

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

FACILITY NAME (1) <b>JAMES A. FITZPATRICK NUCLEAR POWER PLANT</b>	DOCKET NUMBER (2) <b>0 5 0 0 0 3 3 3</b>	PAGE(S) <b>1 OF 0 2</b>
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TITLE (4)  
**Reactor Low Water Level Scram While Shutdown**

EVENT DATE (5)			LER NUMBER (8)			REPORT DATE (7)			OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED (8)		
MONTH	DAY	YEAR	YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	FACILITY NAMES		DOCKET NUMBER(S)
0 3	2 5	8 6	8 6	0 0 6	0 0	0 4	1 4	8 6			0 5 0 0 0

OPERATING MODE (9) **N**

POWER LEVEL (10) **0 1 0 1 0**

THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR § (Check one or more of the following) (11)

<input type="checkbox"/> 20.402(b)	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> 20.406(e)	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> 90.73(a)(2)(iv)	<input type="checkbox"/> 73.71(b)
<input type="checkbox"/> 20.406(a)(1)(i)	<input type="checkbox"/> 90.38(a)(1)	<input type="checkbox"/> 90.73(a)(2)(v)	<input type="checkbox"/> 73.71(e)
<input type="checkbox"/> 20.406(a)(1)(ii)	<input type="checkbox"/> 90.38(a)(2)	<input type="checkbox"/> 90.73(a)(2)(vi)	OTHER (Specify in Abstract below and in Text, NRC Form 386A)
<input type="checkbox"/> 20.406(a)(1)(iii)	<input type="checkbox"/> 90.72(a)(2)(i)	<input type="checkbox"/> 90.73(a)(2)(vii)(A)	
<input type="checkbox"/> 20.406(a)(1)(iv)	<input type="checkbox"/> 90.73(a)(2)(ii)	<input type="checkbox"/> 90.73(a)(2)(vii)(B)	
<input type="checkbox"/> 20.406(a)(1)(v)	<input type="checkbox"/> 90.73(a)(2)(iii)	<input type="checkbox"/> 90.73(a)(2)(ix)	

LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12)

NAME <b>Roger A. Locy Assistant Operations Superintendent</b>	TELEPHONE NUMBER AREA CODE: <b>3 1 5</b> NUMBER: <b>3 4 2 - 3 8 4 0</b>
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COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (13)

CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NPROS	CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NPROS

SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (14)

YES (If yes, complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE)  NO

EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE (15)

MONTH	DAY	YEAR

ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e., approximately fifteen single-space typewritten lines) (16)

On March 25, 1985 at 1017 while the plant was in a cold condition, all control rods fully inserted, a reactor scram occurred as a result of low vessel level. The vessel level was being lowered using the Residual Heat Removal System reject to radwaste when the operators attention was diverted to isolating a leak in the Turbine Building. The low vessel level alarm was disabled because the vessel level recorder, which initiates the alarm, had been secured because it was driving upscale as a result of the vessel level previously being maintained above the range of the recorder at approximately 15 inches below the main steam lines.

At the low level of 177 inches above the top of active fuel a reactor scram occurred. All rods were fully inserted prior to the scram, but all other expected automatic actions did occur. Level was immediately restored to the level previously being maintained.

Licensed operators have been counselled concerning the need to control work activities within the control area, the responsibility to maintain Control Room formality and to designate individuals with no concurrent duties to perform critical evolutions.

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## LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION

FACILITY NAME (1) <b>JAMES A. FITZPATRICK NUCLEAR POWER PLANT</b>	DOCKET NUMBER (2)  0   5   0   0   0   3   3   3   8   6	LER NUMBER (6)			PAGE (3)		
		YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER			
		8   6	—   0   0   6	—   0   0	0   2	OF	0   2

TEXT (If more space is required, use additional NRC Form 368A's) (17)

On March 25, 1986 at 1017, while the reactor was in a cold condition with all control rods fully inserted, a reactor scram occurred as a result of a reactor vessel low level of 177 inches above the top of active fuel. At the time of the scram, the reactor vessel level was being lowered using the Residual Heat Removal (RHR) System to reject water to radwaste. The Shutdown Cooling System had just been returned to service, after being secured while replacing a floor plug in the Reactor Building.

Several other evolutions were being performed in the Control Room at the time of the scram. Instrument and Control personnel were working on the feed flow transmitters and trouble shooting a reactor vessel level instrument problem. This reactor water level instrument work was not related to the instrument being used to monitor level. The Instrument and Control work was taking place in the same area of the Control Room in which the operator was monitoring level. The operator received a call on the plant paging system informing him of a large Feedwater System leak in the Turbine Building. This leak was not related to lowering reactor vessel level or to the RHR System. While isolating the leak the operators attention was diverted from closely monitoring reactor vessel level.


The reactor vessel low level alarm was not operating, because the reactor vessel level recorder was turned off. Contacts on the recorder provide vessel high and low level alarms. The recorder was secured because vessel level was being maintained above the range of the narrow range instruments, which is the range of the vessel level recorder. The high level was causing the recorder to continuously drive upscale. The recorder has started making a grinding noise as a result of this continuous upscale signal. The operator was concerned the recorder would be damaged and secured the recorder.

Because of the lack of low level alarm at 196.5 inches above the top of active fuel, the leak in the Turbine Building which distracted the operators attention, and the number of people present in the area of the Control Room where vessel level is monitored, the operator failed to notice the low vessel level until the reactor scram occurred. Because of plant conditions all rods were fully inserted prior to the reactor scram and all other automatic actions expected to take place were verified. Level was immediately restored to its original level.

## Corrective Actions:

1. Licensed operators have been counselled on the need to control work activities taking place within the control area of the control room, and emphasized their responsibility to maintain control room formality.
2. Counsellled licensed operators on the need to monitor critical evolutions and to designate individuals to perform these evolutions with no concurrent duties.
3. Revise Operations Department Standing Order 2 (Operating Principles and Philosophy) to add clarification of when an additional operator should be present to assist with control room evolutions. This revision will be incorporated by May 31, 1986.

James A. FitzPatrick  
Nuclear Power Plant  
P.O. Box 41  
Lycoming, New York 13093  
315 342-3840



Radford J. Converse  
Resident Manager

April 14, 1986  
JAFP-86-0309

United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
Document Control Desk  
Washington, D.C. 20555

REFERENCE: DOCKET NO. 50-333 Licensee Event Report: 86-006-00

Dear Sir:

Enclosed please find the referenced Licensee Event Report in accordance with the requirements of 10 CFR 50.73.

If there are any questions concerning this report, please contact Mr. Roger A. Locy (315) 342-3840, Extension 302.

A handwritten signature in cursive script, appearing to read 'R. Converse'.

RADFORD J. CONVERSE

RJC:RAL:dmh

Enclosure

CC: USNRC, Region I (1)  
INPO Records Center, Atlanta, Georgia (1)  
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