

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

FACILITY NAME (1) <b>SAN ONOFRE NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION, UNIT 3</b>	DOCKET NUMBER (2) <b>0 5 0 0 0 3 6 2</b>	PAGE (3) <b>1 OF 0 2</b>
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TITLE (4)  
**CORE PROTECTION CALCULATOR CHANNEL 'D' FUNCTIONAL TEST NOT PERFORMED**

EVENT DATE (5)			LER NUMBER (6)			REPORT DATE (7)			OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED (8)		
MONTH	D-Y	YEAR	YEAR	SEG. NUMBER	REV. NUMBER	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	FACILITY NAMES		DOCKET NUMBER(S)
0 2	1 2	8 6	8 6	0 0 2	0 0	0 3	1 4	8 6			0 5 0 0 0
DOCKET NUMBER(S) 0 5 0 0 0											

OPERATING MODE (9) <b>1</b>	THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR §: (Check one or more of the following) (11)									
POWER LEVEL (10) <b>1 0 0</b>	<input type="checkbox"/> 20.402(b)	<input type="checkbox"/> 20.405(c)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(iv)	<input type="checkbox"/> 73.71(b)						
	<input type="checkbox"/> 20.405(a)(1)(i)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.36(c)(1)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(v)	<input type="checkbox"/> 73.71(c)						
	<input type="checkbox"/> 20.405(a)(1)(ii)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.36(c)(2)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(vii)	OTHER (Specify in Abstract below and in Text, NRC Form 366A)						
	<input type="checkbox"/> 20.405(a)(1)(iii)	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(i)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A)							
	<input type="checkbox"/> 20.405(a)(1)(iv)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(ii)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B)							
<input type="checkbox"/> 20.405(a)(1)(v)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(iii)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(ix)								

LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12)		TELEPHONE NUMBER	
NAME	AREA CODE		
<b>H. E. MORGAN, STATION MANAGER</b>	<b>7 1 4</b>	<b>3 6 8 - 6 2 4 1</b>	

COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (13)

CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NPDPS	CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NPDPS

SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (14)		EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE (15)	MONTH	DAY	YEAR
<input type="checkbox"/> YES (If yes, complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE)	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> NO				

Abstract (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e., approximately fifteen single-space typewritten lines) (16)

On 2/12/86 at 0920, with Unit 3 at 100% and Core Protection Calculator (CPC) Channel 'A' in bypass, CPC 'D' was declared inoperable based on the determination that a required channel functional test had not been performed. As a result, with CPC 'A' and 'D' inoperable, Limiting Condition for Operation (LCO) 3.3.1, Action 3, which requires one of the inoperable channels to be placed in bypass and the other inoperable channel in the trip condition within 1 hour, was exceeded. Immediately upon discovery of the missed test, CPC 'A' was tripped and CPC 'D' was bypassed. There is no safety significance to this event since subsequent testing determined that CPC 'D' remained capable of performing its intended safety function during the event.

On 2/11/86, a Work Authorization Request (WAR) was initiated to perform troubleshooting on CPC 'D'. The computer technician performing the troubleshooting reloaded CPC 'D' software thereby performing a repair activity. Retest requirements specify a 31-day channel functional test to establish CPC operability for repairs to CPC. When the WAR was released to Operations, neither the computer technician releasing the WAR nor the licensed operator accepting the release ensured that the specific condition of operability was addressed. As a result, the WAR was not revised to add the functional test as a retest requirement.

As corrective action, a memorandum was issued to all computer group personnel stressing the importance of clearly recording on the WAR any required operability test and the status of equipment being released to Operations. The WAR process has been changed to include a new form for the computer group to clearly indicate equipment status when releasing equipment.

