay time which indicates pilot stage leakage. It was further supported by information supplied through NPRDS that revealed similar events at other Nuclear Power Stations. (Note: IE Information Notice No. 86-12 "Target Rock Two-Stage SRV Setpoint Drift" is not related to this event based on the fact that the valves at Vermont Yankee are three stage relief valves.)

#### Analysis of Event

Technical Specification section 2.2.8 requires Vermont Yankee to have four relief valves, one to relieve at  $\leq 1080$  psig, two to relieve at 1090 psig and the last to relieve at 1100 psig. In addition to this, Vermont Yankee is required to have two safety valves that actuate at  $\leq 1240$  psig and a Reactor Coolant High Pressure Scram set at 1055 psig. These valves are part of the Automatic Depressurization System (ADS) which is an emergency system capable of relieving pressure in the Main Steam lines and in the Reactor Vessel.

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION													N		U S NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION APPROVED OMB NO 3150-0104 EXPIRES \$/31.85										
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LER 86-03

With the exception of the two relief valves that were slightly higher than the Tech. Spec. setpoint and code specified deviation, all other FSAR/Design code requirements were met. Based on this, the Pressure Relief/Automatic Depressurization systems would have performed their intended design function in that:

- Although two S.R.V's were out of tolerance for pressure relief, vessel over pressurization protection was provided in that all the relief valve settings were below the safety valve actuation setpoint.
- Operation of the ADS system by pilot operation on either the ADS initiation signal or Manual operation from the Control Room was still available. Therefore, vessel over pressure, protection and operability of ECCS was not effected.

## Corrective Action

No immediate operator actions were necessary as a result of this event.

Vermont Yankee will continue to track/evaluate the performance of the four relief valves based on the NPRDS findings. Since there has only been one similar event in the last five years (RO 83/31/3L), no immediate corrective action will be pursued.

Vermont Yankee will have the two subject relief valves repaired and retested to all applicable requirements prior to their reinstallation in ADS.



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# VERMONT YANKEE NUCLEAR POWER CORPORATION

P. O. BOX 157 GOVERNOR HUNT ROAD VERNON, VERMONT 05354

March 12, 1986

VYV 86-057

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Document No. 50-271 Washington, D.C. 20555

REFERENCE: Operating License DPR-28 Docket No. 50-271 Reportable Occurrence No. LER 86-03

Dear Sirs:

As defined by 10CFR50.73, we are reporting the attached Reportable Occurrence as LER 86-03.

Very truly yours,

VERMONT YANKEE NUCLEAR POWER CORPORATION

nes P. Pelletier

Plant Manager

HMM/drc

cc: Regional Administrator USNRC Office of Inspection and Enforcement Region I 631 Park Avenue King of Prussia, Pennsylvania 19406