- 5. R. R. SMITH & C B. DOE, "CLADDING FAILURE IMULATION TESTS IN EBR-II," ANL-7067, DECEMBER, 1966.
- 6 R.R. SMIT,M, ET AL., "LOCATING AND IDENTIFYING THE SOURCE OF THE MAY 24, 1967 FISSION PRODUCT RELEASE IN EBR-II," ANL-7543, APRIL, 1969.
- 7. F. M. FRYER, ET AL., "SYMPTOMS AND DETECTION OF A FISSION PRODUCT RELEASE FROM AN EBR-II FUEL ELEMENT\ CASE 1. DEFECT ABOVE FUEL ELEVATION," ANL-7605, JANUARY, 1970.
- 8. I. A. EFIMOV, ET AL., "ISOTOPIC COMPOSITION OF FISSION PRODUCTS IN
 THE GAS OF THE FIRST CIRCUIT OF A BR-5 REACTOR WITH URANIUM
 MONOCARBIDE FUEL," TRANSLATION FORM ATOMNAYA ENERGIYA, UNDERSCORE LAST
 TWO WORDS, VOL. 26, NO. 6, PP. 544-546, JUNE, 1969.

BEGIN NEW PAGE

Companies of the other states of the state of

Section of the second

ATTACHMENT A - NEW AND REVISED PAGES FOR THE SEFOR TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS - PROPOSED CHANGE NO. &

2818-

BEGIN NEW PAGE

3.10 APPROACH TO POWER

APPLICABILITY

APPLIES TO REACTOR POWER LIMITS DURING THE INITIAL APPROACH TO FULL POWER FOR CORE I AND ALSO FOR CORE II.

OBJECTIVE

TO PROVIDE A METHOD OF ASSURING A SAFE AND ORDERLY APPROACH TO FULL POWER.

SPECIFICATION

A. REACTOR POWER SHALL BE LIMITED TO 2 MWT INITIALLY. THIS LIMIT SHALL BE SUCCESSIVELY INCREASED TO VALUES OF 5, 10, 15, 17.5

AND 20 MWT PROVIDED THE CONDITIONS LISTED IN SECTION 3.3C, D & E

ARE SATISFIED AT EACH OF THESE LIMITS IN THE APPROACH TO RATED FLUX

APPROACH. SATISFACTORY RESULTS OBTAINED AT A GIVEN LIMIT SHALL PERMIT

REACTOR OPERATION UP TO AND INCLUDING THE NEXT SCHEDULED STEP IN THE

APPROACH TO POWER.

IF AT ANY POWER LEVEL, THE ANALYSIS OF THE CONVENTIONAL OSCILLATOR

THE INDICATES THAT THE STABILITY CRITERION OF SPECIFICATION 3.3.F

HOT STATES AND SIGNED LEVEL OF POWER, THE REACTOR POWER MAY

RECE AS THE MALPHAY POINT EXTREM THE LEVEL AT MILITER

AND THAT AT MICHEN THE FAILURE TO MEET THE SPECIFICA- 1.0

REACTOR STABILITY V L BE DETERMINED BY MEANS CONVENTIONAL OSCILLATION TOR TESTS AT EACH STEP IN THE APPROACH TO POWER. THESE TESTS WILL CONSIST OF MEASURING REACTOR FLUX AND INPUT REACTIVITY AS A FUNCTION OF TIME WHILE THE REACTIVITY IS OSCILLATED AND COOLANT FLOW RATE IS HELD CONSTANT. DATA FROM THESE TESTS WILL BE USED TO MAKE NYQUIST PLOTS FOR EACH POWER LEVEL.

100

STATE OF THE STATE

ANC.

