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occurred approximately six hours earlier. Upon investigation it was determined that hand held radios most likely caused spurious signals in the tone relaying transfer trip receivers of the preferred station transformers. Corrective action is being taken in an effort to minimize the probability of recurrence. This event did not affect the TE2.2

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Sequence of Events:

On 01/01/86 at 0941 with the unit in operational condition 3 (hot shutdown) and cooling down from a reactor trip which occurred approximately six hours earlier (reference LER 86-001), preferred station transformers 'A' and 'C' tripped. Recirculation pump 'A' tripped, the operating condensate pump tripped, and the Reactor Water Cleanup (RWCU) system isolated. Reactor Protection System (RPS) bus 'A' de-energized initiating a half scram and partial Nuclear Steam Supply Shutoff System (NSSSS) isolation. The partial NSSSS isolation caused an instrument air isolation to the Reactor Building which caused the scram valves to leak filling the Scram Discharge Volume (SDV). This subsequently resulted in an RPS actuation on high SDV level at 0957. Upon the preferred station transformer trips Division I and III diesel generators started, Division I emergency ventilation systems autostarted, and standby service water pumps 1SWP*P2A, B, C, and D load sequenced. N rmal service water pump SWP-P1B and circulating water pump CWS P1B were still running but without bearing cooling water since bearing cooling water pump BCS-P1A had lost power. At 1001 the Main Steam Isolation Valves (MSIVs) automatically isolated due to decreasing condenser vacuum.

At 1003 operators were dispatched and attempted to recover de-energized load centers. At 1031 RPS bus 'A' was reset. Later, panel 1SCM*PNL01A was discovered de-energized due to a blown fuse in LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION

US NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION APPROVED OMB NU 3150-0104

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Text // more seener a request of a second MAC form REAL (IT) transformer ISCM*XRC14A1. This caused several Control Building HVAC (HVC) and Fuel Building HVAC (HVF) dampers to close which caused the Division I Control Iding chiller (HVK) to trip. Subsequent attempts to restore operation of HVK chillers 'B' and 'D' were also unsuccessful. The partial NSSSS isolation remained sealed in because of de-energized panel ISCM*PNL01A.

The RPS actuation was reset at 1042. At 1044, approximately one hour after the initiating event, preferred station transformers 'B' and 'D' tripped. The station was now in a complete loss of offsite power (LOP). The Division II diesel generator started and sequenced properly. An Unusual Event was immediately declared and Abnormal Operating Procedures (AOP) 004, 005, 0010 and 0042 were initiated. Reactor Water level was +80 inches on the shutdown range and pressure was at 240 psig.

At 1114 the half RPS actuation was reset and power to RPS bus 'B' was restored. At 1124 the preferred station transformers were energized, but the supply breakers to the plant could not be closed. It was determined that breaker closure was locked out by the tone relaying transfer trip (fiber optic) system which could not be reset. At 1130 this backup system was disabled and the breakers were closed. All in house loads were restored and the Unusual Event ended after an hour and ten minute duration. The plant was stabilized.

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Investigation:

In an effort to determine the cause of the transformer trips an investigation of the protective relaying was conducted and revealed that no protective relaying targets were initiated. It was further determined that the trip signals sent to the lockout relays could only have been initiated by a spurious signal in the backup pilot wire or tone relaying transfer trip circuits. Functional and diagnostic testing of both the pilot wire and tone relaying circuits showed that both systems were operating as designed at the time of testing.

As a result of this testing two items were noted. First, spurious trips could be generated on the tone relaying system with hand held radios in close proximity (within approximately a 10-12 foot radius) of the transmitters/receivers. Second, some of the tone relaying keying and rack power were supplied from two separate battery sources. Although no spurious trips could be simulated by testing, this type of connection could result in transients within the tone relaying equipment. It was decided to correct the wiring in the field such that keying and rack power were supplied by the same battery source.

The two types of hand held radios tested were the 4 watt, 150 MHz Motorola and 5 watt, 450 MHz Motorola. Both are commonly used on site by security and operations personnel. Both of these radios were keyed to transmit inside the control building of the Fancy Point switchyard and both caused spurious trips on the tone relaying system. Also

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in the tone relaying system. After careful consideration it was concluded with high probability that the LOP was caused by radio frequency interference.

