

EPRI TR-107286 April 1997



BWR Vessel and Internals Project

BWR Standby Liquid Control System/Core Plate ∆P Inspection and Flaw Evaluation Guidelines (BWRVIP-27)

Prepared by BWR Vessel and Internals Project Assessment Committee Standby Liquid Control Inspection and Evaluation Focus Group

GE Nuclear Energy

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REPORT SUMMARY

BWRVIP Vessel and Internals Project

BWR Standby Liquid Control System/Core Plate ΔP Inspection and Flaw Evaluation Guidelines (BWRVIP-27)

The Boiling Water Reactor Vessel and Internals Project (BWRVIP), formed in June, 1994, is an association of utilities focused exclusively on BWR vessel and internals issues. This BWRVIP report defines inspection requirements for BWR Standby Liquid Control (SLC) system piping from the vessel nozzle safe-end inward.

INTEREST CATEGORIES

Piping, reactor, vessel & internals Licensing and safety assessment

KEYWORDS

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Boiling water reactor Inspection strategy Standby liquid control Stress corrosion cracking Vessel and internals **BACKGROUND** Cracking due to intergranular stress corrosion cracking (IGSCC) has been observed in a number of internal components in domestic and overseas BWRs. Utilities require a standardized methodology which is accepted by regulators for performing inspections and for evaluating the consequences of any observed cracking.

OBJECTIVE To develop a generic inspection strategy for BWR SLC piping.

APPROACH A group of utility and industry experts evaluated available data, including IGSCC experience, to develop generic Guidelines. This information was used to identify the weld locations on the SLC piping (from the vessel safe-end inward) which could be susceptible to cracking. The consequences of cracking at each of the locations was assessed and, based on those results, generic inspection recommendations were developed.

RESULTS The report concludes that the integrity of the piping internal to the vessel is not critical to safety. However, it is critical that the vessel nozzle integrity be maintained such that sodium pentaborate can always be injected into the vessel with only minor loss due to leakage. Consequently, inspection requirements concentrate on inspection of the nozzle and safe-end weids. It is recommended that for most configurations, the current ASME inspection requirements be followed. For some configurations, however, an additional ultrasonic (UT) examination is recommended.

EPRI PERSPECTIVE It is the intent that, for BWRVIP members, these Guidelines will be followed in place of prior GE Services Information Letters (SILs). It is further intended that these Guidelines will be submitted to the US NRC and, possibly, non-US regulators for their approval. Regulatory acceptance of these Guidelines will significantly reduce the utility effort required to obtain approval for plant-specific programs.

PROJECT

B310 EPRI Project Manager: Robert G. Carter Nuclear Power Group Contractor: General Electric

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BWR Standby Liquid Control System/Core Plate △P Inspection and Flaw Evaluation Guidelines (BWRVIP-27)

TR-107286 Research Project B301

Final Report, April, 1997

Prepared by:

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Executive Summary

In the BWRVIP-06 safety assessment, there are several components where extensive degradation can be tolerated because of the redundancy provided by the Standby Liquid Control (SLC) System. Therefore, the successful function of the SLC system is important to achieve reactor shutdown. A number of failures are readily detectable, but even without detection of cracking the SLC system would function adequately when initiated as long as the boron is injected into the bottom head. Therefore, the focus of the evaluations in these guidelines is on the region where the $\Delta P/SLC$ housing or nozzle penetrates the vessel bottom head.

The objective of these guidelines is to show that boron can be successfully injected into the bottom head under the worst credible cracking conditions because the line to the vessel will not fail in a way that the external pipe is ejected from the vessel. Each of the nine penetration design types in BWR/2-6 is presented and a basis is provided to support the conclusion that the $\Delta P/SLC$ housing or nozzle will not be ejected as a result of potential cracking of the penetration weld. Further, such cracking would result in pressure boundary leakage, which would be detected and allow for an orderly shutdown.

Based on the conclusion that a $\Delta P/SLC$ housing or nozzle cannot be ejected, and the detectability of significant cracking of the penetration weld, the guidelines recommend that the inspection requirements currently in ASME Section XI continue to be followed for penetration welds.

For the plants where a stainless steel safe end is welded to the $\Delta P/SLC$ low alloy steel nozzle, and the plants where a stainless steel safe end extension is welded to the Alloy 600 $\Delta P/SLC$ housing, UT is recommended for SCC-susceptible regions.

ABOUT BWRVIP

The BWR Vessel and Internals Project (BWRVIP) is an association of utilities owning and operating boiling water reactors. The project is focused exclusively on reactor vessel and vessel internals issues in operating plants. Objectives of the BWRVIP are to lead the BWR industry toward generic resolution of vessel and internals integrity and operability issues; to identify or develop generic, cost-effective strategies from which each operating plant will select the most appropriate alternative; to serve as the focal point for the regulatory interface with the industry on BWR vessel and internals integrity and operability issues; and to share information among members. EPRI manages the technical program on behalf of the utility members of the BWRVIP.

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