24

GUINEA PIG FUEL RODS \REF. 1\ CONTAINING FUELPELLETS OF 25\ FISSILE
PLUTONIUM WILL BE PLACED IN THE CORE AT POSITIONS LOCATED UNDER
THROUGH-HEAD REFUELING PORTS, AND WILL BE REMOVED FOR EXAMINATION AT
SCHEDULED INTERVALS IN TE TEST PROGRAM. UP TO THREE OF THE GUINEA
PIG RODS WILL OPERATE AT POWER DENSITIES UP TO 15\ HIGHER THAN A
STANDARD ROD NEAREST THE CENTER OF THE CORE.

THE SPECIFIED GUINEA PIG ROD EXAMINATIONS AFTER OPERATION AT POWER
LEVELS OF 15 AND 17.5 MWT WERE CHOSEN SUCH THAT SATISFACTORY OPERATING
EXPERIENCE WITH THE GUINEA PIG RODS AT EACH OF THESE POWER LEVELS WILL
PROVIDE ASSURANCE OF SATISFACTORY OPERATION OF STANDARD FUEL RODS AT
THE NEXT HIGHER POWER LEVEL.

- C. THE REACTOR POWT LIMIT SHALL NOT BE INCRE' ED ABOVE 15 MWT OR ABOVE 17.5 MWT UNLESS ANALYSIS OF RESULTS FROM GUINEA PIG FUEL ROD EXAMINATIONS SHOWS THAT NO DAMAGE TO STANDARD FUEL RODS IS TO BE EXPECTED BY OPERATION AT THE NEXT SCHEDULED POWER LEVEL.
- D. A REACTOR HEAT BALANCE SHALL BE MADE AS SOON AS PRACTICABLE AFTER ACHIEVING STEADY STATE POWER LEVELS OF 5, 10, 15, 17.5, AND 20 MWT, TO DETERMINE THE CORRELATION BETWEEN RATED FLUX AND REACTOR POWER.
- E. THE SPECIFICATIONS PREVIOUSLY IDENTIFIED IN THIS SECTION HAVEBEEN APPROVED AND ARE INCORPORATED INTO THE SEFOR TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS AS SECTION 3.L3. \PLACE BRACKET AROUND ITEM E ON RIGHT HAND SIDE.\

SEPTEMBER 3, 1970 \PAGE NO. SHOULD BE 3.10-1.\

TIS PAGE IS INTENTIONALLY BLANK. \PLACE BRACKET AROUND THIS SENTENCE
ON RIGHT HAND SIDE.\

PROPOSED CHANGE NO. 4
SEPTEMBER 3, 1970

BEGIN NEW PAGE

MORE AND THE REAL PROPERTY.

BASES

THE REACTOR POWER LIMIT WILL BE INCREASED IN A STEP-WIDE MANNER WITH STATIC AND OSCILLATOR MEASUREMENTS MADE AT THE INDICATED POWER LEVELS. THE RESULTS FROM TESTS AT EACH POWER LEVEL WILL BE EVALUATED AND COMPARED TO PREDICTED RESULTS BEFORE PROCEEDING TO THE NEXT HIGHER POWER LEVEL. RESULTS FROM STATIC AND OSCILLATOR TESTS WILL BE ANALYZED TO VERIFY THAT THE MINIMUM CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION SPECIFIED IN SECTION 3.3 C, D AND E ARE BEING MET.

GUINEA PIG RODS NET ST THE CENTER OF THE CORE WILL BE REMOVED PRIOR TO REACTOR OPERATION ABOVE 17.5 MWT, SO THAT NO FUEL RODS WILL BE OPERATED AT POWER DENSITIES IN EXCESS OF THAT EXPERIENCED BY THE HOTTEST STANDARD FUEL ROD AT 20 MWT. \SEE SPECIFICATION 3.3.H.\

Secretary and the second

THE INITIAL CALIBRATION OF THE WIDE RANGE FLUX MONITOR WILL BE BASED ON PHYSICS CALCULATIONS. THIS CALIBRATION WILL BE VERIFIED BY EXPERIMENTAL DATA AS SOON AS PRACTICABLE, AND WILL BE CHECKED AT THE SPECIFIED STEPS IN THE APPROACH TO POWER.