Also investigated was the difficulty in resetting the lockout relays. Because of the complexity of the tone relaying and pilot wire tripping circuitry, the resetting of the lockout relays must be performed in the proper sequence. It was determined that operations procedures did not address the required sequence.

Corrective Actions:

As a result of this event several corrective actions have been completed or are in progress. These corrective actions include:

- 1. Installation of shielding on the tone relaying equipment in the Fancy Point switchyard. Shielding of the equipment in the plant is not required because the equipment is enclosed in a reinforced concrete r or 'ith locked doors and a sign restricting the use of radios on control door. This activity is presently scheduled for completion by 02/12/86.
- Rewiring the tone equipment such that both channels are required for tripping. At the time of the event if one channel had a loss

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION

US NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION APPROVED OMB NO 1150-0104

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of guard and the other channel had a trip signal the transfer trip would have been initiated. This wiring change provides increased reliability to help prevent spurious tripping. Temporary Alterations were installed. This design change (MR 86-0081) is scheduled for completion prior to the planned 35 percent power scram at the conclusion of test condition 2.

- 3. Changing DC power supplies to tone relaying equipment such that the keying and rack power are both supplied from the same DC source. Temporary Alterations were installed. The design change (MR 86-0026) is scheduled for completion prior to the planned 35 percent scram at the conclusion of test condition 2.
- 4. Installation of sequence of event recorders in the switchyard and at the generator/transformers protective relaying panel. This requires the completion of two design modifications (MR 86-0027 and MR 86-0098). The final installation of these recorders is to be completed during an outage just after the planned 35 percent power scram.
- 5. Installation of additional drainage reactors at the plant end of the pilot wire shielding. This design change (MR 86-0093) is scheduled for completion prior to the planned 35 percent scram at the conclusion of test condition 2.
- 6. Installation of Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) system alarms to provide annunciation in the main control room and

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
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at the Government St	reet transmission a	and distribution	control	
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This is scheduled	for completion on	02/05/86. Add	ditional	
capabilities for monito	oring trip and loss of	of guard signals	will be	
added (MR 86-0094) u	pon receipt of alar	m cards by approx	kimately	
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- 7. Training personnel on the restricted use of radios. Signs have been posted in the Fancy Point switchyard pr ibiting the use of radios in the control building. Signs have also been posted on the doors of the room in the turbine building which houses the tone relaying equipment. Letters have been sent to Security, Operations, Maintenance, and Transmission and Distribution personnel informing them of the radio use restrictions. This action is complete.
- 8. Training operations personnel on the resetting of lockouts, including necessary procedural changes and the posting of operator aids. Operator aids have been posted. Operators are presently undergoing requalification and will be trained on protective relaying, tone relaying, and pilot wire relaying including the proper resetting of the lockout relays. This process is presently scheduled to be completed on or before 03/28/86.
- 9. A procedure for the periodic testing of the tone relaying equipment and the proper operation of the sequence of event

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to the planned 35 perc	cent scram at t	the conclusion of	test
condition 2.			

Safety Assessment:

There were no safety consequences to the public as a result of this event. The safety implications of a loss of offsite power are however, clearly recognized and it is for this reason that the above corrective actions are being taken.



RIVER BEND CATION POST OFFICE BOX 220 ST FRANCISVILLE, LOUISIANA 70775 AREA CODE 504 635-6094 346-8651

> February 4, 1986 RBG-23104 File Nos. G9.5, G9.25.1.3

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Document Control Desk Washington, D. C. 20555

Dear Sir:

River Bend Station - Unit 1 Docket No. 50-458

Please find enclosed Licensee Event Report No. 86-002 for River Bend Station - Unit 1. This report is submitted pursuant to 10CFR50.73.

Sincerely,

J.E Booky

J. E. Booker Manager-Engineering, Nuclear Fuels & Licensing River Bend Nuclear Group

JEB/TFP/DRG/BEH/amg

cc: U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 611 Ryan Plaza, Suite 1000 Arlington, TX 76011

> INPO Records Center 1100 Circle 75 Parkway Atlanta, GA 30339-3064