NRC Form 366	U.S. NUCLEA	R REGULATORY COMMISSION
	DRT (LER)	VED OM8 NO. 3150-0104 ES 8/31/85
PACILITY NAME (1)	DOCKET NUMBER (2)	PAGE (3)
EDWIN I, HATCH, I	0 5 0 0 0	321110102
SPURIOUS STANDBY GAS TREATMENT INITIATION		
EVENT DATE (6) LER NUMBER (6) REPORT DATE (7)	OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED	(8)
MONTH DAY YEAR YEAR NUMBER NUMBER MONTH DAY YEAR	T HATCH LINIT IT O	15101010131616
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OPERATING THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CF	R §: (Check one or more of the following) (11)	73.71(b)
POWER 20.405(a)(1)(i) 50.36(c)(1)	50.73(a)(2)(v)	73.71(c)
LEVEL 1 0 0 20.405(a)(1)(iii) 50.38(e)(2)	50.73(a)(2)(vii)	OTHER (Specify in Abstract below and in Text, NRC Form
20,406(a)(1)(iii) 80.73(a)(2)(i)	50.73(a)(2)(v(ii)(A)	366A)
20.408(a)(1)(iv) 80.73(a)(2)(ii) 20.408(a)(1)(v) 80.73(a)(2)(iii)	50.73(a)(2)(vin)(b)	
LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER	A (12)	
NAME	AREA CODE	EPHONE NUMBER
Steven B. Tipps, Superintendent of Regulatory Comp	1 iance 9 1 1 2 3	6171-1718151
COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DES	SCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (13)	
CAUSE SYSTEM COMPONENT MANUFAC. REPORTABLE CAUSE SY	STEM COMPONENT MANUFAC RI	EPORTABLE . TO NPROS
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SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (14)	EXPECTED	MONTH DAY YEAR
	SUBMISSION DATE (15)	
ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e., approximately filteen single space typewritten lines) (16)		
At approximately 0245 CST on 12/19/85, with Unit Unit 2 operating at 2436 MWt (100% power), Standby "2B" started for no apparent reason.	l in cold shutdown for 7 Gas Treatment (SBGT)	refueling, and trains "1B" and
and returned to the standby mode at approximately (ently, the SBGT trains 0315 CST on 12/19/85.	were shut down
This event has been determined to be a nonrecur trains.	rring spurious actuatio	on of the SBGT
An engineering evaluation has shown that although demanded by plant conditions, the system did in designed. Since this actuation was a conservative of the public were not affected by the event.	the subject actuation nitiate and subsequent system response the he	of SBGT was not ly function as ealth and safety
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LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION

U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

APPROVED OMB NO 3150-0104 EXPIRES 8/31/85

FACILITY NAME (1)	DOCKET NUMBER (2)		LER NUMBER (6)						PAGE (3)			
EDWIN I. HATCH, I	경영합니다. 집안 여기 전 것이 같아.	YEAR		SEQUE	NTIAL		NUMBER					-
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This 30 day LER is required by 10CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv) because this event is the unplanned actuation of the Standby Gas Treatment (SBGT) System which is an Engineered Safety Feature (ESF).

At approximately 0245 CST on 12/19/85, with Unit 1 in cold shutdown for refueling, and Unit 2 operating at 2436 MWt (100% power), SBGT trains "1B" (1T46-C001B) and "2B" (2T46-C001B) automatically started for no immediately apparent reason from the standby mode. Simultaneously, the Unit 1 reactor building exhaust vent closed and the Units 1 and 2 refueling floor exhaust vents closed.

An immediate coordinated investigation was initiated by plant operations personnel and contract engineering personnel. The investigation showed that SBGT trains "lB" and "2B" automatically started while contract engineering personnel were changing out SBGT HFA relay 1A71-K5C per previously approved Design Change Request (DCR) 82-171.

Further investigation by engineering personnel failed to identify a cause for the automatic starting of SBGT trains "1B" and "2B". Consequently, the SBGT trains were shut down and returned to the standby mode at approximately 0315 CST on 12/19/85.

Onsite engineering personnel have evaluated this event, and they have determined it to be a spurious actuation. Although one relay in the system logic was being changed out (1A71-K5C), this alone could not have initiated the event. For SBGT to automatically start, at least one of two other relays in the system logic would also have to have been de-energized. No maintenance was in progress on the SBGT logic which would have resulted in those relays being de-energized. Furthermore, there was no evidence that the replacement of relay 1A71-K5C was being performed improperly.

Since this is an isolated event with no discernable cause, no action to prevent recurrence was initiated. The operability of the SBGT systems was not affected by this event.

There have been no previous events where the SBGT systems have actuated for no discernable reason.

An engineering evaluation has shown that although the subject actuation of SBGT was not demanded by plant conditions, the system did inititiate and subsequently function as designed. Since this actuation was a conservative system response the health and safety of the public were not affected by the event.

NRC Form 366A

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L. T. Gucwa Manager Nuclear Engineering and Chiel Nuclear Engineer



SL-196 0166C

January 17, 1986

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Document Control Desk Washington, D. C. 20555

Attached is Licensee Event Report 50-321/1985-046. This report meets the reporting requirements of 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)

Very truly yours,

fT Quan

L. T. Gucwa

CBS/1c

Attachment

c: Mr. J. T. Beckham, Jr. Mr. H. C. Nix, Jr. NRC-Region II GO-NORMS