REACTOR OPERATING DATA AND EXPERIENCE UP TO AND INCLUDING 10 MWT WERE USED TO ESTABLISH ALLOWABLE LIMITS FOR UNEXPLAINED REACTOR BEHAVIOR.

SECTION 3.13 WAS ADDED TO THESE SPECIFICATIONS TO SPECIFY THESE LIMITS. /9

B. A COVER GAS MONITOR INDICATION GREATER THAN 10 TIMES

NORMAL BACKGROUND AT THE INDICATED POWER LEVEL AND THE PRESENCE

OF NOBLE GAS ISOTOPES IN THE COVER GAS SHALL BE CONSIDERED A

POSSIBLE INDICATION OF FAILED FUEL. TWO OR MORRE GUINEA

PIG RODS SHALL BE EXAMINED IN ADDITION TO THE SURVEILLANCE

REQUIRED BY 4.9.B.4 AND 4.4.P. SUBSEQUENT REACTOR OPERATIONS

WILL BE ALLOWED, PROVIDED THAT THE INVESTIGATIONS CONCLUDE IT

IS SAFE TO PROCEED \USING THE STEPS OUTLINED BY 4.9.B\. THE

RESPONSE TO ADDITIONAL FISSION GAS RELEASES TO THE COVER GAS

WILL FOLLOW THE PROCEDURES OUTLINED IN 4.9.B, UTILIZING THE

INFORMATION OBTAINED FROM THE INITIAL RELEASE.

3.13-2
PRÔPOSED CHANGE NO. 4
SEPTEMBBER 3, 1970

2818-

REFERENCE

EDSAR, VOLUME I, PARA. 4.2.2.4, P. 4-9.

3.10-3.

PRÔPOSED CHANCE NO. 4

SEPTEMBER 3, 1970

START NEW PAGE

3.13 OPERATING LIMITS

APPLICABILITY

APPLIES TO PARAMETERS OBSERVED OR MEASURED DURING STEADY STATE
REACTOR OPERATION.

OBJECTIVE

West to the second

ANOMALOUS REACTOR BEHAVIOR AND TO ESTABLISH LIMITS FOR STEADY

STATE OPERATION WITH KNOWN LOSS OF CLAD INTEGRITY.

28 18-

- A. THE LIMITS FOR UNEXPLAINED BEHAVIOR SHALL BF AS GIVEN BELOW.

 IF THESE LIMITS ARE EXCEEDED, THE ACTIONS SPECIFIED IN SECTION

 4.9.B SHALL BE TAKEN.
- 1. A GROSS COVER GAS MONITOR INDICATION GREATER THAN NORMAL BACKGROUND BY A FACTOR OF THREE AT THE INDICATED POWER LEVEL SHALL BE CONSIDERED ANOMALOUS. IF IT IS DETERMINED THAT IT IS SAFE TO RESUME REACTOR OPERATIONS \USING THE STEPS OUTLINED IN 4.9.B.1\ OPERATION MAY BE RESUMED FOLLOWING THE SELECTION OF A NEW LIMIT FOR THE GROSS COVER GAS MONITOR WHICH WILL ASSURE THAT AN EQUIVALENT RELEASE OF FISSION GAS FROM ANOTHER FUEL ROD WILL BE DETECTED. THE NEW LIMIT SHALL BE REPORTED IN THE QUARTERLY OPERATIONS REPORT.
- 2. A CHANGE IN STEADY STATE REACTIVITY OF MORE THAN PLUS OR MINUS 10 CENTS FROM THE PREDICTED VALUE AT THE REACTOR OPERATING CONDITIONS SHALL BE CONSIDERED ANOMALOUS.
 - 5. A CHANGE IN MAIN PRIMARY COOLANT FLOW RATE OF MORE THAN PLUS OR MINUS 16 FROM THE PREDICTED VALUE WHEN THE COOLANT FLOW RATE
 - IS GREATER THAN 1500 GPM SHALL BE CONSIDERED ANOMALOUS.

