## INDEX

SECTION	NUMBER OF PAGES
Operating Data Report	2
Average Daily Unit Power Level	1
Refueling Information	1
Monthly Operating Summary	1
Summary of Changes, Tests, and Experiments	5

\*

DOCKET NO.:	50-354
UNIT:	Hope Creek
DATE:	06/05/97
COMPLETED BY:	F. Todd
TELEPHONE:	(609) 339-1316
	state operation of the second se

# OPERATING DATA REPORT OPERATING STATUS

Reporting Period <u>May 1997</u> Gross Hours in Report Period <u>744</u>
Currently Authorized Power Level (MWt) 3293

	*		a and the second frank and	And and a subscription of the local division
Max. De	epend. Capa	city (MW	Ve-Net)	1031
Design	Electrical	Rating	(MWe-Net)	1067

3. Power Level to which restricted (if any) (MWe-Net) None

4. Reasons for restriction (if any)

		This Month	Yr To Date	Cumulative
5.	No. of hours reactor was critical	744.0	3623	77346
6.	Reactor reserve shutdown hours	0.0	0.0	0.0
7.	Hours generator on line	744.0	3623	76183
8.	Unit reserve shutdown hours	0.0	0.0	0.0
9.	Gross thermal energy generated (MWH)	2424650	11670194	243538441
10.		803760	3940380	80834593
11.	Net electrical energy generated (MWH)	771635	3786611	77266007
12.	Reactor service factor	100.0	100.0	84.4
13.	Reactor availability factor	100.0	100.0	84.4
14.	Unit service factor	100.0	100.0	83.2
15.	Unit availability factor	100.0	100.0	83.2
16.	Unit capacity factor (using MDC)	100.6	101.4	81.8
17.	Unit capacity factor (using Design MWe)	97.2	98.0	79.1
18.	Unit forced outage rate	0.0	0.0	4.2
19.	Shutdowns scheduled over nex duration):	t 6 months	(type, dat	e, &
	Refueling Outage, Sep	tember 13,	1997, 50 d	ays
20	TE shiph days in and the second		and the second second	

20. If shutdown at end of report period, estimated date of start-up:

DOCKET NO.: <u>50-354</u> UNIT: <u>Hope Creek</u> DATE: <u>06/05/97</u> COMPLETED BY: <u>F. Todd</u> TELEPHONE: <u>(609) 339-1316</u>

# OPERATING DATA REPORT UNIT SHUTDOWNS AND POWER REDUCTIONS

MONTH MAY 1997

NO.	DATE	TYPE F=FORCED S=SCHEDULED	DURATION (HOURS)	REASON (1)	METHOD OF SHUTTING DOWN THE REACTOR OR REDUCING POWER (2)	CORRECTIVE ACTION/COMMENTS

DOCKET NO.: 50-354 UNIT: Hope Creek DATE: 06/05/97 COMPLETED BY: F. Todd TELEPHONE: (609) 339-1316

### AVERAGE DAILY UNIT POWER LEVEL

•

MONTH	MAY 1997		
DAY	AVERAGE DAILY POWER LEVEL (MWe-Net)	DAY	AVERAGE DAILY POWER LEVEL (MWe-Net)
1	1096	17	1093
2	1090	18	1095
3	1088	19	1080
4	1093	20	1086
5	1097	21	1094
6	1089	22	1094
7	1094	23	1093
8	1095	24	1088
9	1094	25	1079
10	1095	26	1089
11	1075	27	<u>975</u>
12	1089	2.8	1083
13	1094	29	1092
14	1095	30	1087
15	1088	31	893
16	1095		

DOCKET NO.: 50-354 UNIT: Hope Creek DATE: 06/05/97 COMPLETED BY: L. Kepley TELEPHONE: (609) 339-1106

#### REFUELING INFORMATION

#### MONTH MAY 1997

1. Refueling	information	has changed	from	last	month:
--------------	-------------	-------------	------	------	--------

Yea X No

- 2. Scheduled date for next refueling (RF07): 9/13/9
- Scheduled date for restart following refueling: 11/12/97
- 4A. Will Technical Specification changes or other license amendments be required?