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)  
TEXT CONTINUATION

FACILITY NAME (1)  SAN ONOFRE NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION, UNIT 3	DOCKET NUMBER (2)  0 5 0 0 0 3 6 2	LER NUMBER (6)			PAGE (3)	
		YEAR	SEQ. NUMBER	REV. NUMBER		
		8 6	0 0 2	0 0	0 2	OF 0 2

TEXT (If more space is required, use additional NRC Form 366A's) (17)

On February 12, 1986, at 0650, with Unit 3 operating at 100% power and Core Protection Calculator (CPC) Channel 'D' in bypass for troubleshooting, CPC Channel 'A' failed causing the channel to trip. At 0715, a channel check was satisfactorily performed on CPC 'D' and was declared operable and placed in service, while CPC 'A' was placed in bypass. At 0900, the computer technician who performed the CPC 'D' troubleshooting, notified the Unit 3 Control Room Supervisor that the software for CPC 'D' had been reloaded and as a result, a 31-day channel functional test was required to have established CPC 'D' operability.

With CPC Channels 'A' and 'D' inoperable (Channels 'B' and 'C' operable), Limiting Condition for Operation (LCO) 3.3.1, Action 3 requires one of the inoperable channels to be placed in bypass and the other inoperable channel in the tripped condition within 1 hour. At 0920, in accordance with Technical Specification requirements, CPC 'A' was placed in the tripped condition and CPC 'D' was placed in bypass. As a result of not performing the required retest for CPC 'D', a period of greater than 2 hours elapsed before the appropriate channels were bypassed/tripped, and therefore the 1-hour action statement of LCO 3.3.1, Action 3 was exceeded. At 1005, the 31-day channel functional test was satisfactorily performed and CPC 'D' was declared operable and placed in service, and CPC 'A' was again placed in bypass. There is no safety significance to this event since subsequent testing determined that CPC 'D' remained capable of performing its intended function during the event.

Retest requirements are established through the equipment control/work authorization process. After CPC 'D' spuriously tripped on 2/11/86, the channel was placed in bypass and a "Work Authorization Request" (WAR) was initiated to perform troubleshooting and repairs if necessary. The computer technician performing the investigation found no cause for the tripped condition. He reloaded the software and released the WAR to Operations. He then reported that no problems were identified and that CPC 'D' should be left in bypass for a 24-hour period for observation. Since reloading of the software constituted a repair activity, a 31-day channel functional test was required prior to declaring CPC 'D' operable. The licensed operator accepting the WAR release, unaware that a repair was made due to a miscommunication, believed that CPC 'D' only required a channel check to establish operability. Neither the computer technician releasing the WAR, nor the licensed operator accepting the release, ensured that the specific condition of operability was clearly understood and identified on the WAR, contrary to procedures.

As corrective action, a memorandum was issued to all computer group personnel stressing the importance of clearly recording on the WAR any required operability test and the status of equipment being released to Operations. The WAR process has been changed to include a new form for the computer group to clearly indicate equipment status when the equipment is released to Operations. A Special Order has been issued to Operations requiring this form to be implemented; the Special Order will remain in effect until it is determined whether any changes to equipment control procedures are warranted.



*Southern California Edison Company*

SAN ONOFRE NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION

P. O. BOX 128

SAN CLEMENTE, CALIFORNIA 92672

H. E. MORGAN  
STATION MANAGER

TELEPHONE  
(714) 368-6241

March 14, 1986

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
Document Control Desk  
Washington, D.C. 20555

Subject: Docket No. 50-362  
30-Day Report  
Licensee Event Report No. 86-002  
San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station, Unit 3

Pursuant to 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i), this submittal provides the required 30-day written Licensee Event Report (LER) for an occurrence involving Reactor Protective Instrumentation. Neither the health and safety of plant personnel nor the health and safety of the public was affected by this event.

If you require any additional information, please so advise.

Sincerely,

Enclosure: LER No. 86-002

cc: F. R. Huey (USNRC Senior Resident Inspector, Units 1, 2 and 3)

J. B. Martin (Regional Administrator, USNRC Region V)

Institute of Nuclear Power Operations (INPO)

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