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At approximately 0950 CST on 02/13/86 the Unit was in steady state operation at 2062 MWt (approximately 85% of rated thermal power). At that time, plant personnel were performing the 18-month High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) steam line differential pressure transmitter calibration of transmitter 2E41-N057B per the "HPCI STEAM LINE DELTA P TRANSMITTER FT&C" procedure (57SV-E41-003-2) when operations personnel noted that the HPCI steam supply outboard isolation valve (2E41-F003) had isolated. This represented an unplanned actuation of an Engineered Safety Feature(ESF). The HPCI steam supply outboard isolation valve(2E41-F003) was re-opened at approximately 1010 CST on 02/13/86. The ESF actuation occurred as a result of an unplanned isolation signal from differential pressure transmitter 2E41-N057B. The isolation signal from transmitter 2E41-N057B caused trip unit 2E41-N657B to actuate and isolate valve 2E41-F003 per design. Thus, this event had no adverse effect on plant safety or the health and safety of the public. An investigation determined that the unplanned isolation signal was due to procedure 57SV-E41-003-2 being defective in that it did not require electrical link JJ32 (inside control panel 2H1-P926) to be opened prior to performing	YE	s (If yes, c	ompleti	EXPE	CTED S	UBM	1155101	VDAT	E)			-	XN	5						SUBMISS	ION		ï		1	
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LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION

U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION APPROVED OMB NO. 3150-0104

EXPIRES 8/31/85	EXPIRES 8/31	/85
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FACILITY NAME (1)	DOCKET NUMBER (2)	LER NUMBER (6)	PAGE (3)		
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On 02/13/86 at approximately 0950 CST, an unplanned actuation of an Engineered Safety Feature (isolation of High Pressure Coolant Injection primary containment outboard isolation valve) occurred. This event is reportable pursuant to 10CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv).

Unit 2 was in steady state operation at 2062 MWt (approximately 85% of rated thermal power). Plant personnel were performing the 18-month High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) steam line differential pressure calibration of transmitter 2E41-N057B.

At approximately 0950 CST on 02/13/86, plant personnel were performing the 18-month HPCI steam line differential pressure transmitter calibration of transmitter 2E41-N057B per procedure 57SV-E41-003-2, "HPCI STEAM LINE DELTA P TRANSMITTER FT&C", when operations personnel noted that the HPCI steam supply primary containment outboard isolation valve (2E41-F003) had isolated. The isolation valve (2E41-F003) was re-opened at approximately 1010 CST on 02/13/86.

The ESF actuation occurred as a result of an unplanned isolation signal from differential pressure transmitter 2E41-N057B. The isolation signal from transmitter 2E41-N057B caused trip unit 2E41-N657B to actuate and isolate valve 2E41-F003 per design.

There have been no past similiar events.

An investigation determined that this event was caused by a defective procedure. Procedure 57SV-E41-003-2 was defective in that it did not require electrical link JJ32 (inside control room panel 2H11-P926) to be opened prior to performing the calibration of differential pressure transmitter 2E41-N057B. Consequently, when the transmitter was calibrated, an unplanned isolation signal was sent to HPCI isolation valve 2E41-F003.

After further investigation, the cause of the defective procedure was determined to be an incomplete drawing. Elementary drawing H-27667 (which did not show electrical link JJ32) was used as the reference for writing procedure 57SV-E41-003-2. Consequently, the electrical link was not included in the procedure as one of those to be opened prior to performing the calibration on transmitters 2E41-N057A and 2E41-N057B. The procedure required link JJ30 to be opened which per the elementary diagram would have correctly isolated the instrument.

Control room panel 2H11-P926 (where link JJ32 is located) was recently installed as part of the analog transmitter trip system (ATTS). Differential pressure transmitters 2E41-N057A and 2E41-N057B were calibrated per procedure 57SV-E41-003-2 on 07/22/84. However, at that time the Unit was shutdown for refueling and recirculation piping repair with the reactor vessel head removed. The valve (2E41-F003) auto-isolates with low reactor pressure. Thus, the procedure defect would not have been apparent at that time.

NRC Form 368A

NRC Form 366A (9-83)	LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION APPROVED OMB NO. 3150-0104 EXPIRES: 8/31/85										
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TEXT (If more space is required, use additional NRC Form 366A's) (17)

The isolation signal from transmitter 2E41-N057B caused trip unit 2E41-N657B to actuate and isolate valve 2E41-F003 per design. Other systems (Low Pressure Coolant Injection, Automatic Depressurization, Core Spray, and Reactor Core Isolation Cooling) required to be operable by Technical Specifications following loss of HPCI were available at the time of this event. Thus, this event had no adverse effect on plant safety or the health and safety of the public.

Plant personnel discontinued using the calibration portion of procedure 57SV-E41-003-2 after determining that the procedure was defective. Subsequently, a new procedure (57SV-CAL-003-2S), "ATTS TRANSMITTER CHANNEL CALIBRATION", was written to provide a correct calibration procedure for ATTS transmitters. Differential pressure transmitter 2E41-N057A was then satisfactorily calibrated per procedure 57SV-CAL-003-2 on 02/25/86. This new procedure (57SV-CAL-002-2S) should prevent recurrence of this type event.

An as-built notice (ABN) will be generated by the Hatch engineering department to correct the system elementary drawing to show the same circuitry as the electrical wiring diagrams. Georgia Power Company 333 Pledmont Avenue Atlanta, Georgia 30308 Telephone 404 526-6526

Mailing Address Post Office Box 4545 Atlanta, Georgia 30302

L. T. Gucwa Manager Nuclear Safety and Licensing



SL-486 0166C

March 14, 1986

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Document Control Desk Washington, D. C. 20555

Attached is Licensee Event Report 50-366/1986-007. This report meets the reporting requirements of 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv).

Very truly yours,

William & Burn / for

L. T. Gucwa

EBS/1c

Attachment

c: Mr. J. T. Beckham, Jr. Mr. H. C. Nix, Jr. NRC-Region II GO-NORMS