Yes X

B. Has the Safety Evaluation covering the COLR been reviewed by the Station Operating Review Committee (SORC)?

No

No

Yes

If no, when is it scheduled? <u>To Be Determined for Cycle 8</u> COLR

X

- Scheduled date(s) for submitting proposed licensi<sup>-</sup> , action: A License Change Request will be submitted to the NRC on or before June 30, 1997.
- Important licensing considerations associated with refueling: The above required LCR concerns the Technical Specification Safety Limit Minimum Critical Power Ratio for Cycle 8.
- 7. Number of Fuel Assemblies:

A. Incore B. In Spent Fuel Storage

		7	6	4	
	11	A	7	2	

- Present licensed spent fuel storage capacity: 4006 Future spent fuel storage capacity: 4006
- Date of last refueling that can be discharged <u>5/3/2006</u> to spent fuel pool assuming the present licensed capacity: (EOC13)

(Does allow for full-core off-load) (Assumes 244 bundle reloads every 18 months until then) (Does not allow for smaller reloads due to improved fuel)

DOCKET NO.: 50-354 UNIT: Hope Creek DATE: 06/05/97 COMPLETED BY: F. Todd TELEPHONE: (609) 339-1316

### MONTHLY OPERATING SUMMARY

#### MONTH MAY 1997

- The Hope Creek Generating Station remained on-line for the entire month and operated at 100% power for the month of May 1997. There were three load reductions which are identified below.
- Power was reduced to 87% on May 11, 1997, starting at 0305 hours to perform monthly turbine valve testing. The unit was returned to 100% power on May 11, 1997, at 0714 hours.
- Power was reduced to 80% on May 27, 1997, starting at 1135 hours due to "C" Feedwater isolation resulting from a UPS failure. The unit was returned to 100% power on May 28, 1997, at 0229 hours.
- Power was reduced to 75% on May 31, 1997, starting at 0659 for scram time testing. At the end of the month, the unit was at 76% power.
- At the end of the month the unit had been on-line for 205 days.

DOCKET NO.: 50-354 UNIT: Hope Creek DATE: 06/05/97 COMPLETED BY: 7...Kepley TELEPHONE: 1609) 339-1106

### SUMMARY OF CHANGES, TESTS, AND EXPERIMENTS FOR THE HOPE CREEK GENERATING STATION

#### LONTH: MAY 1997

The following items completed during April 1997 have been evaluated to determine:

- If the probability of occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety previously evaluated in the safety analysis report may be increased; or
- If a possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any evaluated previously in the safety analysis report may be created; or
- If the margin of safety as defined in the basis for any technical specification is reduced.

The 10CFR50.59 Safety Evaluations showed that these items did not create a new safety hazard to the plant nor did they affect the safe shutdown of the reactor. These items did not change the plant effluent releases and did not alter the existing environmental impact. The 10CFR50.59 Safety Evaluations determined that no unreviewed safety or environmental questions are involved.

### Design Changes Summary of Safety Evaluations

Replacement of Air-Operated Valves in the Safety Auxiliary Cooling System (SACS), 4EC-03612 Pkg. 8, Revision 0. The Standby Diesel Generator (SDG) room cooler water supply valves in the SACS were replaced. The previous valves were carbon steel air actuated flexible-wedge gate valves. The replacement valves are stainless steel air actuated ball valves which are more suitable to the application. UFSAR Figure 9.2-5 was changed to show the type and material of the replacement valves and actuators. UFSAR Table 3.9-18 was changed to show the valve/actuator replacement type. This replacement does not change the function of the valves or the function of the affected systems. The change does not alter the ability of the SACS, the SDG Room Recirculation System, or the SDGs to perform their intended safety function. The affected systems will function in accordance with the original design and licensing basis of the plant. Therefore, this design change does not increase the probability or consequences of an accident previously described in the UFSAR and does not involve an Unreviewed Safety Question.

