



UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555

NEBRASKA PUBLIC POWER DISTRICT

DOCKET NO. 50-298

COOPER NUCLEAR STATION

AMENDMENT TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE

Amendment No. 96
License No. DPR-46

1. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission) has found that:
 - A. The application for amendment by Nebraska Public Power District dated March 11, 1986 complies with the standards and requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act), and the Commission's rules and regulations set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I;
 - B. The facility will operate in conformity with the application, the provisions of the Act, and the rules and regulations of the Commission;
 - C. There is reasonable assurance (i) that the activities authorized by this amendment can be conducted without endangering the health and safety of the public, and (ii) that such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations;
 - D. The issuance of this amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public; and
 - E. The issuance of this amendment is in accordance with 10 CFR Part 51 of the Commission's regulations and all applicable requirements have been satisfied.
2. Accordingly, the licensee is amended by changes to the Technical Specifications as indicated in the attachment to this license amendment and paragraph 2.C(2) of Facility Operating License No. DPR-46 is hereby amended to read as follows:


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(2) Technical Specification

The Technical Specifications contained in Appendices A and B, as revised through Amendment No. 96, are hereby incorporated in the license. The licensee shall operate the facility in accordance with the Technical Specifications.

3. This license amendment is effective as of its date of issuance.

FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION



Daniel R. Muller, Director
BWR Project Directorate #2
Division of BWR Licensing

Attachment:
Changes to the Technical
Specifications

Date of Issuance: March 17, 1986

ATTACHMENT TO LICENSE AMENDMENT NO. 96

FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. DPR-46

DOCKET NO. 50-298

Replace the following pages of the Appendix A Technical Specifications with the enclosed pages. The revised areas are indicated by marginal lines.

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COOPER LEAR STATION
TABLE A (Page 1)
PRIMARY CONTAINMENT AND REACTOR VESSEL ISOLATION INSTRUMENTATION

Instrument	Instrument I.D. No.	Setting Limit	Minimum Number of Operable Components Per Trip System (1)	Action Required When Component Operability is Not Assured (2)
Main Steam Line High Rad.	RMP-RM-251, A,B,C,&D	< 3 Times Full Power	2	A or B
Reactor Low Water Level	NBI-LIS-101, A,B,C,&D	>+12.5" Indicated Level	2(4)	A or B
Reactor Low Low Water Level	NBI-LIS-57 A & B #2 NBI-LIS-58 A & B #2	>-37" Indicated Level	2	A or B
Reactor Low Low Low Water Level	NBI-LIS-57 A & B #1 NBI-LIS-58 A & B #1	>-145.5" Indicated Level	2	A or B
Main Steam Line Leak Detection	MS-TS-121, A,B,C,&D 122, 123, 124, 143, 144, 145, 146, 147, 148, 149, 150	< 200°F	2(6)	B
Main Steam Line High Flow	MS-dPIS-116 A,B,C,&D 117, 118, 119	< 150% of Rated Steam Flow	2(3)	B
Main Steam Line Low Pressure	MS-PS-134, A,B,C,&D	> 825 psig	2(5)	B
High Drywell Pressure	PC-PS-12, A,B,C,&D	< 2 psig	2(4)	A or B
High Reactor Pressure	RR-PS-128 A & B	< 75 psig	1	D
Main Condenser Low Vacuum	MS-PS-103, A,B,C,&D	> 7" Hg (7)	2	A or B
Reactor Water Cleanup System High Flow	RWCU-dPIS-170 A & B	< 200% of System Flow	1	C

3.2 BASES: (Cont'd)

and the guidelines of 10CFR100 will not be exceeded. For large breaks up to the complete circumferential break of a 28-inch recirculation line and with the trip setting given above, CSCS initiation and primary system isolation are initiated in time to meet the above criteria. Reference Paragraph VI.5.3.1 USAR.

The high drywell pressure instrumentation is a diverse signal for malfunctions to the water level instrumentation and in addition to initiating CSCS, it causes isolation of Group 2 and 6 isolation valves. For the breaks discussed above, this instrumentation will generally initiate CSCS operation before the low-low-low water level instrumentation; thus the results given above are applicable here also. The water level instrumentation initiates protection for the full spectrum of loss-of-coolant accidents and causes isolation of all isolation valves except Groups 4 and 5.

Venturis are provided in the main steam lines as a means of measuring steam flow and also limiting the loss of mass inventory from the vessel during a steam line break accident. The primary function of the instrumentation is to detect a break in the main steam line. For the worst case of accident, main steam line break outside the drywell, a trip setting of 150% of rated steam flow in conjunction with the flow limiters and main steam line valve closure, limits the mass inventory loss such that fuel is not uncovered, fuel clad temperatures peak at approximately 1000°F and release of radioactivity to the environs is below 10CFR100 guidelines. Reference Section XIV.6.5 USAR.

Temperature monitoring instrumentation is provided in the main steam tunnel and along the steam line in the turbine building to detect leaks in these areas. Trips are provided on this instrumentation and when exceeded, cause closure of isolation valves. See Spec. 3.7 for Valve Group. The setting is 200°F for the main steam leak detection system. For large breaks, the high steam flow instrumentation is a backup to the temp. instrumentation.

High radiation monitors in the main steam tunnel have been provided to detect gross fuel failure as in the control rod drop accident. With the established setting of 3 times normal background, and main steam line isolation valve closure, fission product release is limited so that 10CFR100 guidelines are not exceeded for this accident. Reference Section XIV.6.2 USAR.

Pressure instrumentation is provided to close the main steam isolation valves in RUN Mode when the main steam line pressure drops below Specification 2.1.A.6. The Reactor Pressure Vessel thermal transient due to an inadvertent opening of the turbine bypass valves when not in the RUN Mode is less severe than the loss of feedwater analyzed in Section XIV.5 of the USAR, therefore, closure of the Main Steam Isolation valves for thermal transient protection when not in RUN mode is not required.

The Reactor Water Cleanup System high flow and temperature instrumentation are arranged similar to that for the HPCI. The trip settings are such that core uncover is prevented and fission product release is within limits.