Agricultural and the Francisco

A. A DIFFERENCE OF MORE THRAN 60 DEGREE F BETWEEN THE UPPER DEAGTOR VESSEL OUTLET TEMPERATURE AND THE RESISTANCE TEMPERATURE DETECTORS ARTDASA IN THE REACTOR VESSEL MAIN PRIMARY OUTLET PIPE SHALL BE COMBIDERED ABONALOUS.

START NEW PAGE

BASES

THE REACTOR AND AUXILIARY SYSTEMS \INCLUDING THE RADWASTE SYSTEM\ HAVE BEEN DESIGNED SO THAT STEADY STATE OPERATION WITH FIVE FAILED FUEL RODS CAN BE ACCOMMODATED REFS. 1,21. THE COVER GAS MONITOR IS CAPABLE OF DETECTING LOSS OF CLAD INTEGRITY IF IT OCCURS REF. 31. THE COVER GAS MONITOR WILL ALSO RESPOND TO FISSION PRODUCTS ESCAPING FROM PIN HOLE LEAKS, WHICH MAY OCCUR IN SOME FUEL RODS BUT WHICH ARE NOT CLASSED AS FAILURES \REF. THE NORMAL COVER GAS ACTIVITY DUE TO A-41 WILL BE ABOUT .024 MICRO CI/CC AT 20 MWT, AND THE CORRESPONDING INDICATION ON THE COVER GAS MONITOR WILL BE ABOUT 20 MR/H. IF 1\ OF THE 20 MWT EQUILIBRIUM FISSION PRODUCTS FROM A SINGLE ROD WERE RELEASED TO THE COVER GAS, THE COVER GAS ACTIVITY WOULD INCREASE BY ABOUT 3 MICRO CI/CC, \REF. 5\ WHICH IS A FACTOR OF MORE THAN 100 ABOVE THE NORMAL READING. THE NORMAL COVER GAS ACTIVITY MAY INCREASE OVER A LONG PERIOD OF TIME DUE TO THE POSSIBILITY OF PIN HOLE LEAKS IN SOME FUEL RODS. LIMITING ANY UNEXPLAINED INCREASED IN THE COVER GAS MONITOR READING TO A FACTOR OF THREE TIMES THE NORMAL READING, THE CAPABILITY OF DETECTING NEW LEAKS AND/OR CLADDING FAILURE IS ASSURED.

REPEATABILITY CONSIDERATIONS, BUT IS SMALL ENOUGH TO DETECT INCIPIENT PROBLEMS BEFORE THEY HAVE A DETRIMENTAL EFFECT ON REACTOR COOLING.

BECAUSE THE OUTLET TEMPERATURES VARY SO WIDELY OVER THE COURSE OF THE EXPERIMENTS. IT IS NECESSARY TO HAVE CRITERIA WHICH WILL BE APPLICABLE TO ALL CONDITIONS. THE COMPARISON BETWEEN THE VESSEL EXIT RTD\S AND THE UPPER REACTOR VESSEL OUTLET TEMPERA-TURES PROVIDES A CROSS-CHECK ON BOTH INSTRUMENTS. THE ALLOWABLE VARIATION WAS OBTAINED BY EXAMINING THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN THESE TWO TEMPERATURE DEVICES OVER THE TESTING COMPLETED UP TO 10 MWT, INCLUDING THE NATURAL CIRCULATION TESTS. THE VALUE OF PLUS OR MINUS 60 DEGREE F IS SLIGHTLY LARGER THAN ANY VARIATION OBTAINED TO DATE. CALCULATIONS INDICATE THAT FOR FULL FLOW. FULL POWER, THERE SHOULD BE 12 DEGREE F DIFFERENCE FOR THE AS-DESIGNED CORE. A DIFFERENCE INTHESE TEMPERATURES OF 60 DEGREE A WOULD CORRESPOND TO APPROXIMATELY 35% OF THE TOTAL VESSEL FLOW DYPASSING THE CORE COMPARED TO THE DESIGN CONDITION OF 10', BYPASS LEAKAGE. IT COULD ALSO BE CAUSED BY CHANGES IN FLOW DISTRIBUTION BUE TO SPITICING EFFECTS AT LOW FLOW RATES.