Replacement of Air-Operated Valves in the Safety Auxiliary Cooling System (SACS), 4EC-03612 Pkg. 17, Revision 0. The High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) pump room cooler water supply valves in the SACS were replaced. The previous valves were carbon steel air actuated flexible-wedge gate valves. The replacement valves are stainless steel air actuated ball valves which are more suitable to the application. UFSAR Figure 9.2-4 was changed to show the type and material of the replacement valves and actuators. UFSAR Table 3.9-18 was changed to show the valve/actuator replacement type. This replacement does not change the function of the valves or the function of the affected systems. The change does not alter the ability of the SACS, the Equipment Area Cooling System (EACS), or the HPCI pump room unit coolers to perform their intended safety function. The affected systems will function in accordance with the original design and licensing basis of the plant.

Therefore, this design change does not increase the probability or consequences of an accident previously described in the UFSAR and does not involve an Unreviewed Safety Question.

Replacement of Air-Operated Valves in the Safety Auxiliaries Cooling System (SACS), 4EC-03612 Pkgs. 20 and 23, Revision 0. The Filtration, Recirculation, Ventilation System (FRVS) Recirculation System cooling coil water supply valves in the SACS were replaced. The previous valves were carbon steel air actuated flexible-wedge gate valves. The replacement valves are stainless steel air actuated ball valves which are more suitable to the application. UFSAR Figure 9.2-4 was changed to show the type and material of the replacement valves and actuators. UFSAR Table 3.9-18 was changed to show the valve/actuator replacement type. This replacement does not change the function of the valves or the function of the affected systems. The change does not alter the ability of the SACS or the FRVS Recirculation System to perform their intended safety functions. The affected systems will function in accordance with the original design and licensing basis of the plant.

Therefore, this design change does not increase the probability or consequences of an accident previously described in the UFSAR and does not involve an Unreviewed Safety Question.

Replacement of Air-Operated Valves in the Safety Auxiliaries Cooling System (SACS), 4EC-03612, Pkg. 30, Revision 0. The Core "pray (CS) pump room cooler water supply valves in the SACS were replaced. The previous valves were carbon steel air actuated flexible-wedge gate valves. The replacement valves are stainless steel air actuated ball valves which are more suitable to the application. UFSAR Figure 9.2-4 was changed to show the type and material of the replacement valves and actuators. UFSAR Table 3.9-18 was changed to show the valve/actuator replacement type. This replacement does not change the function of the valves or the function of the affected systems. The change does not alter the ability of the SACS, the Equipment Area Cooling System (EACS), or the CS pump room unit coolers to perform their intended safety functions. The affected systems will function in accordance with the original design and licensing basis of the plant.

Therefore, this design change does not increase the probability or consequences of an accident previously described in the UFSAR and does not involve an Unreviewed Safety Question.

Remove Flow Switch 1EPFS-2225A, 4HE-00356, Pkg. 1, Revision 0. This design change removed the service water screen and backwash flow switch, 1EPFS-2225A, and installed gaskets and a blind flange in place of the flow switch. Stress and seismic evaluations have been performed to demonstrate the adequacy of the change. The replacement of the flow switch with a blind flange does not affect the amount of flow being provided to the Reactor Auxiliary Cooling System (RACS) and Safety Auxiliary Cooling System (SACS) heat exchangers during plant conditions, transients, and accident conditions. The change does not: 1) change, degrade, or prevent actions described or assumed in any accident described in the UFSAR, 2) alter any assumptions previously made in evaluating radiological consequences of any accident described in the UFSAR, 3) affect the mitigation of the radiological consequences of any accident described in the UFSAR, 4) affect a fission product barrier, or 5) change the composition or inventory of radioactivity releases. This change does not adversely affect the operability of the Station Service Water System (SSWS).

