

Enclosure

Edwin I. Hatch Nuclear Plant
Annual Operating Report for 1996
Supplemental Report

Plant Procedures

42SV-C71-001-1S

Revision 0 of this LSFT was written to implement Technical Specification Improvement Program (TSIP) surveillance requirement, SR 3.3.1.1.15. This LSFT demonstrates the operability of various RPS trip logic channels. This procedure will be performed while the Unit is in the Shutdown or Refuel modes, with no CRD work or fuel movement activities in progress, and all clearances that affect the performance of the procedure will be released.

The performance of the procedure has been evaluated to not increase the probability or consequences of occurrence of an accident or malfunction previously evaluated in the FSAR, or create the possibility of an accident or malfunction of a different type than any previously evaluated in the FSAR, and no margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification is reduced by this activity.

52PM-MEL-006-1S

Revision 0 provides instructions for removing the breaker from Frame 1B of Bus 1R22-S016 while maintaining power to its respective load by installing a temporary feed from Frame 3T of the same Bus to the load side of Frame 1B. The plant will be restored to design configuration before procedure completion.

The performance of the procedure has been evaluated to not increase the probability or consequences of occurrence of an accident or malfunction previously evaluated in the FSAR, or create the possibility of an accident or malfunction of a different type than any previously evaluated in the FSAR, and no margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification is reduced by this activity.

34SO-T47-001-2S

Revision 2 of this procedure allows operation of the drywell cooling fans, 2T47-B010A&B, simultaneously to maintain drywell cooling average temperature < 135°F.

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34SP-110495-DC-1-2S

This procedure checks the interlocks between valves in the Residual Heat Removal (RHR) system which have the potential to establish a drain path from the reactor to the torus. The prerequisites for this procedure are designed to prevent an actual draindown event and to maintain compliance with Technical Specifications. This procedure does not involve a change to plant design and does not involve the installation of jumpers or the opening of links. The purpose of the procedure is to ensure that valve interlocks function as designed.

The performance of the procedure has been evaluated to not increase the probability or consequences of occurrence of an accident or malfunction previously evaluated in the FSAR, or create the possibility of an accident or malfunction of a different type than any previously evaluated in the FSAR, and no margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification is reduced by this activity.

42SV-P41-001-1S

Revision 1 deletes the automatic isolation function on high flow of valves 1P41-F310A-D in accordance with Design Change Request (DCR) 1H93-049. Please see the summary of the evaluation for this DCR in the Unit 2 Design Change Requests section of the Annual Operating Report submitted on February 28, 1997.

52PM-MEL-001-2S

Revision 0 of this procedure provides instructions for removing the breaker from Frame 3B of Bus 2R22-S016 while maintaining power to its respective downstream load. This is a temporary change to the plant and the plant will be restored to design configuration before procedure completion.

The performance of the procedure has been evaluated to not increase the probability or consequences of occurrence of an accident or malfunction previously evaluated in the FSAR, or create the possibility of an accident or malfunction of a different type than any previously evaluated in the FSAR, and no margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification is reduced by this activity.

42SP-112095-PI-1-2S

Revision 0 of this procedure allows continued enforcement of preloaded control rod patterns beyond the low power setpoint by blocking the signal from 2C32-K608 and 2C32-K618, which normally send a signal to the NUMAC Rod Worth Minimizer (RWM) indicating that the plant power level is greater than the setpoint (based on feed flow and steam flow). This action in no way impacts the function of the RWM to enforce the control rod pattern to maintain BPWS requirements; in fact, the use of this procedure to continue the enforcement beyond the low power setpoint (below which the enforcement is required due to the analyzed Rod Drop Accident) is conservative and will serve as an operator aid for the prevention of control rod movement errors.

The performance of the procedure has been evaluated to not increase the probability or consequences of occurrence of an accident or malfunction previously evaluated in the FSAR, or create the possibility of an accident or malfunction of a different type than any previously evaluated in the FSAR, and no margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification is reduced by this activity.

03SP-022296-SA-1-1S

Revision 0 of this procedure was for the performance of Test or Experiment Request (TER) 96-001. The purpose of the TER was to determine the capability, or capacity, of one Reactor Feed Pump (RFP). The test was to show if one RFP, in conjunction with a Reactor Recirculation System run back to the Number 2 Speed Limiter could maintain reactor vessel water level above the low water level scram setpoint in the event of a trip of one of the two operating Reactor Feed Pump Turbines (RFPT) at power uprate conditions.

The performance of the procedure has been evaluated to not increase the probability or consequences of occurrence of an accident or malfunction previously evaluated in the FSAR, or create the possibility of an accident or malfunction of a different type than any previously evaluated in the FSAR, and no margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification is reduced by this activity.

34SO-R22-003-1S

Revision 0 of this procedure provides instructions for de-energizing and electrically isolating 4160 VAC Bus 1C from the system grid so that preventative maintenance can be performed on the Bus. Performance of this procedure is only allowed when the plant is in cold shutdown or during refueling outages.

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31GO-INS-001-0S

Revision 8 of this procedure incorporates the Third Ten Year Interval IST program requirements. The changes include new requirements as directed in the ASME OM Code. The revision changes the method of determining the allowable stroke time of motor operated valves tested per the IST program.

The performance of the procedure has been evaluated to not increase the probability or consequences of occurrence of an accident or malfunction previously evaluated in the FSAR, or create the possibility of an accident or malfunction of a different type than any previously evaluated in the FSAR, and no margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification is reduced by this activity.

42SV-R42-009-0S

Revision 1 of this procedure resulted from Technical Specifications Amendment 195 and added the remaining Unit 1 safety-related batteries, 1R42-S001A/B & 1R42-S002A/C, to the procedure and combined the service and performance tests into one procedure.

The performance of the procedure has been evaluated to not increase the probability or consequences of occurrence of an accident or malfunction previously evaluated in the FSAR, or create the possibility of an accident or malfunction of a different type than any previously evaluated in the FSAR, and no margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification is reduced by this activity.