THE SEFOR REACTOR OPL .TES OVER A WIDE RANGE OF MPERATURE AND POWER CONDITIONS IN THE COURSE OF THE DEFINED EXPERIMENTAL PROGRAM. TO FOLLOW NORMAL EXPERIMENTAL REACTOR CONDITIONS REQUIRES A PREDICTIVE CAPABILITY FOR A BROAD RANGE OF CONDITIONS. TO ESTABLISH DEFINITIVE CRITERIA FOR ANOMALOUS REACTIVITY, CAREFUL REACTIVITY BALANCES AD COMPARISONS HAVE BEEN MAINTAINED DURING ZERO POWER TESTING, FUEL ARRANGEMENT AND THE POWEP ASCENSION TO 10 MWT. INCONSEQUENTIAL RANDOM AND SYSTEMATIC ERRORS NORMALLY ARE LESS THAN THE PLUS OR MINUS 10 CENTS MAXIMUM DISPARITY BETWEEN PREDICTED AND MEASURED REACTIVITY VALUES. THE LIMIT IS RESTRICTIVE ENOUGH TO ALERT THE OPERATOR AND STAFF TO ITEMS OF CONSEQUENCE, E.G., SIGNIFICANT CHANGES IN THE REACTOR COEFFICIENTS, ERRONEOUS FUEL ARRANGEMENTS OR OTHER PROBLEMS.

COMPARISON OF THE COOLANT FLOW RATE TO THE PUMP CHARACTERISTIC PROVIDES A CROSS COMPARISON BETWEEN THE PUMP PERFORMANCE AND THE MAGNETIC FLOWMETER. THE PLANT IS PROTECTED FROM ABRUPT AND LARGE LOSSES OF FLOW BY THE LOW FLOW TRIPS AT 80\ OF THE SET POINT FLOW RATE. THE REQUIREMENT FOR COMPARISON OF MEASURED FLOW TO PREDICTED FLOW WILL ALERT THE OPERATOR TO ANY DETERIORATION IN PERFORMANCE OF EITHER THE PUMP OR THE MAGNETIC FLOWMETER.

THE LIMIT OF PLUS OR MINUS 10\ IS LARGE ENOUGH TO EXCLUDE VARIATIONS DUE TO RANDOM ERRORS AND

3.13-3 PROPOSED CHANGE NO. A SEPTEMBER 3, 1970 2818

THESE CONDITIONS ARE "T DETRIMENTAL TO THE CORE. THE RESULTING UPPER REGION TEMPERATURES WOULD BE BELOW THE TRIP LIMIT OF 900 DEGREE F FOR THESE SENSORS. THE 60 DEGREE F LIMIT WOULD ASSURE DETECTION OF SUCH A CONDITION BEFORE THE SITUATION BECAME SERIOUS.