Therefore, this design change does not increase the probability or consequences of an accident previously described in the UFSAR and does not involve an Unreviewed Safety Question.

# UFSAR Change Notices Summary of Safety Evaluations

UFSAR CHANGE NOTICE 97-015, Nuclear Engineering Department Organizational Changes. This Updated Final Safety Analyis Report (UFSAR) change reorganizes the functions within the Nuclear Engineering Department. The description of the entire Nuclear Engineering Department function is now consolidated under the control of the Senior Vice President - Nuclear Engineering. This provides flexibility in transferring responsibilities between direct reports to the Senior Vice President - Nuclear Engineering. Therefore, this UFSAR change does not increase the probability or • consequences of an accident previously described in the UFSAR and does not involve an Unreviewed Safety Question.

UFSAR CHANGE NOTICE 97-013, Nuclear Business Unit (NBU) Organization Changes. This UFSAR change shifts, clarifies, and consolidates responsibilities for NBU organizations, revises the succession of authority and responsibility for Salem station operations, establishes new positions, and corrects editorial errors. The changes provide better control over NBU activities, and do not involve any reduction in the qualifications or training requirements, technical support, management control, commitments, or the quality assurance program.

Therefore, this UFSAR change does not increase the probability or consequences of an accident previously described in the UFSAR and does not involve an Unreviewed Safety Question.

### Temporary Modifications Summary of Safety Evaluations

Temporary Modification 97-003, Leak Repair of Steam Tunnel Main Steam Drain Line, 1-AB-028-DBD-2". This Temporary Modification installs clamps and a hanger to contain a leak on line 1-AB-028-DBD-2", a main steam drain line, shown in UFSAR Figures 6.2-46 and 6.3-1. Line 1+ AB-028-DBD-2" is non-safety related and provides a flowpath to the condenser in the standby mode of High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI)/Reactor Core Isolation Cooling (RCIC). In the event that HPCI or RCIC is placed into service, the flow path of the main steam drain line is isolated. This Temporary Modification does not alter or change the function or design requirements of the main steam drain line as described in the UFSAR. The clamp is designed to meet the temperature and pressure requirements of the main steam drain line. A temporary hanger is installed to support the additional load of the clamps. The main steam drain line meets seismic II/1 requirements with the temporary hanger installed.

Therefore, implementation of this temporary modification does not increase the probability or consequences of an accident previously described in the UFSAR and does not involve an Unreviewed Safety Question.

Temporary Modification 97-004, Aligning Valves to Allow Continuous Draining of Drain/Bucket Trap, 1KLDT-126. This Temporary Modification establishes an off normal line-up for the Primary Containment Instrument Gas (PCIG) drain trap, 1KLDT-126, on the "B" compressor skid. The off normal line-up consists of closing the trap inlet valve, closing the trap equalizer valve and throttling the trap bypass valve open. This is a change to the normal configuration of the facility as described in the USFAR. This line-up allows the water generated from the intercooler condenser/separator to be eliminated without excessive PCIG loss. Normal operation of the traps blows gas into the equipment drain funnel in the conversion area while expelling water. This Temporary Modification establishes a controlled small bleed from the separator. The continuous small (2.5 SCFM maximum) blowdown is a small increase to the normal total flow and any change to radiological conditions will be detected by existing plant monitoring systems. Water elimination is included in the original design basis function of the system. No unmonitored release path is created by this temporary modification.

Therefore, implementation of this temporary modification does not increase the probability or consequences of an accidenc previously described in the UFSAR and does not involve an Unreviewed Safety Question.

# Deficiency Reports Summary of Safety Evaluations Procedures Summary of Safety Evaluations Other Summary of Safety Evaluation

There were no changes in these categories implemented during April 1997.