# ENCLOSURE 1 TO NLS-85-479

PROPOSED TECHNICAL SFECIFICATION PAGES BRUNSWICK-1 ROD SEQUENCE CONTROL SYSTEM (84TSB47)

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# PROPOSED CHANGES TO BRUNSWICK-1 TS SECTION 3/4.1.4.2

Page	Description	of Change	9
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3/4 1-15 "CONDITIONS" changed to "OPERATIONAL CONDITIONS."

Add Item 3.1.4.2.c to indicate that an incorrable control rod may be bypassed provided: the position and bypassing of the rod are verified by a second licensed operator or technically qualified member of the unit technical staff; and not more than three control rods in any RSCS group are inoperable.

3/4 1-16 This page has been generally reformatted to conform more closely to the GE-BWR/4 STS.

## ROD SEQUENCE CONTROL SYSTEM

## LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.1.4.2 The Rod Sequence Control System (RSCS) shall be OPERABLE when THERMAL POWER is less than 20% of RATED THERMAL POWER.

APPLICABILITY: OPERATIONAL CONDITIONS 1\* and 2\*#.

### ACTION:

- a. With the RSCS inoperable:
  - 1. Control rod withdrawal for reactor startup shall not begin.
  - If control rod withdrawal has started and THERMAL POWER is less than 20% of RATED THERMAL POWER, control rod movement shall not be permitted, except by scram, until the rod sequence control system is returned to OPERABLE status.
  - With THERMAL POWER being reduced by control rod insertion, do not continue control rod insertion except by a scram.
- b. With erroneous control rod position input to the RSCS, the sequence restraints may be bypassed for correction of the erroneous information and reinitialization of the RSCS provided that a second licensed operator or other qualified member of the technical staff is present at the reactor control console and verifies compliance with the prescribed control rod pattern.
- c. With an inoperable control rod(s), OPERABLE control rod movement may continue by bypassing the inoperable control rod(s) in the RSCS group(s) provided that:
  - The position and bypassing of the inoperable control rod(s) is verified by a second licensed operator or other technically qualified member of the technical staff, and
  - There are not more than three inoperable control rods in any RSCS group.

\* See Special Test Exception 3.10.2.

<sup>#</sup> Entry into OPERATIONAL CONDITION 2 and withdrawal of selected control rods is permitted for the purpose of determining the OPERABILITY of the RSCS prior to withdrawal of control rods for the purpose of bringing the reactor to criticality.

#### SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

4.1.4.2 The RSCS shall be demonstrated OPERABLE by:

- a. Attempting to select and move an out-of-sequence control rod:
  - 1. In OPERATIONAL CONDITION 2 prior to the start of control rod withdrawal for a reactor startup, and
  - 2. As soon as the RSCS is automatically initiated during control rod insertion when reducing THERMAL POWER.
- b. Attempting to move a control rod more than one notch as soon as the group notch mode is automatically initiated during:
  - 1. Control rod withdrawal for each reactor startup, and
  - 2. Power reduction.
- c. Performance of the comparator check of the group notch circuits prior to control rod:
  - 1. Withdrawal for each reactor startup, and
  - Insertion to reduce THERMAL POWER to less than 20% of RATED THERMAL POWER.

# ENCLOSURE 2 TO NLS-85-479

# PROPOSED TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION PAGES BRUNSWICK-2 ROD SEQUENCE CONTROL SYSTEM (84TSB47)

## PROPOSED CHANGES TO BRUNSWICK-2 TS SECTION 3/4.1.4.2

Page	Description of Change
3/4 1-15	"CONDITIONS" changed to "OPERATIONAL CONDITIONS"
	Add from 2.1.4.2 - to indicate that an incomplete control rate

Add Item 3.1.4.2.c to indicate that an inoperable control rod may be bypassed provided: the position and bypassing of the rod are verified by a second licensed operator or technically qualified member of the unit technical staff; and not more than three control rods in any RSCS group are inoperable.

3/4 1-16 This page has been generally reformatted to conform more closely to the GE-BWR/4 STS.

### ROD SEQUENCE CONTROL SYSTEM

### LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.1.4.2 The Rod Sequence Control System (RSCS) shall be OPERABLE when THERMAL POWER is less than 20% of RATED THERMAL POWER.

APPLICABILITY: OPERATIONAL CONDITIONS 1\* and 2\*#.

#### ACTION:

- a. With the RSCS inoperable:
  - 1. Control rod withdrawal for reactor startup shall not begin.
  - If control rod withdrawal has started and THERMAL POWER is less than 20% of RATED THERMAL POWER, control rod movement shall not be permitted, except by scram, until the rod sequence control system is returned to OPERABLE status.
  - With THERMAL POWER being reduced by control rod insertion, do not continue control rod insertion except by a scram.
- b. With erroneous control rod position input to the RSCS, the sequence restraints may be bypassed for correction of the erroneous information and reinitialization of the RSCS provided that a second licensed operator or other qualified member of the technical staff is present at the reactor control console and verifies compliance with the prescribed control rod pattern.
- c. With an inoperable control rod(s), OPERABLE control rod movement may continue by bypassing the inoperable control rod(s) in the RSCS group(s) provided that:
  - The position and bypassing of the inoperable control rod(s) is verified by a second licensed operator or other technically qualified member of the technical staff, and
  - There are not more than three inoperable control rods in any RSCS group.

\* See Special Test Exception 3.10.2.

<sup>#</sup> Entry into OPERATIONAL CONDITION 2 and withdrawal of selected control rods is permitted for the purpose of determining the OPERABILITY of the RSCS prior to withdrawal of control rods for the purpose of bringing the reactor to criticality.

### SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

4.1.4.2 The RSCS shall be demonstrated OPERABLE by:

- a. Attempting to select and move an out-of-sequence control rod:
  - 1. In OPERATIONAL CONDITION 2 prior to the start of control rod withdrawal for a reactor startup, and
  - 2. As soon as the RSCS is automatically initiated during control rod insertion when reducing THERMAL POWER.
- b. Attempting to move a control rod more than one notch as soon as the group notch mode is automatically initiated during:
  - 1. Control rod withdrawal for each reactor startup, and
  - 2. Power reduction.
- c. Performance of the comparator check of the group notch circuits prior to control rod:
  - 1. Withdrawal for each reactor startup, and
  - Insertion to reduce THERMAL POWER to less than 20% of RATED THERMAL POWER.