

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

FACILITY NAME (1) Wolf Creek Generating Station	DOCKET NUMBER (2) 0 5 0 0 0 4 8 2	PAGE (3) 1 OF 0 3
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TITLE (4)
Technical Specification Violation - Missed Hourly Firewatch Patrol

EVENT DATE (5)			LER NUMBER (6)			REPORT DATE (7)			OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED (8)																	
MONTH	DAY	YEAR	YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	FACILITY NAMES		DOCKET NUMBER(S)															
0	2	1	1	8	6	8	6	0	0	0	4	0	0	0	0	3	1	1	8	6	0	5	0	0	0	0

OPERATING MODE (9) 1	THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR §: (Check one or more of the following) (11)																					
POWER LEVEL (10) 1 0 0	<input type="checkbox"/> 20.402(b)	<input type="checkbox"/> 20.405(a)	<input type="checkbox"/> 20.405(a)(1)(i)	<input type="checkbox"/> 20.405(a)(1)(ii)	<input type="checkbox"/> 20.405(a)(1)(iii)	<input type="checkbox"/> 20.405(a)(1)(iv)	<input type="checkbox"/> 20.405(a)(1)(v)	<input type="checkbox"/> 20.405(e)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.36(e)(1)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.36(e)(2)	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(i)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(ii)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(iii)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(iv)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(v)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(vii)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(x)	<input type="checkbox"/> 73.71(b)	<input type="checkbox"/> 73.71(e)	OTHER (Specify in Abstract below and in Text, NRC Form 366A)

LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12)		TELEPHONE NUMBER	
NAME Merlin G. Williams - Superintendent of Regulatory, Quality and Administrative Services		AREA CODE	3 1 6 3 6 4 - 8 8 3 1

COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (13)										
CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NPRDS	CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NPRDS	

SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (14)			EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE (15)		
<input type="checkbox"/> YES (If yes, complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE)	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> NO				

ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e., approximately fifteen single-space typewritten lines) (16)

On February 13, 1986, at approximately 1410 CST, a violation of Technical Specification 3.7.11 was discovered due to a failure to initiate an hourly fire watch patrol of three areas containing inoperable fire barriers. Technical Specification 3.7.11 requires, in part, the establishment of an hourly fire watch patrol for areas containing inoperable fire barriers.

On February 11, 1986, craft personnel had removed fireproofing material from structural steel in the Auxiliary Building, but through a cognitive personnel error, failed to recognize that sufficient quantities of fireproofing material had been removed to necessitate the initiation of a Fire Protection Impairment Control Permit (which is utilized to establish fire watch patrols).

Upon discovery, an hourly fire watch patrol was established in accordance with Technical Specification 3.7.11. During this time period, the unit operated in Mode 1, Power Operation, at power levels up to 100 percent reactor power. To prevent recurrence, a knowledgeable individual has been assigned the responsibility of overseeing the removal and reinstallation of fireproofing material.

There was no damage to plant equipment or release of radioactivity as a result of this event, and at no time did conditions develop that might have posed a threat to the public health or safety.

A previous similar occurrence is discussed in Licensee Event Report 85-077-00.

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION

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TEXT (If more space is required, use additional NRC Form 366A's) (17)

On February 13, 1986, at approximately 1410 CST, a violation of Technical Specification 3.7.11 was discovered. This situation was the result of the removal of portions of fireproofing material from structural steel in the Auxiliary Building [NF] without establishing the required hourly fire watch patrols. Technical Specification 3.7.11 requires, in part, the establishment of an hourly fire watch patrol of areas containing an inoperable fire barrier.

The potential for the existence of this situation was identified by an NRC Resident Inspector, who questioned the removal of fireproofing material without issuance of a Fire Protection Impairment Control Permit. It was subsequently determined that craft personnel had removed sufficient quantities of fireproofing material from structural steel at three locations in the Auxiliary Building to render the areas as inoperable fire barriers.

Upon discovery, an hourly fire watch patrol was established for the affected areas in accordance with the requirements of Technical Specification 3.7.11. The fireproofing material was re-installed in the three affected areas on February 14, 1986.

Investigations revealed that the craft personnel had removed the fireproofing material from these locations on February 11, 1986, in support of other work activities. Therefore, this Technical Specification violation existed from that time until the hourly patrol was established on February 13. During this time period, the unit operated in Mode 1, Power Operation, at power levels up to 100 percent reactor power.

A previous engineering evaluation had identified the maximum allowable amount of fireproofing material that could be removed without affecting the performance of the fireproofing material. The craft personnel were aware of the criteria and of the necessity to initiate a Fire Protection Impairment Control Permit (utilized to establish fire watch patrols) if the criteria were exceeded. However, through a cognitive personnel error, the craft personnel failed to recognize that the fireproofing material removal criteria had been exceeded in these three areas.

A contributing factor to this occurrence was the fact that this crew of craft personnel was relatively new and may not have fully understood the requirements. Cross training of craft personnel on fire protection program requirements was in progress, and these personnel had not yet received this training. These personnel have now received training on the fireproofing material removal criteria. A field inspection of the areas in which they had been working revealed no other instances of noncompliance.

To prevent future occurrences of this nature, a knowledgeable individual has been assigned the responsibility of overseeing the removal and replacement of fireproofing material in all areas by craft personnel.

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION

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TEXT (if more space is required, use additional NRC Form 366A's) (17)

There was no damage to plant equipment or release of radioactivity as a result of this event, and at no time did conditions develop that may have posed a threat to the health or safety of the public.

Licensee Event Report 85-077-00 discusses one previous similar occurrence of a Technical Specification violation resulting from a failure to initiate a required fire watch when rendering a fire barrier penetration inoperable.



KANSAS GAS AND ELECTRIC COMPANY

GLENN L. KOESTER
VICE PRESIDENT - NUCLEAR

March 11, 1986

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Document Control Desk
Washington, D.C. 20555

Mr. E.H. Johnson, Director
Division of Reactor Safety and Projects
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Region IV
611 Ryan Plaza Drive, Suite 1000
Arlington, Texas 76011

KMLNRC 86-042
Re: Docket No. STN 50-482
Subj: License Event Report 86-004-00

Gentlemen:

The attached Licensee Event Report is submitted pursuant to 10 CFR 50.73
(a) (2) (i) concerning a Technical Specification violation.

Yours very truly,

Glenn L. Koester
Vice President - Nuclear

GLK:see

Enclosure

xc: PO Connor (2), w/a
JCummins, w/a

IE22
1/1