A GCGM \GROSS COVER GAS MONITOR\ INDICATION OF 10 TIMES NORMAL BACKGROUND SUPPLEMENTED BY A SPECTRAL ANALYSIS WHICH INDICATES WOBLE GASES IN THE REACTOR COVER GAS WOULD PROVIDE A POSITIVE INDICATION OF A FISSION GAS RELEASE FROM A FUEL ROD INTO THE REACTOR COVER GAS. IT IS POSSIBLE THAT SMALL PIN HOLE LEAKS FROM ONE OR MORE FUEL RODS WILL OCCUR DURING OPERATION \REF. 6\. HOWEVER, THE FIRST OBSERVATION OF A FISSION GAS RELEASE TO THE REACTOR COVER GAS RESULTING IN A GCGM INDICATION OF 10 TIMES BACKGROUND WILL BE TREATED AS A POSSIBLE INDICATION OF A FUEL ROD FAILURE. A SPECTRAL ANALYSIS OF A COVER GAS SAMPLE WILL BE PERFORMED \AS REQUIRED BY 4.4.P\ TO ESTABLISH THE AGE OF THE GAS. TWO OR MORE OF THE GUINEA PIG RODS WILL BE EXAMINED TO VERIFY THAT A DAMAGE THRESHOLD FOR THE FUEL HAS NOT BEEN REACHED. SODIUM SAMPLES \AS REQUIRED BY 4.9.B.4\ WILL BE TAKEN AND ANALYZED FOR FISSION PRODUCTS. THE RESULTS FROM THESE INVESTIGATIONS WILL BE USED AS REQUIRED BY 4.9.B TO DETERMINE IF IT IS SAFE TO RESUME REACTOR OPERATION. THE FREQUENCY OF ROUTINE SURVEILLANCE ASUCH AS COVER GAS SAMPLES FOR SPECTRAL ANALYSISA WILL BE INCREASED AS REQUIRED TO DETERMINE THE BEHAVIOR OF THE which is the property of the p

B-23-2

Proposer Change No. 4 September 3, 1970 2

EN

CORRECTIONS

PAR. IV.A.1, LINE 2\ --- DUE TO A-41 ACTIVITY

PAR. IV.A.2, LINES 6,7\

-260 LN \1 \ \77 P/\460 \ T SUBSCRIPT C\\\
-0.5 P -0.015 DELTA T

PAR. IV.A.2, LINE 11\

T SUBSCRIPT C \ AVERAGE CORE COOLANT TEMPERATURE

2818-23

CAS RELEASE FROM FUEL RODS IN THE SEFOR SYSTEM. THE RESPONSE

TO ANY ADDITITIONAL INDICATIONS OF FISSION GAS RELEASE WILL DEPEND

ON THE NATURE OF THE RELEASE AND THE INFORMATION OBTAINED FROM

THE INVESTIGATIONS OF THE INITIAL RELEASE.

REFERENCES

- 1. SEFOR TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS, P 3.7-4, BASES FOR 3.7.H.
- 2. SEFOR FDSAR, SUPPLEMENT 21, SECTION I.
- 3. SEFOR FDSAR, SUPPLEMENT 21, SECTION II.
- 4. SEFOR TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS, PP 3.3-5,6, BASES FOR 3.3.K.
- 5. SEFOR FDSAR, SUPPLEMENT 21, P 14.
- 6. G. KAYSER, *PROBLEMS DUE TOOFISSION PRODUCTS IN CIRCUITS OF SODIUM-COOLED FAST REACTORS IN THE EVENT OF CAN FRACTURES,*

 EURFNR-593 \ORIGINAL REPORT NUMBER DRP/SENTR/CAD.68.R.575\,

 NUCLEAR RESEARCH CENTER CADARACHE & SACLAY \FRANCE\, DECEMBER, 22

 1968.

PAR. IV.A.2, ADD TO LAST PARAGRAPHY

FOR-EXAMPLE, ON THE BASIS OF PREVIOUS REACTOR \RA JODIE\ AND
FUEL TESTING EXPERIENCE, CHANGES IN THIS EQUATION ARE INEVITABLE DUE TO FUEL RESTRUCTURING AND CRACKING AND WOULD NOT BE
CONSIDERED TO BE ANOMALOUS. REDUCTIONS IN THE POWER COEFFICIENT HAVE ALREADY BEEN OBSERVED AT SEFOR DURING THE INITIAL
APPROACH TO POWER AS WOULD BE PREDICTED CONSIDERING THIS EFFECT.

PAR. IV.A.3, LINE 3\

Q \ 100V/\\V/400\ \ 6.01\

PAR. IV.B, LINE 1\

B. INITIAL OPERATIONS UP TO A POWER LEVEL OF 15 MWT HAVE BEEN

PAR. IV. B, LINE 12\

"LEADERS" SHOULD BE "LEAKERS"

K COHEN GENERAL ELECTRIC COMPANY SUNNYVALE CALIF



24