

100X

September 23, 1969

W. R. Stratton, Subcommittee Chairman  
Oyster Creek Unit 1

J. M. Hendrie, Vice Chairman, ACRS

CATEGORY B REPORTS - OYSTER CREEK UNIT 1 - DIVISION OF COMPLIANCE REPORT  
TO THE DIRECTOR OF REGULATION DATED SEPTEMBER 15, 1969

Attached is a brief summary of the information presented in the subject correspondence. No ACRS action appears warranted.

This item may be destroyed when you have completed your evaluation of this matter.

Original Signed by  
J. C. McKinley

J. C. McKinley  
Staff Assistant

Attachments:

- 1) Summary
- 2) Div. of Compliance Report  
to Dir. of Regulation dated  
9/15/69

OFFICE ►	ACRS						
SURNAME ►	JCM/c1						
DATE ►	9/23/69						

A/59  
2/25/69

Oyster Creek Unit 1

A Division of Complainant Report to the Director of Regulation, dated September 13, 1966, reports the malfunction of the pressure control system and subsequent series of the Oyster Creek Reactor.

During startup, while the reactor pressure was being incrementally increased from 970 psig to 1000 psig with the electrical pressure control system, a false signal caused the steam bypass valves to open and the reactor to depressurize. The plant was at 32 MWe and scrammed about 40 seconds after the valves opened. The pressure decreased to about 320 psig within 5 minutes and the temperature dropped from 320°F to 410°F. The water level dropped seven feet but still seven feet of water remained above the core. No safety limits were exceeded.

Discussions with the cognizant NRC and CO personnel revealed that the initial scram signal came from the flow biased flux scram (which should not have been tripped at this low power level) followed closely by the low water level scram signal. The operator tripped the steam line stop valves before the level reached the double low trip point but a valve trip signal was received when the water level went below the double low point. The core spray pumps started but did not inject any water since vessel pressure did not drop below the pump discharge pressure. The diesel generators started, the first signal (low-low water level) was fed into the containment spray circuitry, reactor and containment isolation occurred, and the isolation condenser was placed in service, all through automatic action.

CO has asked the operator for a report on this occurrence, the operator's informal reaction is to treat this as a debugging operation and not make any report, he has not made any formal commitment.

Both GE and the operator are investigating the failure of the pressure control system.

No ACRS action appears warranted.

OFFICE ►					
SURNAME ►					
DATE ►					

JCM

MEMO ROUTE SLIP		Form APC-B3 (Rev. May 14, 1967)	See me about this. Note and return.	For concul. For signature.	For action. For information.
TO (Name and unit)  R. J. Fields Executive Secretary, 1034 H Street	INITIALS  ACRS	DATE	REMARKS		
			RE: MALFUNCTION OF PRESSURE CONTROL SYSTEM JERSEY CENTRAL POWER AND LIGHT COMPANY (OYSTER CREEK REACTOR)		
TO (Name and unit)	INITIALS	DATE	REMARKS Forwarded for information are three copies of a report to the Director of Regulation on the above subject.		
			Enclosure: JC rpt dtd 9/15/69 (3)		
TO (Name and unit)	INITIALS	DATE	REMARKS		
			JC rpt dtd 9/15/69 (3)		
FROM (Name and unit)  Lawrence D. Low, Director Division of Compliance  <i>Low</i>	REMARKS				
PHONE NO.	DATE 9/18/69				

USE OTHER SIDE FOR ADDITIONAL REMARKS

GDS-16-78902-1

GPO : 1967 - 277-337