

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION

FACILITY NAME (1) Browns Ferry - Unit 2	DOCKET NUMBER (2) 0 5 0 0 0 2 6 0 8 6 - 0 0 3 - 0 0 0 2 OF 0 2	LER NUMBER (6)			PAGE (3)	
		YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER		

TEXT (If more space is required, use additional NRC Form 366A's) (17)

Units 1 and 3 were in extended maintenance outages, and unit 2 was in a refueling outage. This event affected unit 2 and common ventilation systems.

On February 26, 1986, at 2112, electrical modifications electricians were pulling cables in unit 2 battery board room when the workmen accidentally bumped the reactor protection system (RPS) (JE) bus 'A' transfer switch. Power to RPS bus 'A' is supplied from a motor generator (MG) set or an alternate transformer. The transfer of power between the two sources momentarily interrupted power to the RPS bus. Bumping the transfer switch deenergized RPS 'A,' which tripped the normally energized isolation logic and caused:

1. Group 2 (shutdown cooling) inboard isolation (BO)
2. Group 3 (reactor water cleanup) inboard isolation (CE)
3. Group 6 (purging and venting) isolation (VB)
4. Group 8 (traversing incore probe) isolation (IG)
5. Half-scam signal on RPS channel 'A'
6. Unit 1, 2, and 3 refuel zone isolation (VG)
7. Unit 2 reactor zone isolation (VA)
8. Control room emergency ventilation initiation (VI)
9. Standby gas treatment initiation (BH)

The operators reset the isolations and returned the actuated systems to normal standby readiness by 2120.

Unit 2 was completely defueled at the time, and the inadvertant trip was in the conservative direction.

Personnel error is involved in that the electricians did not exercise due caution while pulling cables in the unit 2 battery board room. The transfer switch, along with the voltage adjustment control knob are located on the battery board for each unit. The switch is a General Electric type SBM. The switch is physically located about four feet above the floor and is not protected against accidental contact. The voltage adjustment control knob on unit 3 had been previously bumped on January 1986 as described in LER BFRO-50-296/86001. A temporary cover for protection against accidental bumping of unit 2 RPS bus transfer switches has been provided. Permanent protection in the form of an enclosure over the switch is planned for recurrence control.

Responsible Plant Section - EM

Previous Events - BFRO-50-296/86001

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